Richard Castillo v. City of Los Angeles, et al Case No. 2:20-cv-04257-JAK-JC United States District Court, C.D. California Filed December 13, 2021 Chooljian, Jacqueline, United States Magistrate Judge Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO QUASH (DOCKET NO. 41) I. SUMMARY *1 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Richard Castillo's Motion to Quash, or in the Alternative, to Modify Subpoena (“Motion to Quash” or “MTQ”), which Defendant Officer Frank Hernandez opposes.[1] The Motion to Quash has been submitted for decision. (Docket No. 49). Based on the Court's consideration of the parties' submissions in connection with the Motion to Quash, and for the reasons explained below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Motion to Quash. II. BACKGROUND On September 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (alternatively, “SAC”) against the City of Los Angeles and Officers Frank Hernandez and Kim Hanna, asserting two federal claims of excessive force and municipal/supervisory liability arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and three state claims of battery, interference with constitutional rights by threat (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52.1, et seq.) and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Docket No. 21). Defendants thereafter filed Answers to the Second Amended Complaint. (Docket Nos. 26, 33, 36). Plaintiff's claims are predicated on an April 27, 2020 interaction between Plaintiff, who then resided in a tent on an empty lot in Boyle Heights, and Defendants Hernandez and Hanna – an interaction which was recorded by a bystander. (SAC at 5-8). During such interaction, Defendants assertedly stopped Plaintiff, Defendant Hernandez allegedly aggressively restrained and violently beat Plaintiff and spat in Plaintiff's face, and Defendant Hanna allegedly stood by, pointing her taser at Plaintiff and largely failing otherwise to intervene. (SAC at 7-10). Defendant Hernandez assertedly thereafter falsely conveyed to other responding officers that he had hit Plaintiff because Plaintiff had grabbed Defendant Hernandez's hand, Plaintiff had attacked him, and Plaintiff was not cooperating – assertions that Defendant Hanna did not attempt to correct. (SAC at 10-12). Plaintiff was thereafter jailed overnight, but was released the next day without any charge or citation. (SAC at 12). Plaintiff further alleges that the foregoing events caused him to experience emotional and psychological distress, pain and suffering, physical injuries, humiliation and embarrassment, and fears for his health and well-being, entitling him to general, special, economic and non-economic damages. (SAC at 17).[2] *2 On October 8, 2020, this Court issued a Protective Order governing the production and dissemination of confidential information produced in discovery. (Docket No. 32). The non-expert discovery cut-off in this action is January 10, 2022. (Docket No. 48). On June 23, 2021, Defendant Hernandez issued a subpoena (“Subpoena”) directed to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD), calling for the production of records regarding Plaintiff by July 9, 2021. (Ouchi Ex. A). More specifically, the Subpoena called for the production of: (1) the Arrest Report Re: Richard Castillo by Los Angeles County Sheriff on September 3, 2018 involving an H&S 11378 “Possess Control Substance for Sale” allegation; (2) “any and all records pertaining to past incarcerations regarding any and all incidents, including but not limited to police reports, reports, investigations, follow up reports, supplemental reports, addendums to reports, written and/or recorded statements, interviews, 911 logs, communications transcript, dispatch units, transcriptions, officer notes, diagrams or drawings, evidence logs, computer notes, records showing dispatch units to scene, color copies of all photographs, including digital photographs and photographs stored electronically or on CD-ROM, videos, recordings”; (3) “all other police records, classification and evaluation records, and documents pertaining to [Plaintiff] including:” All Rule Violation Reports, All incident reports involving violence by or to Plaintiff, All records which reflect any gang membership by Castillo, All records of in-custody crimes, All reports filed by Castillo in which he alleged any type of mistreatment by correctional staff, Probation Officer's report, Chronological history, All documents which reflect the sentence received, time served, and any time credited or removed from the sentence, Legal status reports with applicable calculation sheets, Time Credit Waiver, Abstract of judgment, Classification hearing minutes, Notice of critical case information, Medical report of unusual incident or injury, List of approved visitors, and Confidential file. (Ouchi Ex. A). Plaintiff's counsel did not receive a copy of the Subpoena/Notice of the Issuance – items which apparently had been served on Plaintiff solely by mail – until June 28, 2021. (First Ouchi Decl. ¶ 4). On July 1, 2021, after researching the matter, Plaintiff's counsel emailed a meet and confer letter to Defendant's counsel, requesting that counsel meet and confer regarding the Subpoena/Plaintiff's anticipated motion to quash by July 5, 2021. (First Ouchi Decl. ¶ 6; Ouchi Ex. B). Defense counsel did not respond