*1 This case is before the Court on the cross motions to compel production filed by Defendants Allergy and Asthma Network/Mothers of Asthmatics (AANMA) and Tonya Winders (docket no. 280) and Plaintiff United Allergy Services (UAS) (docket no. 319). The Court concludes that AANMA's and Winders's motion to compel (docket no. 280) should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as set forth below; and that UAS's motion to compel (docket no. 319) should be DENIED.

AANMA's first request for production of documents sought “all documents and communications relating to any investigations of UAS regarding the practice of remote allergy.” Docket no. 280-1 at 2-3. UAS raised a number of objections, including objecting to the extent that the request sought “information subject to third party confidentiality obligations[.]” Docket no. 280-1 at 3. In their motion to compel, AANMA and Winders now allege that UAS has failed to produce evidence related to government investigations of UAS.

First, AANMA and Winders have discovered through third-party discovery that, in another qui tam action involving UAS,[1] the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas ordered the U.S. Attorney to disclose to UAS “a list of every case, investigation, inquiry, or process of which they know involving” UAS and its co-defendants. Docket no. 280-2 at 17. The U.S. Attorney subsequently represented to that court in November 2015 that it had complied with that order, docket no. 280-2 at 13, but UAS has not disclosed that list to AANMA and Winders.

Second, AANMA and Winders claim that, in light of the number of investigations of UAS that they have discovered, UAS's claim that it has produced or identified in its privilege log all material that is responsive to their request for investigation-related documents is not credible. Docket no. 280 at 5-8. AANMA and Winders contend that UAS has been the subject of at least eleven investigations by various government entities, including the FBI, the Texas Department of Insurance, the Office of Personnel Management-Office of Inspector General (OPM-OIG), and the Unites States Attorneys' Offices for the Northern, Southern, and Eastern Districts of Texas and the Northern District of Georgia. Docket no. 280 at 3-4. AANMA and Winders contend that the third-party production from which they learned of these investigations also shows that “at least three top UAS officials and over 150 UAS providers and patients were interviewed in connection with one or more of these investigations.” Docket no. 280-2 at ¶ 5. AANMA and Winders also have obtained a UAS procedure on “Responding to Audits, Investigations and Media Inquiries[,]” which provides that UAS employees who are made aware of government audits or investigations or media inquiries should alert UAS's marketing and legal departments. Docket no. 280-5. AANMA and Winders argue that the number of investigations that have taken place and the fact that UAS felt the necessity to adopt such a procedure suggest that additional responsive materials must exist.

*2 AANMA and Winders contend that former UAS CEO Nicholas Hollis's failure during his deposition testimony to acknowledge the existence of any government investigation of UAS aside from the Houston qui tam was misleading, and they argue that discovery should be extended and they should receive an additional opportunity to depose a UAS corporate representative. Docket no. 280 at 2-3. AANMA and Winders also assert a request under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A) for UAS to be sanctioned for its nondisclosure of these materials.

The Court first considers the list of government investigations of UAS ordered to be disclosed to UAS in the Houston qui tam action. UAS acknowledges that the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a letter containing the list of investigations to UAS's counsel in this action. Docket no. 319 at 7-8. However, UAS's counsel claims that, because the U.S. Attorney's Office requested that “you keep this letter confidential [,]” “possession of the letter has been retained at the attorney level” and its contents have not been shared with any UAS witnesses, including Hollis. Docket no. 319 at 8. UAS counsel claims that the basis for the U.S. Attorney's directive to maintain the confidentiality of the list is a sealing order that has been imposed in another qui tam action pending before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia (the Georgia qui tam). Docket nos. 280-2 at 29; 291 at 22; 319 at 8.

