*1 This matter is before the undersigned on the application of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) to enforce certain administrative subpoenas served on Respondents First State Depository Company, LLC (“First State”) and Argent Asset Group LLC (“Argent”). ECF No. 1. Judge Boasberg referred the petition to the undersigned for full case management. ECF No. 2. For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that the Court grant the CFTC's application.[1]

According to the CFTC, First State is a “private depository,” registered and operating in Delaware, that offers “a full range of specialized certified coin and precious metals custody, shipping[,] and accounting services to both commercial and individual participants in the rare coin and precious metals markets.” ECF No. 1-1 at 3 (quoting About First State, https://www.fsdeposi-tory.com/about (last visited June 18, 2021)). Argent—a Delaware business entity that shares an address with First State—buys, sells, and leases “coins, bullion bars and other precious metals.” Id. Both companies are owned and controlled by Robert Leroy Higgins, a Pennsylvania resident, who previously owned a company known as Certified Assets Management, Inc. (“CAMI”), “which had a similar business model to Argent.” Id. at 3–4.

In 2019, the CFTC began investigating whether a third party (not before this Court) had “engaged in fraudulent or manipulative conduct involving precious metals purchased, sold, or leased to Argent, or held on deposit at First State.” ECF No. 1-2 at 3. During that investigation, the CFTC obtained information suggesting that Argent, First State, and/or Robert Higgins may also have “engaged in fraudulent or manipulative conduct involving the precious metals they held on deposit or purchased, sold, or leased for or from customers across the country.” Id. at 4. It therefore issued and served a subpoena on First State in November 2019 (the “November 2019 First State Subpoena”) seeking documents largely related to First State's business interactions with an entity known as West Hills Capital[2]—a company that apparently stored precious metals at First State—and with West Hills Capital's owner and its customers. Id. at 16, 18–21. The subpoena also sought documents concerning the so-called “Silver Lease Program,” an “investment opportunity that West Hills Capital advertised to [its] customers” by which those customers “could purportedly earn monthly income by leasing precious metals coins, precious metals bullion, or precious metals tokens that were purchased, nominally acquired, or invested through West Hills Capital.” Id. First State did not comply with the subpoena by its return date in December 2019, and in January 2020, the CFTC sent a follow-up letter warning First State that the agency would commence an enforcement proceeding if the company did not immediately produce the subpoenaed material. Id. at 48–49.

*2 Also in January 2020, the CFTC issued and served a subpoena on Argent (the “January 2020 Argent Subpoena”) seeking similar documents regarding Argent's interactions with West Hills Capital, its owner and customers; silver leasing programs; and Argent's year-end financial statements.[3] Id. at 54, 59, 61–64. At the end of that month, an attorney representing First State, Argent, and Robert Higgins contacted the CFTC. Id. at 5. On March 12, 2020, 14 documents were produced to the CFTC. Id. at 6. On June 18, 2020, after further communication between Robert Higgins and the agency, Respondents and the agency apparently agreed on search terms to be used in the search for responsive materials, and also agreed that the companies did not need to engage in a document-by-document review for responsiveness prior to production. Id. at 6 n.4; ECF No. 6-3 at 2. According to the CFTC, First State and Argent together produced approximately “17 standalone PDFs,” 14 of which had already been produced in March 2020, and “47,412 emails and attachments that were collected from the electronic mailboxes of two individuals: Eric Higgins and Robert Higgins.” ECF No. 7 at 2 & n.3; ECF No. 7-1.

According to the CFTC, the agency's review of the documents produced by Respondents revealed two things. First, the agency identified deficiencies in the production. Specifically, Respondents have reportedly not produced the following categories of documents responsive to the November 2019 First State Subpoena and/or the 2020 Argent Subpoena:

