Arias v. Villas at Cent. Park Assocs. Ltd. P'Ship
Arias v. Villas at Cent. Park Assocs. Ltd. P'Ship
2021 WL 8155474 (M.D. Fla. 2021)
May 20, 2021
Hoffman, Leslie R., United States Magistrate Judge
Summary
The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to permit an untimely response and amended the prior order to extend the time period for Topics 8, 9, 15 and the document requests for the deposition duces tecum of Defendants' corporate representatives to five (5) years prior to the subject incident. This set the parameters for the ESI that must be produced in the case.
JOSE ARIAS, TERESA ANTROP ARIAS, TERESA ANTROP ARIAS and SEAN BOGLE, Plaintiffs,
v.
THE VILLAS AT CENTRAL PARK ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and CLK MULTI FAMILY MANAGEMENT, LLC, Defendants
v.
THE VILLAS AT CENTRAL PARK ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and CLK MULTI FAMILY MANAGEMENT, LLC, Defendants
Case No. 6:20-cv-1924-PGB-LRH
United States District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed May 20, 2021
Counsel
W. Doug Martin, Morgan & Morgan, PA, Orlando, FL, for Plaintiffs.Thomas F. Brown, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Orlando, FL, for Defendants.
Hoffman, Leslie R., United States Magistrate Judge
Order
*1 This cause came on for consideration without oral argument on the following motion filed herein:
MOTION: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO PERMIT UNTIMELY RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (Doc. 21), RELIEF FROM THIS COURT'S ORDER (Doc.22) AND INCORPORATED RESPONSE IF PERMITTED (Doc. No. 23)
FILED: May 19, 2021
THEREON it is ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
On May 12, 2021, Defendants moved for a protective order to limit the topics and document requests related to Plaintiffs’ notices of taking depositions duces tecum of Defendants’ corporate representatives. (Doc. 21). The motion was filed in accordance with the Court's Standing Order on Discovery Motions. (Doc. 5). Pursuant to the Standing Order, which was docketed in this case on October 21, 2020, a party opposing a discovery motion “shall file a response no later than five days after the Motion is filed,” and “a failure to file a timely response will result in the Motion being deemed unopposed.” (Id., ¶ 5) (emphasis supplied). Plaintiffs did not file a response within the five-day time period, and the Court accordingly granted the motion for protective order as unopposed on May 18, 2021. (Doc. 22).
Apparently, the Court's Order grabbed Plaintiffs’ attention for the very next day, May 19, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the present “Motion to Permit Untimely Response to Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order, Relief from this Court's Order, and Incorporated Response if Permitted.” (Doc. 23). Through their motion, Plaintiffs request that the Court reconsider the May 18, 2021 Order, permit Plaintiffs to file a late response to the motion for protective order, and consider the late response which is embedded in the present motion. (Id.). In support, Plaintiffs’ counsel states that he “incorrectly calendared Plaintiffs’ deadline to respond for 14 days after Defendants’ motion based on Local Rule 3.01(c).” (Id., ¶ 5).
Although Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the Court's prior order and cite to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b), 26, and 72, they nowhere discuss any of these rules or the standard for reconsideration. Nor do they provide any memorandum of legal authority as required by Local Rule 3.01(a), save for a lone citation to Bradley v. King, 556 F.3d 1225, 1229 (11th Cir. 2009), which merely states the known tenet that “a district court has wide discretion in discovery matters” and review by appellate courts is “deferential.” (Id., at 1 and ¶ 7). And compounding issues is the fact that Plaintiffs’ motion does not comply with the typography requirements set forth in Local Rule 1.08. For these reasons alone, the Court would be well within its discretion to deny Plaintiffs’ motion.
However, in this one – and only one – instance, the Court will exercise its discretion and grant Plaintiffs’ motion in part. The Court is taking this course solely to avoid further waste of attorney and judicial resources, and in recognition of the fact that the corporate representative depositions have been rescheduled for June 23, 2021, the issues raised in the untimely response are narrow, and the Court does not wish to jeopardize the parties’ deposition schedule with additional motions practice.[1] Moreover, the Court is persuaded by the Local Rule 3.01(g) certification attached to Plaintiffs’ motion, which states that Defendants’ counsel “does not take a position on this motion based on procedural grounds (i.e., failure to file a response within 5 days as required by the Court's standing discovery order); however Defendants stand by their substantive arguments and to the extent the Order was based on substantive findings, Defendants argue it is correct and there is no basis to reconsider the Order.” (Doc. 23, at 3). The Court interprets this to mean that Defendants raise no objection to allowing Plaintiffs’ untimely response, and stand on their prior substantive arguments in support of their motion for protective order. For these reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion to the extent that Plaintiffs’ untimely response, which is embedded in the motion, will be considered, and will further grant Plaintiffs’ request to reconsider the May 18, 2021 Order.
