*1 THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff Terri Rizza's Motion to Compel Compliance with Court Order (DE 46), filed on February 3, 2022. The Motion is fully briefed. (DE 48; DE 49). For the reasons explained below, the Motion is granted in part.

On January 28, 2022, I granted in part Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Discovery “in the interest of resolving this matter on a full record and because I [was] alarmed by the fact that Plaintiff's prior counsel cancelled a deposition with less than an hour's notice without Plaintiff's consent only days before the discovery cutoff deadline.” (DE 42 at 3). Specifically, I granted Plaintiff's Motion to allow Plaintiff to depose Matthew Grossman. (Id.). The Parties now dispute whether my Order allows Plaintiff to depose Mr. Grossman only as an individual or both as an individual and as Defendant's corporate representative.

In support of her position, Plaintiff argues that the deposition that was cancelled by her prior counsel included both Mr. Grossman individually and as corporate representative. (DE 46 at 2). Defendant disagrees. It argues that because my Order referred to the deposition of Mr. Grossman in the singular, it only covered the deposition of Mr. Grossman individually. (DE 48 at 2). As Defendant sees it, deposing Mr. Grossman as an individual and as corporate representative would actually have been two depositions, and Plaintiff did initially notice two depositions to take place on November 8, 2021. (DE 48-1; DE 49-1).

When I reopened discovery to allow Plaintiff to depose Mr. Grossman, I did so because I found that the questionable behavior of her former counsel—cancelling the depositions of an important witness less than an hour before they were scheduled to begin with little time left to conduct discovery—constituted good cause. (See DE 42 at 3). I intended to put Plaintiff in the position she would have been in had her former counsel proceeded with the November 8th depositions as scheduled, and this therefore includes deposing Mr. Grossman both as corporate representative and as an individual. (See DE 48-1; DE 49-1). As such, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is granted.

However, I will deny Plaintiff's request for attorneys’ fees because my Order was ambiguous as to the capacities in which Mr. Grossman was to be deposed. A party may move for an order compelling production if “a party fails to produce documents ... as requested.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iv). Moreover, “an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). If the motion to compel is granted, or if the requested documents are provided after the motion to compel is filed, then “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party ... whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). “But the court must not order this payment if: (i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Id. Because my Order was subject to alternative interpretations, I find that the circumstances make an award of expenses unjust, and Plaintiff's Motion is denied as to her request for attorneys’ fees.

*2 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

SIGNED in Chambers, at West Palm Beach, Florida, this 10th day of February, 2022.