ECF No. 1-1 at 8 n.5. Second, the agency determined that “Respondents likely possess[ ] documents that may have been outside the scope” of the November 2019 First State Subpoena and the January 2020 Argent Subpoena. Id. at 8. Therefore, in July 2020, the CFTC issued a subpoena each to First State (the “July 2020 First State Subpoena”) and Argent (the “July 2020 Argent Subpoena”) (together, the “July 2020 Subpoenas”) seeking (1) trial or deposition testimony given by a number of individuals (including a number of individuals surnamed “Higgins”) in any civil or criminal matters, including a case against First State and CAMI (the precursor to Argent) brought in Delaware Chancery Court, see Israeli Disc. Bank of N.Y. v. First State Depository Co., Civil Action No. 7237, 2013 WL 2326875 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2013); and (2) “all monthly records reflecting the physical inventory of precious metals, bullion, coins, or other tangible assets held or stored” at the companies’ offices. ECF No. 1-2 at 100, 126. Documents responsive to the July 2020 Subpoenas have not been produced. See ECF No. 6 at 2 (admitting, on May 26, 2021, that Respondents are “still attempting to gather the [ ] documents called for by the [CFTC's] most recent subpoenas”).

The CFTC filed its application seeking an order from this Court enforcing the four subpoenas at issue—the November 2019 First State Subpoena, the January 2020 Argent Subpoena, and the two July 2020 Subpoenas. ECF No. 1. At the agency's request, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the CFTC's application should not be granted. ECF No. 3. That Order to Show Cause required the CFTC to serve a copy of it, along with the CFTC's application and exhibits (which include the memorandum in support of the application and the relevant subpoenas), on Respondents. Id. at 2. The CFTC did so (ECF No. 4) and Respondents filed a response to the Order to Show Cause on May 26, 2021 (ECF No. 6). That response admits that the CFTC has the authority to issue the relevant subpoenas, but argues that “an order compelling Respondents to produce documents to the [CFTC] is unnecessary” because they have already produced most of the requested documents and “do not dispute” that they are required to produce the remainder “as soon as they are able to locate them.” ECF No. 6 at 1. The CFTC filed a reply and a supplement to the reply. ECF No. 7; ECF Nos. 8 & 8-1. Petitioner's application to enforce the administrative subpoenas is now ripe for adjudication.

*3 In considering a petition to enforce an administrative subpoena, courts “consider only whether ‘the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite[,] and the information sought is reasonably relevant.’ ” Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Thornton, 41 F.3d 1539, 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)); see also FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 871–72 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (recognizing that “the court's role in a proceeding to enforce an administrative subpoena is a strictly limited one” and considers only whether “the investigation [is] for a lawfully authorized purpose, the documents sought [are] relevant to the inquiry, and the demand [is] reasonable”). “If an agency's subpoena satisfies these requirements, [the court] must enforce it.” United States v. Inst. for Coll. Access & Success, 27 F. Supp. 3d 106, 111 (D.D.C. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Thornton, 41 F.3d at 1544).

“[A]gencies are given broad deference both in their interpretation of the scope of their authority to issue a subpoena for targeted records and their estimation of the relevance of such records.” United States v. Capitol Supply, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 91, 99 (D.D.C. 2014). “Consequently, the burden of showing that an administrative subpoena is unreasonable rests on the subpoenaed party and ‘is not easily met.’ ” Id. at 100 (quoting Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 882).

A. Jurisdiction and Venue

It is axiomatic that, before a federal court may resolve a case, it must have subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute and personal jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent; in addition, the court must be the proper venue for the case.

In the D.C. Circuit, subject-matter jurisdiction over an action seeking enforcement of an administrative subpoena is determined by examining the statute that authorizes issuance of the subpoena. See, e.g., U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n v. ASAT, Inc., 411 F.3d 245, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (assessing the statute that authorized the agency to issue subpoenas to determine if the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case); see also NLRB v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 438 F.3d 1198, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (same); CFTC v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same); cf. SEC v. Lines Overseas Mgmt., Ltd., No. Civ. A. 04-302, 2005 WL 3627141, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 2005) (finding that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to either the statute empowering the agency to issue subpoenas or “via the ... general jurisdictional provisions” in Title 28 of the U.S. Code).

