*1 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on The Trial Lawyers College's (hereinafter, “Petitioner”) Motion to Compel Discovery [ECF Doc. 1] which was filed on June 2nd, 2021 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Mr. Hunter Hillin (hereinafter, “Mr. Hillin”) filed a Response [ECF Doc. 6] on behalf of himself on June 14th, 2021. The Respondents collectively filed a Response [ECF Doc. 14] on July 1st, 2021. Petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Response in Opposition [ECF Doc. 29] on July 27, 2021. Petitioner also filed a Motion to Consolidate [ECF Doc. 21] on July 13, 2021. A hearing was held on August 3rd, 2021 to address this issue. Mr. Hillin and his counsel failed to appear without explanation.[1] The Court having reviewed the briefing and being otherwise fully apprised, finds:

As a preliminary matter, this dispute arises from a subpoena duces tecum served on Mr. Hillin in Austin, Texas. This matter was transferred from the United States District Court, Western District of Texas by order of Judge Lang on June 17th, 2021. ECF Doc. 10. Although Petitioner and Mr. Hillin engaged in motion play before the transfer, this is essentially another discovery dispute in a case these parties and the Court are all too familiar with. See The Trial Lawyers College v. Gerry Spences Trial Lawyers College at Thunderhead Ranch et. al, Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-00080-JMC-MLC (D. Wyo.). The Court filed an order in The Trial Lawyers (hereinafter, “Underlying Case”) on effectively the same issue, just concerning a different third-party individual. Id. ECF Doc. 204. Respondents, in the Underlying Case the defendants, have since filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court's findings. Id. ECF Doc. 211.

Specific to this motion, a subpoena was issued by Petitioner to Mr. Hillin on March 30th, 2021 and it specified April 14th, 2021 as the deadline for compliance. On April 12th, 2021, Mr. Hillin objected to the subpoena. Those objections were identical to objections provided by other non-party individuals served with similar subpoenas. Unlike other non-parties who eventually provided documents pursuant to the subpoena, Mr. Hillin has continued to refuse to comply with the subpoena.

*2 Mr. Hillin has been subpoenaed by Petitioner because he is one of the five individuals Respondents nominated to the putative TLC board of directors in 2020 and as addressed in the Order Consolidating Cases, Granting In Part and Denying in Part Motions to Dismiss and For Summary Judgment and Granting Declaratory Relief in the related Wyoming state case in the First Judicial District, County of Laramie Civil Action No. 193-124 and 390 [Doc. 1-2 P: 30-1]. Mr. Hillin has continued his relationship with Respondents after disassociating himself with Petitioner. Respondents, and Mr. Hillin, claim he is now a director of Respondents’ competing entity, The Spence Method. Doc. 15. While there has been some reference to a board of directors for The Spence Method, this Court has been unable to confirm that such a board has been formed and even Mr. Getzoff, as lead counsel for the Spence Defendants, could not confirm if such a board had been formed as of August 3, 2021. This Court was informed by Defendant Mr. Parris by affidavit on June 4, 2021 that no formal meeting or election of directors had occurred for the Spence Method, but that certain persons were acting as such in the process of setting up a trial skill training event(s) and other matters.

Petitioner argues the subpoena seeks only relevant, non-privileged information that is within the scope of discovery and proportional to the issues at hand. Respondents and Mr. Hillin disagree completely. They believe a large portion of what is being sought is protect by attorney-client privilege and has not been waived. Further, they believe all of what is being sought is duplicative, beyond the scope of discovery, and far exceeds the proportionality of this case.

The Court has broad discretion when considering discovery motions such as the one at issue here. Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. A & B Builders, Ltd., No. 15-CV-91-ABJ, 2017 WL 10309306, at *5 (D. Wyo. Oct. 31, 2017). According to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Importantly, Rule 26 specifies that information “need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

The term “relevant” is broadly construed and “contemplates discovery into any matter that bears on or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on any issue that is or may be raised in a case.” Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co., 2017 WL 10309306, at *4 (quoting Anaya v. CBS Broad, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 645, 649–50 (D.N.M. 2007)). The party seeking discovery bears the burden to prove relevance. Id. at *5. However, discovery can be facially relevant, at which point the burden shifts to the party resisting discovery to prove that the discovery is either (1) not relevant or (2) has such marginal relevance that its potential harm outweighs the presumption favoring broad discovery. Id.

