*1 On December 3, 2020, Plaintiff David Nakhid filed a Motion to Compel Defendant American University to provide responses to certain written discovery requests and deposition testimony. Pl.’s Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 24 [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot.]. The court briefly addresses the substance of the motion below.

First, Plaintiff asks the court to compel production of additional documents in response to his Interrogatory No. 9 and his Request for Production No. 10. The interrogatory asks Defendant to identify any and all discrimination complaints made against or involving American University's Athletic Department or any employee of the Athletic Department, and to describe the disposition of such complaints. Pl. Mot., Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 24-1 [hereinafter Pl.’s Mem.], at 1; see also id., Ex. 1, ECF No. 24-2 [hereinafter Ex. 1], at 9. The request for production covers any documents relating to any complaints of discrimination asserted against the Athletic Department and any employee. Pl.’s Mem. at 1; Ex. 1 at 19. Defendant objects on the grounds of overbreadth, undue burden, and relevance. Def.’s Opp'n to Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 25 [hereinafter Def.’s Opp'n] at 2.

The court agrees with Defendant. “[W]hile claims of disparate treatment [by] necessity require discovery of how others have been treated, [the discovery] should be reasonably related to the circumstances involved in the alleged discrimination ... and the individuals who are allegedly involved in that conduct.” Kargbo v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 15-698 (RBW/GMH), 2016 WL 10998394, at *7 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); Pleasants v. Allbaugh, 208 F.R.D. 7, 9 (D.D.C. 2002) (stating the same). Despite its objections, Defendant conducted a search for complaints of race or national origin discrimination regarding the four individuals involved in the hiring for the Men's Soccer Head Coach Position (“Position”). See Def.’s Mem. at 2. It found nothing. Id. Moreover, it inquired whether “generalized complaints regarding the makeup of the Athletic Department ha[d] been raised during the relevant time period.” Id. at 3–4. It again found nothing.[1] Defendant thus has provided adequate responses to all relevant discovery regarding prior discrimination complaints. Because compelling Defendant to search for and produce complaints of discrimination made against the other 400-plus employees in the Athletic Department would have no bearing on the individuals and circumstances involved in Plaintiff's non-selection, Plaintiff's motion on this issue is denied.

*2 Second, Plaintiff asks the court to compel testimony from Brenda Harner, a Rule 30(b)(6) witness, regarding (1) specific aspects of Defendant's Affirmative Action Plan; and (2) whether Ms. Harner believed making an offer of employment to someone before the formal recruitment process for the Position had commenced would be inconsistent with Defendant's recruitment policies. Pl.’s Reply in Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 27 [hereinafter Pl.’s Reply], at 5–9. In response to both lines of questioning, Ms. Harner stated that she could not provide an answer, and Defendant objected on the grounds that the questioning fell outside the scope of the topics for which Ms. Harner was the University's designated witness. See Pl.’s Reply, Dep. of Brenda Harner, ECF No. 27-3 [hereinafter Harner Dep.], at 48:19–51:16, 98:6–104:2. Although Rule 30(b)(6) requires a designated witness to thoroughly educate herself on the noticed topic, “deponents are not required to be prepared to provide answers for questions outside of the scope of the deposition.” Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P. v. Sebelius, No. 11-0116 (ESH), 2013 WL 12313880, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 2013). Here, it is undisputed that Ms. Harner was the designated witness for Topic 2 (“Complaints concerning the selection process.”) and Topic 14 (“The investigation(s) of Plaintiff's complaint of discrimination.”). Def.’s Opp'n at 10. Neither topic encompassed Plaintiff's questions concerning the Affirmative Action Plan and recruitment/selection policies. In fact, Defendant had already designated Deadre Johnson to testify on behalf of the University as to its affirmative action efforts and its selection policies and practices. See id. at 8 n.5; id., Ex. 8, ECF No. 25-8, at 3. Because Plaintiff's questions are clearly outside the scope of Ms. Harner's deposition, the court will not compel her to testify further as to those issues. See Dist. Hosp., 2013 WL 12313880, at *6 (refusing to compel testimony).