The relevant provision in the Commodity Exchange Act, which the CFTC enforces, see 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (establishing the CFTC's jurisdiction), provides that “[i]n [any] case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to, any person, the [CFTC] may invoke the aid of any court in the United States within the jurisdiction in which the investigation or proceeding is conducted,” 7 U.S.C. § 9(8). To “determin[e] the location of an investigative inquiry for purposes of district court jurisdiction to enforce agency subpoenas,” the D.C. Circuit has “articulated a two-part test” that asks “(1) whether [the location bears] a sufficiently reasonable relation to the subject matter of the investigation ..., and (2) whether the agency's choice of this [location for enforcement] ... exceed[s] the bound of reasonableness.” Cooper Tire, 438 F.3d at 1201 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting FEC v. Comm. to Elect Lyndon La Rouche, 613 F.2d 849, 856–57 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). Moreover, “[b]ecause the second criterion resembles a traditional venue analysis that focuses on the convenience of the ... parties,” the questions of subject-matter jurisdiction and venue “merge.” ASAT, 411 F.3d at 248.

*4 The D.C. Circuit's two-part test is informed by a number of factors:

Cooper Tire, 438 F.3d at 1201 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting ASAT, 411 F.3d at 249). “When an investigation is nationwide in scope, its subject matter is not located in any particular place, and the location of the investigating office may well be the most reasonable choice for purposes of subpoena enforcement.” Id. at 1202. Here, the bulk of the activities related to the relevant investigation have a connection to Washington, D.C. Specifically, Michael Loconte, a Futures Trading Investigator with the Enforcement Division of the CFTC, which is located at the agency's headquarters in this jurisdiction, asserts that the staff of his division working in Washington, D.C.:

ECF No. 1-1 at 5. To be sure, the targets of the subpoenas—First State and Argent—are located in Delaware and their owner resides in Pennsylvania. Id. at 15. However, “the District of Columbia, where the [CFTC] maintains its headquarters, [is] the hub of the [agency's] investigative activity,” including the “activities regarding the subpoena[s] at issue,” which were issued in and are returnable here (see ECF No. 1-2. at 9–40, 48–83, 122–45). ASAT, 411 F.3d at 249 (quoting La-Rouche, 613 F.2d at 857). Because the CFTC “conducted the ‘administrative activities essential to the investigation in [the District of Columbia],’ the district court here [has] subject matter jurisdiction.” ASAT, 411 F.3d at 249–50 (first alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n v. ASAT Inc., 355 F. Supp. 2d 67, 71 (D.D.C. 2004)). Moreover, the investigation has involved multiple jurisdictions (ECF No. 1-2 at 3 (noting that, in connection with the investigation, the CFTC has corresponded and had telephone interviews with, taken testimony from, and issued subpoenas to individuals or entities across the country)) and the targets of these subpoenas “offer services online with no geographic restriction” (ECF No. 1-1 at 15). The fact that this is a national investigation further “tip[s] the scale in favor of the District [of Columbia].” Cooper Tire, 438 F.3d at 1204. Finally, neither First State nor Argent has argued that responding to the subpoenas, which requires only the production of documents to an address in this jurisdiction, would cause any hardship. Because Respondents “[have] demonstrated no actual hardship of defending [themselves] in the District of Columbia, ... it is not difficult to conclude that the [CFTC's] choice of the District of Columbia to enforce the subpoena[s] is well-within the ‘bound[s] of reasonableness.’ ” ASAT, 411 F.3d at 250 (quoting LaRouche, 613 F.2d at 857). For these reasons, the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action and venue is proper here.

