*1 Before this Court are Plaintiffs’ second Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (ECF No. 110), Defendant Imperial Pacific International (CNMI), LLC (“IPI”)’s opposition (ECF No. 124), and Plaintiffs’ Reply (ECF No. 128), as well as Plaintiffs’ third Motion for Attorneys’ fees (ECF No. 133.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS the two motions and ORDERS IPI to pay Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees in the amount of $93,834.25.

The parties are familiar with the details of the discovery disputes in this matter, which have been thoroughly recounted in this Court's Amended Memorandum Decision Striking IPI's Answer and Entering Default Judgment Under Rule 37 (July 17, 2020, ECF No. 193). The Court will briefly state the facts that resulted in the filing of the two motions for attorneys’ fees at issue here.

On April 16, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 84) against Defendant IPI for discovery order violations. (Minutes, ECF No. 98.) However, in March, IPI retained what it represented to be the CNMI's most experienced law firm with ESI discovery, and for that reason the Court ordered new discovery deadlines. (Id.) It also granted Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs and ordered briefing as to the amount. (Id.) Almost immediately following that hearing, IPI terminated that law firm and hired its current counsel. (Memo. in Support of Mot. to Withdraw at 3, ECF No. 99-1.) Plaintiffs objected to the substitution on the grounds that it would cause delay, noncompliance and loss of evidence as more and more IPI employees left the company. (Opposition to Mot. to Withdraw at 4, ECF No. 101.) Over Plaintiffs’ objection, the Court granted IPI's request for new counsel but gave a stern warning that having new counsel would not be a defense to any violations of the Court's discovery orders. (Minutes, ECF No. 107.)

As Plaintiffs anticipated, IPI's change of counsel set back the progress the parties had made regarding discovery and IPI failed to comply with the new discovery deadlines. It also failed to file a certification regarding its progress as ordered by the Court. Instead, it was Plaintiffs that filed a status report to inform the Court of the deficiencies in IPI's discovery efforts. (Pls.’ Status Report, ECF No. 123.) On May 28, 2020, the Court held a status conference to address the ongoing violations. (Minutes, ECF No. 135.) Again, finding that IPI had violated this Court's orders regarding discovery, the Court granted Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and costs, and ordered briefing as to the amount. (Id. at 2.) The Court did not permit IPI to file an opposition to that third motion for attorney's fees. (Id.)

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if a party fails to obey a discovery order, “the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). Once a court has determined that attorneys’ fees and costs should be awarded, it must calculate those fees by applying the lodestar method of multiplying reasonably expended hours by a reasonable hourly rate. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). In most cases, the reasonable hourly rate is based on the prevailing rate for similarly skilled and experienced attorneys in the forum where the court sits. Id. at 979. However, a court may rely on prevailing rates from outside the forum “if local counsel was unavailable, either because they are unwilling or unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience, expertise, or specialization required to handle properly the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The burden is on the party requesting the fees to provide satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate. Id. at 980 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)).

*2 “A district court should exclude from the lodestar amount hours that are not reasonably expended because they are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’ ” Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). The attorney requesting fees must prove that it exercised billing judgment for the hours billed. Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Center, LLC, 893 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 2018). “The party opposing the fee application has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397–98 (9th Cir. 1992).

The lodestar amount is presumptively reasonable, but the court can adjust it upwards or downwards based on other considerations. Van Gerwen, 214 F.3d at 1046. Thus, after calculating the lodestar figure, the second step is for the court to assess the rate for reasonableness based on the Kerr factors.[1] Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363–64 (9th Cir. 1996). Only in rare cases should the lodestar amount be adjusted. Id.

The Court previously determined the reasonable hourly rate for Plaintiffs’ attorneys, Aaron Halegua ($400) and Bruce Berline ($300), as well as paralegal Jacob Kessler ($125). (Amended Order Granting Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, ECF No. 108.) Plaintiffs now request attorneys’ fees for an additional attorney, Times Wang. IPI objects to his proposed hourly rate, and so the Court will address the lodestar rate for Mr. Wang. Additionally, the Court will review the number of hours proposed for all attorneys for reasonableness.

a. Times Wang

Wang is an attorney with nine years of experience litigating complex civil cases. (Wang Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 113.) He has been assisting Plaintiffs’ counsel in the case at their request. (Id. ¶ 2.) Wang assisted with legal research for the motion to compel, but Plaintiffs did not request attorneys’ fees for his time in their first motion for attorneys’ fees. (First Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees at 10, ECF No. 62.) However, in their second and third motions, Plaintiffs request 18.59 and 6.11 hours, respectively, for time Wang spent on this case. (Reply at 7, ECF No. 128; Third Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees at 4, ECF No. 133.) Plaintiffs propose $400 as a reasonable hourly fee for Wang for the same reasons the Court approved that rate for Halegua. (Second Mot. at 5, ECF No. 110.)

In concluding that a $400 hourly rate was reasonable for Halegua, the Court first found that the relevant community was the nation because “civil TVPRA cases involve a specialized area of law and Halegua brings expertise and experience that local attorneys cannot provide.” (Amended Order Granting Attorneys’ Fees and Costs at 5, ECF No. 108.) The Court then considered “the prevailing national rate for ‘similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.’ ” (Id. at 6) (quoting Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979). IPI counters that a $400 hourly rate for Wang is unreasonable because Plaintiffs have not shown why the Court should not use the prevailing rate for the forum district, as there is nothing to indicate that the type of assistance Wang provided—legal research and editing— required special skills or expertise that a local attorney could not provide. (Opposition at 5, ECF No. 124.) IPI proposes $300 as a reasonable hourly rate for Wang. (Id.)