Although UAS has claimed that confidentiality obligations preclude disclosure of the list, it has not supported that claim with any evidence aside from a declaration provided by its own counsel, which states in conclusory terms that “the Department of Justice instructed me not to share the information pursuant to a court order in effect in the Northern District of Georgia.” Docket no. 291 at 22. UAS has not provided the caption, case number, or the sealing order from the Georgia qui tam, or the letter from the U.S. Attorney's office that supposedly directed UAS to keep the list confidential. Lacking the sealing order, this Court cannot assess whether it does in fact prohibit disclosure of the list or some of its contents, and cannot balance the interests of disclosure in this case against the interests of confidentiality in that case—by assessing, for instance, whether the sealing order was imposed pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) for the purpose of protecting the identity of a relator, or whether some other interest is at stake.[2] However, the Court doubts that the Georgia qui tam action does in fact prohibit disclosure of the list. The Houston qui tam court's order did not direct the U.S. Attorney to produce to UAS an extent document, which may have already been subject to a sealing order, but to create and produce to UAS a new document, a list containing “every case, investigation, inquiry, or process of which they know involving the defendants or relating to this scheme.” Docket no. 280-2 at 17. To the extent that information contained within the list might reveal the identity of a relator or other information subject to another court's confidentiality order, it may have been appropriate to produce a redacted copy.

To the extent that the Georgia court's sealing order may prohibit disclosure of information contained within the list, it is not clear how that prohibition against disclosure is consistent with the Houston qui tam court's order that the list be disclosed to UAS, and it is unclear how the Houston court's order directing disclosure of the list to UAS is consistent with the decision of UAS's counsel to withhold the list from UAS. Regardless, the Court need not speculate on the effect of the Georgia court's unseen sealing order or the unseen directive of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Texas. UAS has failed to prove the “preliminary facts showing that the matter is eligible for protection[.]” In re Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 710 & n.7 (5th Cir. 2001); Superior Oil Co. v. Am. Petrofina Co. of Texas, 785 F.2d 130, 130 (5th Cir. 1986); In re U.S. Motion to Modify Sealing Orders, No. 5:03-MC-2, 2004 WL 5584146, at *4 (E.D. Tex. June 8, 2004) (“the question of discoverability in collateral litigation of materials discovered in the underlying action must be decided by the collateral court.”). UAS's counsel has indicated that UAS is willing to seek authorization from the Georgia court to disclose the list. Docket no. 319 at 8 n.2. This Court hereby Orders counsel for UAS to, within ten days from the date of this Order, make a submission to the Georgia court to request that court's authorization to disclose the list to AANMA and Winders, enclosing this Order and the disclosure Order from the Houston qui tam court. Then, no later than thirty days from the date of this Order, UAS shall submit an advisory to this Court that either: states that the list has been disclosed to AANMA and Winders; sets forth the reasons why the list cannot be disclosed, with supporting evidence from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Texas and the Georgia court; or seeks additional time to obtain a response from the Georgia court. Although the Court finds that disclosure of the list should be ordered as set forth above, the Court finds that additional discovery is not warranted and that an award of sanctions would be unjust in light of the seemingly conflicting disclosure and confidentiality directives of the various district courts, as well as UAS's willingness to seek disclosure authorization from the Georgia court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(iii).

*3 The Court next turns to AANMA's and Winders's request that the Court compel UAS to produce additional material related to government investigations of UAS. AANMA and Winders do not specify what material remains to be disclosed other than to speculate that it might include “email communications between UAS employees and UAS and its providers regarding any investigations against UAS[.]” Docket no. 280 at 5 (emphasis omitted). AANMA and Winders base this speculation on the number of government investigations that have been undertaken, the existence of the UAS procedure on “Responding to Audits, Investigations and Media Inquiries[,]” and on a filing in the Houston qui tam in which the Government noted that “[t]he Defendants are aware that an investigation is being conducted” and “were put on notice that an investigation was ongoing hen the Atlanta [Civil Investigative Demand] was served and subsequently ... allowed an Atlanta based employee of the company to be deposed.” United States of America et al. ex rel. Michael Vaughn et al. v. United Biologies, LLC et al., Civil Action No. 4:13-CV-1081, docket no. 25 at 2 n.2.

