*1 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant's Discovery Responses. (Docket Entry 34.) For the following reasons the Court will grant Plaintiff's motion to the extent described below. Furthermore, because the case was conditionally certified as a collective action on December 16, 2020 (see Docket Entry 49), the Court will also order the parties to propose a reasonable schedule for the second phase of discovery.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 6, 2019, Plaintiff Kristen Leann Horton filed this collective action on behalf of herself and similarly situated female “Operations Managers” currently or formerly employed by Defendant Love's Travel Stops & Country Stores, Inc. (“Love's”), alleging violations of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). (See generally Compl., Docket Entry 1.)

This matter came before the Court for an initial pretrial conference on May 20, 2020. (Minute Entry dated 05/20/20.) Pursuant to the Court's Order following the pretrial conference, discovery was bifurcated into two phases. (Text Order dated 05/21/2020.) The first phase of discovery was “limited to the issue of whether Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs are ‘similarly situated’ such that Plaintiff's claims can be conditionally certified as a collective action for notice purposes” and discovery related to the individual merits of Plaintiff and the Opt-in Plaintiffs. (Docket Entry 30 at 2.) The second phase of discovery was set to begin following a grant of conditional certification. (Id.)

Plaintiff served Defendant with its First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents on May 22, 2020. (Docket Entry 35 at 1.) Plaintiff served a second set of discovery requests on June 12, 2020. (Id.) Defendant served Plaintiff responses to these discovery requests on July 24, 2020 and August 3, 2020 respectively. (Id. at 2; see also Docket Entries 35-1, 35-2, 35-3, 35-4.) Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel and supporting materials on September 30, 2020. (Docket Entries 34, 35.) However, shortly after Plaintiff's motion to compel was filed, the parties moved jointly to stay the discovery deadlines in the case to give them time to focus their efforts on mediation. (Docket Entries 37, 38.) The Court granted the stay. (See Text Order dated 10/06/2020.) Mediation occurred on October 14, 2020 but resulted in impasse. (See Docket Entry 39.)

Following unsuccessful mediation, the Court lifted the stay on discovery and entered a protective order in the case. (See Text Order dated 12/04/2020; Docket Entry 43-1.) Defendant then filed a response to Plaintiff's motion to compel. (Docket Entry 48.) Plaintiff thereafter filed a reply. (Docket Entry 50.) Between the dates that the response and reply were filed and after receiving a joint proposal from the parties, the Court entered an Order conditionally certifying the case as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and outlining the notice procedures for potential opt-in Plaintiffs. (Docket Entries 47, 49.) Now that the case has been conditionally certified as a collective action, the second phase of discovery has begun. (See Docket Entry 30 at 2; Docket Entry 49.)

*2 In light of the multiple intervening events that occurred between the time Plaintiff's originally filed their motion to compel and when the motion became ripe for disposition, the Court instructed the parties to meet and confer and submit a joint status report outlining any remaining points of disagreement relating to the motion to compel. (See Text Order dated 03/05/2021.) The parties submitted their Joint Status Report on March 19, 2021 identifying four issues that they were unable to resolve. (Docket Entry 62.) The Court addresses each of these issues below.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides general rules regarding the scope of discovery:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). When a party fails to respond to a discovery request, the party seeking discovery “may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). District courts generally have broad discretion in managing discovery, including whether to grant or deny a motion to compel. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Virginia, Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 929 (4th Cir. 1995); Erdmann v. Preferred Research, Inc. of Georgia, 852 F.2d 788, 792 (4th Cir. 1988). “[T]he party or person resisting discovery, not the party moving to compel discovery, bears the burden of persuasion.” Carter Hughes v. Research Triangle Inst., No. 1:11CV546, 2014 WL 4384078, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 3, 2014) (unpublished) (citation omitted).

B. RFP No. 5

Request for Production (“RFP”) No. 5 from Plaintiff's First Set of RFPs requests:

(Docket Entry 35-2 at 8.) Per the Joint Status Report, Defendant has agreed to provide “all discovery responsive to this request except complaints by Operations Manager Rachel Lewis.” (Docket Entry 62 at 3 (emphasis in original).) Thus, the parties are at an impasse regarding this request for production. (Id.)

