Bearchild v. Cobban
Bearchild v. Cobban
2015 WL 13924068 (D. Mont. 2015)
September 3, 2015
Johnston, John, United States Magistrate Judge
Summary
The Court granted the motion to compel in part, ordering the Defendants to provide ESI regarding similar complaints, grievances, and lawsuits against Defendant Larry Pasha. The Court noted that access to such information may lead to the discovery of evidence admissible for various purposes, and that the right to privacy is not absolute, and discovery may be allowed if a balancing of the privacy right against the need for the information weighs in favor of disclosure.
DEWAYNE BEARCHILD, Plaintiff,
v.
KRISTY COBBAN, SGT. PASHA, SAM JOVANOVICH, TOM BLAZ, and DAN JOHNSON, Defendants
v.
KRISTY COBBAN, SGT. PASHA, SAM JOVANOVICH, TOM BLAZ, and DAN JOHNSON, Defendants
CV 14-00012-H-DLC-JTJ
United States District Court, D. Montana
Filed September 03, 2015
Counsel
Dewayne Bearchild, Browning, MT, Pro se.Kirsten K. Madsen, Montana Department of Justice, Helena, MT, Maxon R. Davis, Davis Hatley Haffeman & Tighe, Great Falls, MT, for Defendant.
Johnston, John, United States Magistrate Judge
Order
*1 Plaintiff Dewayne Bearchild is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and without counsel. He has filed a “Notice to the Court and Request for Court Intervention” (Doc. 27) that the Court construes as a request for sanctions and a “Request for Court intervention to Obtain Compliance and Sanctions as Provided by Rule 37, Federal Rules Civil Procedure, and Request to Supplement Discovery beyond June 17, 2015 imposed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e) due to Defendants’ non-compliance” (Doc. 31; internal quotation marks omitted) that the Court construes as a motion to compel.
The motion for sanctions will be denied. The motion to compel will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. Motion for Sanctions
Mr. Bearchild alleges prison property officers confiscated and destroyed his discovery research, witness statements, legal court papers, legal notes, and legal booklets on February 12, 2015. He contends the property officers would not allow him to mail these materials out of the prison and told him that Sam Jovanovich and/or his agents asked them to destroy Mr. Bearchild's legal material and property. He asks that the Court interview and sanction Defendants. (Doc. 27.)
Defendants have responded to and opposed Mr. Bearchild's motion. (Doc. 30.) Defendants explain that Mr. Bearchild was cited for fighting with another inmate on January 25, 2015, and sent to pre-hearing confinement disciplinary detention (PCDD). Montana State Prison (MSP) policy prohibits inmates from possessing certain items while in PCDD, including legal papers, but inmates are allowed to receive legal papers while in PCDD. When an inmate is in PCDD, prison officials collect his property and hold it in the property office until the disciplinary hearing process is completed. The property office acknowledged receipt of a box and a tote containing Mr. Bearchild's property on January 26, 2015. Mr. Bearchild was found guilty on January 28, 2015, and given 15 days of detention. On February 3, 2015, Mr. Bearchild's property was searched to determine which items he would be allowed to possess while in PCDD. At that time, he authorized the destruction of certain items of property.
After 15 days of detention, Mr. Bearchild was reclassified to Administrative Segregation and was sent to Locked Housing Unit 1 (LHU-1). Staff inventoried his property again on February 12, 2015, to determine which items Mr. Bearchild could have in LHU-1. The Property Receipt indicates that Mr. Bearchild was allowed to retain “misc legal papers” related to his current case. (Doc. 30-2 at 3.)
Mr. Bearchild was allowed to review the Authorized Property Inventory on February 13, 2015, and he signed a Waiver of Liability Form and wrote the word “destroy” on all excess property including “misc. personal paper work (Not legal).” (Doc. 30-2 at 4-7.) In addition, Defendants submit that Mr. Bearchild and his property have not been under Sgt. Jovanovich's supervision or control since January 25, 2015. (Doc. 30 at 5-6.)