As for proportionality, proportionality considers “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The burden of proving proportionality does not entirely lie on the party seeking discovery. Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co., 2017 WL 10309306, at *5. Instead, the party resisting discovery bears a burden to prove that the discovery request is disproportional. Id.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 governs subpoenas duces tecum for the production of documents with or without the taking of a deposition. Moon v. SCP Pool Corp., 232 F.R.D. 633, 636 (C.D. Cal. 2005). One of the purposes of Rule 45 is to facilitate access outside the deposition procedure provided by Rule 30 to documents and other information in the possession of persons who are not parties. Id. Upon receiving a subpoena, the recipient must comply with the request, provide clear objections to the request, or seek to quash or modify the request.

*3 Specifically, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(2)(B) states that, “[a] person commanded to produce documents... may serve on the party or attorney designated in the subpoena a written objection[.] The objection must be served before the earlier of the time specified for compliance or 14 days after the subpoena is served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B). Further, “[o]n timely motion, the court... must quash or modify a subpoena that: i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply, ii) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c), iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies, or iv) subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A). Ample authority exists holding that timeliness means within the specified compliance period, so long as that period is of reasonable duration. City of St. Petersburg v. Total Containment, Inc., No. 06-20953CIV, 2008 WL 1995298, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2008).[2]

Ordinarily, a party may not object to a subpoena duces tecum served on a non-party, but rather, must seek a protection order or file a motion to quash. Moon, 232 F.R.D. at 636. Even then, a party only has standing to attack the third-party subpoena if it has a personal right or privilege in the subject matter of the subpoena or a sufficient interest in it. Brown v. Braddick, 595 F.2d 961, 967 (5th Cir.1979). In order to protect said rights, privileges or interests, Rule 45 requires all parties to the lawsuit be given a copy of the subpoena before it is served in order to put the parties on notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4).

A subpoena served on a third party pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is considered discovery within the meaning of the rules. J White, L.C. v. Wiseman, 2020 WL 3507408, at *1 (D. Utah June 29, 2020). As such, the discussion of both relevance and proportionality govern the subpoena at issue in this case. Under Rule 45, a person subject to a subpoena may file a written objection and seek to have the subpoena modified or quashed on the grounds that it fails to allow a reasonable time for compliance, requires disclosure of privileged or other protected materials not subject to any exception, or subjects a person to undue burden. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(i)–(iv). Moreover, Rule 45 creates an obligation for an attorney to take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). Courts within the Tenth Circuit have noted that discovery requests may be facially overbroad when they use terms such as “any and all,” “referencing,” or “pertaining to” with respect to a broad category of documents. Wiseman, 2020 WL 3507408 at *2.

1. Timeliness

There seems to be an issue as to whether Mr. Hillin and Respondents timely responded. Petitioner filed its motion to compel on June 2nd, 2021, in the Western District of Texas. Simultaneously, Petitioner filed a motion to transfer to Wyoming. Pursuant to the Western District of Texas Local Rule CV-7(e)(2), all responses to non-dispositive motions must be filed within seven days. This District allows opposing parties fourteen days to respond to non-dispositive motions. See Local Rule 7.1. Also, it is fair to argue that this motion is in fact dispositive, seeing as this specific case concerns only this motion. Regarding dispositive motions, both Texas and Wyoming allow opposing parties to respond within fourteen days.

*4 With respect to Mr. Hillin, he filed his response on June 14th, 2021, twelve days after Petitioner filed its motion. He claims the motion was not served on him until June 7th, 2021, despite Petitioner's certification of service claiming otherwise. It appears, that although Respondents’ counsel reported to Petitioner that she represented Mr. Hillin, she was not authorized to accept service on his behalf. Perhaps because Mr. Hillin claims Beth Kushner does not represent him in this matter. ECF Doc. 5. Petitioner does not dispute Mr. Hillin's allegation, or at least is not concerned with the delay in his response seeing as it did not file a reply. The Court finds Mr. Hillin's response was timely. Regardless of what local rules apply, or even what specific section of those rules apply, Mr. Hillin responded within seven days of being properly served.

The Court takes issue with Respondents’ response. First, and just as this Court pointed out in the Underlying Case when faced with a similar motion, Respondents have known about the subpoena issued to Mr. Hillin since March 30th, 2021. It is likely they took no action against the subpoena because Mr. Hillin provided objections. However, Respondents remained actionless even when Mr. Hillin was served the motion to compel. It was not until July 1st, 2021, twenty-nine days after the motion was filed, that Respondents filed their response. Despite the fact Respondents knew about the motion since it was filed because Petitioner tried to serve the motion on Mr. Hillin through Respondents’ counsel.

The Court has been placed in a tough position. It would like to hear all parties on this issue, because it seems similar issues are going to continue to pose a problem in this matter. The Tenth Circuit has recognized that district courts have discretion in applying local rules. Hernandez v. George, 793 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir. 1986). In reviewing the exercise of such discretion, the Tenth Circuit first examines the policies underlying the local rule and then examines the facts of the case in light of that policy to determine whether adherence would further that purpose. Id. at 267.

