*1 This cause comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for a Protective Order (the “Motion”), filed November 1, 2021. (Doc. 43.) On November 15, 2021, Defendants filed a response in opposition (Doc. 52); thus, the Motion is ripe for review. Upon consideration, the Motion is due to be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The instant action involves the death of Jean Samuel Celestin, Plaintiff Rose Marie Celestin's son. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 1, 9.) Jean Samuel Celestin had “long suffered from mental illness,” and, on April 11, 2019, was experiencing an “acute mental health crisis.” (Id. ¶ 3.) Jean Samuel's mother and sister contacted 911 for assistance in removing Jean Samuel from the house. (Id.) Several Ocoee police officers and one Windermere officer responded. (See id. ¶¶ 4, 6.) Upon arrival, the situation escalated—the officers fired tasers at Jean Samuel and placed him in a hobble restraint face down for nearly a full minute. (See id. ¶¶ 4, 6–7.) Jean Samuel died of sudden cardiorespiratory arrest. (Id. ¶ 8.)

As a result, Plaintiff has brought the following claims: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the officers; (2) a § 1983 claim against Ocoee and Windermere; (3) an Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim against Ocoee and Windermere; (4) a Rehabilitation Act (“Rehab Act”) claim against Ocoee and Windermere; (5) a wrongful death negligence claim against Ocoee and Windermere; (6) battery against Ocoee; (7) battery against Windermere; (8) battery against the officers; (9) assault against Ocoee; (10) assault against Windermere; (11) assault against the officers; (12) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision against Ocoee; and (13) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision against Windermere. (Doc. 1-1.) Plaintiff now seeks the entry of a protective order to govern the use and dissemination of sensitive medical information and autopsy photographs subject to discovery. (Doc. 43.) Defendants oppose this request, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to show good cause and that Plaintiff's proposed confidentiality order is unworkable. (Doc. 52.)

II. STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) permits a court, for good cause, to “issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “Rule 26(c) gives the district court discretionary power to fashion a protective order.” Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble, Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1985). Under the Federal Rules, “there is no outright privilege for confidential information or trade secrets.” Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Phosphate Eng'g & Constr. Co. Inc., 153 F.R.D. 686, 688 (M.D. Fla. 1994). A party moving for a protective order has a burden to show “that the information is confidential and that the disclosure would be harmful.” Id.; Gober v. City of Leesburg, 197 F.R.D. 519, 521 (M.D. Fla. 2000). The moving party “must make a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements supporting the need for a protective order.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Se. Floating Docks, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 426, 429–30 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff Has Established Good Cause

*2 Plaintiff contends that, while she has “agreed to permit broad discovery in this matter,” she has “an interest in keeping medical information and autopsy photographs confidential.” (Doc. 43 at 2.) Plaintiff states she does not want her “friends and family,” or the general public, “to learn unnecessarily about [her] medical history, or [Jean Samuel's] medical history,” as the disclosure of such would cause “profound embarrassment.” (Doc. 44 ¶¶ 7, 9.) With respect to the autopsy photographs, Plaintiff states the public disclosure of the photos could lead her or her family to “unwillingly view them, which would cause [them] profound trauma.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Thus, Plaintiff seeks a protective order to govern the use and dissemination of sensitive medical information and autopsy photographs. (Id. at 8.) Defendant opposes this request, arguing that Plaintiff “has placed her medical condition and history and that of Mr. Celestin directly and primarily at issue by filing this lawsuit,” that Plaintiff has not demonstrated Defendants would disclose information Plaintiff seeks to keep confidential to the public, and that the proposed confidentiality order is unworkable. (Doc. 52 at 5, 7–8.)

The undersigned finds that Plaintiff, through the instant Motion and affidavit (Doc. 44), has demonstrated good cause for entry of a protective order due to the nature of the documents sought to be protected. Medical information and nude autopsy photographs fall squarely within the Court's discretionary power under Rule 26 to “protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, [or] oppression.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). And, as Plaintiff notes, “medical records ... are routinely subject to protective orders.” Kristoff-Rampata v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-1324-J-20PDB, 2016 WL 11431488, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2016) (citing Est. of Carrillo v. F.D.I.C., No. 11-22668-CIV, 2012 WL 1831596, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 2012)). Although Defendants argue that Plaintiff has put herself in the position of having to disclose this sensitive information, Defendants fail to advance any compelling reasons demonstrating the harm they would face as the result of a protective order as discussed below. Plaintiff has shown good cause, and the entry of a protective order will not harm Defendants or impede their ability to obtain discovery.

B. The Requested Relief Is Not Unworkable

Defendants state that Plaintiff's proposed confidentiality order is unworkable because: (i) it would not permit any of the defendants to disclose confidential information to the insurance company, insurance trust, their third-party administrators, and their defense counsel; (ii) the proposed order “fails to account for Florida's public records law, with which Windermere and Ocoee are required to comply”; and (iii) the order “would have the party challenging another party's designation of a document as confidential bear the burden of seeking resolution of the confidentiality disagreement with the Court.” (Doc. 52 at 8–9.)

With respect to Defendants’ first argument, the parties could easily agree to permit documents marked as confidential to be shared with Defendants’ insurance representatives. See Goldwire v. City of Riviera Beach, No. 18-CIV-81285, 2019 WL 3916481, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2019). Second, the entry of a “federal court order issued pursuant to Rule 26 to prevent the disclosure of documents renders any state statute or regulation to the contrary void pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.” Mata Chorwadi, Inc. v. City of Boynton Beach, No. 9:19-CV-81069, 2020 WL 2516979, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 2020). Thus, Defendants’ concerns regarding their obligations under the Florida Public Records Law are alleviated. Finally, the Court will not approve a proposed confidentiality or protective order that contravenes Local Rule 1.11(d), which should address Defendants’ concerns about which party bears the burden of seeking resolution from the Court regarding disputed confidentiality designations.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for a Protective Order (Doc. 43) is GRANTED. The parties are DIRECTED to meet and confer in good faith to jointly submit to the Court a proposed confidentiality and protective order. The proposed order should incorporate the provisions of Local Rule 1.11 and the undersigned's Standing Order on the Procedure for Assertion of Privilege.[1] If the parties cannot reach an agreement on or before December 7, 2021, Plaintiff may file a motion for a confidentiality order that sets forth her proposed terms, and Defendants may set forth their proposed terms in opposition.

*3 DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on November 23, 2021.

https://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/sites/flmd/files/documents/mdfl-standing-order-re-procedure-for-assert...