*1 Before the Court is Plaintiff The Official Stanford Investors Committee's (OSIC) Motion to Quash and for Protective Order, asking the Court to quash Defendant The Toronto-Dominion Bank's (TD Bank) subpoena and notice of deposition for non-party Dr. John Wade. ECF No. 626. OSIC objects to TD Bank's subpoena and deposition notice on three grounds: (1) Dr. Wade is not a party to the litigation; (2) Dr. Wade has no personal knowledge of facts relevant to the claims in this action; and (3) TD Bank is attempting to harass and intimidate Dr. Wade through the noticed deposition. See Pl.’s Objections, Motion to Quash, and Motion for Protective Order 2-5, ECF No. 626 [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot.].[1]

The district judge has referred discovery issues such as those raised in the pending motion to the undersigned magistrate judge, see Orders, In re Stanford Entities Secs. Litig., 3:09-MD-2099-N (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2012, and Feb. 13, 2014) (ECF Nos. 30, 50), and the motion is ripe for review. The undersigned has considered the papers filed by the parties and has determined that the motion should be GRANTED in part.

On December 6, 2019, TD Bank issued a Rule 45 subpoena to Dr. John Wade. Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 1, at 1–3, ECF No. 626-1. TD Bank served Dr. Wade with the subpoena on December 13, 2019. Def.’s App. 18, ECF No. 640. The subpoena directed Dr. Wade to appear for a deposition on February 4, 2020, in Covington, Louisiana, where Dr. Wade lives. Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 1, at 4. Dr. Wade is not a party to this action; he is a Stanford investor victim who voluntarily served as an OSIC committee member between August 2010 (the inception of OSIC) and May 28, 2015, when he resigned. Pl.’s Mot. 2; Pl.’s Reply 3, ECF No. 645. TD Bank apparently seeks to depose Dr. Wade because he invested in Stanford International Bank, Limited (SIBL) certificates of deposit (CDs), personally and as trustee “for his animal microchip company's retirement fund,” and because he was a member of OSIC. Def.’s Resp. 2, ECF No. 639. Specifically, TD Bank advises that it intends to depose Dr. Wade on many topics, including:

Id. at 4–5.

Through its motion, OSIC seeks to quash the Wade deposition subpoena or, alternatively, asks the Court to issue a protective “order limiting the discovery, and/or ... prevent[ing] the deposition.” Pl.’s Mot. 4. OSIC argues that the Court should quash or limit the deposition for three reasons. OSIC first contends that Dr. Wade is not a party to the case, and OSIC does not intend to designate Dr. Wade as its 30(b)(6) witness to testify on any of the topics identified in TD Bank's Rule 30(b)(6) notice. Id. at 3, 5. OSIC maintains that because Dr. Wade was merely an OSIC committee member with no personal knowledge about the facts forming the bases of OSIC's claims against TD Bank, the Court should treat TD Bank's deposition notice as an “apex” deposition in accordance with Texas law.[2] Id. at 5. Second, OSIC asserts that “[a]ny knowledge [Dr. Wade] may have gained ... as a member of OSIC is ... privileged” or protected under the work product doctrine. Id. at 2–4. And, according to OSIC, any non-privileged information Dr. Wade may possess is not relevant and “falls outside the limits of Rule 26(b)(1).” Id. at 4. Finally, OSIC claims that TD Bank's effort to depose Dr. Wade is “a transparent attempt ... to harass, intimidate, and annoy Dr. Wade....” Id. at 5.

TD Bank opposes OSIC's motion, contending that OSIC has failed to meet its burden for obtaining quashal or a protective order.[3] Def.’s Resp. 3–5. TD Bank argues that it seeks to depose Dr. Wade to discover relevant, non-privileged information that “go[es] to the core of this litigation.” Id. In TD Bank's view, neither OSIC nor Dr. Wade have provided any evidence, other than conclusory assertions, that the sum of Dr. Wade's knowledge is privileged or irrelevant. Id. at 4. TD Bank further contends that Dr. Wade's relevant knowledge outweighs any potential burden (of which TD Bank claims OSIC has provided no demonstrable evidence) Dr. Wade may suffer by testifying. See id. at 5. In closing, TD Bank asks the Court to award expenses, including attorneys’ fees incurred in opposing OSIC's motion because, according to TD Bank, it properly sought Dr. Wade's testimony and OSIC has not put forth any justification that would make an award of expenses unjust. Id. at 5 n.7.