That then forces the Court to ask, what is the policy behind the two local rules requiring responses within a week or two? The answer is judicial efficiency and finality. Universally, be it state or federal, courts have stressed the importance of handling disputes in an orderly, timely and efficient way. The absolute need for efficiency is the underlying purposes of every local rule. So, when examining the facts of this situation, should the Court decline to follow the rules? It sees no reason to do so. In fact, it believes declining to follow the rules would likely be an abuse of its discretion. The Court finds no justification, based on policy or the specific circumstances in this matter, to allow the Respondents to file a response twenty-nine days after a motion was filed. Particularly when that response fails to make any excuses as to why it was filed late or even acknowledge as much. Therefore, Petitioner's motion to strike must be granted and Respondents’ Response [ECF Doc. 14] shall not be considered.

2. Attorney-Client Privilege

In Mr. Hillin's response and in his April 12, 2021 letter to Petitioner, he sets forth general objections and then boilerplate objections to each request. ECF Doc 1-6. While there is a general objection as to any request which seeks privileged communications, he only submits a specific privilege objection to request number 13 which seeks “documents or communications related to the Board of Directors of either [Gerry Spence Trial Lawyers College] or [Trial Lawyers College], including, but not limited to any board meeting minutes, written materials, agendas, calendar entries or any recordings of board meetings.” His boilerplate objections include relevance, disproportionality, relative access, importance of information, insufficient response time and undue burden. Mr. Hillin concludes each response with “[i]n view of and on the basis of the foregoing objections, Nonparty will neither search for nor produce any documents in response to this Request.” Plaintiff attempted on a number of occasions to set up a meeting to confer with Mr. Hillin in regard to his objections. Mr. Hillin has refused to meet and confer, apparently until his precondition demand of generally “narrowing” to request and paying him for his time was agreed to by Plaintiff.

*5 As noted above, Mr. Hillin claims he is a director of the Spence Method and as such many of his conversations with Respondents and their counsel are likely privileged. In federal court, federal common law “governs a claim of privilege” regarding a federal claim or defense. See Fed. R. Evid. 501. The burden of establishing the applicability of the attorney-client privilege rests on the party seeking to assert it. In re Grand Jury Proc., 616 F.3d 1172, 1183 (10th Cir. 2010). The party must bear the burden as to specific questions or documents, not by making a blanket claim. Id. The privilege must be strictly construed and accepted only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth. Id. (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)).

The attorney-client privilege is meant to “encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” Hedquist v. Patterson, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1243 (D. Wyo. 2016). To establish application of the attorney-client privilege, the party claiming the privilege must prove there was: (1) a communication, (2) between privileged persons, (3) made in confidence, and (4) for the purpose of seeking, obtaining, or providing legal assistance. Id. Privileged persons include attorneys, clients, and “any of their agents that help facilitate attorney-client communications or legal representation. Id.

Also, the mere fact that an attorney was involved in a communication does not automatically render the communication subject to the attorney-client privilege. In re Grand Jury Proc., 616 F.3d 1172, 1182 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1550–51 (10th Cir.1995)). Rather, the “communication between a lawyer and client must relate to legal advice or strategy sought by the client[.]” Id. (citing United States v. Johnston, 146 F.3d 785, 794 (10th Cir.1998)).

Although some of the information sought by Petitioner is likely privileged, Mr. Hillin has not complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. Rule 45 requires a person withholding information under claim that it is privileged or protected, “expressly make the claim; and describe the nature of the withheld documents, communications, or tangible things in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable the parties to assess the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2)(A). Mr. Hillin simply has not done so. Mr. Hillin has refused to even review his documents to determine if they contain any privileged information, but rather blandly asserts they may be such documents. He certainly has not explained to this Court, with particularity, that there was a communication between privileged persons made in confidence for the purposes of seeking, obtaining, or providing legal assistance. His response only generally “incorporates all objections previously made” in his letter to Petitioner and contains one other sentence explaining that, “due to [his] role as a Director of [The Spence Method] not only would everything have to be searched for and retrieved, it would have to be reviewed for privilege by counsel for the organization and all other Directors...”. ECF Doc. 6 at pg 5-6.

