*1 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Southern-Owners Insurance Company's (“Southern”) Motion for Attorneys' Fees in Responding to Sanborn Builders, Inc.'s (“Sanborn”) Motion to Compel Discovery Responses. ECF Doc. 25. Defendant Sanborn responded in opposition. ECF Doc. 27.

In November 2015, Scott and Tabatha Messenger hired Sanborn to build a home in Santa Rosa County, Florida. ECF Doc. 1-1, p. 7-23. Dissatisfied with the result, in September 2017 the Messengers filed suit in state court against Sanborn, alleging: (1) breach of contract; (2) violation of Fla. Stat. § 553.84; (3) negligence and (4) breach of implied warranty. ECF Doc. 1-1, p. 1-6.

Southern issued a commercial general liability policy to Sanborn for June 15, 2016, through June 15, 2017. ECF Doc. 1-2. In this action, Southern seeks a declaration that it does not have a duty to defend or indemnify Sanborn or the Messengers under the insurance policy issued to Sanborn for the allegations raised by the Messengers in state court. ECF Doc. 1. During discovery, Sanborn served Southern with requests for production and interrogatories. Southern objected to several of the discovery requests as irrelevant, as seeking protected information or as overly broad.

On January 10, 2019, Sanborn moved to compel responses to the discovery requests.[1] ECF Doc. 19. Sanborn argued the discovery sought was relevant to its affirmative defenses, specifically its arguments that the policy's terms were ambiguous and Southern provided illusory coverage through the policy's products-completed operations hazard provision.

On February 6, 2019, the Court entered an order denying Sanborn's motion to compel. ECF Doc. 24. The Court found Sanborn had not “specifically explained how the policy provides illusory coverage or why its terms are ambiguous.” ECF Doc. 24, p. 5. The Court also noted a court in the Panama City Division of this district “encountered the policy language at issue ... and determined the language is not ambiguous.” ECF Doc. 25, p. 6 (citing Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Moore, Case No. 5:15cv225-RH/GRJ, 2017 WL 10636445 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2017)). Accordingly, the Court concluded that, “the discovery sought by Sanborn is not relevant to the interpretation of the policy language in this case” and denied the motion to compel. ECF Doc. 24, p. 8. The Court also allowed Southern to submit affidavits or other evidence in support of an award of expenses for responding to the motion and gave Sanborn an opportunity to respond.

Southern subsequently filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees which seeks $3,764.00 in fees for responding to Sanborn's motion to compel. ECF Doc. 25. Southern suggests Sanborn's “intent in filing its Motion ... was to test the waters to determine what a different judge in this district would do with similar facts and policy language as those presented” in Moore. Southern asserts “it should not bear the burden of such an attempt in the form of attorneys' fees incurred in responding to” the motion to compel. In response, Sanborn contends sanctions should not be imposed because its motion was substantially justified, and an award of expenses would be unjust.

*2 If a motion to compel is denied, “the court ... must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the movant, the attorney filing the motion, or both to pay the party ... who opposed the motion its reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney's fees. But the court must not order this payment if the motion was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B). “[A]n individual's discovery conduct should be found ‘substantially justified’ under Rule 37 if it is a response to a ‘genuine dispute, or if reasonable people could differ as to the appropriateness of the contested action.’ ” Devaney v. Cont'l Am. Ins. Co., 989 F.2d 1154, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)).

Through its discovery requests, Sanborn sought information it believed was relevant to its affirmative defenses regarding illusory coverage and ambiguous policy language. Although the Court subsequently concluded, in denying the motion to compel, that the discovery sought by Sanborn was not relevant, the Court's conclusion does not automatically mean the motion to compel was not substantially justified.

As set forth above, the Court's denial of the motion to compel was based on the holding in Moore, namely that policy language similar to that at issue in this case was not ambiguous. The holding in Moore, however, while persuasive, is not binding precedent. See Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Kaye, 256 F.3d 1251, 1258 n.10 (11th Cir. 2001) (“We note that generally district court decisions are only persuasive authority and have no binding precedential authority beyond the case in which they are entered, and not always in that case.”); Fishman & Tobin, Inc. v. Tropical Shipping & Constr. Co., Ltd., 240 F.3d 956, 965 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Unlike circuit court panels where one panel will not overrule another, ... district courts are not held to the same standard.... While the decisions of their fellow judges are persuasive, they are not binding authority.... As a result, the district court cannot be said to be bound by a decision of one of its brother or sister judges.”) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, as the court in Moore acknowledged, there are no controlling decisions from the Florida Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit on the specific matters at issue and for which discovery was sought. Sanborn, therefore, was not precluded by Moore from seeking discovery which it believed was needed to defend against Southern's claims or making arguments to this Court to distinguish Moore or find contrary to Moore. While the Court was not inclined to stray from Moore for purposes of determining whether the motion to compel should be granted, the Court finds that reasonable people could differ as to the appropriateness of Sanborn's motion to compel (and its underlying discovery requests). Thus, the Court finds that the motion to compel was substantially justified.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

Plaintiff's Southern-Owners Insurance Company's Motion for Attorneys' Fees in Responding to Sanborn Builders, Inc.'s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses (ECF Doc. 25) is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of April, 2019.