*1 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Randall J. May's Motion to Compel (“Motion”) (Dkt. 19). For the reasons stated below, the Motion is denied.

On March 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that Defendant Delta Air Lines discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (“ADA”). (Dkt. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to accommodate his disability and harassed him. (Id. at 4-6.) In particular, he alleges that he requested a reasonable accommodation of a schedule modification for his disability and that his request was denied on July 2, 2018. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff further alleges that after he provided Defendant with access to his mental health medical records, he was “accused of making a terroristic type threat”; “was interrogated and harassed” by one of Defendant's corporate security officers, who told him “you need to have your meds checked”; and was stripped of his credentials and “escorted/forced off” the property, all on July 2, 2018. (Id. at 5-6.) He also alleges that Defendant sent him a fraudulently backdated letter on October 9, 2018, after he filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $2,600,000. (Id. at 7.)

After a Rule 16 conference on July 15, 2021, the Court entered a Pretrial Scheduling Order setting, among other things, a fact discovery deadline of March 31, 2022. (Dkt 11; Dkt. 12 at 2.) On July 31, 2021, Plaintiff served his Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures identifying the individuals likely to have information that he may use to support his claims and defenses. (Dkt. 22-1.) He did not identify Defendant's Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), Edward Bastian, in his Initial Disclosures. (Id.) On July 23, 2021, Plaintiff sought the depositions of several of Defendant's employees, including Bastian, and served deposition notices for those employees in August 2021. (Dkt. 19 at 1; Dkt. 22-2 (deposition notices).) Defendant objected to Bastian's deposition. (Dkt. 19 at 1-2.) This Motion followed.

Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the scope of discovery:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

While Rule 26 contemplates a liberal scope of discovery, this Court “possess[es] considerable discretion in determining the need for, and form of, discovery....” In re Nat'l Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 120 F. Supp. 3d 942, 949 (D. Minn. 2015) (citations omitted). Further, as set forth above, information sought in discovery must be “proportional to the needs of the case” as well as relevant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “In determining proportionality, courts consider numerous factors, including ‘the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to the relevant information, the parties’ resources, and importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.’ ” Beseke v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 17-CV-4971-DWF-KMM, 2018 WL 6040016, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 18, 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). To this end, a court upon a motion or on its own “must” limit discovery, when the discovery is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive,” if “the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action” or if the discovery is outside of the scope of Rule 26(b)(1). SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii).

*2 In his Motion to Compel, Plaintiff asks the Court to require Bastian's deposition because Bastian is the CEO of Defendant, and based on Google's definition of a CEO as “the highest ranking person in a company or other institution, ultimately responsible for making managerial decisions.” (Id. at 2 (emphasis removed).) Plaintiff also argues that Bastian was included and involved in the dispute as follows:

(Dkt. 19 at 2; see also Dkt. 20 at 5-9 (October 25-26, 2018 email correspondence).) The Senior Vice President of Human Resources then forwarded the email to Melissa Seppings, the Director of Equal Opportunity and Compliance, with the request “Please handle,” and Seppings said she would do so. (Dkt. 20 at 4-5.)

Plaintiff further argues that Bastian, as the CEO, is accountable for company culture, and that Bastian's decision to forward the email to the Senior VP of Human Resources was a dismissal of his email that set the tone that “Discrimination, Interrogation, Hostility and Harassment are acceptable at Delta Air Lines and therefore he needs to be held accountable through Deposition for guiding a company in violation of the Federal Law of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended.” (Dkt. 19 at 3.) Plaintiff argues that the Senior VP of Human Resource's conduct in forwarding the email to Seppings with an “errant command” of “[p]lease handle” indicates that “[t]here was no worry about the violation of federal law or the fact that an employee with a Disability had been treated atrociously.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that Bastian “may have the most information as to why lower level management thought Discrimination based on Disability was acceptable” and that Bastian's status as CEO does not exempt him from federal law. (Id.)

Defendant argues that the Motion should be denied because Plaintiff has not shown that Bastian has personal knowledge of relevant facts or unique knowledge relevant to this action; (2) Bastian's deposition is not proportional to the needs of the case; and (3) Plaintiff's demand to depose Bastian is barred by applicable law governing depositions of executives at the “apex” of corporations.[1] (Dkt. 21 at 1-2.)