*3 OSIC's reply rejects TD Bank's claim that Dr. Wade has relevant, non-privileged information “that would justify TD's taking his deposition.” Pl.’s Reply 1–3. OSIC explains that it and the Named Plaintiffs have asserted claims against TD Bank “for, inter alia, knowing participation in Stanford's breaches of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting Stanford's fraud, securities violations, and conversion.” Id. at 1. According to OSIC, TD Bank's knowledge—not Dr. Wade's—is relevant to the foregoing claims. Id. at 2. In sum, OSIC asserts that Dr. Wade's testimony concerning his investments in SIBL CDs, experience as a SIBL CD investor, and knowledge of any “red flags” that Stanford was engaged in a Ponzi scheme, as well as his actions as an OSIC member, are “either entirely irrelevant, privileged, or wholly duplicative of the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of OSIC that TD has already noticed and scheduled.” Id. at 1–2.

A. The applicable legal standards.

Two rules govern this dispute: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 45.[4] “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 explicitly contemplates the use of subpoenas in relation to non-parties and governs subpoenas served on a third party, such as [Dr. Wade], as well as motions to quash or modify or to compel compliance with such a subpoena.” Ford Motor Co. v. Versata Software, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d 925, 931 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). Rule 45(d)(3) provides that “[o]n timely motion, the court ... must quash or modify a subpoena that” either “requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies” or “subjects a person to undue burden.”[5] Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii), (iv). Where the moving party asserts the subpoenaed information is privileged or protected, the party must: (1) “expressly make the claim;” and (2) “describe the nature of the withheld documents, communications, or tangible things in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable the parties to assess the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).

*4 In analyzing whether a subpoena presents an undue burden, courts consider the following factors: “(1) relevance of the information requested; (2) the need of the party for the documents; (3) the breadth of the document request; (4) the time period covered by the request; (5) the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents; and (6) the burden imposed.” Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004). “Whether a burdensome subpoena is reasonable must be determined according to the facts of the case, such as the party's need for the documents [or information] and the nature and importance of the litigation.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). In addition, “if the person to whom the document request is made is a non-party, the court may also consider the expense and inconvenience to the non-party.” Id.

The party seeking to quash the subpoena bears the burden of demonstrating “that compliance with the subpoena would be unreasonable and oppressive,” or that compliance will lead to disclosing privileged or protected material. Id. (quoting Williams v. City of Dall., 178 F.R.D. 103, 109 (N.D. Tex. 1998)) (internal quotations omitted). “The moving party opposing discovery must show how the requested discovery was overly broad, burdensome, or oppressive by submitting affidavits or offering evidence revealing the nature of the burden,” Lead GHR Enters., Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., No. 3:17-mc-91-M-BN, 2017 WL 6381744, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2017) (quoting Andra Grp., LP v. JDA Software Grp., Inc., 312 F.R.D. 444, 449 (N.D. Tex. 2015)). Modifying the subpoena “is preferable to quashing it outright.” Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818.

When “a subpoena is issued as a discovery device, relevance for purposes of the undue burden test is measured according to the standard of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(b)(1).” MetroPCS v. Thomas, 327 F.R.D. 600, 609 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (quoting Williams, 178 F.R.D. at 110). Rule 26(b) provides that:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Information must therefore be nonprivileged, relevant, and proportional to the needs of the case to constitute discoverable material. See Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Chung, 321 F.R.D. 250, 279 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (citing Rocha v. S.P. Richards Co., Civil Action No. 5:16-CV-411-XR, 2016 WL 6876576, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2016)) (“Under Rule 26(b)(1), discoverable matter must be both relevant and proportional to the needs of the case—which are related but distinct requirements.”); see also Thomas, 327 F.R.D. at 609–10 (noting that “discovery from a third party as permitted through a subpoena issued under Rule 45 is limited to the scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26(b)(1) in the underlying action, and [d]iscovery outside of this scope is not permitted” (internal quotations omitted)).

Alternatively, Rule 26(c)(1) authorizes the court to issue a protective order, for good cause shown, “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Under Rule 26(c), a court may impose a protective order that, inter alia, forbids “the disclosure or discovery,” specifies the “terms, including time and place or the allocation of expenses” of the discovery, prescribes “a discovery method other than the one selected by the party seeking discovery,” or prohibits “inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A)–(D). “The scope of discovery is the same under both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 45 and 26”—i.e., a party may discover any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to a party's claim or defense. Garcia v. Prof'l Contract Servs., Inc., A-15-CV-585-LY, 2017 WL 187577, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2017).

