*1 This matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to a general assignment made in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and upon Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 247]; the parties’ Joint Motion to Amend Scheduling Order, [Docket No. 258]; and Defendants’ “Motion to Compel Discovery, for a Protective Order, and for Supplemental and De-designation of Disclosures.” [Docket No. 261]. The Court took the parties’ Motions under advisement on the written submissions of the parties. (Order [Docket No. 287]).

For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 247], is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; the parties’ Joint Motion to Amend Scheduling Order, [Docket No. 258], is GRANTED; and Defendants’ “Motion to Compel Discovery, for a Protective Order, and for Supplemental and De-designation of Disclosures,” [Docket No. 261], is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.[1]

I. Background

Plaintiff initiated the present case in the First Judicial District, County of Dakota, State of Minnesota. (Notice of Removal [Docket No. 1]). Defendant Pace removed the present case to this Federal Court on July 23, 2019. (Id.).

On December 20, 2019, Plaintiff, after being given leave of Court to do so, filed its Amended Complaint. (Amended Compl. [Docket No. 80]). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint names as Defendants Daniele Pace (Plaintiff's former employee), and Henry Schein, Inc. (Defendant Pace's new employer and one of Plaintiff's direct competitors). (Id.).

Plaintiff distributes dental supplies, equipment, and software to dental professionals across the United States. (Amended Compl., [Docket No. 80], at 1). In June 2013, Plaintiff hired Defendant Pace as a “CAD/CAM” or “CEREC” Specialist responsible for “working directly with territory sales representatives to provide specialized counseling and services to CAD/CAM customers.” (Id. at 1–3). Defendant Pace “worked out of Patterson's Denver location and she had responsibilities throughout Colorado and portions of Wyoming.” (Id. at 3). On February 9, 2018, during her employment with Plaintiff, Defendant Pace signed an Employment Agreement in which, Plaintiff alleges, Defendant Pace agreed to “keep in confidence and trust” all confidential and proprietary information. (Id. at 4).

On March 18, 2019, Defendant Pace terminated her employment with Plaintiff. (Amended Compl., [Docket No. 80], at 9). According to Plaintiff, Defendant Pace “immediately thereafter took a job with [Defendant] Henry Schein as Regional Sales Manager in the Denver market.” (Id. at 9).

*2 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Pace breached her Employment Agreement in a number of ways, including breaching the confidentiality provisions, failing to return Plaintiff's property, breaching the non-solicitation provision, misappropriating Plaintiff's trade secrets, retaining trade secret information without authorization, and disclosing trade secret information in order to solicit Patterson customers. (Id. at 8–21). Plaintiff further avers that Defendant Pace, after the termination of her employment with Plaintiff, retained certain “Company Property,” including several documents that contained Plaintiff's confidential information and trade secrets, and she “refused” to return certain “Company Property” after Plaintiff requested she do so. (Id.).

Based on its allegations, Plaintiff raises eight causes of action. (Amended Compl., [Docket No. 80], at 13–21). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: Breach of Contract (Count I) against Defendant Pace; Misappropriation of Trade Secrets (Count II) against Defendants Pace and Henry Schein; Conversion (Count III) against Defendant Pace; Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships (Count IV) against Defendants Pace and Henry Schein; Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (Count V) against Defendants Pace and Henry Schein; Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Duty of Loyalty (Count VI) against Defendant Pace; Inducing, Aiding, and Abetting Breaches (Count VII) against Defendant Henry Schein; and Conspiracy (Count VIII) against Defendants Pace and Henry Schein. (Id.).

On August 19, 2019, Plaintiff served Defendant Pace with Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and its First Set of Request for Production. [Docket Nos. 265-1, 265-2]. Plaintiff's First Set of Request for Production contained nineteen (19) individually numbered Request for Production. [Docket No. 265-1]. Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories contained eighteen (18) individually numbered Interrogatories. [Docket No. 265-2]. Defendant Pace subsequently responded to these discovery requests.

On September 26, 2019, prior to Defendant Henry Schein being added as a Defendant in the present action, the Court issued a Pretrial Scheduling Order. [Docket No. 58]. The scheduling Order provided “[t]hat no more than 30 Interrogatories (counted in accordance with Rule 33(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), 30 Requests for Documents (pursuant to Rule 34), and 30 Requests for [Admissions] (pursuant to Rule 36) shall be served by any side.” (Order, [Docket No. 58], at 3) (bold in original) (underline added).

On February 4, 2020, Plaintiff served upon Defendant Henry Schein its First Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Henry Schein, [Docket No. 266], as well as, Plaintiff's First Set of Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Henry Schein. [Docket No. 265-14]. Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Henry Schein, [Docket No. 266], contained nineteen (19) individually numbered interrogatories. Plaintiff's First Set of Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Henry Schein, [Docket No. 265-14], contained twenty-six (26) individually numbered requests for production.

On February 5, 2020, Plaintiff served upon Defendant Pace its Second Set of Interrogatories. [Docket No. 265-15]. Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories contained three (3) individually numbered interrogatories. [Docket No. 265-15]. On February 5, 2020, Plaintiff served upon Defendant Pace its Second Set of Requests for Production. [Docket No. 265-16]. Plaintiff's Second Set of Request for Production contained two (2) individually numbered requests for production. [Docket No. 265-15].

On March 5, 2020, Defendant Henry Schein served its substantive responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Henry Schein, [Docket No. 265-17], as well as, Defendant Henry Schein's responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Henry Schein. [Docket No. 265-18].

*3 On March 6, 2020, Defendant Pace served Plaintiff with Defendant Pace's substantive responses to both Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories, [Docket No. 254], and Plaintiff's Second Set of Request for Production of Documents. [Docket No. 254-1].

On March 25, 2020, the parties jointly moved to amend the scheduling Order. [Docket No. 127]. The parties agreed that the scheduling Order needed to be amended; however, the parties disagreed on the extent to which certain deadlines needed to be extended. Specifically, Defendants sought to amend the scheduling Order to “permit each party seven (1) deposition, thirty (30) Requests for Production, thirty (30) Interrogatories, and thirty (30) Requests for Admission.” (Mot., [Docket No. 127], at 2). Plaintiff “object[ed] to this request for relief.” (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff argued that there was “no good cause” to amend the scheduling Order to “permit discovery ‘per party’ rather than ‘per side.’ ” (Plf.’s Mem., [Docket No. 136], at 15).

On June 18, 2020, the Court issued an Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order. [Docket No. 196]. As relevant to the present Motions, this Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order, [Docket No. 196], provided “[t]hat no more than 30 Interrogatories (counted in accordance with Rule 33(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), 30 Requests for Documents (pursuant to Rule 34), and 30 Requests for Admissions (pursuant to Rule 36) shall be served by any side.” (Order, [Docket No. 196], at 3) (bold in original) (underline added).

On August 3, 2020, Plaintiff served Defendant Henry Schein with Plaintiff's Second Set of Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Henry Schein, [Docket No. 265-23], which contained four (4) separate, individually numbered request for production. On August 3, 2020, Plaintiff also served Defendant Henry Schein with Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Henry Schein, [Docket No. 265-24], which contained eight (8) separate, individually numbered interrogatories.

Plaintiff also served upon Defendant Pace, on August 3, 2020, Plaintiff's Third Set of Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Daniele Pace, [Docket No. 265-25], which contained one (1) request for production. On that same date, Plaintiff served Defendant Pace with Plaintiff's Third Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Daniele Pace, [Docket No. 265-26], which contained two (2) separate, individually numbered interrogatories.