*5 As to personal jurisdiction, Rule 4(k)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[s]erving a summons ... establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant ... when authorized by a federal statute.” Here, the Commodity Exchange Act provides, as discussed above, that the CFTC “may invoke the aid of any court of the United States within the jurisdiction in which the investigation or proceeding is conducted.” 7 U.S.C. § 9(8). In ASAT, the D.C. Circuit held that similar language in the Tariff Act of 1930, which “permits enforcement of [International Trade] Commission subpoenas by district or territorial courts ‘within the jurisdiction of which such inquiry is carried on,’ ” constitutes “authoriz[ation] [for] nationwide service of process in actions to enforce Commission subpoenas.” 411 F.3d at 250 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1333(b)). Courts in this Circuit have specifically found that the language in the Commodity Exchange Act likewise allows for service of process on a respondent in any district in which it may be found. See CFTC v. Conley, No. 16-mc-2158, slip op. at 7 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2017) (“Personal jurisdiction is also proper in this District. The statutory language permitting courts ‘within the jurisdiction in which the investigation ... is conducted’ to order compliance with the Commission's subpoenas, 7 U.S.C. § 9(8), ‘must be interpreted as a special grant of jurisdiction’ and thus authorizes the court ‘in the district wherein the action is required to be brought to obtain jurisdiction of the person[ ] of the defendant[ ] through service upon [him] of its process in whatever district [he] may be found.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting FTC v. Browning, 435 F.2d 96, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1970))); accord CFTC v. Sullivan, No. 15-mc-32, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2015) (finding that 7 U.S.C. § 9(8) “establishes where venue and personal jurisdiction are proper”). Here, Respondents were served with the relevant subpoenas and this Court's Order to Show Cause together with the CFTC's application. ECF No. 1-2 at 4–5, 7, 42–43, 85; ECF No. 4. This Court therefore has personal jurisdiction over Respondents. See, e.g., Conley, slip op. at 7 (finding that the court had personal jurisdiction over the respondent because he had been served with the CFTC's subpoena and with an order to show cause); see also SEC v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 417 (10th Cir. 1996) (basing the district court's personal jurisdiction over the respondent in part on the fact that he was personally served with that court's order to show cause); FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[T]he [district] court has secured personal jurisdiction over the respondent by proper service of process ....”); United States v. Hiramanek, No. 17-cv-3389, 2017 WL 3605232, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2017) (collecting cases for the proposition that a court may acquire personal jurisdiction over a respondent in an agency enforcement proceeding “by service of the show cause order and the petition for enforcement” (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Gilleran, 992 F.2d 232, 233 (9th Cir. 1993))). Moreover, Respondents have waived any objection to this Court's personal jurisdiction by “enter[ing] [the] case, mak[ing] no objection to jurisdiction, and ask[ing] the court to act on [their] behalf in some substantive way.” FEC v. Automated Bus. Servs., 888 F. Supp. 539, 541 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting Grammenos v. Lemos, 457 F.2d 1067, 1070 (2d Cir. 1972)); see also SEC v. Carebourn Capital, LP, No. 20 C 7162, 2021 WL 1546438, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2021) (noting that a defendant who appears in a case and “believes that [the] court is without [personal] jurisdiction” must “immediately object to the court's personal jurisdiction” (quoting Philos Techs., Inc v. Philos & D, Inc., 645 F.3d 851, 855–56 (7th Cir. 2011))).

B. Enforceability of the Subpoenas

The remaining question is whether the subpoenas are enforceable, that is, whether “the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite[,] and the information sought is reasonably relevant.” Thornton, 41 F.3d at 1544. Respondents have conceded that the subpoenas at issue meet these requirements by explicitly stating that the CFTC “is authorized to subpoena most of the documents called for by the [ ] subpoenas the staff issued to Respondents” (ECF No. 6 at 2) and by failing to respond to any of the CFTC's arguments as to the enforceability of the subpoenas or identify any documents or categories of documents sought by the agency that do not fall within its authority. See, e.g., United States v. Fischer, 993 F. Supp. 2d 238, 243–44 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding the respondent to an administrative subpoena had conceded its enforceability by failing to address the relevant factors); see also 1443 Chapin St., LP v. PNC Bank, N.A., 810 F. Supp. 2d 209, 222 n.12 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting that “[i]n this Circuit, ‘it is well understood’ ” that a court may treat as conceded arguments raised in a motion that are not addressed in the opposition (quoting Hopkins v. Women's Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, 284 F.Supp.2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003))). Nevertheless, the undersigned will briefly address the D.C. Circuit's requirements for enforcement of an administrative subpoena.