*5 Like a motion to quash, the “burden is upon [the party seeking the protective order] to show the necessity of its issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Meisenheimer v. DAC Vision Inc., No. 3:19-cv-1422-M, 2019 WL 6619198, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2019) (quoting In re Terra Int'l, 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998)). Courts have generally concluded that to obtain a protective order, the moving party must show both “good cause and a specific need for the protection.” Id. (citing Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 901 F.2d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 1990)). The Fifth Circuit has noted the following with respect to Rule 26(c)’s good cause requirement:

Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540, 555 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To successfully oppose a motion for protective order, however, the party seeking discovery may “need to make its own showing of ... the proportionality factors, including the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues....” Dennis v. United States, No. 3:16-cv-3148-G-BN, 2017 WL 4778708, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2017).

The court has broad discretion in determining whether to impose a protective order. Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 684 (5th Cir. 1985). But protective orders barring depositions are rarely granted, “and absent extraordinary circumstances, such an order would likely be in error.” Salter v. Upjohn Co., 593 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1979); see Bucher v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 160 F.R.D. 88, 92 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (“Protective orders prohibiting depositions are rarely granted.”).

B. OSIC has standing to challenge TD Bank's subpoena.

To the extent TD Bank incorporates the standing argument raised in its response to OSIC's motion to quash the Reed subpoena, the Court concludes, as it did in its February 27, 2020, order, that OSIC has standing to bring the instant motion. See ECF No. 695. “A party, although not in possession or control of the materials sought in a subpoena and not the person to whom the subpoena is directed, has standing to file a motion to quash or modify under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(3) if he has a personal right or privilege in the subject matter of the subpoena or a sufficient interest in it.” Booth v. City of Dall, 312 F.R.D. 427, 430 (N.D. Tex. 2015); see Brown v. Braddick, 595 F.2d 961, 967 (5th Cir. 1979) (explaining that a party moving to quash a subpoena issued to a third party must show that he is “in possession of the materials subpoenaed” or possesses a “personal right or privilege with respect to the materials subpoenaed”). A party “cannot challenge a Rule 45 subpoena directed to a third party on the basis that it violates another person's privacy rights ..., that the subpoena is overly broad, or that the subpoena seeks information that is irrelevant because only the responding third party” can seek Rule 45 relief on those grounds. Frazier v. RadioShack Corp., Civil Action No. 10–855–BAJ–CN, 2012 WL 832285, at *1 (M.D. La. Mar. 12, 2012). But “a party has standing to challenge a subpoena issued to a non-party if the subpoena seeks confidential or protected information sensitive to the movant.” Schmidt Tr. of Estate of Border Anesthesia Servs., P.C. v. McKee, Civil Action No. B-10-20, 2012 WL 13137023, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2012) (quoting Keybank Nat'l Ass'n v. Perkins Rowe Assocs., L.L.C., Civil Action No. 09–497–JJB–SR, 2011 WL 90108, at *2 (M.D. La. Jan. 11, 2011)). Moreover, “a party has standing to move for a protective order [under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(c) seeking to limit the scope of discovery, even if the party does not have standing pursuant to Rule 45(d) to bring a motion to quash a third-party subpoena.” Stancu v. Hyatt Corp./Hyatt Regency, Dall., No. 3:17-cv-675-L-BN, 2017 WL 2984052, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 13, 2017) (quoting Bounds v. Capital Area Family Violence Intervention Ctr., 314 F.R.D. 214, 218 (M.D. La. 2016)).

*6 “Given that [TD Bank] does not challenge [OSIC's] standing under Rule 26,” TD Bank's “argument under Rule 45 is largely irrelevant.” Garcia, 2017 WL 187577, at *1 (overruling the defendant's standing objection because plaintiff not only sought to quash the subpoena under Rule 45 but also sought imposition of a protective order under Rule 26). Indeed, OSIC may challenge the Wade deposition under Rule 26—to protect Dr. Wade from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense”—even if it lacks Rule 45 standing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); Stancu, 2017 WL 2984052, at *1. But to the extent Dr. Wade's testimony will involve attorney-client communications and attorney work product, the Court also finds OSIC has established it has standing under Rule 45 to quash the Wade deposition subpoena.[6] See, e.g., Total Rx Care, LLC v. Great N. Ins. Co., 318 F.R.D. 587, 594 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (finding plaintiff had standing to challenge subpoena served on third-party where it “allege[d] that documents protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection are among those responsive” to the subpoena); MC Asset Recovery, LLC v. Castex Energy, Inc., Civil Action No. 4:07-CV-076-Y, 2013 WL 12171724, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2013) (noting that movants had not made a privilege claim in their original motion but because they asserted in their reply that the testimony and documents would involve privileged material, the court found movants had standing to challenge the subpoena). Thus, the Court overrules TD Bank's challenge to OSIC's standing.