On September 2, 2020, Defendant Henry Schein served upon Plaintiff its responses to Plaintiff's Second Set of Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Henry Schein, as well as, its responses to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Henry Schein. (Responses [Docket No. 265-27, 265-28]). On this same date, Defendant Pace served upon Plaintiff her response to Plaintiff's Third Set of Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Daniele Pace, as well as, her responses to Plaintiff's Third Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Daniele Pace. (Responses [Docket Nos. 265-29, 265-30]). Defendants did not substantively respond to any of these discovery requests. Rather, Defendants objected to each of these discovery requests as over the permissible limited permitted by the operative scheduling Order.

II. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery from Defendants. [Docket No. 247].

*4 Plaintiff seeks an Order of this Court compelling Defendant Pace to produce discovery in response to Plaintiff's Interrogatory Nos. 22 and 23, as well as, Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents No. 22. (Plf.’s Mot. [Docket No. 247]). Plaintiff also seeks an Order of this Court compelling Defendant Henry Schein to produce discovery in response to Plaintiff's Interrogatory Nos. 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28, as well as, Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents Nos. 27, 28, 29, and 30. (Id.). Plaintiff also seeks to compel Defendant Henry Schein to produce unredacted copies of certain documents Defendant Henry Schein has only produced in redacted form. (Id.).

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) states:

Courts generally have construed Rule 26(b)(1) broadly. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978); see, Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1992) (Rule 26 “is liberal in scope and interpretation, extending to those matters which are relevant”).

B. Interrogatories and Request for Production

As noted above, Plaintiff seeks an Order of this Court compelling Defendant Pace to produce discovery in response to Plaintiff's Interrogatory Nos. 22 and 23; compelling Defendant Pace to produce discovery in response to Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents No. 22; compelling Defendant Henry Schein to produce discovery in response to Plaintiff's Interrogatory Nos. 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28; and compelling Defendant Henry Schein to produce discovery in response to Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents Nos. 27, 28, 29, and 30. (Id.). These at issue discovery requests were part of Plaintiff's August 3, 2020, Third Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Daniele Pace, [Docket No. 265-26]; Plaintiff's Third Set of Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Daniele Pace, [Docket No. 265-25]; Plaintiff's Second Set of Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Henry Schein, [Docket No. 265-23]; and Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Henry Schein, [Docket No. 265-24], respectively.

Defendants did not substantively respond to any of the foregoing at issue discovery request. Instead, Defendants objected to each of these discovery requests asserting that Plaintiff had already exceeded the permitted number of interrogatories and requests for production provided for in the Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order.

Under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court is empowered and directed to issue an Order limiting the time to complete discovery, as well as, the extent of discovery to be conducted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). “This order controls the course of the action unless the court modifies it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e).

In the present case, the Court entered the initial scheduling Order, on September 26, 2019. [Docket No. 58]. That scheduling Order provided “[t]hat no more than 30 Interrogatories (counted in accordance with Rule 33(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), 30 Requests for Documents (pursuant to Rule 34), and 30 Requests for [Admissions] (pursuant to Rule 36) shall be served by any side.” (Order, [Docket No. 58], at 3) (bold in original) (underline added).

*5 On June 18, 2020, the Court issued an Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order. [Docket No. 196]. This Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order, [Docket No. 196], again contained the limitation “[t]hat no more than 30 Interrogatories (counted in accordance with Rule 33(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), 30 Requests for Documents (pursuant to Rule 34), and 30 Requests for Admissions (pursuant to Rule 36) shall be served by any side.” (Order, [Docket No. 196], at 3) (bold in original) (underline added).

The unambiguous language of these scheduling Orders is clear: the discovery limits imposed are on discovery which shall be served by any side. (See, Order, [Docket No. 196], at 3). This is not only the language of the operative scheduling Order, but it has been the unambiguous language of the scheduling Order for the life of this entire case. (Order, [Docket No. 58], at 3).

“A scheduling order is an important tool in controlling litigation. A magistrate judge's scheduling order is not a frivolous piece of papers, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril. Scheduling order have become increasingly critical to the district court's case management responsibilities ....” Luigino's Inc. Pezrow Companies, 178F.R.D. 523, 525 (D. Minn. 1998). “Obedience to the constraints of the Scheduling Orders of the Court is critical if the Court is to capably perform its case manages responsibilities.” Tomlin v. Holecek, 158 F.R.D. 132, 135 (D. Minn. 1994). For example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed the importance of scheduling Orders when it granted a petition for mandamus vacating a district court's Order and directing the Court to take certain action in compliance with the scheduling order in that case. See, In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., 956 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir. 2020). Both the Court and the parties are bound by the constraints and requirements of the scheduling Order. Id.

At the time Plaintiff served the foregoing at issue discovery requests, Plaintiff had already served forty (40) interrogatories[2] and forty-seven (47) Requests for Production. This amount of discovery is already plainly in excess of the discovery permitted by the unambiguous language of the Court's operative scheduling Order in the present case. Thus, Plaintiff was not permitted to seek the at issue discovery. See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e); Tomlin v. Holecek, 158 F.R.D. 132, 135 (D. Minn. 1994). Consequently, Defendants are under no obligation to answer said discovery. Plaintiff is simply not entitled pursuant to the operative Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order, [Docket No. 196], at ¶ V), to seek the at issue discovery.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants should be compelled to respond to all of the at issue discovery requests in excess of the limits imposed by this Court because the scheduling Order, “as reasonably interpreted by the parties,” permits this discovery in excess of the limits imposed by the Court. (See, Plf.’s Mem., [Docket No. 250], at 7–11, 15–16). In support of this argument, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have served more than thirty interrogatories; that Defendants have served in excess of thirty requests for productions of documents; that the parties tacitly agreed to permit discovery in excess of the limits imposed by the Court; and that Defendants should be compelled to respond to all discovery requests in excess of the Court-imposed limits because Defendants responded to a previous set of discovery request which were, in part, also in excess of the discovery limits. (Id.). Plaintiff also argues that Defendants should be compelled to respond to the at issue discovery because Defendants previously argued that the scheduling Order should be amended “to permit an equal amount of discovery by each party.” (Id. at 10). The Court is unpersuaded by these arguments for several reasons.

*6 Regarding Plaintiff's argument that Defendants should be compelled to respond to the at-issue discovery requests in excess of the limits imposed by the Court because the parties previously agreed to respond to discovery requests in excess of the Court imposed limitations, the Court finds this argument to be wholly without merit. Most importantly, the parties may not unilaterally agree among themselves to amend the scheduling Order without the approval of this Court. In addition, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendants actually agreed to respond to any and all discovery in excess of the limitations imposed by this Court.

In support of its assertion that the parties reached an agreement that Plaintiff could serve discovery requests in excess of the limitation imposed by the Court, Plaintiff points to a telephone conversation between counsel for all parties on January 24, 2020. (Plf.’s Mem., [Docket No. 250], at 7). Plaintiff asserts that during this telephone conversation its counsel asked Defendants’ counsel if Defendants interpreted the scheduling Order as “permitting all parties the opportunity to serve 30 interrogatories, [sic] requests for production of documents, and 30 request for admissions on all opposing parties.” (Hammel Decl., [Docket No. 252], at ¶ 38) (See, Plf.’s Mem., [Docket No. 250], at 7). According to Plaintiff, Defendants’ counsel responded, “that he thought this interpretation seemed correct.” (Hammel Decl., [Docket No. 252], at ¶ 38).[3] Defendants’ counsel refutes the accuracy of this assertion. However, even assuming solely for the sake of argument that Defendants’ counsel made such an assertion, Defendants are still not entitled to serve discovery in excess of the Court imposed limitations.