“[E]nforcement of an agency's investigatory subpoena will be denied only when there is ‘a patent lack of jurisdiction’ in an agency to regulate or to investigate.” FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583, 587 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 591 F.2d 951, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). The Commodity Exchange Act makes it unlawful to engage in fraudulent or manipulative conduct “in connection with any swap, or contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity.” 7 U.S.C. § 9(1); 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a). The CFTC “ha[s] the authority under the [Commodity Exchange Act] to regulate precious metals contracts.” CFTC v. Topworth Int'l, Ltd., 205 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999). The statute also authorizes the agency to “make such investigations as it deems necessary to ascertain the facts regarding the operations of ... persons subject to the provisions of [the Commodity Exchange Act].”[4] 7 U.S.C. § 12(a)(1). In aid of such investigations, the CFTC may “subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, or other records that the [agency] deems relevant or material to its inquiry.” 7 U.S.C. § 9(5). The investigation here concerns suspected fraudulent or manipulative conduct involving precious metals in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act. ECF No. 1-1 at 20; see also Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41398, 41401 n.37 (July 14, 2011) (“[I]f an entity employed a deceptive device to sell precious metals to customers as a way for the customers to speculate on the value of such commodities ... the [CFTC] would exercise its authority against the entity under [7 U.S.C. § 9(1)] and final Rule 180.1.”). It is therefore within the authority of the agency.

*6 To be enforceable, an administrative subpoena must not be “too indefinite and the information sought [must be] reasonably relevant.” Thornton, 41 F.3d at 1544. The subpoenas at issue are sufficiently definite. They ask for specific categories of documents created or transmitted during specific and limited time periods. See ECF No. 1-2 at 18–21 (identifying the categories of documents sought by the November 2019 First State Subpoena and delineating the “Subpoena Period” as “December 31, 2016 through the present”); id. at 61–64 (identifying the categories of documents sought by the January 2020 Argent Subpoena and delineating the “Subpoena Period” as “December 31, 2011 through the present”); 99–100 (identifying the categories of documents sought by the July 2020 Argent Subpoena and importing the “Subpoena Period” from the January 2020 Argent Subpoena); 125–26 (identifying the categories of documents sought by the July 2020 First State Subpoena and delineating the “Subpoena Period” as “December 31, 2011 through the present”). And, indeed, the definiteness of the request is confirmed by the fact that Respondents have asserted that they have or will produce all responsive documents that are in their possession, custody, or control (ECF No. 6 at 2), which indicates that they have been able to identify what materials are responsive.

The relevance standard for the purposes of an administrative subpoena

FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (internal citation omitted). Thus, information will be deemed relevant as long as it is “ ‘not plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose’ of the [agency].” Id. at 1089 (alteration in original) (quoting Texaco, 555 F.2d at 872). More, “the agency's own appraisal of relevancy must be accepted so long as it is not ‘obviously wrong.’ ” Id. (quoting FTC v. Carter, 636 F.2d 781, 787–88 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

The CFTC has not provided a great deal of information about its investigation, asserting merely that it was prompted by “information indicating that third party ... may have engaged in fraudulent or manipulative conduct involving precious metals purchased, sold, or leased to Argent, or held on deposit at First State” and later obtained “information indicating that Argent, First State, and/or Mr. Higgins may themselves have engaged in fraudulent or manipulative conduct involving precious metals that they held on deposit or purchased, sold, or leased.” ECF No. 1-1 at 5.

Nevertheless, it is not difficult to determine that the CFTC has met the relevance standard. As noted, the agency may define the investigation “quite generally.” Invention Submission, 965 F.2d at 1090. Here, the information sought by the subpoenas, which relates to business of three entities involved in the buying, selling, leasing, or storing of precious metals—First State, Argent, and West Hills Capital—fits within that general description of the investigation. The CFTC's assessment that such information is relevant is not “obviously wrong.” Id. at 1089. Indeed, Respondents have not argued that the information sought is irrelevant. See, e.g., Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Frates, 61 F.3d 962, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he party resisting an administrative subpoena bears the burden of showing that the information sought is irrelevant.”).