C. The record as developed sufficiently shows the need for a limited protective order.

OSIC argues that Texas's apex doctrine precludes TD Bank from deposing Dr. Wade. Pl.’s Mot. 5. Although not stated in its operative response, TD Bank previously argued that the apex doctrine is inapplicable to OSIC because it is not a corporation. See ECF No. 614, at 9.

“Although this Court is not subject to Texas state court decisions applying the so-called Apex Doctrine, federal courts permit the depositions of high-level executives, sometimes referred to as apex executives, when conduct and knowledge at the highest levels of the corporation are relevant to the case.” Gaedeke Holdings VII, Ltd. v. Mills, No. 3:15–mc–36–D–BN, 2015 WL 3539658, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 5, 2015) (citing cases for support); see Harding v. Cty. of Dall., Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-0131-D, 2016 WL 7426127, at *7 n.12 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2016) (explaining that although federal courts do not follow Texas's apex doctrine, they still require a party to demonstrate “exceptional or extraordinary circumstances” to depose a high-ranking official, similar to Texas's apex doctrine (internal quotations omitted)). Where the executive possesses “unique personal knowledge,” the court may permit an apex deposition. Robinson v. Nexion Health at Terrell, Inc., Case No. 3:12-CV-03853-L-BK, 2014 WL 12915533, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2014). The Fifth Circuit has observed, however, that the party seeking to take such a deposition should first utilize less-intrusive means, e.g., by deposing lesser-ranking officials, before taking an apex deposition. Mills, 2015 WL 3539658, at *3 (citing Salter, 593 F.2d at 651). Indeed, courts “ha[ve] authority to prevent or alter apex depositions under the Federal Rules to avoid duplication, harassment, and burdensomeness.” Sanchez v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., L.L.C., No. PE: 15-CV-15, 2016 WL 10589438, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2016) (internal quotations omitted).

United States District Judge Godbey has likened OSIC to an unincorporated association. See Order, Janvey v. IMG Worldwide, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-0117-N (Sept. 24, 2012) (holding that OSIC had standing to sue defendants as an unincorporated association). Assuming, without deciding, that the apex doctrine applies to an unincorporated association,[7] the Court nevertheless concludes the doctrine does not prohibit the Wade deposition. “[T]he doctrine may be invoked only when the deponent has been noticed for deposition because of his corporate position.” Simon, 950 S.W.2d at 442. Moreover, the high-ranking official invokes protection under the apex doctrine only where he “files a motion for protection accompanied by an ‘affidavit denying any knowledge of relevant facts....’ ” Id. (quoting Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 904 S.W.2d at 128).

*7 Here, TD Bank asserts that it wants to depose Dr. Wade not only because he is a former OSIC member, but also because he invested (personally and on behalf of his company) in SIBL CDs. Def.’s Resp. 2–4. Put differently, TD Bank claims that it does not seek to depose Dr. Wade just because he was an OSIC member. Id. More importantly, OSIC did not provide an affidavit from Dr. Wade attesting to his purported lack of knowledge (see ECF Nos. 626, 645), and therefore cannot carry its burden for the Court to either quash the subpoena or issue a protective order. For these reasons, the Court finds the apex doctrine does not shield Dr. Wade from testifying. See, e.g., Boales v. Brighton Builders, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 159, 168 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (concluding apex doctrine did not apply where “[a]ppellants [did] not seek to depose [executive] merely because of his corporate position,” but instead “[sought] to depose him because they allege he has first-hand knowledge of certain facts”); Simon, 950 S.W.2d at 442.