First, here again the parties are not entitled to unilaterally alter the operative scheduling Order without the Court's approval. Second, Defendants’ counsel's assertion, again assuming its authenticity solely for the sake of argument, falls well short of either a complete agreement that Plaintiff's interpretation is correct or a binding agreement to permit excessive discovery. Most crucially, Plaintiff fails to acknowledge that this January 24, 2020, conversation took place before Defendants moved this Court to amend the scheduling Order to impose the discovery limitations on a per party basis as opposed to limitations being imposed per side. Even if Defendants had agreed with Plaintiff on January 24, 2020, the Court clearly rejected that interpretation when it issued the Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order, [Docket No. 196], without amending said limitation to be imposed on the parties independently. Plaintiff, in fact, argued against Defendants’ Motion which sought to impose discovery limitations on each party as opposed to each side.[4]

*7 Plaintiff also argues that Defendants should be compelled to respond to the at issue discovery requests because Defendants previously responded to a separate set of discovery requests which in part were over the Court imposes discovery limitations. The record now before the Court demonstrates that all of the discovery requests presently at issue are contained within Plaintiff's Second Set of Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Henry Schein; Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Henry Schein; Plaintiff's Third Set of Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Daniele Pace; and Plaintiff's Third Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Daniele Pace. Defendants did not substantively respond to any of the discovery requests within these four sets of discovery requests, and Plaintiff does not assert otherwise. Instead, Plaintiff argues that because Defendants had responded previously to an entirely separate sets of discovery requests which also happened to contain some discovery requests in excess of the permitted limitations, then Defendants are now obligated to respond to all discovery requests for the remainder of this case regardless of the number served by Plaintiff. Plaintiff's argument fails here.

Plaintiff's argument is logically implausible. If the Defendants substantively responding to previous discovery requests operated as a waiver of the ability to object to subsequent discover requests as in excess of the limitation imposed by the Court, the Defendants could now be subject to Plaintiff's discovery requests without limitation. “If a responding party answers an initial set of 15 interrogatories and is then served with 11 more, it would defy logic to hold that that party has waived its objection to the numerosity of the new set.” Paananen v. Cellco P'ship, No. 8-cv-1042 (RSM), 2009 WL 3327227, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 8, 2009). “[T]he best rule, and the one this Court applies here, is that a responding party must answer the first [set of] interrogatories” to which it has responded, and it may not retroactively object to the numerosity thereof. Id. at *5.

Applying this well reasoned rule to the present case, Defendants are not required to answer any of the presently at issue discovery because all of said discovery exceeds the limits of the operative scheduling Order imposed by the Court, and Defendants have here proffered a numerosity objection in response to every discovery requests in the sets of discovery requests now at issue. Defendants have not waived any numerosity based objection to the current at issue discovery. Defendants may not, however, retroactively assert any numerosity objection to any previous discovery requests to which they have already substantively answered.

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff's Motion seeks an Order of this Court compelling Defendants to respond to the at issue discovery under the operative Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order, [Docket No. 196], Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 247], is DENIED.

C. Request to Amend the Pretrial Scheduling Order

Plaintiff also argues that if the Court finds that Plaintiff “exceeded the discovery limits in the Scheduling Order, the Court should issue a nunc pro tunc order modifying the discovery limits to permit [Plaintiff] to serve 30 interrogatories, 30 RPDs, and 30 RFAs on each Defendant.” (Plf.’s Mem., [Docket No. 250], at 22–24). Plaintiff argues that the scheduling Order should be retroactively amended because it “acted diligently after Defendants decided to take their now contradictory discovery position,” and because so amending the scheduling Order would “align[ ] the Scheduling Order with the parties’ understanding over the past year.” (Id.). Here too the Court is unpersuaded.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) and Local Rule 16.3(b), a party who moves to modify a scheduling order must demonstrate good cause to do so. “The primary measure of good cause is the movant's diligence in attempting to meet the order's requirements.” Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 716–17 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Rahn v. Hawkins, 464 F.3d 813, 822 (8th Cir. 2006); see, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), advisory committee note (1983 Amendment) (“[T]he court may modify the schedule on a showing of good cause if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.”)). “While the prejudice to the nonmovant resulting from modification of the scheduling order may also be a relevant factor, generally, [a court] will not consider prejudice if the movant has not been diligent in meeting the scheduling order's deadlines.” Id. (citing Bradford v. DANA Corp., 249 F.3d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 2001)). “Obedience to the constraints of the Court's Scheduling Orders is critical if the Court is to capably perform its case management responsibilities.” Damgaard v. Avera Health, No. 13-cv-2192 (RHK/JSM), 2015 WL 1608209, at *7 (D. Minn. Apr. 10, 2015) (quoting Tomlin v. Holecek, 158 F.R.D. 132, 135 (D. Minn. 1994)).

*8 Regarding Plaintiff's assertion that it “acted diligently after Defendants decided to take their now contradictory discovery position,” the record now before the Court fails to support such an assertion. First, it is a mischaracterization of the record to state that Defendants now take a “contradictory discovery position.” As discussed above, prior to their earlier motion to amend the scheduling Order, Defendants argued that the scheduling Order should be amended to impose discovery limitation “per party” as opposed to “per side,” but the Court rejected that argument finding Defendants had failed to show the requisite good cause. Since the Court rejected this argument and entered the Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order, [Docket No. 196], on June 18, 2020, Defendants have complied with this Court directive. Second, the record now before the Court does not demonstrate that Plaintiff acted diligently in pursuing to amend the operative scheduling Order to permit discovery limitations to be imposed “per party” as opposed to “per side.” In fact, as discussed above, Plaintiff specifically argued in opposition to Defendants’ previous motion to amend the schedule which intended to make this exact change.

On the record now before the Court, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the requisite good cause to amend the operative scheduling Order. Since September 26, 2019, when the Court issued the initial scheduling Order, [Docket No. 58], the discovery limitations on interrogatories and requests for production have been imposed “per side,” and those limitations clearly continued in effect as part of the amended scheduling Order, [Docket No. 196], issued on June 18, 2020. At the time of the issuance of the amended scheduling Order, [Docket No. 196], Plaintiff had argued in opposition of this limitations being imposed “per party.” This cannot now be described as diligent action.

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff's Motion seeks a nunc pro tunc Order of this Court further amending the operative Amended Scheduling Order, [Docket No. 196], to impose discovery limitations “per party” as opposed to “per side,” Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 247], is DENIED.

D. Redactions

Plaintiff also seeks as a part of its Motion to Compel an Order of this Court compelling Defendant Henry Schein to produce certain responsive, redacted documents in an unredacted form. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to prevent Defendant Henry Schein from redacting portions of responsive documents which Defendant Henry Schein unilaterally finds to be unresponsive. Plaintiff does not here challenge any redaction completed on the basis of an asserted privilege or personal identifying information.