Similar to Mr. Amedee in the Underlying Case, Mr. Hillin has failed to establish that he is a formally elected director of the Spence Method.[3] The Court knows the Spence Method did not exist until April 2021 and by affidavit of Rex Parris of June 4th, 2021 no formal meetings or election of directors has occurred. See The Trial Lawyers College v. Gerry Spences Trial Lawyers College at Thunderhead Ranch et. al, Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-00080-JMC-MLC (D. Wyo.) ECF Doc. 109-3 pg 3. Mr. Getzoff was also unable to confirm the existence of an elected board during the hearing of August 3rd, 2021. As far as the Court knows, and without any evidence to the contrary, the Spence Method does not have elected directors. As this Court pointed out in the Underlying Case, an entity does not have directors if directors have not been elected.

*6 However, just because Mr. Hillin has not proven he is in fact an elected director of the Spence Method or TLC, that does not necessarily mean he wasn't included in a communication between privileged persons, made in confidence, for the purpose of seeking, obtaining, or providing legal assistance. For example, if Mr. Hillin and the putative TLC board met with counsel to receive advice on how to handle their ousting from TLC, the fact Mr. Hillin was not actually a board member would be irrelevant. Those communications would be privileged.

Also, unlike Mr. Amedee in the Underlying Case, there is no evidence before the Court suggesting Mr. Hillin's relationship with Respondents is in question. Mr. Hillin strongly holds the position he is an active participant with the Spence Method and has continued his relationship with Respondents throughout this entire endeavor and was likely privy to communications with Respondents/Defendants and their counsel. Again, the Court cannot say Mr. Hillin is a director of the Spence Method, no such evidence has been provided. But, that does not mean Mr. Hillin has not been included in communications between privileged persons, made in confidence, for the purpose of seeking, obtaining, or providing legal assistance related to the Spence Method or the putative TLC board.

Even though the Court could find that an applicable attorney-client privilege exists, that privilege only applies to specific communications. The privilege cannot be used as a blanket protection and prevent production completely. Without context or details about specific communications, the Court can only say it believes there are communications at issue that will be protected by the attorney-client privilege. Those communications need not be produced, but a privilege log is required. To that end, Mr. Hillin is ordered to comply with Rule 45 and provide a privilege log by September 1, 2021.

3. Boilerplate Objections

Courts have held that a subpoenaing party may make discovery requests under Rule 45 that fall within the general scope of discovery as defined by Rule 26. Hinkel v. Colling, No. 20-CV-166-NDF, 2021 WL 1341357, at *6 (D. Wyo. Apr. 9, 2021) (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kirk's Tire & Auto Servicenter of Haverstraw, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 658, 662 (D. Kan. 2003)). Pursuant to Rule 26, the Court has broad discretion over the control of discovery. S.E.C. v. Merrill Scott & Assocs., Ltd., 600 F.3d 1262, 1271 (10th Cir. 2010).

Further, to determine whether a subpoena presents an undue burden, courts consider (1) relevance of the information requested; (2) the need of the party for the documents; (3) the breadth of the document request; (4) the time period covered by the request; (5) the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents; and (6) the burden imposed. Hinkel, 2021 WL 1341357 at *7. Additionally, “if the person to whom the document request is made is a non-party, the court may also consider the expense and inconvenience to the non-party.” Id.; see Goodyear Tire, 211 F.R.D. at 663 (explaining that “the status of a person as a non-party is a factor that weighs against disclosure”).

As a starting point, the Court stresses that “[a]n order directing production from a non-party over that party's objection ‘must protect’ that party ‘from significant expense resulting from compliance.’ ” Rhea v. Apache Corp., 833 F. App'x 186, 190 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(ii))). Application of the rule is mandatory. Id. District courts have been warned that under Rule 45, the question is not so much what constitutes “an undue burden”, but rather would compliance with the subpoena bring upon the non-party a “significant expense”. See Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 251 F.3d 178, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2001)(“[u]nder Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii), the questions before the district court are whether the subpoena imposes expenses on the non-party, and whether those expenses are ‘significant.’ If they are, the court must protect the non-party by requiring the party seeking discovery to bear at least enough of the expense to render the remainder ‘nonsignificant.’ ”).

*7 Had Mr. Hillin undertaken the minimal duties required of a person subject to a subpoena, this matter may have been resolved without the Court's involvement. Additionally, had Mr. Hillin taken a constructive approach this Court would have had some sympathy and acceptance of the stated objections. Further, this Court would have had specific information upon which to determine the validity of objections, rather than just conclusionary statements of protest. Clearly, there is some validity in Mr. Hillin's stated concerns about burden, timeliness and duplication. Many of these concerns could have likely been resolved with an honest conferral process. Rather, Mr. Hillin took the position that he would not comply nor properly confer and that he would not make any effort to even determine the scope of the burden imposed by the subpoena. As a practicing attorney this Court would have expected Mr. Hillin to have understood his legal duties upon receiving a subpoena. Rule 45 provides protections for a person receiving a subpoena and this Court is mindful of the need to protect such persons from unreasonable burdens, but the Rule also places obligations and duties upon the receiver of a subpoena. The Rule's intent is to protect from undue burden, but was treated by Mr. Hillin as a tool to condition his compliance with a court order upon Petitioner's agreement to make concessions prior to engaging in the conferral process. In doing so Mr. Hillin has lost the opportunity to confer and potentially narrow the discovery requests. The following order is a direct result of Mr. Hillin's callous disregard of his duties under Rule 45.