UAS responds by describing the steps it took to search for information responsive to AANMA's request for production—steps it argues met their obligations under the discovery rules and the parties' joint discovery plan. Docket no. 319 at 3-4. UAS argues that AANMA lacks any evidence that UAS is in possession of any undisclosed, responsive, non-privileged material. Docket no. 319 at 10-11. According to UAS, it has produced or listed in its privilege log all material that it discovered after running several agreed search terms against its repository of potentially responsive information, including “OIG,” “Inspector General,” “Federal Trade Commission,” “Department of Justice,” and related terms. Docket no. 291 at 5, 21. AANMA and Winders now suggest a number of additional search terms that UAS should use, such as “FBI,” “Federal Bureau of Investigation,” “AUSA,” “U.S. Attorney, “AG,” “Attorney General,” and “qui tam.” Docket no. 292 at 2. In addition to further searches of potentially responsive material using these terms, AANMA and Winders also challenge UAS's claims of privilege with respect to several investigation-related documents identified in UAS's privilege log. AANMA and Winders also dispute that they are subject to the discovery plan agreed to by UAS and previous defendants in this case, which UAS contends provided for the search terms that it used to search for responsive material and imposed a discovery cut-off date corresponding to the date that each party joined in this litigation. Docket no. 292 at 4.

UAS's privilege log identifies material that it has withheld on the basis of attorney-client privilege that related to the Georgia qui tam action, the Civil Investigative Demand, and the development of its procedures on responding to investigations. Docket no. 292-1 at 2. The Court is satisfied that, through the production of this privilege log, UAS has met its burden of establishing the privileged nature of these materials. UAS's log identifies groups of documents by date, sender, recipient, and a description of subject matter that permits assessment of the applicability of the privilege invoked. Compare In re Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 2001) (party invoking privilege must “make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection”; this is “usually accomplished by submission of a log identifying documents or other communications by date and by the names of the author(s) and recipient(s), and describing their general subject matter”) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted).

In addition to making a sufficient showing of the privileged nature of the otherwise responsive materials that UAS has withheld, the UAS privilege log excerpts that have been submitted to the Court show that UAS has acknowledged the existence of materials that related to the Georgia and Houston qui tams and the Civil Investigative Demand served upon UAS in connection with the Georgia qui tam, as well as materials prepared in connection with an employee deposition in the Georgia qui tam and generated during the production of the internal UAS employee policy for handling investigations. Docket no. 292-1 at 2. AANMA's and Winders's speculation that material related to these topics must exist does not show the existence of materials in addition to those described in the privilege log, or that any additional extant materials would not post-date the discovery cut-off date contained within the parties' discovery plan. Accordingly, the Court finds that that speculation is an insufficient basis for the Court to order further production from, or impose sanctions against, UAS.

*4 Next, AANMA and Winders challenge UAS's failure to produce or provide a privilege log for any responsive material created after the discovery cut-off date that was established by the discovery plan agreed to by UAS and other parties before AANMA and Winders joined the case. Docket no. 78 at 4. AANMA and Winders argue that, because they did not agree to the discovery plan, UAS's failure to produce material created after the discovery cut-off date amounts to an improper blanket assertion of privilege. Docket no. 292 at 2. As AANMA and Winders point out, the discovery plan that establishes a discovery cut-off date of January 13, 2014, for UAS was agreed to by the parties to this case in May 2014, nearly a year before the filing of the Third Amended Complaint that added AANMA and Winders as parties. Docket nos. 78, 159. However, the record also reveals that, in January 2016, AANMA and Winders conferred with UAS and other parties regarding discovery issues and “did not specifically object to the previously filed discovery control plan[.]” Docket no. 218 at 3. Thereafter, in March 2016, AANMA and Winders joined with UAS in seeking a one-month extension of time to conduct additional discovery and assuring the Court of the progress of discovery up to that point. Docket no. 245 at 2 (“the parties have diligently engaged in [ ] substantial discovery efforts” and, in addition to interrogatories and depositions, had “produced hundreds of thousands of pages of documents[.]”). In a May 2016 filing, AANMA and Winders withdrew a previous emergency motion to compel, described an agreement they had reached with UAS regarding the discovery at issue, and requested “that the Court deem the foregoing agreement as an amendment to the Joint Discovery Plan (Dkt. 78) as necessary[,]” appearing to acknowledge that their conduct of discovery was subject to the earlier discovery control plan. Docket no. 268 at 1-2. It was not until AANMA and Winders filed their emergency motion to compel in July 2016—nearly a year after their initial requests for production from UAS and more than eight months after UAS's initial document production; more than a month after the close of discovery and less than one week before the deadline to file summary judgment motions—that AANMA and Winders raised their dispute of the discovery cut-off date and instituted their demand for production of nearly three years' worth of additional material. The Court declines to grant this belated request. The Court concludes that AANMA's and Winders's Motion to Compel (docket no. 280) should be GRANTED IN PART as to the list of investigations disclosed from the Houston qui tam action, and DENIED as to the remaining materials sought by that motion.