Defendant Henry Schein provided Plaintiff with a “Redaction Log” which demonstrates that Defendant Henry Schein is redacting portions of responsive documents based on Defendant Henry Schein's unilaterally finding that said portions were both not relevant to the present case and so exceeding confidential that said portions cannot be sufficiently protected by the Attorney's Eyes Only designation. Defendant Henry Schein identifies eight responsive documents which it unilaterally redacted, and it argues that because “the redacted information in these documents has no relation to this case, is highly confidential, and has commercial value and is proprietary to HIS, redaction of the same is proper and necessary and is consistent with Paragraph 11 of the Protective Order.” (Defs.’ Mem., [Docket No, 281], at 44).[5]

Defendant Henry Schein cannot unilaterally redact some portions of discoverable documents based on relevancy grounds. “Redaction is an inappropriate tool for excluding alleged irrelevant information from documents that are otherwise responsive to a discovery request. It is a rare document that contains only relevant information. And irrelevant information within a document that contains relevant information may be highly useful to providing context for the relevant information.” Bartholomew v. Avalon Capital Grp., Inc., 278 F.R.D. 441, 451 (D. Minn. 2011) (footnote omitted).

*9 “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize irrelevance as a privilege or an objection that warrants redaction, or that would involve the compilation of a privilege log, as with other redactions.” Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, No. 1-cv-2373 (GV) 2000 WL 33033691, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 30, 2002). “The practice of redacting for nonresponsive or irrelevance finds no explicit support in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the only basis for prohibiting a party from seeing a portion of a document in the Rules are claims of privilege or work-product protection.” Burris v. Versa Prod., Inc., No. 7-cv-3938 (JRT/JJK), 2013 WL 608742, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 19, 2013). “Rule 34 does not permit the redaction of irrelevant portions of ‘items,’ ‘document,’ ‘electronically stored information,’ and designated tangible things,’ ” if a portion of a document is relevant, then the whole of the document is relevant. See, Hageman v. Accenture, LLP, No. 10-cv-1759 (RHK/TNL), 2011 WL 13136510, at *4 (D. Minn. June 7, 2011).

Further, the Court finds unpersuasive Defendant Henry Schein's argument that it may redact portions of discoverable documents based on the assertion that those portions of the documents are confidential. Despite Defendant Henry Schein's assertion to the contrary, paragraph 11 of the Protective Order, [Docket No. 57], does not provide any basis upon which a party may unilaterally redact portions of a discoverable document. Paragraph 11 of the Protective Order, [Docket No. 57], provides only that a party may seek from the Court a modification of the provisions of an existing Protective Order. Defendant Henry Schein did not do so before it unilaterally redacted the documents at issue, and Defendant Henry Schein may not unilaterally modify the Protective Order.

Further, Defendant Henry Schein fails to highlight any caselaw in support of its assertion that it may unilaterally redact “proprietary,” “confidential business information” that “has commercial value.” (See, Defs.’ Mem., [Docket No. 281], at 40–44). This is the exact type of information the Protective Order contemplates as “Highly Confidential—Attorneys’ Eyes Only,” and it is the exact information protected by the Protective Order in this case. (Protective Order, [Docket No. 57], at 1(f)) (defining “Highly Confidential—Attorneys’ Eyes Only” as “Confidential Information, the disclosure of which is likely to significantly harm a person or that person's competitive position or the disclosure of which would contravene an obligation of confidentiality to a third person or to a Court” and providing as examples some of the same type of information Defendant Henry Schein unilaterally redacted).

To the extent Defendant Henry Schein argues that the information cannot be protected under the Attorneys’ Eyes Only designation because it permits Plaintiff's in-house counsel to view the information, that is still an insufficient basis to permit unilateral redaction of a responsive discoverable document. As discussed above, neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Protective Order entered in this case permit Defendant Henry Schein to redact portions of a responsive document on any basis other than an assert privilege or the work product doctrine. If Defendant Henry found the Protective Order in this case to be insufficient based on circumstances which arose in discovery, then the proper course of action would have been for Defendant Henry Schein to seek a modification to the Protective Order in the appropriate manner.[6]

*10 Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff's Motion seeks an Order of this Court compelling Defendant Henry Schein to produce responsive documents in unredacted form, other than redactions based on privilege or the work product doctrine, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 247], is GRANTED.

III. Parties Joint Motion to Amend the Pretrial Scheduling Order. [Docket No. 258].

In their Joint Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order, [Docket No. 258], the parties seek to extend certain deadlines in the operative Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order. Specifically, the parties seek to extend the deadline for conducting fact and expert depositions, the deadline for filing nondispositive motions, and the deadline for filing dispositive motions. (Mot. [Docket No. 258]).

At the time they filed their Joint Motion, Defendants’ previous Motion for Protective Order was still under advisement. The parties requested that the new deadline for conducting deposition, as well as, the new deadline for filing nondispositive motions be set forty-five days after the Court issued its Order on Defendants’ previous Motion for Protective Order. The parties requested that the new deadline for filing dispositive motions be set seventy-five days after the Court issued its decision on Defendants’ previous Motion for Protective Order.

The Court issued its Order on Defendants’ previous Motion for Protective Order on November 5, 2020. (Order [Docket No. 285]).

Being familiar with the present case and based on all the filings and proceedings on the record now before the Court, the undersigned will further amend the operative Amended Pretiral Scheduling Order. The timing of circumstances in the present action, including the timing of the parties’ various cross motions, necessitates the relevant deadlines being extended longer then the times initially requested by the parties.

Therefore, the parties’ Joint Motion to Amend Scheduling Order, [Docket No. 258], is GRANTED. The Court will issue a separate Second Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order.

IV. Defendants’ “Motion to Compel Discovery, for a Protective Order, and For Supplementation and De-designation of Disclosures.” [Docket No. 261].

Through their Motion, Defendants seek an Order of this Court granting them three categories of relief. First, Defendants seek an Order of this Court compelling Plaintiff to produce all documents responsive to Defendant Henry Schein's Request for Production Nos. 16, 17, 20, 21, and 22, as well as, Defendant Pace's Request for Production No. 22; compelling supplemental responses to Defendant Henry Schein's Interrogatory Nos. 1, 4, 9, 11, and 21; compelling supplemental response to Defendant Henry Schein's Request for Production Nos. 2–8, 10–11, and 13 to include an affirmative indication as to whether or not Plaintiff is withholding any documents on the basis of its asserted abjections; and compelling production of all documents and information responsive to Defendants’ discovery requests of which Plaintiff is aware regardless of whether or not the documents and information were discovered within the possession of Plaintiff's designated custodians, including a diligent search for responsive documents by adding Sarah Mealey as a custodian. (Defs.’ Mot. [Docket No. 261]). Second, Defendants seek an Order of this Court compelling “Plaintiff to produce its evidentiary material as required by [Plaintiff's] Initial Disclosure obligation pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii).” (Def.’s Mot. [Docket No. 261]). Finally, Defendants seek an Order of this Court “de-designating [Plaintiff's] Initial Disclosures from ‘Highly Confidential-Attorneys’ Eyes Only’ to ‘Confidential.’ ” (Defs.’ Mot. [Docket No. 261].[7]

A. Additional Facts Relevant to the Present Motion

*11 On September 19, 2019, Plaintiff served its Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures. (Hammell Decl., [Docket No. 275], at ¶ 57). Plaintiff supplemented its Initial Disclosure on October 17, 2019.

On November 20, 2019, Defendant Pace served Plaintiff with her First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Requests for Admission. (Skoff Decl., [Docket No. 265], at ¶ 4). Plaintiff initially responded to these discovery requests, [Docket Nos. 265-6, 265-7, 265-8], and on April 23, 2020, Plaintiff served its Second Supplemental Responses to Defendant Pace's First Set of Interrogatories. [Docket No. 265-9].