Mr. Hillin is ordered to comply fully with the production of all non-privileged documents to Petitioner by September 10, 2021. In addition, and as was already ordered, information withheld on grounds of privilege must be correctly described in a privilege log. He may submit a bill of cost to the Court addressing his expenses in responding to the discovery request thereafter for the Court's consideration and order. The determination of such costs shall take into account the additional expense all parties have been subjected to as a result of his failure to comply with the subpoena originally. Nevertheless, Petitioner is on notice that putting Mr. Hillin to unnecessary expense may result in assessment of some expense to Petitioner.

Because this matter concerns only the subpoena to Mr. Hillin, and the Court's order here today handles the substantive issues in this specific case, Petitioner's motion to consolidate shall be denied. The Court sees little reason to consolidate this matter with the Underlying Case now that this matter has been substantively addressed. Lastly, the Court is aware identical subpoenas have been sent to multiple nonparties. Those nonparties have, from what the Court can tell, all handled the subpoenas in a similar fashion. The Court hopes it is not forced to produce several orders on essentially the same issue.[4] This order, civility and professionalism can surely solve these subpoena issues without further court action. I expect all parties to work together cooperatively to narrow the requests, if in fact they need to be, to each non-party to avoid duplication of efforts and production.

THEREFORE, the Court:

HEREBY ORDERS that Petitioner's Motion to Strike [ECF Doc. 29] is GRANTED. As such, Respondents Response [ECF Doc. 14] is hereby struck from the record.

FURTHER ORDERS that Petitioner's Motion to Consolidate [ECF Doc. 21] is DENIED.

LASTLY ORDERS Petitioner's Motion to Compel [ECF Doc. 1] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Mr. Hillin must comply with Rule 45 and respond to the subpoena at issue. As to any information he withholds on claims of privilege or some other protection, he must provide a description as explained in Rule 45(e)(2)(A). Mr. Hillin may submit a bill of costs if the parties are unable to reach an agreement in that regard. The parties shall notify this Court when production and costs have been completed so that this matter may be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 18th day of August 2021.

There is some confusion in this regard. On May 28, 2021 Ms. Beth Kushner, who has entered an appearance in 20-cv-0080 as counsel for Spence Defendants, emailed counsel for Plaintiff asserting that she was counsel for Mr. Hillin and directed them to have no further contact with her client. On June 11, 2021 Mr. Hillin filed a notice of appearance in the Western District of Texas asserting “[t]he undersigned is not represented in this matter by Ms. Beth Kushner.” Ms. Kushner entered her appearance in this matter on behalf of the Spence Defendants, but not on behalf of Mr. Hillin. On July 19, 2021 Bradley Cave and Jeffery Pope entered appearances as counsel for Mr. Hillin. On July 19, 2021 Ms. Kushner enter her appearance on behalf of Mr. Hillin. Mr. Hillin, nor any of his three attorneys, appeared for the hearing on the motion to compel conducted on August 3, 2021.

See Dexter v. Cosan Chem. Corp., No. 91–5436, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22134, at *7–8 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2000) (motion to quash filed on September 21, 2000, two days after September 19, 2000 return date, was untimely and therefore denied); Innomed Labs, LLC v. Alza Corp., 211 F.R.D. 237, 240 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (motion to quash should be brought before date of deposition commanded by subpoena); Allender v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 220 F.R.D. 661, 665 (D.Kan.2004) (return date for production subpoena had already passed so motion to quash was untimely); United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d 270, 278 (D.D.C.2002) (motion made several months after compliance date untimely).

Respondents have filed a Motion to Reconsider this Court's order concerning Mr. Amedee. 1:20-cv-00080-JMC-MLC ECF Doc. 211. That motion is currently before Honorable Joel M. Carson. The Court's findings and conclusions of law in the Underlying Case, with respect to attorney-client privilege and a few of its exceptions, might be rejected.

The Court is aware of at least four other ripe motions that are identical to the one being addressed herein. While the Court plans to address those motions, it ultimately hopes it is not required to.