*1 Before the court are the Motion for Attorney's Fees (Dkt. 36) filed by Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff Advanced Medical Design, Inc. (“AMD”) and Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant U & I Corporation's Response (Dkt. 40).[1] AMD requests $3,754.50 in attorney's fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4) for bringing its Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Privilege Log and for Entry of Protective Order (Dkt. 19), which the court granted in part and denied in part (Dkt. 34).

AMD's motion for fees is supported by the affidavit of Chaila Restall, Esq., one of AMD's attorneys, who attests to a total of 12.1 associate hours at the rate of $240.00 per hour, 1.1 hours of partner time at a rate of $350.00 per hour, and 4.9 paralegal hours at the rate of $95.00 per hour in preparing the motion to compel and related filings (Dkt. 36, Ex. A). U & I opposes AMD's request for fees because the court's order on the motion to compel “appears at best to be a split of the parties’ inability to resolve certain discovery issues.” (Dkt. 40 at 1).

Rule 37(a)(4)(A), Fed.R.Civ.P., provides for the award of attorneys’ fees when a party must bring a motion to compel. The rule states:

Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(A).

The rule directs the court to impose sanctions against the unsuccessful party unless the nondisclosing party's objection was “substantially justified” or “other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Id.; Pensacola Beach Cmty. United Church, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No. 3:06cv236, 2007 WL 737499 at * 4 (N.D. Fla. March 7, 2007). Substantially justified means that “reasonable people could differ as to the appropriateness of the contested action.” Maddow v. Proctor & Gamble Co., Inc., 197 F.3d 846, 853 (11th Cir. 1997), citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).

Under the circumstances, the court will not assess sanctions against U & I. The court granted in part and denied in part AMD's motion to compel. Although many of AMD's discovery requests were partially justified, U & I was substantially justified in opposing others. Specifically, as to four of the document requests at issue, the court ordered U & I to produce responsive documents but only within a limited time period (Dkt. 34 at 4-5). The court excluded scheduling reports for certain custom use products, but otherwise ordered U & I to respond to another of AMD's requests (Id. at 5-6). Finally, the court ordered U & I to produce the names, addresses, and termination notices of distributors of OPTIMA products or other implant lines, but held that AMD's request targeting all documents relating to these products was overbroad (Id. at 6). U & I was also ordered to produce responsive documents pertaining to certain non-parties under its control for a limited time period (Id. at 6-7). The parties reached agreement as to eight other document production requests after AMD filed its motion but before the court entered its order; thus, the court denied AMD's motion as to these requests as moot.

*2 Thus, a genuine discovery dispute existed which the parties carried before the court. Neither party can accurately be called the overall “winner” or “loser.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 advisory committee's note to 1970 amendments (stating “[o]n many occasions, to be sure, the dispute over discovery between parties is genuine, though ultimately resolved one way or the other by the court.”).

Upon consideration, AMD's Motion for Attorney's Fees (Dkt. 36) is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on this 24th day of October, 2007.