On January 22, 2020, Defendant Henry Schein served its First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production upon Plaintiff. (Skoff Decl., [Docket No. 265], at ¶ 6). On February 21, 2020, Plaintiff served its responses to Defendant Henry Schein's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production. (Exhibit L [Docket No. 265-12]; Exhibit M [Docket No. 265-13]). Thereafter, Plaintiff continued to produce documents on a rolling basis, and Plaintiff's counsel now attests that Plaintiff “has produced all responsive documents it has located after a broad and thorough search.” (Hammell Decl., [Docket No. 275], at ¶ 17).

On April 22, 2020, Plaintiff served its Second Supplement to its Initial Disclosures. [Docket No. 266-1]. The entirety of this Second Supplement to its Initial Disclosures is designated as Attorneys’ Eyes Only. [Docket No. 266-1].

In the portion of its Second Supplement to its Initial Disclosures regarding the identity of individuals with knowledge of disputed facts, Plaintiff lists several of its current and former employees. Accompanying each listed person, Plaintiff provides the person's job title, street address, and phone number, as well as, a brief description of the topics upon which the person may have information.

In the portion of its Second Supplement to its Initial Disclosures regarding its computation of damages, Plaintiff asserts that it “calculates its damages to be in excess of $10 million.” (Second Supp. to Plf.’s Initial Disclosures, [Docket No. 266-1], at 10). Plaintiff asserted that “detailed information regarding [its] lost profit figures is contained in the spreadsheet attached” to its Second Supplement to its Initial Disclosures. That spreadsheet (hereinafter the “Spreadsheet”) includes a list of 159 customers, as well as, the “Feb 2018-2019 Sales”; the “Feb 2019-2020 Sales”; the “Percent Lost in Sales”; and the “Total Lost Sales” for each customer listed. (Id. at 13–18). The list also includes nine “prospective customers” from whom Plaintiff alleges it lost sales; the “Proposal Date” for each prospective customer; and the “Proposal Value” for each of these nine prospective customers. (Id. at 19).

B. Findings of General Applicability

As an initial matter, the Court notes that in responses to several of the discovery requests now at issue Plaintiff included several objections which are mere boilerplate objections. For example, in response to several of the discovery requests, Plaintiff generically asserted the discovery requests are overly broad, unduly burdensome, and disproportionate to the needs of this case without any further explanation as to how the raised objection is applicable to any of the specific discovery requests. Plaintiff further generically asserted that the discovery requests seek information that is protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine again without providing any explanation as to how those objections are specifically applicable to any specific discovery request now at issue.

*12 “Routine, ‘[b]oilerplate objections, without more specific explanations for any refusal to provide information, are not consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.’ ” In re: RFC & ResCap Liquidating Trust Litig., No. 13-cv-3451 (SRN/JJK/HB), 2015 WL 12778780, at *6 (D. Minn. June 8, 2015) (citation omitted); see, Farmers Ins. Exchange v. West, No. 11-cv-2297 (PAM/JJK), 2012 WL 12864845, at *10 (D. Minn. Sept. 21, 2012) (“Conclusory objections asserting the boilerplate response that a request is overly broad and burdensome are not valid objections”). Parties are not permitted to refuse to respond to a discovery request based solely on routine, boilerplate objections without providing any context or discussions as to the applicability of the asserted objection. See, Notes on 2015 Amendments to Rule 26.

Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff raised a merely boilerplate objection in its response and failed to raise any specific argument in support of that objection in the motion practice surrounding the present Motion, the Court will not further address those boilerplate objections.

The Court also notes that, in the motion practice surrounding the present Motion, the parties both proffer several caselaw citations and arguments addressing the merits of the parties’ underlying substantive claims and defenses without articulating any manner in which those arguments are applicable to the discovery issues now before the Court. (See, e.g., Defs.’ Mem., [Docket No. 263], at 23; Plf.’s Mem., [Docket No. 273], at 24–26). The merits of the parties’ underlying claims and defenses, however, are not now before this Court. Therefore, in consideration of the current pretrial discovery issue, the Court will not address the parties’ arguments directed at the underlying merits.

C. Defendant Henry Schein's RFP Nos. 16, 17, 20, 21, and 22, as well as, Defendant Pace's RFP No. 22

Defendant Henry Schein's RFP Nos. 16, 17, 20, 21, and 22, and Plaintiff's responses thereto, are as follows:

(Plf.’s Resps. to Def. Henry Schein's Requests for Production [Docket No. 265-13]).

Defendant Pace's RFP No. 22, and Plaintiff's responses thereto, are as follows:

(Plf.’s Resps. to Def. Pace's Requests for Production [Docket No. 265-7]).

Defendants collectively characterize these Requests for Production as seeking discovery of documents related to Plaintiff's alleged damages. Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to produce any documents evidencing any alleged damages other than the Spreadsheet attached to Plaintiff's Rule 26(a) disclosures.

Plaintiff argues that it has fully responded to these discovery requests by producing all responsive documents. (See, Plf.’s Mem., [Docket No. 273], at 24). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that its Rule 26(a) disclosures provide its calculation of damages, and it has produced other responsive documents in response to other, unspecified discovery requests.

To the extent Plaintiff argues that it may properly respond to these discovery requests at issue merely by informally referring Defendants to the Spreadsheet attached to Plaintiff's Rule 26(a) disclosures, the Plaintiff's is incorrect.

Plaintiff initially responded to these at issue Requests for Production on February 21, 2020. Plaintiff's responses indicated that it would produce certain documents. Plaintiff asserts that it did in fact produce certain documents, however, the record now before the Court fails to support such an assertion.

*14 As discussed above, on April 22, 2020, Plaintiff served its Second Supplement to its Initial Disclosures. [Docket No. 266-1]. To that disclosure, Plaintiff attached the Spreadsheet which Plaintiff characterizes as a calculation of its alleged damages. Plaintiff's production of this Second Supplement to its Rule 26(a) disclosures demonstrates that its prior disclosures were in some way incomplete, and therefore, Plaintiff's Supplemental Disclosures triggered Plaintiff's duty to supplement its discovery responses under Rule 26(e). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (“A party who made a disclosure under Rule 26(a)—or who has responded to an interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission—must supplement or correct its disclosure or response ....”).

Plaintiff's supplementation of its Rule 26(a) disclosures to include the Spreadsheet it characterizes as a calculation of its damages triggered Plaintiff's duty to supplement its responses to Defendants’ actual discovery requests regarding the calculation of Plaintiff's alleged damages. Plaintiff may not, however, simply informally refer Defendants to the Rule 26(a) supplementation.

Instead, Plaintiff is required to serve a supplemental response to each applicable discovery requests. Although Plaintiff may include the Spreadsheet in response to these discovery requests, Plaintiff may not rely solely on the Spreadsheet. Instead, Plaintiff must also produce “the documents or other evidentiary material” upon which its “computation [of damages] is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered ....” See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii).

The record now before the Court indicates that the Spreadsheet containing Plaintiff's calculation of its damages is not a document Plaintiff keeps in the ordinary course of business; rather, it appears to be a document Plaintiff created for purposes of the present litigation. (See, Second Supplement to Plf.’s Initial Disclosures [Docket No. 266-1]). Plaintiff is required to disclose the underlying documents it used or referred to in creating the Spreadsheet. See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. Further, Plaintiff must produce said documents as they are kept in Plaintiff's usual course of business. See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E).[8] In addition, for each individual request for production now at issue, Plaintiff must specifically identify the documents which are responsive to each individual request for production. See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B).