*3 Cost-effectiveness is an integral element of reasonableness for attorney fees. “[S]easoned lawyers should divide their labor with junior lawyers and legal assistants to provide cost-effective services.” Graves v. Penzone, No. CV-77-00479-PHX-NVW, 2020 WL 1984022, at *8 (D. Ariz. Apr. 27, 2020). However, Halegua and Berline, as solo practitioners, do not have the ability to delegate work to associate attorneys. Therefore, engaging outside attorneys for assistance is reasonable. Wang has expertise in large scale e-discovery and complex civil litigation. (Second Wang Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 128-2.) Plaintiffs and IPI agree that the scope of e-discovery in this matter is unique for the CNMI. (See IPI Opposition to Pls.’ Second Mot. for Sanctions at 7, ECF No. 91; Reply at 6, ECF No. 128.) Wang's expertise is relevant, and he has knowledge about the case, as he has been assisting Plaintiffs since December 2019. (See Halegua Decl. ¶ 36, ECF No. 63.) While the particular legal tasks Wang performed for this motion might have been suited for a more junior attorney, it is not reasonable for Plaintiffs to find new outside counsel for each specific task they need assistance with. Therefore, as it did with Halegua, the Court will apply a national hourly rate for Wang. However, it notes that Wang relies on his fee awards in the Southern District of New York and the District of Columbia matrices in support of a $400 hourly rate. (Wang Decl. ¶¶ 8–10.) Those amounts do not reflect a national rate, but rather attorneys’ fees in two of the more expensive parts of the country. The Court will again consider the range of fees granted in TVPRA cases for attorneys with eight to ten years’ experience, $300 to $450 per hour. (See Amended Order Granting Attorneys’ Fees and Costs at 7–8, ECF No. 108.) Considering Wang's experience and expertise, the Court finds a $350 hourly rate reasonable.

b. Reasonable Hours Worked for Second Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

Having determined the hourly rates, the Court turns to the number of hours. The Court will first address Plaintiffs’ second motion for attorneys’ fees, which the Court allowed IPI to oppose. Halegua requested reimbursement for 123.4 hours; Berline for 26.74 hours; Wang for 18.59 hours; and Kessler for 4.07 hours. (Second Mot. at 7; Reply at 7.) As to Wang, IPI objects to the format of his hours, asserting that it is impermissible block billing and therefore his hours should be reduced. (Opposition at 2.) Otherwise, IPI expressly does not dispute the reasonableness of the requested attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id.) The party opposing a fee award has the burden of rebuttal to challenge the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397–98 (9th Cir. 1992).

“Block-billing is the practice of including various tasks within one time entry without specifying the time spent on each task within an entry.” Bana v. Volcano Corp., 47 F. Supp. 3d 957, 966 n.9 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Courts may reduce a fee award for hours billed in block format because it “makes it more difficult to determine how much time was spent on particular activities.” Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007). IPI objects to Wang's billing entries that include legal research and analysis with calls and emails on the same subject in a single entry for a day. (Opposition at 3.) Although these entries do include more than one activity, the Court does not find that they make it difficult to determine the reasonableness of the hours worked, particularly because all of the hours were dedicated to the same issue. (See Wang Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 113.) Wang's requested hours were all focused on the sanctions motion. Therefore, there is no risk that the fee award will include hours spent on tasks not contemplated by Rule 37(b)(2)(C), which mandates the payment of reasonable attorneys’ fees caused by a failure to obey a court order regarding discovery.

As to the remaining hours expended, IPI did not object to their reasonableness. The Court still must review the hours billed for reasonableness because excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours should be excluded from lodestar amounts. Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs are requesting a large number of hours, but the second motion covers a span of almost four months. (See Halegua Timesheet, ECF No. 111-1; Berline Timesheet, ECF No. 112-1.) However, some of the hours proposed are excessive or redundant. For example, Halegua spent almost 2.5 hours drafting an email memorializing a meet and confer that was only one hour on January 16, and almost an hour doing the same for a half-hour telephone call on February 5. Additionally, all three attorneys billed for time spent editing the reply brief. These entries represent a small portion of the total hours requested. Therefore, the Court finds it appropriate to reduce the requested attorney hours by ten percent to compensate for redundancy and excessiveness.

*4 On Plaintiff's second motion for attorney's fees, the Court awards $58,008.40 based on the following:

c. Third Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

The Court did not permit IPI to respond to Plaintiffs’ third Motion for Attorneys’ fees, but the Court must review the hours submitted for reasonableness. IPI's failure to cooperate with discovery forced Plaintiffs to take on tasks it otherwise would not have needed to perform, such as filing a status report with the Court, communicating with ESI vendors, and searching the ACONEX database. Plaintiffs should not have to bear those costs. However, the time period covered by the third motion is less than one month, significantly shorter than the previous motion. At least some of the hours included in timesheets were spent reviewing discovery produced by IPI, hours Plaintiffs would have expended had discovery proceeded normally in this case. Therefore, the Court finds it appropriate to reduce the requested hours by ten percent to compensate for time spent reviewing discovery.

On Plaintiffs’ second motion for attorney's fees, the Court awards $35,825.85 based on the following:

IPI's repeated failures to abide by this Court's discovery orders have resulted in this sanction. IPI has changed counsel multiple times over the course of this case, considerably complicating the discovery process. To date, IPI's current counsel is still reconstructing discovery sought by Plaintiffs back in September 2019, and ordered as a part of the December 2019 sanctions and the parties’ January 2020 stipulation.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court now GRANTS Plaintiffs’ two motions and ORDERS Defendant IPI to pay to Plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees caused by IPI's violations of this Court's discovery orders in the amount of $93,834.25.

The twelve Kerr factors are: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976)).