Defendants argue that: Mr. Bearchild did not file a grievance related to his property; there is no evidence that any named Defendant was involved in the alleged destruction; there is no showing of prejudice; and the motion is untimely because Mr. Bearchild did not file his motion until three months after the alleged deprivation.
*2 The Court will not interfere with day-to-day prison administrative decisions such as those made by Defendants. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1981) (federal courts should avoid enmeshing themselves in the minutiae of prison operations in the name of the Eighth Amendment). It appears that Mr. Bearchild's property was confiscated pursuant to disciplinary proceedings and a reclassification. Apart from unsubstantiated hearsay upon hearsay (Mr. Bearchild's representation that property officers told him that Sgt. Jovanovich told them to destroy Mr. Bearchild's property (Doc. 27 at 2-3)), there is no credible evidence that the named Defendants were involved in the alleged confiscation and destruction of property. Defendants produced un-refuted evidence that Mr. Bearchild signed a form consenting to the destruction of much of his property. Further, it appears from Defendants’ evidence that Mr. Bearchild's legal materials with regard to this case were not destroyed. Mr. Bearchild's motion will be denied.
To the extent Mr. Bearchild seeks to add allegations of destruction of his property to his Complaint (Doc. 27 at 5), the request is denied. Local Rule 15.1 requires that “[w]hen a party moves for leave to amend or supplement a pleading, the proposed pleading must be attached to the motion as an exhibit.” Mr. Bearchild has not filed a motion for leave to amend his Complaint, and he has not submitted a proposed amended complaint. The Court will not speculate on what new claims Mr. Bearchild wanted to bring. Furthermore, this matter is proceeding on Mr. Bearchild's claims of excessive force and retaliation. The Court is not inclined to allow him to change the nature of this litigation by bringing in new claims against new defendants at this late stage of the proceedings.
II. Motion to Compel
A. Compliance with Rules
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires motions to compel to “include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.” Local Rule 7.1(c)(1) requires that “[t]he text of the motion must state that other parties have been contacted and state whether any party objects to the motion.” Local Rule 26.3(c) provides:
(1) The Court will deny any discovery motion unless the parties have conferred concerning all disputed issues before the motion is filed. The mere sending of a written, electronic, or voice-mail communication does not satisfy this requirement. Rather, this requirement can be satisfied only through direct dialogue and discussion in a face to face meeting, in a telephone conversation, or in detailed, comprehensive correspondence.
(2) All motions to compel or limit discovery must:
(A) set forth the basis for the motion;
(B) certify that the parties complied with subsection (c)(1) or a description of the moving party's attempts to comply; and
(C) attach, as an exhibit:
(I) the full text of the discovery sought; and
(ii) the full text of the response.
There is no indication in Mr. Bearchild's motion that he has conferred or attempted to confer with Defendants regarding his discovery requests. He does, however, indicate in his Reply that Defendants failed to answer his requests to comply. (Reply, Doc. 33 at 3.) Based upon this representation, the Court is not inclined to deny the motion on these grounds alone.
Mr. Bearchild also failed to attach the full text of the discovery sought and the full text of Defendants’ response. Defendants, however, attached a copy of their discovery responses to their response brief and those responses include the full text of the discovery requests and responses. (Doc. 32-1.)
B. Standard
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally allow for broad discovery, authorizing parties to obtain discovery regarding:
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense--including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
*3 Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). There is generally no requirement that the information sought by a party directly relate to a particular issue in the case. Rather, relevance encompasses any matter that “bears on,” or could reasonably lead to matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be present in the case. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). The Court has broad discretion to manage discovery. Hunt v. County of Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); Jeff D. v. Otter, 643 F.3d 278, 289 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988)). The Court can limit discovery requests if it finds that “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
It is difficult to determine what Mr. Bearchild allegedly did not receive. Parts of his motion are, in fact, incomprehensible. For example, he writes: “[Request for Production No. 1:][1:5-8] of all Defendants [sic] herein. [Request for Production No. 2:][2:9-17] made by all D.O.C.’s employees [sic], and/or all witnesses written statement's [sic], and/or all written affidavit's [sic] included herein too.” (Motion to Compel, Doc. 31 at 3.) He does not provide the full discovery request or Defendants’ response, and he does not explain or argue how any response was deficient.
