*1 Before me is Plaintiff Sean Stenson's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order Dated June 25, 2020 (“Mot. for Reconsideration,” ECF No. 75). My June 25, 2020 Order granted in part Defendants’ Motion for Attorney Fees and Sanctions. See 6/25/2020 Order, ECF No. 71. In the present Motion for Reconsideration, Stenson “requests 45 days to file a fully briefed motion for reconsideration because he needs time to serve Defendants with limited discovery requests concerning: a) the fee agreement(s) with Defendants to show the amounts claimed are consistent with the fee agreement(s); b) the billing statements submitted to Defendants for legal services provided equal $14,786.64 and $107,074.88; c) payments made by Defendants equal $14,786.64 and $107,074.88; and d) whether the fees charged and/or collected are reasonable.” Mot. for Reconsideration at 2. In his Reply, Stenson tacked on an additional request—that, should I deny his request for reconsideration of my June 25, 2020 Order, I certify the issues regarding dismissal of his non-economic damages claim and the attorney fees awarded for an interlocutory appeal to the Tenth Circuit. See Reply at 5, ECF No. 81. For the reasons stated below, Stenson's request for reconsideration of the substantive rulings made in my June 25, 2020 is DENIED.

On June 11, 2019, I granted Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and Order Release of Medical Records. See Order Granting Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 26. I stated that Stenson “has repeatedly failed to provide complete records, and he appears unwilling to request and produce all relevant pre-collision medical information himself.” Id. at 3. I also found Stenson's financial information relevant to his non-economic claims. See id. at 4.

On November 22, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Sanctions seeking attorney fees associated with the Motion to Compel and attorney fees associated with the preparation of the Motion for Attorney Fees and Sanctions. See Mot. for Att'y Fees and Sanctions at 2, ECF No. 42. In addition, Defendants moved for a sanction dismissing at least Plaintiff's non-economic claims for Plaintiff's interference with the judicial process or, in the alternative, for Plaintiff's failure to obey my previous orders.

In my June 25, 2020 Order, I granted in part Defendants’ Motion for Attorney Fees and Sanctions, finding that Defendants’ Motion to Compel was necessitated by Stenson's unwillingness to provide a proper medical release and failure to produce complete records” and that Stenson's “actions repeatedly frustrated discovery and were not substantially justified.” 6/25/2020 Order at 4. I held that the sum of $16,803 was a reasonable fee for the Motion to Compel based on the “number of hours reasonably expended ... multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. at 5. Additionally, I found that Stenson's abusive litigation conduct warranted sanctions because Stenson “failed to comply with [the Court's] order and continued to provide false assertions of complete production” and “admitted that he wrote the fictitious checks to himself and stated that ‘they were a fraud.’ ” Id. at 3. Accordingly, I ordered three forms of relief: (1) an award of $16,803 in attorney fees to Defendants for having to make the Motion to Compel; (2) an award to Defendants of reasonable expenses incurred in making and defending the Motion for Attorney Fees and Sanctions; and (3) dismissal of Stenson's non-economic damages. Id. at 10.

*2 On July 8, 2020, Defendants filed their Application for Attorney Fees and Expenses (“Fee Application”), seeking $107,074.88 in attorney fees associated with making and defending the Motion for Attorney Fees and Sanctions. See Fee Application, ECF No. 72. Defendants also explained that they incurred only $14,786.64 in actual out-of-pocket expenses associated with their Motion to Compel—not the $16,803 figure that was previously requested and awarded. See id. at 3. In preparing the Fee Application, defense counsel learned that a customary 12% discount had not been applied to the amount of attorney fees associated with the Motion to Compel, and thus the award of $16,803 should be modified to $14,786.64. Id.; see also Casolaro Aff. ¶9, ECF No. 73. The next day, Stenson filed the Motion for Reconsideration.