*2 Turning now to the substantive arguments, Plaintiffs only pose two in their response. First, with respect to Topics 8, 9, and 15 and document requests, Plaintiffs object to Defendants’ request to limit the time period for discovery to three years prior to the subject incident. The incident occurred on March 19, 2019, and the Court previously limited the relevant time period to March 19, 2016. See Doc. 22, at 2. Plaintiffs argue that the relevant time period should be July 2012 – two years before her lease commenced and seven years before the date of the incident – based on a lone statement that “[t]his information is not too remote in time,” and citation to two factually distinguishable district court decisions. (Doc. 23, at ¶ 8(a)).[2] Plaintiffs further argue that Plaintiff Teresa Arias moved into the apartment complex in July 2014, and Defendants’ counsel questioned Ms. Arias at her deposition about her knowledge of crimes and security measures at the apartment complex for the time period July 2014 to the date of the incident. (Id.).
It is the latter argument which the Court finds persuasive. By questioning Ms. Arias about crimes and security measures back to July 2014 (approximately five years before the incident), Defendants themselves have opened the door to a reciprocal discovery period, as well as contradicted their position that such a time period would not be relevant. However, Plaintiffs have not shown that any time period beyond July 2014 would produce discovery relevant to any claim or defense in this case. Accordingly, the Court will amend its May 18, 2021 Order to permit discovery as to Topics 8, 9, 15 and the document requests for the time period of five (5) years prior to the subject incident.
The second and final argument Plaintiffs raise in their response also pertains to Topics 8, 9, and 15 and concerns substantially similar crimes. This entire argument consists of one sentence: “Plaintiff requests this Court order Defendants to comply with requests involving prior crimes on the premises as prior crimes on the premises are substantially similar.” (Doc. 23, at ¶ 8(b)). The Court has no idea what Plaintiffs mean by this sentence. The Court's prior Order limited these Topics to substantially similar violent crimes against persons, (Doc. 22, at 2), and it is wholly unclear what else Plaintiffs seek. Plaintiffs’ motion in this regard is therefore denied and the May 18, 2021 Order concerning limitations on substantially similar violent crimes remains in full force and effect.[3] And because Plaintiffs do not address any other aspects of Defendants’ motion for protective order (i.e., Topics 3, 5, 6, 10, and 16), those portions of the Court's May 18, 2021 Order also remain in full force and effect.
*3 Accordingly, upon due consideration, it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Permit Untimely Response to Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order, Relief from this Court's Order, and Incorporated Response if Permitted (Doc. 23) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED to the extent that the response embedded in the motion is deemed timely filed, and the Court has reconsidered its May 18, 2021 Order. The Court's May 18, 2021 Order is AMENDED to the extent that the time period for Topics 8, 9, 15 and the document requests for the deposition duces tecum of Defendants’ corporate representatives is extended to five (5) years prior to the subject incident. In all other respects, Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED and the May 18, 2021 Order otherwise remains in full force and effect.
Plaintiffs are warned that all future filings must comply with all applicable rules and orders, and the failure to do so may result in the summary denial or striking of the offending filing.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on May 20, 2021.
Footnotes
To put a finer point on it, no party should interpret or rely upon this Order as a finding that “incorrectly calendar[ing]” a deadline due to a failure to review applicable rules and orders constitutes either “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
See Hodge v. Orlando Utilities Comm'n, Case No. 6:09-cv-1059-Orl-19DAB, 2010 WL 11507295 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2010) (plaintiff asserted a claim for physical injury in an employment discrimination lawsuit, including elevated blood pressure, therefore his medical records for several years prior to the incident were relevant to ascertain if other reasons existed for the high blood pressure); Henderson v. Holiday CVS, L.L.C., 269 F.R.D. 682 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (allowing discovery in an FLSA collective action for a five year period prior to the filing of the lawsuit “under the facts and circumstances presented in this case”). Conversely, Defendants have cited to decisions involving “substantially similar incident” discovery, where a three-year time period was deemed appropriate. See, e.g., Faynik v. Magical Cruises Co., Ltd., Case No. 6:17-cv-1282-Orl-37TBS, 2018 WL 7360661, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2018).
Once again, Plaintiffs’ case citation does not shed any light on the issue. Hessen for Use & Benefit of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 915 F.2d 641, 649-50 (11th Cir. 1990) merely discusses when evidence of substantially similar complaints in a products liability action would be admissible. If anything, this decision supports Defendants’ position, as it required the complaints to be nearly identical to be admissible. Id.