OSIC maintains that any personal knowledge of the facts underlying this action that Dr. Wade has gained while a member of OSIC is protected by attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine. Pl.’s Mot. 4 (claiming that Dr. Wade “has no personal knowledge of any relevant facts underlying this case,” and what knowledge he may possess “is based exclusively on the work product, advice and counsel of OSIC's litigation counsel ...”); Pl.’s Reply 2–3. TD Bank generally responds that “[t]he Court cannot rely on OSIC's conclusory statement as to what Dr. Wade may or may not know.” Def.’s Resp. 4. TD Bank asserts that Dr. Wade possesses non-privileged, relevant information and the Court should therefore permit the deposition. See id.

The Court agrees that much of the relevant information Dr. Wade possesses related to his service as an OSIC member could be privileged or protected. But imposing a blanket order barring TD Bank from deposing Dr. Wade concerning information acquired as an OSIC member, because he may hold such privileged or protected information, is not appropriate at this stage. Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:15-cv-1095, 2017 WL 1233047, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2017) (quoting United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983)) (observing that, in a deposition, “[t]he claim of privilege must be made and sustained on a question-by-question or document-by-document basis; a blanket claim of privilege is unacceptable”); see generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2) (specifying the method for objecting to subpoenaed information that a person claims is privileged or otherwise protected, e.g., by describing the nature of withheld information in a manner sufficient to enable the parties to assess the claim). Instead, OSIC may object to questions that call for privileged or protected answers during Dr. Wade's deposition. See, e.g., Wis. Province of Soc'y of Jesus v. Cassem, No. 3:17-cv-01477 (VLB), 2019 WL 4928866, at *4 (D. Conn. Aug. 22, 2019) (denying third-party's motion to quash and explaining that “[d]uring the deposition her counsel [could] object to any questions that implicate[d] a privilege”); Papst Licensing, 2017 WL 1233047, at *6 (noting that “one cannot simply make a blanket claim of privilege at a deposition, let alone make one in advance and avoid testifying entirely,” therefore, “[t]he proper course is to assert the privilege in response to a specific question or questions during the deposition”); McKee, 2012 WL 13137023, at *4 (finding third-party had not met burden to quash deposition where, although it had asserted subpoena sought privileged information, that party could nevertheless “object to the questions that require privileged answers during the deposition”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2) (permitting attorney to instruct deponent not to answer to preserve privilege).

*8 In addition to desiring knowledge Dr. Wade may possess in his capacity as a former OSIC member, TD Bank also seeks information related to Dr. Wade's personal and business investments in Stanford's illicit Ponzi scheme and the resulting financial losses. Specifically, TD Bank claims it can inquire about Dr. Wade's investments (both personally and on behalf of his company) in SIBL CDs, his experience as a SIBL CD investor, why he invested over $2 million in an offshore bank, and whether he was aware of any supposed “red flags” that Stanford was running a Ponzi scheme. Def.’s Resp. 4–5. OSIC contends these areas are irrelevant to the issues before the Court, as currently defined by the parties’ pleadings, and construes TD Bank's attempts to explore such issues as a poorly disguised attempt to harass a Stanford victim. See Pl.’s Mot. 5; Pl.’s Reply 2. OSIC further maintains that, even to the extent Dr. Wade has personal knowledge about non-privileged, relevant facts related to his OSIC membership, such information is likely “duplicative of the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of OSIC that TD has already noticed and scheduled.”[8] Pl.’s Reply 2.

In the Complaint, OSIC and the named Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that TD Bank assisted SIBL and other Stanford entities in fraudulently transferring CD proceeds. First Am. Intervenor Compl. ¶¶ 44–47, ECF No. 403. OSIC also contends that TD Bank “received [an unknown amount of] banking and other fees for providing their supposed ‘services’ which actually facilitated and furthered the Stanford Ponzi scheme” and “also made huge profits on the amounts deposited with them.” Id. ¶ 45. OSIC asserts claims for fraudulent transfer, civil conspiracy, and breach of fiduciary duty, among others, and requests punitive damages as a result. Id. ¶¶ 77–114.

In response to OSIC's allegations, TD Bank raises affirmative defenses based on statute of limitations, waiver, estoppel, unclean hands, failure to plead fraud with particularity, and disavowal of any fiduciary duty. Answer & Affirmative Defenses 31–33, ECF No. 410. TD Bank further contends that it “is not liable for any of the alleged misrepresentations, omissions, fraud, conspiracy, or breaches of fiduciary duty alleged in the [First Amended Intervenor Complaint] because TD did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, any of those actions.” Id. at 33. TD Bank claims that it “acted at all times with and in objective and subjective good faith.” Id.