Moreover, [w]hile an administrative subpoena that is unduly burdensome should not be enforced, see id. (quoting Texaco, 555 F.2d at 881), “to reject a petition to enforce an administrative subpoena” on burdensomeness grounds, “this Circuit requires a showing that compliance with the subpoena ‘threatens to unduly disrupt or seriously hinder normal operations of a business.’ ” FTC v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm. Inc., 898 F. Supp. 2d 171, 174 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Texaco, 555 F.2d at 882). Again, Respondents have not argued that complying with the subpoena would be overly burdensome under that (or any other) standard. Texaco, 555 F.2d at 882 (“The burden of showing that the request is unreasonable is on the subpoenaed party.”).

*7 Because the agency's subpoenas meet the requirements for enforcement, the court “must enforce [them].” Inst. for College Access & Success, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 111. The undersigned therefore recommends granting the CFTC's application.

C. The CFTC's Additional Requests in Its Reply

In its reply brief and supplement, the CFTC requests more than mere enforcement of the administrative subpoenas. Addressing Respondents’ claims that they have produced the majority of responsive material in their possession, custody, or control (and the suggestion that some responsive material once was but no longer is in their possession, custody, or control) (see generally ECF No. 6), the CFTC provides certain evidence garnered from information already produced in the investigation that might well indicate that there are responsive documents that have not yet been produced. Specifically, it points out that (1) it appears that Respondents searched the email accounts of only two individuals—Robert Higgins and Eric Higgins—although there are indications that other employees have responsive records that have not been captured by that search (ECF No. 7 at 3–5); (2) no responsive text messages were produced, although there is evidence that Robert Higgins regularly used text messages to conduct business (id. at 5–6); (3) no documents collected from portable storage devices have been produced, although there is evidence that Robert Higgins used a flash drive in connection with his businesses (id. at 6–7); (4) no documents collected from hard drives have been produced although “[i]t is a seemingly uncontroversial point to suggest that Respondents—which provide custody, accounting, and transactional services for tens of millions of dollars-worth of precious metals ... likely store relevant records on the hard drives of individual computers, if not on shared drives as well” and, indeed, the CFTC has evidence that responsive material was kept on a hard (or perhaps portable) drive (id. at 7; see generally ECF Nos. 8 & 8-1); (5) no documents collected from online portals have been produced although evidence indicates that Respondents used such portals (ECF No. 7 at 8); and (6) no records have been produced from an inventory management system that Respondents apparently used (id. at 8–10). The agency therefore asks that

*8 Id. at 14 (footnote omitted).

The undersigned finds that such a detailed order is unnecessary at this time. As the CFTC points out, each of the types of documents and electronically-stored information in that list are already called for by the subpoenas, which define “[c]ommunication” broadly to include

ECF No. 1-2 at 16 (November 2019 First State Subpoena), 59 (January 2020 Argent Subpoena), 99 (incorporating the definitions from the January 2020 Argent Subpoena into the July 2020 Argent Subpoena), 125 (incorporating the definitions from the November 2019 First State Subpoena into the July 2020 First State Subpoena); see also id. at 6 n.5, 7 nn.6–7, 8 n.8, 14. Similarly, the subpoenas require that, “[i]n determining where responsive documents in [electronic] form might be located,” the target must