To the extent Plaintiff argues that it has fully responded to Defendant Henry Schein's RFP Nos. 16, 17, 20, 21, and 22, as well as, Defendant Pace's RFP No. 22 on the basis that Plaintiff has produced all responsive documents in Plaintiff's document production writ large, Plaintiff's argument is unpersuasive. In response to a request for production, Plaintiff may not simply refer Defendants to Plaintiff's previous document production generically. Plaintiff must specifically identify, by bates number, each document which is responsive to each separate document request. See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B).[9]

*15 Therefore, to the extent Defendants’ Motion seeks an Order of this Court compelling Plaintiff to supplement its responses to Defendant Henry Schein's RFP Nos. 16, 17, 20, 21, and 22, as well as, Defendant Pace's RFP No. 22, Defendants’ Motion, [Docket No. 261], is GRANTED, as set forth herein.[10] In accordance with the present Order, Plaintiff must supplement its responses to Defendant Henry Schein's RFP Nos. 16, 17, 20, 21, and 22, as well as, Defendant Pace's RFP No. 22, as soon as practicable and in any event by no later than January 13, 2021.

D. Defendant Henry Schein's Interrogatory Nos. 1, 4, 9, 11, and 21

Defendant Henry Schein's RFP Nos. 4 and 9, as well as, Plaintiff's responses thereto are as follows:

(Plf.’s Resps. to Defs.’ Interrogatories [Docket No. 265-12]).

Defendant Henry Schein argues that Plaintiff's response to Interrogatory No. 4 is deficient because it defines too generally the “economic value” at issue. Regarding Interrogatory Nos. 9, 11, and 21, Defendants asserts that Plaintiff has failed to supplement their response by providing a calculation of damages as Plaintiff said it would do in its initial response. Defendant Henry Schein argues that Plaintiff's response to Interrogatory No. 1 is deficient because it is nonresponsive, and Plaintiff has failed to supplement its response as it said it would do in its initial response.

Plaintiff argues that it has fully responded to Interrogatory Nos. 1, 4, 9, 11, and 21. (Plf.’s Mem., [Docket No. 273], at 27–30). Regarding Interrogatory No. 4 Plaintiff contends that “economic value is not fully definable, as it presents itself in [Plaintiff's] existing and potential future sales of dental products.” (Id. at 27). Plaintiff continues that it in fact provided Defendants “a calculation of the economic value of its Trade Secrets through its damages calculation” in the Spreadsheet attached to its Second Supplement to its Initial Disclosures. (Id.). Regarding Interrogatory No. 1, 9, 11, and 21, Plaintiff, in pointing to its initial disclosures and the Spreadsheet attached thereto, argues that it has fully responding to these interrogatories.

On the record now before the Court, Plaintiff appears to assert that the “economic value” of its trade secrets is the sales it generates, and the “nature and amount of the damages” arising from the alleged misappropriation of those trade secrets are the damages Plaintiff calculated in the Spreadsheet it attached to the Second Supplement to its Initial Disclosures. This ostensibly appears to be the only computation damages alleged by Plaintiff.[11] Although this response is discernable from the record now before the Court, Plaintiff has not presented this response in a signed response to either Interrogatory No. 4, 9, 11, or 21. To the extent this is Plaintiff's intended response, Plaintiff must present this response in separate written, signed response to Interrogatory Nos. 4, 9, 11, and 21. Plaintiff may not simply rely on its counsel informally directing Defendants to the Spreadsheet or Plaintiff's Second Supplement to its Initial Disclosures. There is an important distinction between information presented in Initial Disclosures and information present in response to interrogatories. Rule 26(a) disclosures, and supplements thereto, are only required to be signed by an attorney. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g). Responses to interrogatories, on the other hand, must be signed under oath by both the individual making the answer, and the attorney. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(5). Moreover, each interrogatory response must be full and complete in and of itself. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3).

*17 The same is true for Plaintiff's response to Defendant Henry Schein's Interrogatory No. 1. Plaintiff may not simply refer Defendant to its initial disclosure to find the discover sought. Plaintiff must serve a signed, complete response to Defendant Henry Schein's Interrogatory No. 1.

Therefore, to the extent Defendants’ Motion seeks an Order of this Court compelling Plaintiff to further supplement its responses to Defendant Henry Schein's Interrogatory Nos. 1, 4, 9, 11, and 21, Defendants’ Motion, [Docket No. 261], is GRANTED, as set forth above. In accordance with the present Order, Plaintiff must supplement its responses to Defendant Henry Schein's Interrogatory Nos. 1, 4, 9, 11, and 21 as soon as practicable and in any event by no later than January 13, 2021.

E. Defendant Henry Schein's RFP Nos. 2–8, 10–11, and 13

Defendant Henry Schein's Requests for Production Nos. 2–8, 10–11, and 13, as well as, Plaintiff's responses thereto are as follows:

(Plf.’s Resps. to Defendant Henry Schein's RFP [Docket No. 265-13]).

In the present Motion, Defendant Henry Schein's sole issue with Plaintiff's responses to RFP Nos. 2–8, 10–11, and 13 is that it is “unclear ... whether [Plaintiff] withheld any document on the basis of its objections. (Defs.’ Mem., [Docket No. 263], at 29). Defendant Henry Schein argues that Plaintiff is required to affirmatively state in its response whether or not it is withholding any documents on the basis of its objections.

In its memorandum, Plaintiff asserts that during the parties meet and confer Plaintiff's counsel “made clear to Defendants’ counsel ... that [Plaintiff] was not withholding any documents on the basis of any objections and had produced all responsive documents located in the document search and review.” (Plf.’s Mem., [Docket No. 273], at 11). Plaintiff argues that because it has informally informed Defendants of the absence of withheld documents, it is not required to supplement its actual discovery responses to include such an assertion. (See, Id.). Plaintiff is incorrect.

Rule 34(b)(2)(C) specifically provides that “[a]n objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added). In response to each of the discovery requests presently at issue Plaintiff raised at least one objection. (See, Plf.’s Resps. to Defendant Henry Schein's RFP [Docket No. 265-13]).[12] Consequently, a supplemental signed response to each request for production now at issue is required to affirmatively state whether or not Plaintiff is withholding any responsive material on the basis of any objection it raised to the respective request for production.

*20 Therefore, to the extent Defendants’ Motion seeks an Order of this Court compelling Plaintiff to supplement its responses to Defendant Henry Schein's Request for Production Nos. 2–8, 10–11, and 13, Defendants’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 261], is GRANTED, as set forth above. In accordance with the present Order, Plaintiff must supplement its responses to Defendant Henry Schein's Request for Production Nos. 2–8, 10–11, and 13 as soon as practicable and in any event by no later than January 13, 2021.

F. Additional Responsive Documents

Defendants assert that Plaintiff has unilaterally limited its search for responsive documents to a set of custodians without Defendants prior knowledge. Defendants argue that “Plaintiff should be obligated to produce all responsive documents it is aware of, whether such documents are possessed by the custodians searched.” (Defs.’ Mem., [Docket No. 263], at 32) (emphasis in original). Defendants do not identify the specific discovery request to which this argument applies. The only possible additional custodian to which Defendants refer is Sarah Mealey, the former human resource employee at Patterson, who sent letters to Defendants following Defendant Pace's termination of her employment with Plaintiff. (Id.).

