*1 This is an insurance action. The Plaintiff, Trisura Specialty Insurance Co., has sued the Defendants, Kanpai, Inc. and Clay Lewis, seeking a declaration that it has no duty to defend or indemnify Kanpai in an underlying state-court suit between the Defendants. Trisura filed a summary judgment motion [ECF No. 47] more than two months before the close of discovery. In response, the Defendants filed a motion to continue [ECF No. 52] (the “Motion”), in which they ask for more time to conduct discovery and respond to Trisura's motion. For the reasons set out below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Defendants’ Motion.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) “provides shelter against a premature motion for summary judgment.” Est. of Todashev by Shibly v. United States, 815 F. App'x 446, 450 (11th Cir. 2020). To that end, the Rule provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). “Whether to grant or deny a Rule 56(d) motion for discovery requires the court to balance the movant's demonstrated need for discovery against the burden such discovery will place on the opposing party.” Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 1998). In striking this balance, though, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that Rule 56(d) “is infused with a spirit of liberality.” Reflectone, Inc. v. Farrand Optical Co., 862 F.2d 841, 844 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Wallace v. Brownell Pontiac-GMC Co., 703 F.2d 525, 527 (11th Cir. 1983)). And this makes sense: granting summary judgment when a party hasn't had a chance to discover the facts it needs to defend its position would undermine our pursuit of justice.

In accordance with Rule 56(d), the Defendants have filed an affidavit, in which they lay out their request for more time to conduct discovery before responding to Trisura's motion for summary judgment. See Affidavit [ECF No. 52-1]. That affidavit explains that Trisura's motion “included a six page affidavit from a previously undisclosed witness,” Dragan Djordjevic, Trisura's Head of Underwriting. Id. ¶ 7. In its summary judgment motion, Trisura argues that the insurance policy it issued to Kanpai was “void” and should be “rescinded” because Trisura (allegedly) relied on Kanpai's material misrepresentations. See Motion for Summary Judgment at 1–2, 6. Trisura apparently offers Djordjevic's affidavit to prove reliance and materiality: that Trisura would either have significantly raised premiums or else refused to issue the policy at all had it known of Kanpai's misrepresentations. Id. at 10–11. But the Defendants aver—and Trisura does not dispute—that Trisura never identified this witness through its Rule 26(a) disclosures. See Affidavit ¶ 8. And so, the Defendants (fairly) ask for some more time to depose Djordjevic, as well as the insurance agent who helped procure the policy, to scrutinize (and perhaps undermine) Djordjevic's testimony. Id. ¶ 21.

*2 Unsurprisingly, courts have routinely granted extensions in similar circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Wernicke, 2019 WL 718558, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2019) (granting a Rule 56(d) motion where the summary judgment motion was filed “well before the parties’ agreed discovery deadline”—and so, the non-movant “had only a limited opportunity to engage in discovery”); The Indigo Room, Inc. v. City of Fort Myers, 2013 WL 12155439, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2013) (granting a Rule 56(d) motion where the motion was made “within the discovery deadline” and counsel “point[ed] to specific items of evidence and testimony” it needed, including “additional depositions”); Starace v. Averitt Express, Inc., 2013 WL 12170581, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2013) (granting a Rule 56(d) motion where “expert discovery [was] not yet complete”—and so, the motion for summary judgment was “premature”).

In response, Trisura concedes that the Defendants deserve some additional discovery. See Opposition to Motion to Continue [ECF No. 55] at 3. Specifically, Trisura agrees to an extension through July 19, 2021. Id. This, Trisura says, “would allow Defendants more than six weeks to complete their requested depositions and file whatever affidavits, etc. they deemed appropriate to oppose Plaintiff's Motion.” Id. Trisura objects, though, to the Defendants’ request for an extension through September 7, 2021—which is fourteen days past the summary judgment deadline. Fair enough. But, given this Court's scheduling orders [ECF Nos. 27, 31], which set a discovery deadline of August 9, 2021, the Court finds that the summary judgment deadline should be pushed back—especially since neither Trisura nor the Defendants explain how they might possibly be prejudiced by having to litigate the summary judgment motion after the close of discovery. In short, the Defendants will be allowed more time to conduct discovery and respond to Trisura's motion.

Consistent with the “spirit of liberality” underlying Rule 56(d), the Court ORDERS and ADJUDGES as follows:

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 15th day of June 2021.