In its response to AANMA's and Winders's motion to compel, UAS asserts its own motion to compel, claiming that AANMA improperly withheld as privileged materials that are responsive to UAS's requests for production of materials showing AANMA's communications inciting government investigations of UAS and discouraging insurers from doing business with UAS. Docket no. 319 at 11-14. Specifically, UAS seeks an order compelling disclosure of a “list of doctors with patient records” that AANMA sent to the Government and which is referenced in AANMA's document production at AANMA014244; “additional files” that AANMA submitted to the Government and which are referenced in AANMA's document production at AANMA010008; and communications and documents that AANMA sent internally, to insurance companies and third parties, and to U.S. Attorney's Offices in the Southern District of Texas and Northern District of Georgia that are referenced in AANMA's privilege log. Docket no. 319 at 12-13. AANMA and Winders have responded to UAS's cross-motion to compel, arguing that it should be denied as untimely; that any documents that have not been produced and were not identified in their privilege log cannot be produced because they are no longer in AANMA's possession; and that its invocations of attorney-client privilege, common interest privilege, and work product protection permit nondisclosure of the remaining materials referenced in the UAS cross-motion to compel.

AANMA argues that UAS's cross-motion to compel is untimely because the materials it seeks were responsive to discovery requests that UAS propounded upon AANMA in August 2015, which AANMA responded to with responsive materials in October and November 2015. Docket nos. 291 at 132; 294-1 at 14-15, 29-31, 35, 39; 320 at 2. Specifically, UAS's fall 2015 interrogatories and requests for production sought a broad range of AANMA communications with both government investigators and third parties.[3] The parties thereafter exchanged correspondence regarding the sufficiency of AANMA's responses to these requests through February 2016. Docket nos. 291 at 24, 139-51; 294-1 at 14-15, 29-31, 35, 39. In May 2016, UAS propounded a third request for production, which included a request for “[a]ll communications and documents related to communications between [AANMA] and any third party for the purpose of advising or obtaining any testimony related to this Litigation.” Docket no. 294-1 at 43. In July 2016, UAS's counsel sent two additional letters that disputed the sufficiency of AANMA's production of communications with government agencies and third parties. Docket no. 291 at 153-60. Given that the parties engaged in a nearly continuous course of supplemental production and correspondence regarding the sufficiency of AANMA's production from fall 2015 to the weeks preceding the filing of UAS's cross-motion to compel, the Court declines to deny that motion on timeliness grounds.

*5 The “list of doctors with patient records” and “additional files” that AANMA sent to the Government, which are referenced in AANMA's document production at, respectively, AANMA014244 and AANMA 010008 refer to a material that AANMA claims is no longer within its possession because, not anticipating its involvement in this litigation, AANMA did not retain copies of those materials after sending them to the government. Docket nos. 291 at 165; 294-2 at 4-6; 320 at 5. Documents are considered to be within a party's control “when that party has the right, authority, or practical ability to obtain the documents from a nonparty” and “[t]he party seeking production of documents bears the burden of establishing the opposing party's control over those documents.” Perez v. Perry, No. SA-11-CV-360-OLG-JES, 2014 WL 1796661, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2014); Shell Glob. Sols. (US) Inc. v. RMS Eng'g, Inc., No. 4:09-CV-3778, 2011 WL 3418396, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2011) (quoting United States v. Intern. Union of Petro. & Indus. Wkrs., 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989)). UAS has not produced any evidence disputing Winders's affidavit statement that, before AANMA was joined as a Defendant, she sent physical copies of several documents to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Texas, but did not retain copies for herself. Accordingly, the Court finds that UAS has failed to carry its burden of establishing AANMA's control over these materials, and that UAS's cross-motion to compel should be denied as to these two documents.