Plaintiff asserts that it “engaged in a diligent effort to determine all persons with potentially relevant documents, including by interviewing possible custodians and discussing with [its] employees where relevant documents might be kept.” (Plf.’s Mem., [Docket No. 273], at 21). Plaintiff also included in its search the persons the Court previously ordered in response to discovery requests from Defendant Pace. (See, Order, [Docket No. 149], at 28–33). Plaintiff asserts that it “also searched for responsive documents in other ... company files, including employment agreements and policies.” (Plf.’s Mem., [Docket No. 273], at 22). Regarding Sarah Mealey, Plaintiff argues that there is nothing to be gained by adding her as a custodian because her “minimal involvement” included sending “two, standard form letters she sent to [Defendants] Pace and Henry Schein in March 2019, both of which already have been produced.” (Plf.’s Mem., [Docket No. 273], at 23).

The Court has already addressed the issue of identification of “custodians,” and it will not repeat that discussion here. (See, Order, [Docket No. 149], at 28–33). The Court previously identified custodians for purposes of discovery seeking relevant information. Plaintiff asserts that it has performed a search of those custodians, and Defendants do not refute that contention. In fact, Plaintiff asserts that it searched for responsive documents beyond these identified custodians.

If, however, Plaintiff is in fact aware of any additional custodian who possesses relevant information,[13] Plaintiff is required to include said custodian in it search for responsive documents, even if that custodian was not previously identified by the Court. In other words, Plaintiff will not be permitted to use this Court's previous Order as a shield behind which to obfuscate relevant, responsive documents.

Plaintiff is forewarned, however, that it maintains a duty to disclose any non-privileged, responsive materials of which it is aware regardless of where Plaintiff discovered those documents. See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e); 26(g). The purpose of discovery is to preclude surprises at trial. That is why when responding to requests for production, producing attorneys are required to certify their Rule 34 responses by signing the responses themselves; thereby, certifying that the responses are completed and thorough. See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g). “The signature ‘certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry.’ ” Catholic Mut. Relief Soc'y of Am. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., No. 17-cv-3141 (JRT/LIB), 2019 WL 4897189, at *3 (D. Minn. May 24, 2019) (quoting Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Md. 2008)). “If a certification violates this rule without substantial justification, the court on motion or on its own, must impose an appropriate sanction on the signer, the party on whose behalf the signer was acting, or both.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3). Thus, other than materials produced by Defendants in discovery, Plaintiff will be precluded from using any material at trial, or otherwise in support of its claims, unless Plaintiff had previously disclosed said materials to Defendants in the discovery period. See, Lumber v. PPG Indus., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 641, 643 n.1 (D. Minn. 1996) (noting the Court's power “to appropriately sanction a recalcitrant party for failing to responsibly honor its discovery obligations”).

*21 Therefore, to the extent Defendants’ Motion seeks an Order of this Court compelling Plaintiff to produce responsive, non-privileged materials already within Plaintiff's possession which Plaintiff has not already produced, Defendants’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 261], is GRANTED. To the extent Defendant's Motion seeks an Order of this Court designating Sarah Mealey, or some other unidentified person, as document custodian in the present action, Defendants’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 261], is DENIED.

G. Rule 26(a) Disclosures

As observed above, on April 22, 2020, Plaintiff served its Second Supplement to its Initial Disclosures. [Docket No. 266-1]. The entirety of Plaintiff's initial disclosures, including this Second Supplement to its Initial Disclosures and the Spreadsheet attached thereto, are designated as Attorneys’ Eyes Only. [Docket No. 266-1]. It includes a description of Plaintiff's alleged damages and the Spreadsheet discussed above. The Second Supplement to its Initial Disclosures also lists several of Plaintiff's current and former employees along with the person's job title, street address, and phone number, as well as, a brief description of the topics upon which the person may have information.

In the present case, the Protective Order defines Confidential Information as:

(Protective Order, [Docket No. 57], at 1–2). The Protective Order defines Highly Confidential—Attorney's Eyes Only as:

(Id. at 2). As relevant to the present Motion, the difference between the use of these two types of information is that Confidential Information may be shown to the parties and “[w]itnesses testifying in a deposition, or pretrial or trial proceedings, specifically in this Action.” (Id. at 6–7). On the Other hand, Highly Confidential—Attorney's Eyes Only designated information may not be shown to these individuals. (Id.).

Defendants seek an Order of this Court “de-designating [Plaintiff's] Initial Disclosures and the Exhibit A [S]preadsheet, from ‘Highly Confidential—Attorneys’ Eyes Only,’ to ‘Confidential.’ ” (Defs.’ Mem., [Docket No. 263], at 40). In support of this request, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the information in its initial disclosures is likely to significantly harm Plaintiff, and therefore, Plaintiff's initial disclosures should not be permitted to be designated as Highly Confidential—Attorneys’ Eyes Only. Defendants assert that this designation limits their ability to defend the present action because they are unable to view the damages alleged against them or the basis for those damages.

*22 Plaintiff asserts that the entirety of its Rule 26(a) initial disclosures should remain designated as Highly Confidential—Attorneys’ Eyes Only because, if the contents thereof were available to Defendants, then Plaintiff would likely suffer significant commercial harm. (Plf.’s Mem., [Docket No. 273], at 35). In support of this assertion, Plaintiff asserts that it is Defendants’ obligation to demonstrate good cause to de-designate Plaintiff's initial disclosures, and because Defendants have failed to do so, the designation should not be changed.

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff is incorrect that Defendants bears the burden on this particular issue. The Protective Order in the present case specifically provides that the party “who designated Information as Confidential or Highly Confidential—Attorney's Eyes Only has the burden of persuading the Court of the propriety of the designation.” (Protective Order, [Docket No. 57], at 10). Thus, it is Plaintiff who bears the burden of persuading the Court that the entirety of its initial disclosures warrants the “Highly Confidential—Attorneys’ Eyes Only” designation.

In the present case and on the record now before the Court, Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden.

Plaintiff's argument in support of the “Highly Confidential—Attorneys’ Eyes Only” designation ignores the fact that large portions its initial disclosures warrant no confidential status for any reason whatsoever. For example, Plaintiff's initial disclosures contain a list of person who may have knowledge of disputed facts, and for each person on that list, Plaintiff provides, among other things, their job title and a list of topics of which the person may have information. Plaintiff fails to offer any argument as to how Defendants’ knowledge of these job titles and topics of information related to the case would result in any harm to Plaintiff's competitive position. Plaintiff's initial disclosures also contain a list of general categories of documents which Plaintiff describes as “[d]ocuments currently known to bear some relevance to the disputed facts alleged” in the present case. ([Docket No. 266-1] at 8–9). Plaintiff here too fails to offer any argument as to how Defendants accessing this list, containing generic descriptions such as e.g., “Defendant's job description at Patterson,” could cause any harm to Plaintiff's competitive advantage.

The Court also finds the arguments espoused by Plaintiff to be based on speculation and conjecture.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants should not be granted access to the addresses and contact information of the persons listed in its initial disclosures because Defendant “Henry Schein has sought to convince multiple Patterson employees to leave the company and join Henry Schein.” (Plf.’s Mem., [Docket No. 273], at 35).[14] Plaintiff's argument is based on speculation, and it ignores the fact that the Protective Order, [Docket No. 57], specifically orders that “[a]ll Confidential Information (including Highly Confidential—Attorneys’ Eyes Only) shall be used solely for the purpose of litigating or attempting to resolve this Action. Any other use is prohibited.”

Similarly lacking merit is Plaintiff's argument that the disclosure of “names of customers, annual sales figures, and profit margins” to Defendants would cause significant harm to Plaintiff's competitive position because Plaintiff and Defendant Henry Schein are “fierce competitors.” (See, Plf.’s Mem., [Docket No. 273], at 35–36). Here again, Plaintiff's argument is based on its speculation that Defendants will violate this Court's Order which prohibits it from using said information for any purpose other than litigating the present action.