As the party resisting discovery, Defendant bears the burden of persuading the Court why complaints by Operations Manager Rachel Lewis should not be produced. See Carter Hughes, 2014 WL 4384078, at *2. The Joint Status Report includes no explanation for Defendant's unwillingness to produce these documents. (Docket Entry 62 at 3.) The parties indicated in the Joint Status Report that they “otherwise rely on their arguments as fully briefed in the papers already before the Court regarding Plaintiff's Motion to Compel.” (Docket Entry 62 at 2.) However, Defendant's response brief does not include any arguments regarding why Rachel Lewis’ complaints should not be disclosed. (See generally Docket Entry 48.) In fact, Defendant specifically states that “Love's will produce confidential documents pursuant to the entered Protective Order in response to ... Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Production Nos. 1, 2, 5 ....” (Id. at 4 n.1.) Nor did Defendant make any particularized objection to producing complaints by Rachel Lewis in its original response to Plaintiff's First Set of RFPs. (See Docket Entry 35-2 at 8-9.) Defendant's original response to Plaintiff's RFP No. 5 raises only general objections concerning the relevance, proportionality, and specificity of this request. (Id.) Moreover, Defendant appears to have abandoned these objections by agreeing to produce responsive documents in its response brief. (See Docket Entry 48 at 4 n.1.)

*3 The documents sought by RFP No. 5 are clearly relevant to the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 41 (“Consistent with Defendant's policy, pattern or practice, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the Putative EPA Collective members the same wages it paid to male [Operations Managers] for equal work which required the performance of equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which were performed under similar working conditions.”).) Defendant has not given the court any reason to believe that complaints by Operations Manager Rachel Lewis are privileged, disproportionate to the needs of this case, or otherwise undiscoverable. Therefore, Defendant has not met its burden in resisting discovery, and Plaintiff's motion to compel will be granted as to any complaints by Operations Manager Rachel Lewis.

C. RFP No. 3

RFP No. 3 from Plaintiff's First Set of RFPs requests:

(Docket Entry 35-2 at 6.) According to the Joint Status Report, Defendant “intends to produce all responsive documents except communications from Defendant's Learning and Development Project Lead Kate Griggs sent on or about October 24, 2018.” (Docket Entry 62 at 4 (emphasis in original).) The parties have therefore reached impasse with respect to these communications. (Id.)

Again, Defendant bears the burden of persuading the Court why these particular communications are not discoverable. And again, Defendant has not made any such argument in its filings. In its response brief, Defendant makes no mention of Kate Griggs, but merely states that it intends to supplement its response to this request “[g]iven that Love's now has consented to conditional certification.” (Docket Entry 48 at 5.) The Joint Status Report provides no explanation for Defendant's position. (See generally Docket Entry 62.) Defendant's original response to Plaintiff's First Set of RFPs raised primarily boilerplate objections to the relevance, proportionality, and specificity of the request. (Docket Entry 32-5 at 6-7.) Such boilerplate objections “do not suffice.” Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. ConvaTec Inc., 268 F.R.D. 226, 241, 247 (M.D.N.C. 2010) (“[M]agistrate judges in at least five district courts in the Fourth Circuit have declared boilerplate objections to discovery requests, including for documents, invalid.”). The only non-boilerplate argument in Defendant's response is a conclusory statement that the request “refers to documents that Love's produced subject to a protective order in a previous litigation which states ‘Confidential Material shall be used only for the purposes of preparing for and conducting the litigation ....’ ” (Docket Entry 35-2 at 7.)

When the production of discovery documents would violate a protective order entered in a separate litigation, “[p]rinciples of comity and respect for preexisting judicial orders generally compel the parties to return to the court that issued the existing protective order for any modifications.” Bowen v. Adidas Am., Inc., No. CV 3:18-3118-JFA, 2021 WL 425889, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 5, 2021) (unpublished). However, “[t]hese principles, while unquestionably important, are not absolute, and courts asked to issue discovery orders in litigation pending before them also have not shied away from doing so, even when it would modify or circumvent a discovery order by another court, if under the circumstances, such a result was considered justified.” Tucker v. Ohtsu Tire & Rubber Co., 191 F.R.D. 495, 499-500 (D. Md. 2000).