The remaining documents sought by UAS's cross-motion to compel are documents referenced in AANMA's privilege log that UAS disputes are privileged. AANMA and Winders have tendered the purportedly privileged responsive material to the Court for in camera review. Docket no. 320-3. First, AANMA claims attorney-client privilege with respect to certain communications between AANMA CEO Tonya Winders and AANMA counsel Kimberly Turner. Docket no. 320 at 6. UAS disputes that they fall within the attorney-client privilege because the subject lines included in AANMA's privilege log suggest that the purpose of these communications was not to provide legal advice, but “to drum up insurance and governmental investigations of Plaintiffs[.]” Docket no. 319 at 12. Those communications are listed in the AANMA privilege log with subject lines such as “Memorandum re: Federal Trade Commission”; “How to get the FTC to Investigate”; “Congressional Allergy & Asthma Caucus Strategy”; “Strategy-Deception”; and “JCAI One-pager[.]” Docket no. 319 at 12-13.

UAS's challenge to AANMA's claims of attorney-client privilege with respect to these communications disputes whether the primary purpose of the communications was securing an opinion of law, legal services, or assistance in some legal proceeding. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1975) (reciting elements of attorney-client privilege). Courts have noted the difficulties that arise in distinguishing legal advice from other communications commonly exchanged between corporate counsel and representatives of the corporate client. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 798 (E.D. La. 2007) (noting that “modern corporate counsel have become involved in all facets of the enterprises for which they work. As a consequence, in-house legal counsel participates in and renders decisions about business, technical, scientific, public relations, and advertising issues, as well as purely legal issues.”). After undertaking an in camera review of these materials, the Court concludes that the contested communications conveyed legal advice and are therefore privileged. The contested materials are communications between AANMA's in-house counsel and CEO in which that counsel provided the CEO with legal advice. Winders and Turner appear to have been the primary or the only parties to these communications, and there is no indication that AANMA communications were routinely forwarded to Turner in order to invoke attorney-client privilege as to an inappropriately broad group of internal AANMA communications. Cf. Phillips v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 290 F.R.D. 615, 630 (D. Nev. 2013) (“merely copying or ‘cc-ing’ legal counsel, in and of itself, is not enough to trigger the attorney-client privilege.”). For these reasons, the Court is comfortable in classifying the contents of the contested communications between Winders and Turner as communications that were “primarily in furtherance of legal assistance.” Phillips, 290 F.R.D. at 631; compare Heaton v. Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia, No. CIV.A. 98-1823, 2004 WL 515760, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 16, 2004) (attorney-client privilege did not apply where “the primary purpose of most of the documents was not to secure legal opinions, services, or assistance in a legal proceeding.... [but] involved ... daily business activities”). The Court therefore concludes that UAS's cross-motion to compel should be denied as to these documents.

*6 The Court next turns to communications between AANMA and third parties, including the user of an e-mail account “doctorlem@aol.com”[4] and several insurance companies and other third parties, including Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Texas, Parkland Community Health Plan, Superior Health Plan, Centene Corp., South Central Preferred, Wee Tots Pediatrics, HealthSmart, Texas Health Physicians Group, Greer Laboratories, John Roby, and Wellspan. Docket nos. 291 at 168-71; 319 at 13-14. AANMA claims that the e-mail message from Winders to doctorlem@aol.com is protected by the attorney client privilege, that all of the other third-party communications are subject to attorney work product protection, and that the communications that AANMA exchanged with Blue Cross Blue Shield, Health Smart, Parkland, Centene Corp., and South Central Preferred are also subject to the common legal interest privilege. Docket nos. 291 at 168-71; 319 at 13; 320 at 6-10.

UAS does not appear to dispute that these communications were protected under the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine, but argues that the involvement of third parties in these communications waives whatever privilege or protection applied to them. Docket no. 319 at 13-14. The Court has undertaken an in camera review of the contested materials and AANMA's privilege log and finds that AANMA has established that the January 2014 e-mail to Tonya Winders referenced in the excerpted portion of AANMA's privilege log reproduced at page 13 of docket no. 319—which Winders then forwarded to doctorelm@aol.com—was a privileged attorney-client communication. The Court also finds that, setting aside waiver questions, the communications identified in the excerpts of AANMA's privilege log found at pages 169 and 171 of docket no. 291 are protected under the work product doctrine. Finally, the Court agrees with AANMA that, under the common interest privilege, the involvement of certain third parties in these communications does not waive the attorney-client privilege and work product protection that applies to them.