Third, Plaintiff moves to compel testimony from Ms. Harner regarding her search and production of documents for discovery. Pl.’s Reply at 3–5. Defendant responds that that testimony would infringe on attorney-client privilege, Def.’s Opp'n at 13, but the court disagrees. Plaintiff's questions were not directed at any conversations or communications between Ms. Harner and Defendant's counsel; rather, they asked where Ms. Harner looked to obtain the documents responsive to Plaintiff's discovery requests. Harner Dep. at 24:21–25:6. Defendant provides no case law supporting its view that such questioning implicates privilege. And to the extent Defendant objects that the questions were outside the scope of Ms. Harner's designation, the court concludes that it would elevate form over substance to preclude a witness from testifying on background issues of which she has firsthand knowledge solely because her testimony came during a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Ms. Harner, who investigated Plaintiff's discrimination complaint, looked for responsive records, and Plaintiff is entitled to ask her how she located them. Thus, on this line of questioning, Plaintiff's motion to compel is granted.

Fourth, Plaintiff asks the court to order the identification and production of the documents Ms. Harner had in her physical possession during her deposition. Pl.’s Mem. at 8. Defendant objects that Ms. Harner already identified any documents she referenced during the deposition; that it immediately produced any of those documents that were not already produced; and that the identification and production of all documents to which Ms. Harner had access during the deposition (including those which she did not explicitly reference) would reveal only “what counsel believed to be relevant to Ms. Harner's designated topics.” Def.’s Opp'n at 14–15. The court again disagrees. Prior production aside, if the witness had attended an equivalent in-person deposition carrying and relying on the same set of 40 documents, Plaintiff could have required her to identify each of those documents on the record. Defendant cites no authority indicating that such an exercise would violate either attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine. Even if the documents collectively represent counsel's sense of what was relevant to Harner's testimony, Harner's decision to openly carry and review the documents during her deposition effectively waived any otherwise attendant privilege. See United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that “disclosing work product to a third party can waive protection if ‘such disclosure, under the circumstances, is inconsistent with the maintenance of secrecy from the disclosing party's adversary’ ” (citation omitted)). As a result, Plaintiff is entitled to the identification and production of all the documents to which Ms. Harner had access during her deposition.

*3 Fifth and finally, Plaintiff moves to compel production of Defendant's Affirmative Action Plan and any EEO-1 or IPEDs reports during the relevant period. Pl.’s Mem. at 9; Pl.’s Reply at 9–10. As for the Affirmative Action Plan, the court finds that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate relevance. Plaintiff asserts that the Plan's relevance turns on whether “the executive staff and other responsible officials were aware of the Athletic Department's shortcomings [with regard to the Plan's racial inclusion goals], yet refused to take action.” Pl.’s Mem. at 9. In other words, if the relevant decisionmakers knew about the Plan and disregarded it during the selection process, that would be “probative of intentional discrimination.” Id. But Plaintiff provides no evidence that any of the pertinent decisionmakers actually knew about the Plan in the first place. See Def.’s Opp'n at 9 & n.7 (noting that Plaintiff's counsel did not ask about the Plan); Pl.’s Reply at 9–10 (not disputing the point). Therefore, under Plaintiff's own theory of relevance, her demand to compel production of the Plan falls short.

Defendant has also already informed Plaintiff that it is not legally required to submit EEO-1 reports and therefore possesses no such reports. Def.’s Opp'n, Ex. 1, ECF No. 25-1, at 3. Plaintiff counters that because Defendant is a federal contractor, pursuant to 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7, it must submit EEO-1 reports annually. Pl.’s Reply at 10. Accordingly, in Plaintiff's view, either the representation that Defendant does not have EEO-1 reports “is inaccurate or Defendant is not in compliance with its obligations.” Id. Not necessarily. As the EEOC's website appears to confirm, certain “institutions of higher education” may be exempt from EEO-1 reporting requirements. See EEO-1: Who Must File, U.S. EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo-1-survey/eeo-1-who-must-file (last visited Dec. 29, 2020); EEO-1 Instruction Booklet, U.S. EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo-1-survey/eeo-1-instruction-booklet (last visited Dec. 29, 2020). Since Plaintiff has not provided enough evidence to overcome Defendant's representation that it is exempt from any EEO-1 reporting requirements, the court sees no basis to require any further action.

As for the IPEDs reports, Defendant objects to their production because “the information in those reports is aggregated by occupational category, and not by department,” and thus, is “not segregable by the Athletic Department.” Def.’s Opp'n at 7. Although the court agrees that demographic information about the entirety of the University's workforce should not be discoverable, insofar as the reports describe demographic data and/or hiring trends within a comparable occupational category specific to the Athletic Department (e.g., “head coaches” or “assistant coaches”), Defendant must produce that relevant data for Plaintiff's review. See Minority Employees at NASA v. Beggs, 723 F.2d 958, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, ECF No. 24, is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff's demand for fees and costs is denied. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii) (granting courts the discretion not to impose fees and costs in connection with a discovery dispute where “the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified”).