*23 Therefore, to the extent Defendants’ Motion seeks an Order of this Court removing the “Highly Confidential—Attorneys’ Eyes Only” designation from Plaintiff Second Supplement to its Initial Disclosures, [Docket No. 266-1], and the Spreadsheet attached thereto, Defendants’ Motion, [Docket No. 261], is GRANTED. As soon as practicable and in any event by no later than January 5, 2021, Plaintiff must serve upon Defendants a new copy of Plaintiff's Second Supplement to its Initial Disclosures and the Spreadsheet attached thereto with the Confidential Information designation.

V. Conclusion

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, and based on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

In the motion practice surrounding the parties’ present Motions, the parties filed several documents under temporary seal. The Court will address the possible continued sealing of these filings in a separate Order in accordance with Local Rule 5.6. Although the Court, in the present Order, references and quotes portions of some of the documents the parties filed under temporary seal, the Court finds that none of the references contained within the present Order warrant sealing the present Order. Therefore, the present Order will not be issued under seal.

This is the number of interrogatories as counted by Plaintiff. When Plaintiff's interrogatories are counted in accordance with Rule 33(a), Plaintiff has served well in excess of forty interrogatories. Because forty is already in excess of the permissible number of interrogatories, the Court need not reach the issue of the exact number of interrogatories served under Rule 33(a).

In opposition to the present Motion, Defendants’ counsel submitted a recording of the January 24, 2020, telephone conversation between counsel. [Docket No. 283-3]. To resolve the present issues, the Court need not and does not review the recording of this telephone conversation. As discussed below, even assuming solely for the sake of argument that Plaintiff's counsel's assertion regarding the contents of the conversation are accurate, Plaintiff still fails to present any persuasive argument in support of its requests to compel Defendants to respond to the excessive discovery.

Plaintiff now asserts that it only opposed Defendants’ previous Motion to the extent it sought to permit Defendant Henry Schein to take seven depositions in addition to those Defendant Pace was permitted to take, however, the record now before the Court does not support such a limited view Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants’ previous Motion. (See, Plf.’s Mem. [Docket No. 136]). Defendants sought to change the term “side” to “party,” and Plaintiff opposed that request. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to Defendants’ previous Motion is devoid of any indication of Plaintiff's current implicit assertion that it should be permitted to construe discovery limitations “per party” while Defendants are bound by “per side” limitations. (See, Id.).

Paragraph 11 of the Protective Order, [Docket No. 57], provides: “Any Party may apply to the Court for a modification of the provisions of this Order, and nothing in this Order shall be construed to prevent a Party from seeking such further provisions enhancing or limiting confidentiality as may be appropriate.” It should be noted that Defendant Henry Schein did not seek leave of the Court in any fashion prior to its unilateral redaction of the documents now at issue.

This may not, however, any longer be a concern because the parties purport to have ostensible agreed to stipulate to a new protective order which includes an “Enhanced Attorneys’ Eye Only” designation which does not permit viewing by in-house counsel. If the parties have so agreed, they should file said stipulation with the Court post haste.

Defendants also seek a Protective Order striking Plaintiff's second set of discovery requests to Defendant Henry Schein, as well as, Plaintiff's third set of discovery requests to Defendant Pace. These are the same discovery requests at issue in Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. [Docket No. 247]. For the reasons discussed above, the Court has already determined that Plaintiff is not entitled to serve said discovery requests. Therefore, to the extent Defendants’ Motion seeks an Order of this Court striking Plaintiff's second set of discovery requests to Defendant Henry Schein, as well as, Plaintiff's third set of discovery requests to Defendant Pace, Defendants’ Motion, [Docket No. 261], is DENIED as moot.

In their memorandum, Defendants conclusorily assert that Plaintiff must produce certain information in a particular manner. (See, Defs.’ Mem., [Docket No. 263], at 21) (asserting that Plaintiff must produce sales data “broken down by product type”). Plaintiff is not required, however, to produce responsive documents in any manner other than as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In their memorandum, Defendants identify five categories of hypothetical documents they contend must also be produced by Plaintiff. (See, Defs.’ Mem., [Docket No. 263], at 20–22). The Court makes no finding on the issue of these hypothetical documents. Plaintiff must produce responsive documents in accordance with this Order and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court will not engage in speculation as to the types of documents which exist.

To the extent Defendants seek an Order of this Court requiring Plaintiff to supplement its Rule 26(a) disclosures with this exact same information, Defendants’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 261], is DENIED. Such a production would be wholly duplicative, and Defendants are not entitled to duplicative discovery. See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(B)(2)(C).

The Spreadsheet contains only lost sales from existing customers and prospective customers. To the extent, Plaintiff intended the damages to its “economic value” to consist of anything other than solely the alleged lost sales identified in the Spreadsheet, Plaintiff must include this information in its response to Interrogatory Nos. 4, 9, 11, and 21. To the extent Plaintiff has any other information responsive to the “economic value” of its alleged trade secrets or the “nature and extent” of damages caused by Defendants’ alleged misappropriate of any trade secret, Plaintiff must present that information in response to Interrogatory Nos. 4, 9, 11, and 21, or Plaintiff risks being precluded from using said information at trial in support of its claims in the present case. See, Haddley v. Isanti Cty., No. 15-cv-2106 (DWF/LIB), 2016 WL 11004385, at *8 (D. Minn. May 31, 2016) (citing Lumber v. PPG Indus., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 641, 643 n.1 (D. Minn. 1996) (“In our view, the failure to produce evidence, without just cause, which is relevant within the context of Rule 26, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, bears a close relationship to the ‘spoliation of evidence,’ and should be sanctioned accordingly .... In the language of Cervantes, ‘a word to the wise is enough.’ Don Quixote, Part II, Book IV, Chapter 37, at page 692.”) (internal citations omitted). For example, Interrogatory No. 21, seeks “a calculation of all monetary relief [Plaintiff] claims in” the present action. (Plf.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Interrogatories [Docket No. 265-12]) (emphasis added). Plaintiff now points to only the supplemental Spreadsheet; however, the Spreadsheet contains only lost sales information. The Second Supplement to Plaintiff's Initial Disclosures, however, indicates that Plaintiff may be seeking other damages beyond the Spreadsheet. These other damages are not, however, contained in any written, signed response to Interrogatory No. 21.

Many, if not all, of these objections appear to be mere boilerplate objections lacking any substances. Such objections are disfavored. See, e.g., In re: RFC & ResCap Liquidating Trust Litig., No. 13-cv-3451 (SRN/JJK), 2015 WL 12778780, at *6 (D. Minn. June 8, 2015) (citation omitted); see, Farmers Ins. Exchange v. West, No. 11-cv-2297 (PAM/JJK), 2012 WL 12864845, at *10 (D. Minn. Sept. 21, 2012). Nevertheless, Plaintiff chose to raise said objections, and therefore, Plaintiff is now required to assert whether or not it is withholding any responsive materials on the basis of those objections.

Defendants have not here identified any such custodian at this time.

Plaintiff also argues that the “Highly Confidential—Attorneys’ Eyes Only” designation protects the privacy of the listed persons, but these persons’ privacy is equally protected under the “Confidential” designation for the reasons discussed herein.

To the extent any relief is not expressly provided for in this Order, the request for that relief is denied.

See, fn. 15.

See, fn. 15.