While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not directly provide for a motion to reconsider an interlocutory ruling, district courts have discretion to reconsider interlocutory orders before the entry of judgment. See Mantooth v. Bavaria Inn Rest., Inc., 360 F.Supp.3d 1164, 1168-69 (D. Colo. 2019). “Notwithstanding the district court's broad discretion to alter its interlocutory orders, the motion to reconsider is not at the disposal of parties who want to rehash old arguments.” Id. at 1169 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “A motion to reconsider should be denied unless it clearly demonstrates manifest error of law or fact or presents newly discovered evidence.” Nat'l Bus. Brokers, Ltd. v. Jim Williamson Prods., Inc., 115 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1256 (D. Colo. 2000) (alteration incorporated).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a district court judge has discretion to certify an otherwise unappealable order as appealable if the order (1) “involves a controlling question of law,” (2) “as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and (3) “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 47 (1995). While I have discretion in determining whether to certify an order for interlocutory appeal, certification is generally warranted only in “exceptional” cases. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 74 (1996).

Stenson points to no new evidence, no new legal authority, and no clear error in the Court's findings that would justify reconsideration of my decision to impose sanctions. Indeed, while Stenson's Reply requests that I certify the issues regarding dismissal of his non-economic damages claim for an interlocutory appeal to the Tenth Circuit (see Reply at 5), his actual Motion does not address the Court's sanction dismissing his non-economic claims. Nor is there any basis for reconsideration of my award of attorney fees associated with Defendants making and defending the Motion for Attorney Fees and Sanctions. I found that Defendants were entitled to their attorney fees for that motion because Stenson's fraudulent misconduct and failure to comply with my previous order necessitated such a motion. See 6/25/2020 Order at 4-5. Stenson has provided no new evidence, change in the law, or clear error that has any bearing on that finding or any other ruling made in the June 25, 2020 Order. I will not allow Stenson to waste time and resources relitigating the substantive findings made in my June 25, 2020 Order.

I further decline to certify the issues regarding dismissal of Stenson's non-economic damages claim and the attorney fees awarded for an interlocutory appeal to the Tenth Circuit. In his Reply, Stenson asserts that “[t]here is a split of authority on the dismissal of the non-economic damages claims, and/or the order in question involves a potentially important issue of first impression regarding the dismissal of the noneconomic damages claims.” Reply at 4. Stenson provided no further explanation or legal citations to support this conclusory statement. Indeed, Stenson included no statutory authority or case law whatsoever to justify his request that I certify the June 25, 2020 Order for interlocutory review. Although Stenson claims that “an immediate appeal will materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation,” id., his own misconduct has already wasted time and resources, and I do not see how an immediate appeal of my June 25, 2020 Order will bring the case any closer to termination. Therefore, I decline to exercise my discretion to certify the June 25, 2020 Order for interlocutory appeal.

*3 However, I am reluctant to accept Defendants’ contention that Stenson waived his right to challenge the reasonableness of the fee amounts or that he conceded that the hourly rates and time worked were reasonable. See Resp. at 8, ECF No. 78. As Stenson states, the Court must be assured that billing errors are not also embedded in Defendants’ current $107,074.88 request and that the fees claimed in the Fee Application are reasonable. I will not reconsider my ruling that Defendants are entitled to fees associated with the Motion to Compel and the Motion for Attorney Fees and Sanctions, but I do think arguments related to the accuracy and reasonableness of the amounts requested in the Fee Application warrant consideration. To that end, I will allow Stenson to file an objection to the fees included in Defendants’ Fee Application, and I will then refer the Fee Application (ECF No. 72) and the related motions to compel discovery regarding the fees requested (ECF Nos. 82 & 83) to the assigned magistrate judge. After resolving Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and reviewing Plaintiff's initial objection to the Fee Application, the magistrate judge may deem it appropriate to allow Plaintiff to supplement his objection or may have the parties present experts at an evidentiary hearing, but I leave that up to the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge will then determine the appropriate fee amount and issue a recommendation on the Fee Application.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 75) is DENIED. However, Plaintiff may file an objection to Defendants’ Fee Application (ECF No. 72), with the objection due on or before October 5, 2020.

DATED this 14th day of September, 2020.