ECF No. 1-2 at 17 (November 2019 First State Subpoena), 60 (January 2020 Argent Subpoena), 99 (incorporating the definitions from the January 2020 Argent Subpoena into the July 2020 Argent Subpoena), 125 (incorporating the definitions from the November 2019 First State Subpoena into the July 2020 First State Subpoena). More, Respondents have not even suggested that complying with the subpoenas as written would impose an undue burden on them. See, e.g., Capitol Supply, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 101 (“It cannot be gainsaid that ‘some burden on subpoenaed parties is to be expected and is necessary in furtherance of the agency's legitimate inquiry and the public interest.’ To establish an undue burden, the subpoenaed party resisting enforcement must show that the ‘compliance threatens to unduly disrupt or seriously hinder normal operations of a business.’ ” (internal citations omitted) (first quoting CFTC v. McGraw–Hill Cos., 390 F. Supp. 2d 27, 35 (D.D.C. 2005), then quoting United States v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 186 F.3d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 1999))). Rather, they have admitted that their production is incomplete and committed to complying with those subpoenas and producing all responsive documents within their possession, custody, or control. ECF No. 6 at 1. And, of course, a failure to comply with a court order enforcing an administrative subpoena is punishable by civil contempt. See, e.g., Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947); see also Hugler v. Jasper Contractors, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-3845, 2017 WL 8186737, at *10–13, 16 (N.D. Ga. June 8, 2017) (recommending holding respondent in civil contempt for “failing to produce responsive documents within its possession, custody or control that would have been gathered in a reasonable search” and imposing, among other things, a fine of $1,000 per day until the violations of the order enforcing the relevant administrative subpoena were cured), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Acosta v. Jasper Contractors, Inc., 2017 WL 8186721 (N.D. Ga. July 24, 2017). For these reasons, the undersigned thinks it unnecessary to enter the CFTC's more detailed order described in its reply.

*9 One dispute remains. The CFTC asks the Court to require Respondents to comply with the subpoenas within two weeks of the entry of an order enforcing the subpoenas. ECF No. 7 at 14. Respondents seek a deadline of July 31, 2021, to respond. ECF No. 6-5 at 1–2. In light of the CFTC's contentions in its reply that compliance with the subpoenas may well require Respondents to engage in significant additional searches to locate responsive material, a two-week deadline might well be setting Respondents up to fail. The undersigned therefore recommends setting a deadline of 30 days after entry of any order enforcing the subpoenas with the understanding that the parties may confer and jointly propose an alternative schedule for the Court's approval.

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the CFTC's petition to enforce the administrative subpoenas (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED, and that Respondents be ordered to engage in a reasonable search and produce all material relevant to the subpoenas within 30 days after receipt of an order by this Court. The undersigned further RECOMMENDS ordering that Respondents’ failure to comply with the Court's order to respond to the subpoena may be punished as contempt of this Court.

The parties are hereby advised that, under the provisions of Local Rule 72.3(b) of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, any party who objects to the Report and Recommendation must file a written objection thereto with the Clerk of this Court within 14 days of the party's receipt of this Report and Recommendation. The written objections must specifically identify the portion of the report and/or recommendation to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The parties are further advised that failure to file timely objections to the findings and recommendations set forth in this report may waive their right of appeal from an order of the District Court that adopts such findings and recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).

The undersigned determined that a Report and Recommendation was appropriate here because the petition is a case-dispositive matter. See NLRB v. Frazier, 966 F.2d 812, 817 (3rd Cir. 1992) (finding that a report and recommendation was required for a petition to enforce an administrative subpoena because, “[w]hile a motion to enforce a subpoena arising in a civil action would be a routine matter which a magistrate judge could dispose of as a nondispositive motion, the Board's enforcement proceeding was not part of a larger case before the court[,]” so “once the court grant[ed] [the] motion to ... compel[ ] compliance with [the] subpoena, the court [would] dispose[ ] of the entire case before it”); Cf. Strong v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913–14 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (concluding that a petition to quash was analogous to a dispositive motion and thus required a report and recommendation because “[o]nce the petitions are decided, the matter is over” and “[u]nlike a discovery motion, petitions to quash summonses are not ancillary to a larger proceeding. They are the entire proceeding.”).

According to its website, West Hills Capital “is a national leader in bullion delivery and silver bullion lease income programs.” Bullion Purchasing & Silver Income Specialists, https://westhillscapital.com/new-to-whc/ (last visited June 18, 2021).

The November 2019 First State Subpoena and the January 2020 Argent Subpoena were not the first subpoenas the CFTC served on Respondents. In June and July 2015, the CFTC served two subpoenas on Argent and one on First State. ECF No. 6-1 at 4–55. It is not clear whether those subpoenas were connected with the CFTC's current investigation or a different one. In any case, compliance with those subpoenas is not at issue here.

“The term ‘person’ [under the Commodity Exchange Act] imports the plural or singular, and includes individuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts.” 7 U.S.C. § 1a(38).