*1 This case involves the breach of a settlement agreement reached in a state-court lawsuit between Plaintiffs David Byker and Global Asset Management-Holdings, LLC (“GAM”) and Defendant Nannette Smith. Doc. 1. The docket sheet reveals a long history of disputes requiring repeated court intervention, and the parties continue down the same path now.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. Doc. 27. Before the court are three motions to compel, two filed by Defendant and one filed by Plaintiffs. Docs. 170, 171 & 173. All the motions have been briefed (Docs. 170, 171 & 173–77) and are ripe for decision. None of the motions, however, follow the guidelines of the initial order regarding discovery disputes, including the filing of a joint stipulation. Doc. 30 at 2–3. Because this case recently has been reassigned, the court will not deny the motions on this basis alone, but the parties should be aware that any future motions to compel must follow the initial order.

A. Defendant's Motion to Compel

The first motion before the court is Defendant's motion to compel certain responses to her Second Set of Consolidated Discovery, which includes requests for admission, interrogatories, and requests for production. Doc. 170. The discovery generally seeks information and documents regarding Plaintiffs' efforts (1) to access the B2K software and source code Smith tendered to Plaintiffs as part of the settlement of the underlying lawsuit and (2) to have third parties assist with developing the software into a marketable product. See Doc. 170-1. Smith complains that Plaintiffs have interposed improper general and boilerplate objections and asks the court to compel Plaintiffs to give full responses to the contested discovery detailed below. The court first addresses the requests for admission, then moves on to the interrogatories, and concludes with the requests for production.

1. Requests for Admission

Request for Admission Nos. 4 through 6 ask for admissions related to a written quote Plaintiffs received from Allen Roeder, the owner of Database License Reseller, LLC (“DLR”). Doc. 170-1 at 13–15. In these three requests, Smith asks Plaintiffs to admit that the “quote ... included” either “PowerBuilder software,” “support for PowerBuilder,” or both. Doc. 170-1 at 13–15. Smith's objections to Plaintiffs responses are based on her contention that answers to requests for admissions should only “admit, deny, or object” without explanation. Doc. 170-4 at 1. She argues that any other response includes extraneous information and contends that Plaintiffs' responses “largely fail to respond consistent with [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 36.” Doc. 170 at 4. The court disagrees.

First, Rule 36(a)(4) does not rigidly require a party only to “admit, deny, or object,” but explicitly allows a party to “qualify an answer or deny only a part of a matter.” Second, the language of the requests necessarily results in some measure of ambiguity because of the nature of the “PowerBuilder software.” There have been multiple versions of the program with that name, and Plaintiffs have claimed that not all of the versions necessarily allow a user to access and manipulate the B2K Software.

*2 That being said, the responses from Plaintiffs essentially are admissions, albeit with some qualifications. Smith does not like these qualifications, but the use of the general term “PowerBuilder software” requires it. Therefore, it was reasonable for Plaintiffs to qualify their responses as relating to particular versions of the software. The motion to compel with respect to Request for Admission Nos. 4–6 is due to be denied.

Smith's motion next asks the court to order Plaintiffs to supplement their responses to Request for Admission Nos. 7–10, 12–15, and 21–28. Doc. 170 at 4-5. Plaintiffs argue that Smith's motion fails to reasonably identify how Plaintiffs' responses to these requests for admission are actually deficient under Rule 36. Doc. 174 at 4. The court agrees with Plaintiffs.

A motion must “state with particularity the grounds for seeking” the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)(B). The purpose of this requirement is to provide the opposing party with notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. See Registration Control Sys., Inc. v. Compusystems, Inc., 922 F.2d 805, 807–08 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Smith's motion, however, does not address the substance of any of the requests for admission or Plaintiffs' allegedly deficient responses. Doc. 170 at 5. While Smith attaches an email sent by her counsel to Plaintiffs before filing the motion in which she raises certain arguments with respect to the requests (Doc. 170-4), the motion only mentions the email in the context of supporting her efforts to resolve the discovery dispute without involving the court, as required under Rule 37(a)(1). Doc. 170 at 2. It is not the job of the court to make arguments for the parties. The motion to compel as it relates to Request for Admission Nos. 7–10, 12– 15, and 21–28 is due to be denied.

2. Interrogatories

Smith asks that Plaintiffs, “for each request for admission that was not admitted, without equivocation or condition, provide a detailed explanation for the denial or failure to fully admit.” Doc. 170-1 at 9. And Smith contends that Plaintiffs' “response provides little in the way of substance and the court should require a substantive response.” Doc. 170 at 5–6. That conclusory assertion, however, does not meet the particularity requirement of Rule 7(b). It is Smith's burden to explain specifically why a given interrogatory response is deficient. Because Smith has failed to do so, her motion to compel is due to be denied as it relates to Interrogatory No. 1.