*3 “While there is no rule precluding the depositions of top corporate executives, ‘courts frequently restrict efforts to depose senior executives where the party seeking the deposition can obtain the same information through a less intrusive means, or where the party has not established that the executive has some unique knowledge pertinent to the issues in the case.’ ” Schwendimann v. Arkwright Advanced Coating, Inc., No. CV 11-820 (ADM/JSM), 2016 WL 6916838, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2016) (quoting Cardenas v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Civ. No. 99-1421 (JRT/FLN), 2003 WL 21293757 at *1 (D. Minn. May 16, 2003)). “Under the ‘apex doctrine,’ high-ranking executives of a corporate party are protected from depositions unless: (1) the executive has unique or special knowledge of the facts at issue; and (2) other less burdensome avenues for obtaining the information sought have been exhausted.” Hanson v. Loparex Inc., No. 09-CV-1070 (MJD/SRN), 2010 WL 11432148, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 27, 2010). “This is because when the discovery to be obtained is through the deposition of a senior executive, a court must remain mindful that permitting unfettered discovery of corporate executives would threaten disruption of their business and could serve as a potent tool for harassment in litigation.” 3M Co. v. ACS Indus., Inc., No. CV 15-1889 (PAM/JSM), 2016 WL 9308317, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 10, 2016) (cleaned up). Accordingly, “in addition to analyzing whether less invasive means may be available to obtain the information, courts have generally restricted parties from deposing high-ranking officials because (by virtue of their position) they are vulnerable to numerous, repetitive, harassing, and abusive depositions, and therefore need some measure of protection from the courts.” Hanson, 2010 WL 11432148, at *2 (cleaned up).

Here, Plaintiff has not established that Bastian has “some unique knowledge pertinent to the issues in the case.” Based on the record, Bastian was not involved in the decision to deny Plaintiff his requested accommodation, comment on Plaintiff's mental health, remove his credentials, escort him off the premises, or any other decision on which Plaintiff's claims are based. The only connection between Bastian and Plaintiff is the fact that Plaintiff sent Bastian one email relating to his claims on October 25, 2018—months after the incidents on July 2, 2018 that gave rise to Plaintiff's claims—and Bastian forwarded that email without comment to Defendant's Senior VP of Human Resources. (Dkt. 20 at 5-9.) This is insufficient to establish that Bastian has any unique or special knowledge of the facts of the case. Indeed, Plaintiff did not identify Bastian in his Initial Disclosures. (Dkt. 22-1.) Plaintiff asserts that Bastian “may have the most information as to why lower level management thought Discrimination based on Disability was acceptable.” (Dkt. 19 at 3 (emphasis added).) This speculation is insufficient to justify Bastian's deposition. Further, Plaintiff has not shown that he cannot obtain the rationale for lower level management's conduct through other means, including the depositions he has noticed of employees involved in the July 2, 2018 incidents and subsequent events, to which Delta apparently does not object.[2] (See Dkt. 22-2 at 4-13; Dkt. 21 at 10.) Plaintiff has sufficient time to depose these individuals before fact discovery ends on March 31, 2022.

Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that Bastian “needs to be held accountable through Deposition” for Defendant's alleged violations of the ADA. (Id.) This suggests that Plaintiff seeks Bastian's deposition for punitive reasons rather than because Bastian has information relevant to a claim or defense in this action, which is the type of conduct the “apex” doctrine is intended to prevent. See 3M, 2016 WL 9308317, at *2 (noting that depositions of senior executives “could serve as a potent tool for harassment in litigation”) (cleaned up); Hanson, 2010 WL 11432148, at *2 (recognizing that “high-ranking officials ... (by virtue of their position) ... are vulnerable to numerous, repetitive, harassing, and abusive depositions, and therefore need some measure of protection from the courts”) (quotation marks omitted).

*4 Finally, given the fact that Bastian's only connection with Plaintiff's claims is the receipt and forwarding of an email in October 2018, months after the July 2018 conduct at issue, renders Bastian's deposition disproportionate to the needs of the case due to the burden the deposition would impose and the minimal importance, if any, of his deposition in resolving Plaintiff's claims of failure to accommodate and harassment. SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). For all of these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion.

Based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT: Plaintiff Randall J. May's Motion to Compel (Dkt. 19) is DENIED.

Depositions of high-level executives, such as CEOs, are referred to as “apex” depositions. See, e.g., Bombardier Recreational Prod., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., No. 12-CV-2706 MJD/LIB, 2014 WL 5685463, at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 24, 2014), aff'd, 2014 WL 5685707 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2014).

Plaintiff served deposition notices for his former Manager (Kelly Patton), the Human Resources Manager (Leah Gajria), the Equal Opportunity Manager (Annelyse Sanders), the Department Manager at the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport (Steven Grenz), and the former corporate security officer he identified in his Complaint. (Dkt. 22-2 at 4-13.) Delta has also stated it does not object to the deposition of Seppings, who followed up on Plaintiff's email to Bastian. (Dkt. 21 at 10.)