*1 Plaintiffs James Lobisch and Anna Lobisch, Individually, and as Personal Representative for the Estate of her deceased daughter, Abigail Lobisch, and as Next Friend of her son, Zachariah Lobisch (together, “Plaintiffs”) and Defendant United States of America (“USA”) are before the Court on a request for LR37.1 expedited discovery assistance. ECF Nos. 86, 90. The parties have satisfied their meet-and-confer obligation. Id.

The thought-provoking issue in dispute is whether, because the USA is the proper defendant in a Federal Torts Claims Act (“FTCA”) case (as opposed to a federal department, agency, or employee), Plaintiffs are entitled to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 discovery from any United States agency, military branch, or employee. Although the parties and the Court have found no authority directly on point, the Court answers this question in the negative for the reasons set forth below.

This case concerns the 2019 death of seven-month-old Abigail Lobisch, allegedly from a Benadryl overdose provided to her by military spouse Denise Villa on the Aliamanu Military Reservation. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) Plaintiffs served their underlying administrative claim with the Department of the U.S. Army, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. In this lawsuit, though, Plaintiffs seek records, documents, materials, and electronic data concerning the former privatized U.S. Navy housing of non-parties. The USA does not appear to dispute that Plaintiffs’ requests seek relevant information proportional to the needs of the case. The USA does dispute, however, whether the U.S. Navy documents fall within the USA's “possession, custody, or control.”

The starting point for any analysis of discovery issues relating to requests for production of documents is Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. Rule 34 expressly provides that “[a] party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of Rule 26(b) ... (1) to produce and permit the requesting party ... to inspect, copy, test, or sample ... items in the responding party's possession, custody, or control[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. There is no ambiguity regarding the meaning of the phrase “possession, custody, or control.” The federal courts have universally held that documents are deemed to be within the possession, custody, or control of a party for purposes of Rule 34 if the party has actual possession, custody. or control of the materials or has the legal right to obtain the documents on demand. E.g., Searock v. Stripling, 736 F.2d 650, 653 (11th Cir.1984); Scott v. Arex, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 39, 41 (D. Conn.1989); Haseotes v. Abacab Int'l Computs., Inc., 120 F.R.D. 12, 14 (D. Mass.1988); Buckley v. Vidal, 50 F.R.D. 271, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).

Because an action against the USA under the FTCA is the exclusive remedy for property damage, death, or personal injuries arising out of the negligence of federal employees, the United States is the proper defendant in a suit under the Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The FTCA does not grant federal courts jurisdiction over actions against individual federal defendants or federal agencies. Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1099 (10th Cir. 2009) (“The United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.”); Allen v. Veterans Admin., 749 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Individual agencies of the United States may not be sued.”).

*2 Plaintiffs position is straightforward and based upon the language of Rule 34 – the USA, as the named defendant, is obligated to produce documents within its possession, custody, or control. “USA” necessarily includes any and all branches of its military and cannot be limited to the Department of the Army simply because Plaintiffs served the Army with their administrative claim. ECF No. 86. Plaintiffs have provided no authority supporting this logic in the context of an FTCA case.

USA counters with the argument that it is “defending the role of the U.S. Army and its personnel” and that Plaintiffs have not asserted any claims against “non-parties” U.S. Navy, Hunt Military Communities/Whidbey Island Family Housing, or Mr. and Mrs. Villa, from whom they now seek discovery. ECF No. 90. USA argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) does not address discovery and cannot be used to expand discovery responsibilities onto the entire federal government in all FTCA cases. Id. The USA asserts that the requested documents are not in the possession, custody, or control of the U.S. Army, with the result that they are not discoverable via Rule 34. The USA has provided no authority supporting this argument in the specific context of an FTCA case.

The Court found one opinion, Tri-State Hospital Supply Corp. v. U.S., 226 F.R.D. 118 (D.C. 2005), tangentially addressing the issue. There, the court did not explicitly hold that a plaintiff asserting a claim under the FTCA is entitled to discovery from a different governmental agency than the agency named in the underlying administrative claim. Nor did the court address the “possession, custody, or control” arguments made here. The court did, however, in overruling the USA's relevancy objection, find that the plaintiff was entitled to a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition that includes employees of federal agencies other than the agency against which the plaintiff's FTCA claim was asserted, concluding: “[I]t does not follow that the plaintiff is precluded from seeking discovery about actions taken by other agencies that were not named in the administrative claim if that information is relevant to the intent and actions of the government employees and agencies that were named in the administrative claim. In other words, it does not matter whether the ‘other’ agencies’ actions can form the basis for relief as long as their actions or situations helped motivate employees whose actions can be the basis of relief.” 226 F.R.D. at 127.

Addressing the different argument made here, the Court reaches a different result because of the significant implications of Plaintiffs’ argument, which runs afoul for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1. Rule 34, like all of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is subject to the injunction of Rule 1 that it be construed “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979). The Court finds that Plaintiffs position, albeit grounded upon the language of Rule 34, conflicts with Rule 1 and would lead to untenable results by subjecting the entire federal government to party discovery every FTCA case. This would include not just production of documents, but requests for answers to interrogatories, requests for admissions, and party depositions. Such an interpretation would turn the FTCA on its head with potentially far-reaching party discovery in every FTCA case, likely leading to numerous relevancy and proportionality disputes. Plaintiffs have cited no language in the FTCA or is legislative history to support this result, and this Court finds that Rule 1 counsels strongly against it.

*3 For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ request to order the USA to produce documents in response to the document requests identified by the parties in this LR37.1 dispute.

IT IS SO ORDERED.