Smith argues that Plaintiffs' answers to these three interrogatories are insufficiently detailed. Doc. 170 at 6. The court disagrees. Although the answers may not include all of the details Smith would prefer, they reasonably respond to the substance of the interrogatories. And, regarding Interrogatory No. 4, Smith's terse objection does not adequately advise the court of the additional information she contends it lacks. Doc. 170 at 6. The motion to compel as it relates to these interrogatories is due to be denied.

3. Requests for Production

This portion of the motion is moot. Plaintiffs' opposition states that the COVID-19 pandemic hindered their timely response, but they have since produced materials that “will (or at least should) resolve the issue regarding [RFPs] 1–6.” Doc. 174 at 5 & 10–13. Despite having the opportunity to do so, Smith has not informed the court that Plaintiffs' latest production is insufficient. Accordingly, the motion to compel is due to be denied as to these requests for production.

*3 Smith seeks all documents “used by” Plaintiffs “to provide any responses” or “to assist in responding to” the Requests for Admission and Interrogatories. Doc. 170-1 at 11. Plaintiffs objected to each request on the grounds that it is “vague, ambiguous, overly broad, not proportional, and fails to identify with reasonable particularity the specific or particular documents requested.” Doc. 170-2 at 12. These kinds of requests for production, however, are fairly common, and courts generally allow them. See Crider, Inc. v. Convenience Food Sys., Inc., 2005 WL 8157607, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 15, 2005); In re Reliance Fin. & Inv. Grp., Inc., 2006 WL 8435541, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2006); Davila v. Odum & Sons Trucking, Inc., 2006 WL 8431572, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2006). This court follows suit and finds that the motion to compel is due to be granted with respect to any such documents. Plaintiffs must produce any documents, not already produced, that they reviewed or that contained information upon which Plaintiffs materially relied to formulate responses to the interrogatories and requests for admission.

B. Plaintiffs' Motion to Have Requests for Admissions Deemed Admitted and Compel Responses to Discovery Requests

Plaintiffs move to have certain requests for admission deemed admitted and seek an order compelling Defendant to answer certain related interrogatories and requests for production. Doc. 171. The discovery at issue centers around Plaintiffs' counsels' receipt of information[1] that Defendant's attorney, Jason Yearout, contacted at least one third party[2] “purporting to represent B2K Systems, LLC and asking to obtain information regarding the software Smith tendered to GAM in the state court lawsuit settlement.” Doc. 171 at 2. Plaintiffs maintain that any intimation by Yearout to potential witnesses that he represented B2K LLC is improper because neither Yearout nor Smith has legal authority to act on behalf of B2K LLC. Plaintiffs assert that they propounded the discovery in question to investigate the circumstances and substance of Yearout's contacts with these companies. Doc. 171 at 6.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) permits discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Relevance is “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citation omitted). Relevant information is discoverable even if it is not admissible at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

The court agrees with Defendant that the information sought is not relevant to this dispute under Rule 26. Plaintiffs' claims in this case are relatively straightforward. They contend that Smith is liable for breach of the settlement agreement and fraud based on her alleged failure to deliver a “functional and operational” copy of the B2K Software to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs fail to articulate, however, how the information sought through this discovery, even if true, is relevant to whether the B2K Software is functional and operational, whether Smith knew or believed it was, whether Plaintiffs made reasonable efforts to access and use the software, or any other material issue. And while Plaintiffs are correct that information need not be admissible at trial to be discoverable, the court cannot find that the discovery sought is relevant to resolving any substantive issues in the case.[3] Any allegation of misconduct on the part of counsel for Defendant is a separate matter not before the court. For this reason, Plaintiff's motion (Doc. 171) is due to be denied.

C. Defendant's Second Motion to Compel

*4 The final motion now pending is Defendant's second motion to compel. Doc. 173. This motion seeks the production of two emails for which Plaintiffs have asserted attorney-client privilege. Docs. 171 & 173. Excerpts of the emails at issue were attached to Plaintiff's motion to compel and reflected an email exchange between Stewart Moffat, a Metex employee, and an unknown person. Doc. 171 at 13. Defendant requested a copy of the entire email exchange under Federal Rule of Evidence 106. Doc. 175-1. Plaintiffs produced the exchange, revealing that the unknown individual was Robert Przybysz, but two of the emails were completely redacted. Doc. 173-2. Plaintiffs produced a privilege log describing the two redacted emails. Doc. 173-3 at 5–6.