*4 Here, Defendant has provided no further information about this previous litigation or the alleged protective order. Nor is it clear from Defendant's response to Plaintiff's RFP No. 3 that the objection even applies to the communications by Kate Griggs now at issue. Defendant did not raise any argument concerning a prior protective order that might be operational in this case in its brief in response to Plaintiff's motion to compel. Without more, the Court cannot determine whether this alleged prior protective order would have any bearing on the discoverability of the documents Plaintiff seeks. Documents analyzing pay, hiring or promotion disparities between male and female Operations Managers employed by Defendant are clearly relevant to Plaintiff's allegations. Defendant simply has not met its burden to resist the discovery of these communications. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion to compel will be granted as to any communications from Defendant's Learning and Development Project Lead Kate Griggs sent on or about October 24, 2018.

D. RFP Nos. 6 and 24

The Court addresses these two RFPs together because the parties have reached impasse on the limited issue of the time period for Defendant's productions pursuant to these discovery requests. (See Docket Entry 62 at 3-4.) Plaintiff's RFP No. 6 from Plaintiff's First Set of RFPs requests:

(Docket Entry 35-2 at 9.) Regarding this request, Defendant has agreed to provide responsive documents limited to those “created at any time three years prior to the filing of this lawsuit.” (Docket Entry 62 at 4.) Plaintiff agreed to limit the request to documents created “any time four years prior to the filing of the lawsuit.” (Id.) Neither party has provided any basis for the time period they have proposed. (See generally Docket Entries 35, 48, 50, 62.)

RFP No. 24 from Plaintiff's Second set of RFPs requests:

(Docket Entry 35-4 at 23.) Here too, Defendant has agreed to produce responsive documents created within three years of the filing of the lawsuit, whereas Plaintiff has agreed to limit the request to six years. (Docket Entry 62 at 3.) Again, neither party has provided the Court with arguments in support of its proposed time period for this request.

First, the Court notes that for claims like Plaintiff's, brought “[u]nder the FLSA, the limitations period is generally two years but can extend to three years where a defendant's violation was willful.” Privette v. Waste Pro of N. Carolina, Inc., No. 2:19-CV-3221-DCN, 2020 WL 1892167, at *7 (D.S.C. Apr. 16, 2020) (unpublished) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 255(a)). Plaintiff has alleged willful conduct by Defendant and has asserted that a three-year statute of limitations applies in this case. (See Compl. ¶¶ 39, 44, 53, 54.) Without any arguments before it, the Court can only speculate that Defendant's refusal to produce documents created more than three years prior to the filing of this lawsuit might be based on the statute of limitations. However, when setting the temporal scope of discovery, a Court is not restrained to the limitations period. See, e.g., Owens v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 221 F.R.D. 649, 655 (D. Kan. 2004) (“With regard to temporal scope, discovery of information both before and after the liability period ... may be relevant and/or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and courts commonly extend the scope of discovery to a reasonable number of years both prior to and following such period.”). The proper inquiry for the Court is whether Defendant's burden of producing relevant documents from a longer time period would outweigh the benefit of the information sought. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

*5 Here, Defendant has not articulated the burden it would face in producing responsive documents that were created more than three years prior to the filing of this lawsuit. Plaintiff has alleged a “policy, pattern or practice” of paying female Operations Managers less than their male counterparts (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 39, 41, 47), which necessarily involves conduct over time. To provide context for the EPA violations that allegedly occurred during the three-year limitations period, the Court finds it reasonable to set the temporal scope of Defendant's productions pursuant to these two RFPs at four years prior to the filing of this lawsuit. Accordingly, Defendant shall produce all documents responsive to these two requests created between December 6, 2015 and the date of this Order.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant's Discovery Responses (Docket Entry 34) is GRANTED to the extent described above. Defendant shall supplement its responses as stated herein no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within fourteen (14) days of this Order, the parties shall meet and confer and submit a joint proposal to the Court setting forth a reasonable schedule for the second phase of discovery that includes an overall discovery deadline of July 30, 2021 and an August 30, 2021 deadline for dispositive motions. The parties should be forewarned that the Court will review any requests for extensions of these deadlines with close scrutiny given the age of this case.

March 29, 2020

Durham, North Carolina