Hasenbein v. F3EA, Inc.
Hasenbein v. F3EA, Inc.
2021 WL 6496791 (W.D. Ky. 2021)
May 18, 2021
Edwards, Regina S., United States District Judge
Summary
The Court denied the Joint Motion for Entry of Agreed Protective Order filed by Plaintiff John Jacob Hasenbein and Defendant F3EA, Inc. due to the parties' failure to identify specific documents entitled to protection or exceptional circumstances that warrant protection of the ESI. The parties must now either agree to the conditions of their protective order amongst themselves or attempt to re-file their motion before the discovery period ends.
JOHN JACOB HASENBEIN PLAINTIFF
v.
F3EA, INC. DEFENDANT
v.
F3EA, INC. DEFENDANT
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-00822-BJB
United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky
Filed May 18, 2021
Counsel
David R. Tscheschke, Jonathan D. Perrone, Timothy J. Turner, Whitcomb Selinsky, PC, Denver, CO, James M. Bolus, Jr., Bolus Law Office, Michael A. Augustus, Ackerson & Yann PSC, Louisville, KY, for Plaintiff.Joshua A. Mullen, Paul T. Madden, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Nashville, TN, Lynn M. Watson, Seiller Waterman, LLC, Louisville, KY, for Defendant.
Edwards, Regina S., United States District Judge
ORDER
*1 Before the Court is a “Joint Motion for Entry of Agreed Protective Order” filed by Plaintiff John Jacob Hasenbein and Defendant F3EA, Inc. (DN 49).
Rule 26 allows for “a party or any person from whom discovery is sought” to seek a protective order from the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). This Rule specifies that a motion for protective order must demonstrate “good cause” for its entry and include “a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action.” Id. (emphasis added). Good cause exists when the moving party “articulate[s] specific facts showing ‘clearly defined and serious injury’ resulting from the discovery sought ...” Nix v. Sword, 11 F. App'x 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Avirgan v. Hull, 118 F.R.D. 252, 254 (D.D.C. 1987)). This District further requires that the moving party set forth specific reasons why the protective order is necessary, including the type(s) of documents that require protection. See Gluc v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 309 F.R.D. 406, 414-15 (W.D. Ky. 2015). These requirements align with the basic public policy in favor of broad discovery and public access to court proceedings. See Williams v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 3:16-CV-00236-CRS, 2018 WL 989546, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 20, 2018) (citing Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Banker's Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996)).
This Court is generally disinclined to enter agreed protective orders. Almost by definition, a proposed protective order signed by both parties cannot comply with the requirement that the parties certify their good faith efforts to resolve a discovery dispute. Kentucky ex rel Beshear v. Marathon Petroleum Co., LP, No. 3:15-cv-354-DJH-CHL, 2017 WL 2272082, at *2 (W.D. Ky. May 24, 2017). In most instances, when the parties have agreed to certain limitations on the use of materials produced in discovery, entry of a protective order is neither appropriate nor necessary, and the parties need only document the terms of their agreement and proceed with discovery. However, the Court may deviate from this policy where the parties can demonstrate compliance with Rule 26 despite their joint request or that exceptional circumstances exist in their case. See id. (finding good cause for entry of joint protective order where parties demonstrated that a private agreement between them would not “be effective in resolving the parties' discovery dispute”); see also Bussell v. Elizabethtown Ind. School Dist., 3:17CV-00605-GNS, DN 33 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 23, 2018) (finding good cause for entry of joint protective order where “no other avenues” existed for parties to obtain sensitive images if protective order was not entered).
The parties here submit only a vague explanation as to why the Court should enter their protective order. They state that certain discovery materials in this litigation will need protection and the protective order will facilitate the discovery process. (DN 49). The proposed protective order itself broadly governs documents and information, including electronically stored information, depositions, deposition exhibits, interrogatory responses, admissions, and any other materials produced, given or exchanged by and among the parties and non-discovery in this action. (DN 49-1).
*2 The parties, however, fail to identify specific documents entitled to protection or exceptional circumstances that warrant protection of these categories of information. Without a concrete showing that specific documents entitled to protection must be produced, the Court will not enter such a broad protective order.
In light of this analysis, the parties have two options. They can simply agree to the conditions of their protective order amongst themselves without court intervention. Or, the parties can attempt to re-file their motion for protective order, demonstrating compliance with the above discussion, at any time before the discovery period ends.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Parties' Joint Motion for Entry of Agreed Protective Order (DN 49) is DENIED without prejudice.
Copies: Counsel of Record