The common interest privilege “is not a separate privilege, but is a rule of non-waiver” that “exten[ds] ... the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine” by creating “an exception to the general rule that the privilege is waived upon disclosure of privileged information with a third party.” United States v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 4:12-CV-543, 2016 WL 1031157, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2016) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to this exception, attorney-client privilege and work product protection are not waived by “(1) communications between co-defendants in actual litigation and their counsel; and (2) communications between potential co-defendants and their counsel.” Sparling v. Doyle, No. EP-13-CV-323-DCG, 2014 WL 12489987, at *15 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2014) (citing In re Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 2001)). The Court agrees with AANMA that the third-party communications identified in the portions of its privilege log that are excerpted in UAS's cross-motion to compel fall within common interest privilege, and that AANMA did not waive its claims of attorney-client privilege and work product protection by including third parties in those communications. The third parties in question are parties who share a legal interest with AANMA in this litigation. UAS has identified them as AANMA's “co-conspirators” and claims that they “are also the target of AANMA's boycott attempt aimed at driving Plaintiffs from the market[,]” docket no. 319 at 13-14, and most of the contested communications involved coordination between AAMNA and third parties of their litigation of UAS's claims. Docket no. 320 at 7-8. Therefore, the Court concludes that the third-party communications sought by UAS's cross-motion to compel are privileged or protected attorney work product, and finds that UAS's cross-motion to compel should be denied as to these materials.

*7 It is therefore ORDERED that AANMA's and Winders's motion to compel (docket no. 280) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as set forth above; and that UAS's motion to compel (docket no. 319) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SIGNED this 14 day of March, 2017.

United States of America et al. ex rel Michael Vaughn et al. v. United Biologics, LLC et al., Civil Action No. 4:13-CV-1081 (the Houston qui tam).

Notably, the third-party discovery that led AANMA and Winders to file this motion suggests that many of the investigations identified in the list are not qui tam-related, and thus not subject to a Section 3730(b)(2) confidentiality order.

These requests included, inter alia, “all communications [AANMA] ha[s] engaged in with insurance providers, health plans, managed care organizations, and/or other third-party payors ... regarding the provision of allergy testing and allergen immunotherapy by non-board-certified allergists and related support services by Plaintiffs”; “any communication with the Government concerning Plaintiffs, including any complaints about the business practices of Plaintiffs”; “any communications [AANMA] ha[s] engaged in with physicians, physician groups, physician clinics, hospitals, accounts or contracts known to be in incipient contract or contract with UAS and all individuals known to be associated with that entity, regarding the provision of allergy testing and allergen immunotherapy by non-board-certified allergists and related support services by Plaintiffs”; “[a]ny communications and documents concerning ‘remote practice,’ ‘remote practice of allergy,’ ‘remote allergy,’ ‘or ‘RPA,’ or the practice of allergy testing and/or allergen immunotherapy by primary care physicians or non-board certified allergists”; [a]ny communications and documents concerning Plaintiff UAS including any name used to refer to Plaintiff UAS ... Plaintiff AAAPC or any of its member physicians, or ‘Allergy Companies[ ]’ ”; “[a]ny documents and communications related to communications with third-party payors concerning allergy testing or allergen immunotherapy performed by primary care physicians or non-board certified allergists, including [AANMA's] efforts or the efforts of others to change the policy of any third-party payor regarding the practice of allergy testing or allergen immunotherapy by physicians who are not board certified allergists”; “[a]ny communications and documents related to communications with the United States Department of Health and Human Services including its Office of Inspector General, or the United States Department of Justice”; and “[a]ny communications and documents related to communications with state governments, including attorney generals.” Docket no. 291 at 125-26, 129-30, 132.

It appears from the record that this e-mail address was used by Dr. Lyndon E Mansfield, a former defendant in this case.