According to the privilege log, the first redacted email was from Przybysz to one of Plaintiffs' attorneys, Glenn Waldrop, “communicating about a response from Moffat.” Doc. 173-3 at 5. A carbon copy of the email went to Paige Knott (formerly Timmer), an in-house attorney for GAM and Byker & Associates. Doc. 173-3 at 5. The second redacted email was from Waldrop to Przybysz, “advising about [the] response from Moffat,” with carbon copies to Knott and Plaintiffs' other attorney of record in this action, Wayne Morse. Doc. 173-3 at 5.

Plaintiffs contend that both emails are protected by the attorney-client privilege and “common interest” doctrine. Doc. 176 at 4–5. Defendant counters that “[w]hen non-party Przybysz copied Timmer on the email, he scotched privilege.” Doc. 173 at 4. She further contends that the common interest doctrine does not apply because Przybysz was dismissed with prejudice from this case, and therefore he no longer has any interest in this lawsuit or interests in common with Plaintiffs. Doc. 173 at 3–4. The court disagrees.

In federal court cases where jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, state privilege law applies. Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 501). Under Alabama law, the attorney-client privilege attaches to confidential communication “(1) between the client or a representative of the client and the client's attorney or a representative of the attorney, or ... (3) by the client or a representative of the client or the client's attorney or a representative of the attorney to an attorney or a representative of an attorney representing another party concerning a matter of common interest.” Ala. R. Evid. 502(b)(1) & (3). The privilege “may be waived, either directly or constructively, by the client.” Swain v. Terry, 454 So. 2d 948, 953–54 (Ala. 1984). The client waives the privilege if the client “voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter.” Ala. R. Evid. 510; see also Bassett v. Newton, 658 So. 2d 398, 402 (Ala. 1995) (“Voluntary disclosure bars a subsequent claim of privilege based on confidentiality.”). Waiver by disclosure does not apply, however, “if the disclosure itself is privileged.” Ala. R. Evid. 510. Additionally, under Rule 502(b)(3), the presence of a third party does not destroy the attorney-client privilege “when the third person is also a client as to the subject matter discussed in the conference or has a common interest in the matters discussed.” Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hatas, 252 So. 2d 7, 27 (Ala. 1971) (emphasis omitted).

When the common interest doctrine is raised in the context of disclosure to a third party who is not also a client of the attorney, courts examine whether the third person is considered to have a common legal interest in the subject matter of the communication. See Hope For Families & Comm. Serv., Inc. v. Warren, 2009 WL 1066525, at *14 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 21, 2009); Lynch v. Hamrick, 968 So. 2d 11, 16 (Ala. 2007); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 646 So. 2d 661, 663 (Ala. 1994); Hatas, 252 So. 2d at 28. “[T]he common interest privilege applies when persons share a common legal interest, not when the primary common interest is a joint business strategy that happens to include a concern about litigation.” Infinite Energy, Inc. v. Econnergy Energy Co., 2008 WL 2856719, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 23, 2008) (citing Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suissse), 160 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). “The interest must, therefore, relate to litigation for this privilege to apply ....” Id.

*5 The common interest doctrine applies here. Przybysz is Waldrop's client. He represented Przybysz when he was a party in this action, and he also represents GAM, Byker, and Przybysz in active, related litigation in state court, where all three are aligned with each other and in opposition to Smith. This litigation and the state-court litigation are intertwined and arise from common facts. The third party to the communication is Knott, an in-house attorney for GAM and Byker. Both GAM and Byker are parties to this action and the related-state court litigation. These facts reflect a sufficient common legal interest for the attorney-client privilege to extend to Knott. Accordingly, the motion to compel (Doc. 173) is due to be denied.

For these reasons, it is ORDERED that:

(1) Defendant's Motion to Compel (Doc. 170) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiffs shall produce documents responsive to Request for Production Nos. 8 & 9 by July 21, 2020, and DENIED in all other respects;

(2) Plaintiff's Motion to Have Requests for Admissions Deemed Admitted and Compel Responses to Discovery Requests (Doc. 171) is DENIED; and

(3) Defendant's Second Motion to Compel (Doc. 173) is DENIED.

(4) Additionally, in accordance with the March 27, 2020 order (Doc. 172), the discovery deadline is SET for September 1, 2020, and the deadline for dispositive motions and Daubert challenges is SET for October 1, 2020.

DONE and ORDERED on July 7, 2020.

The motion does not detail what information Plaintiffs received, how they came to believe this allegation, or otherwise provide any evidence in support of this allegation.

The third-party is Metex, a software development company. Metex is based in Canada and not subject to subpoena from this court.

The court rejects Plaintiffs' contention that such information could be used for cross-examination or impeachment. Doc. 171 at 6. Plaintiffs fail to explain how an admission that Yearout “failed to inform” witnesses that “he represented a party to litigation adverse to” B2K LLC, Przybysz, or Plaintiffs could be appropriately used at trial.