In its response to the instant motion, TD Bank further asserts that “Dr. Wade's status as a former OSIC member, an active SIBL CD investor advocate and participant in other Stanford MDL litigations, and a SIBL CD investor who invested millions ... makes it more than reasonably likely he has relevant and discoverable information” related to the above claims and defenses.[9] Def.’s Resp. 4. The Court disagrees, at least in relation to knowledge concerning Dr. Wade's personal investment decisions.

Questioning related to Dr. Wade's investments in SIBL CDs (including his experience as an investor and why he chose to invest in SIBL) and “whether he was aware of any of the supposed ‘red flags’ that Stanford was running a Ponzi scheme” (id.) do not relate to OSIC's claims asserted herein and therefore exceed the bounds of Rule 26(b)(1)’s relevancy requirement. As argued by OSIC, TD Bank provides little to no practical explanation for how Dr. Wade's personal decision to invest in SIBL CDs bears any relevance to Stanford's alleged fraudulent transfers routed through TD Bank or the bank's assertion that it acted in good faith in regard to such transfers. See Pl.’s Reply 2 (“TD ignores that it—as well as the other Bank Defendants in this case—was in a different position from Dr. Wade—as an investor—relative to Stanford leading up to the collapse of the Stanford fraud.”) Dr. Wade is not an individual plaintiff in this action and has not been a member of OSIC since May 28, 2015. Pl.’s Reply 3. The Court agrees with OSIC's assessment that Dr. Wade's personal investment encounters with the Stanford scheme are not relevant to the disputed matters raised by the parties’ pleadings herein, e.g., TD Bank's relationship with Stanford, whether and why it served as SIBL's main U.S. dollar correspondent bank, and whether it knew of “Stanford's breaches of fiduciary duty, fraud, securities violations, and conversion.” Id. at 1–2.

*9 Based on the record as presently developed, the Court finds no support for a determination that TD Bank needs[10] Dr. Wade's testimony concerning his personal decision to invest in SIBL CDs (and related topics) to defend against OSIC's institutional claims against TD Bank. Weighing the hardship to Dr. Wade—testifying in an individual capacity at a deposition in an action where he is not an individual plaintiff—against the probative value of the information (which the Court finds at this time is minimal to nonexistent) concerning Dr. Wade's personal investment activity, the Court determines that the record demonstrates good cause exists for the imposition of a narrow protective order. Cf. Thomas 327 F.R.D. at 627–28 (granting third-party's motion to quash subpoena as “unduly burdensome” where “record [did] not support a determination that [third-party] [was] likely to be able to provide deposition testimony that would be relevant to—and needed by [plaintiff] to prove or support—the claims”); Hansen v. Alamo Mobile X-Ray & EKG Servs., Inc., Civil No. SA–14–CA–01070–FB, 2015 WL 12866215, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2015) (quoting Reynolds v. York, No. 3–04–MC–045–P, 2004 WL 1490040, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 2, 2004)) (explaining that “efforts to use third-party subpoenas to obtain [information] ... in the hope of impeaching the plaintiff's credibility ‘amounts to nothing more than a fishing expedition’ ”). The Court determines that such an order appropriately balances the “interests of [the persons] affected by discovery.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). That is, a narrow protective order is necessary to shield Dr. Wade—a third party who voluntarily served as a representative for countless other Stanford investor-victims—from the annoyance and burden of testifying as to his personal investment decisions (as opposed to his involvement during his tenure as an OSIC member), while maintaining TD Bank's right to conduct discovery on relevant, non-privileged information.

Thus, the Court hereby ORDERS TD Bank to limit its deposition questions to information related to Dr. Wade's service as an OSIC member, as opposed to his personal activity (both individually and as trustee for his company's retirement account) as a Stanford investor, and such questioning should be limited to the period of August 2010 (when the Court created OSIC) to May 28, 2015 (or the date of Dr. Wade's resignation as a committee member, whichever is later), subject to any appropriate claim of privilege.[11]

In sum, the Court declines to quash the Wade deposition subpoena. The Court concludes, however, that the record demonstrates good cause exists for imposition of a protective order, in the form of limiting Dr. Wade's deposition testimony to his service as an OSIC member, subject to any appropriate claim of privilege. The Court therefore GRANTS in part OSIC's Motion to Quash and Motion for Protective Order (ECF No. 626), consistent with its discussion herein.

All other relief not expressly granted is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.