The Court cannot compel discovery when it is unclear what Mr. Bearchild seeks. On its face, Defendants’ responses to Request for Production Nos. 1-4, 6-7, 9-15, and 17-19 appear to be sufficient. Without a clear statement regarding the deficiency of these responses, the motion will be denied as to these requests.
However, it is clear that Mr. Bearchild seeks information regarding similar complaints, grievances, and lawsuits against Defendant Larry Pasha. (See Discovery Requests 5, 7, 8, 16).[1] Federal Rule of Evidence 404 prohibits litigants from introducing “evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act ... to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” However, information about prior complaints, grievances, and/or litigation involving alleged incidents of sexual abuse/misconduct by Officer Pasha may lead to the discovery of evidence admissible for purposes such as “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Federal Rule of Evidence 404. Access to such information may also lead to the discovery of evidence admissible for the purpose of proving habit or routine. Federal Rule of Evidence 406. Most significantly, information regarding past incidents of sexual abuse/misconduct may be highly probative to Mr. Bearchild's allegation that supervisory Defendants were aware of other inmate complaints against Defendant Pasha for sexual assault and sexual misconduct but still allowed Pasha to work in the unit and failed to properly supervise him. (Complaint, Doc. 2 at 12.). Defendants object to these requests because disclosure of other inmates’ grievances or complaints against Defendant Pasha for sexual assault may affect the privacy interest of those other inmates. Defendants represent in their responses that MSP Policy 4.1.3 at III.A.15 prohibits inmates from possessing personal information about other inmates.
*4 The right to privacy is not absolute, and discovery may be allowed if a balancing of the privacy right against the need for the information weighs in favor of disclosure. For purposes of this motion, the identity of the inmates filing grievances and/or PREA complaints may be redacted. Defendants must provide Mr. Bearchild responsive documents regarding similar complaints, grievances, and lawsuits against Defendant Larry Pasha. (See Discovery Requests 5, 7, 8, 16). Monetary sanctions upon Defendants are not appropriate because Mr. Bearchild failed to certify in his motion that he attempted to confer with Defendants’ counsel and the undersigned has denied the majority of Mr. Bearchild's requests.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court issues the following:
ORDER
1. Mr. Bearchild's “Notice to the Court and Request for Court Intervention” (Doc. 27) as construed as a request for sanctions is DENIED.
2. Mr. Bearchild's “Request for Court intervention to Obtain Compliance and Sanctions as Provided by Rule 37, Federal Rules Civil Procedure and Request to Supplement Discovery beyond June 17, 2015 imposed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e) due to Defendants’ non-compliance” (Doc. 31; internal quotation marks omitted) as construed as a motion to compel is DENIED as to Request for Production Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, and 19. The motion is GRANTED as to Mr. Bearchild's requests for similar complaints, grievances and lawsuits against Defendant Larry Pasha. (See Discovery Requests 5, 7, 8, 16).
3. At all times during the pendency of this action, Mr. Bearchild must immediately advise the Court and opposing counsel of any change of address and its effective date. Failure to file a notice of change of address may result in the dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
DATED this 3rd day of September, 2015.
Footnotes
This is at least the third federal lawsuit filed against Mr. Pasha raising allegations of sexual abuse/misconduct. See Pearson v. Pausha, 10-CV-0035-H-DWM; Harris v. Cobbon, et al., 13-CV-39-H-DWM.