to the meet and confer letter by such deadline. (First Ouchi Decl. ¶ 7). The Motion to Quash followed. As it appeared to the Court that counsel had not actually conferred regarding the Motion to Quash and that the Subpoena was, at a minimum, vastly overbroad and called for the production of information in which Plaintiff had a privacy interest, the Court ordered counsel to confer and to attempt to resolve, or at least to narrow their disputes/to significantly narrow the Subpoena and to thereafter file supplemental briefs/status reports. (Docket No. 49). On August 31, 2021, the parties jointly filed the Status Report with supporting documents. See supra note 1. The Status Report reflects that Defendants have narrowed the Subpoena to call for the production of (1) arrest reports, including all related supplemental reports; (2) records related to any in custody use of illegal drugs; (3) any and all medical records; (4) reports by Castillo of mistreatment if they exist; (5) Probation Officer's report; (6) any documents reflecting sentence received, time served, and time credited/removed; and (7) abstract of judgment. (Status Report at 2-3). It further reflects that Plaintiff no longer challenges the Subpoena to the extent it calls for the production of medical records with the LASD and (2) abstracts of judgments which would provide information related to convictions, sentences, and confinement terms of Mr. Castillo, if any. *3 Accordingly, the remaining dispute is whether the Subpoena should be quashed to the extent it calls for the production of (1) arrest reports, including all related supplemental reports; (2) records related to any in custody use of illegal drugs; (3) reports by Castillo of mistreatment, if they exist; (4) Probation Officer's report; and (5) any documents reflecting sentence received, time served, and time credited/removed. III. Pertinent Law “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 26(b)(1). Relevance under Rule 26(b)(1) is defined broadly. See Snipes v. United States, 334 F.R.D. 548, 550 (N.D. Cal. 2020); V5 Techs. v. Switch, Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 306, 309 (D. Nev. 2019), aff'd, 2020 WL 1042515 (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2020) (noting that relevance for discovery purposes remains broad even after the 2015 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Moreover, “[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Rule 26(b)(1). “Generally, the purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 378 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citations omitted). Although relevance for discovery purposes is defined very broadly, it is not without boundaries. See Rule 26(b)(2); see, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, 364 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (“District courts need not condone the use of discovery to engage in fishing expeditions.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 905, U.S., Mar. 07, 2005. District courts have broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes. Mfg. Automation & Software Sys., Inc. v. Hughes, 2017 WL 5641120, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2017) (citing Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005)). Rule 45(d) provides various bases upon which a person subject to or affected by a federal subpoena may move to quash or limit such subpoena. Generally, “a party has no standing to quash a subpoena served upon a third party, except as to claims of privilege relating to the documents being sought.” Cal. Sportfishing Prot. All. v. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., 299 F.R.D. 638, 643 (E.D. Cal. 2014); Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 973-74 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Ordinarily a party has no standing to seek to quash a subpoena issued to someone who is not a party to the action, unless the objecting party claims some personal right or privilege with regard to the documents sought.” (quoting Charles Wright & Arthur Miller, 9A Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2459 (3d ed. 2008))). A party therefore lacks standing to object a subpoena served on a third party on grounds of relevance, overbreadth, or undue burden. See Krenitsky v. Kirsch, 2020 WL 5017270, *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2020) (defendant has no standing to object to subpoena directed to third party based on relevance); Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. v. Certified Forensic Loan Auditors, LLC, 2020 WL 1181491, *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2020) (defendant has no standing to object to subpoena directed to third party based on undue burden); Eclat Pharmaceuticals, LLC, v. West-Ward Pharmaceutical Corp., 2014 WL 12607663, *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014) (denying defendant's motion to quash/for a protective order, finding defendant lacked standing to challenge plaintiff's subpoena to third parties based on, among other things, relevance and overbreadth); Windsor v. Martindale, 175 F.R.D. 665, 668 (D. Colorado 1997) (denying defendant's motion to quash/for a protective order, finding defendant lacked standing to challenge plaintiff's subpoena to third parties based on, among other things, relevance and overbreadth) *4 A person from whom discovery is sought may move for an order limiting or forbidding discovery “for good cause” to protect the moving party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense. Rule 26(c)(1). A party seeking to limit discovery has a “heavy burden” of showing why discovery should be limited. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Fausto v. Credigy Servs. Corp., 251 F.R.D. 436, 437 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 868 (1992)). The party who resists discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Blankenship, 519 F.2d at 429); see Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. Money Mkt. 1 Inst. Inv. Dealer, 285 F.R.D. 481,485 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence”). “[G]eneral or boilerplate objections such as ‘overly burdensome and harassing’ are improper – especially when a party fails to submit any evidentiary declarations supporting such objections.” A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 188 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Paulsen v. Case Corp., 168 F.R.D. 285, 289 (C.D. Cal. 1996)). IV. Discussion and Orders Plaintiff argues that the Subpoena should be quashed based on overbreadth/lack of relevance and privacy.[3] Defendant contends that Plaintiff does not have standing to object to the Subpoena based on overbreadth/lack of relevance, but that, in any event, the items sought by the Subpoena are relevant to Plaintiff's damages claims and to his asserted bias against law enforcement and are proportional to the needs of the case. More specifically, Defendant argues that the information sought is relevant to establish an alternative or contributing cause of Plaintiff's assertedly significant emotional distress and lost capacity to function as to which Plaintiff apparently seeks damages exceeding $7 million (see supra note 2), and that it is relevant to Plaintiff's bias against law enforcement which may have colored his attitude and conduct during the subject incident and acted as a motivating factor in filing the instant action.[4] Defendant does not appear to dispute that Plaintiff has standing to seek quashal of the Subpoena based on privacy, but contends that Plaintiff's privacy objection is unsupported and insufficiently specific. First, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff does not have standing to object to the Subpoena based on relevance/overbreadth. See Krenitsky, 2020 WL 5017270, at *2; Eclat Pharmaceuticals, LLC, 2014 WL 12607663 at *1; Windsor, 175 F.R.D. at 668. *5 Second, however, “[t]he Court may, on its own, limit the extent of discovery when it falls outside the scope of Rule 26(b)(1).” Tater v. City of Huntington Beach, 2021 WL 4735015 *5 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2021) (citations omitted); see Rule 26(b)(2)(C); Vysata v. Menowitz, 2019 WL 2871145, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2019) (“Although [the] [d]efendants appear to lack standing, the Court nevertheless exercises its inherent power to limit discovery.” (citing Rule 26(b)(1), (b)(2)(C)(iii))); Moon v. SCP Pool Corp., 232 F.R.D. 633, 638 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (quashing subpoena to non-party on defendant's motion based on, among other things, overbreadth). Accordingly, the Court has considered the parties' contentions regarding relevance/overbreadth in assessing whether to quash the Subpoena to the extent it seeks the remaining items in dispute. In light of the amount and scope of damages apparently sought by Plaintiff (see supra note 2), the Court is persuaded – irrespective of Plaintiff's contentions regarding admissibility which are not appropriate for resolution in assessing this discovery matter – that a subset of the remaining disputed items sought by the Subpoena are at least somewhat probative of whether Plaintiff's asserted emotional distress damages were all caused by Defendants' alleged actions or whether other events not attributable to Defendants caused or contributed to causing such damages, e.g., issues involved in certain prior arrests/convictions, interactions with/other alleged mistreatment by law enforcement officers, and drug use, which may be evidenced by the remaining items sought by the Subpoena. See, e.g., Morris v. Long, 2012 WL 3276938, *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012) (denying motion in limine to exclude evidence suggesting plaintiff used alcohol excessively, had prior arrests unrelated to the subject incident, and had confrontations with police officers unrelated to the subject incident, finding such evidence relevant and admissible on the issues of economic and emotional distress damages), clarified on denial of reconsideration, 2012 WL 3528015 (E D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2012), aff'd, 592 F. App'x 579 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 851 (2015); Udemba v. Nicoll, 237 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2001) (affirming admission of evidence of unrelated arrest as probative of contested issue in the case, namely, the extent of damages attributable to emotional distress); Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 686 (9th Cir. 1988) (“If a person's damages are ‘I was extremely upset by the event,’ then evidence of similar events before and after the one at issue may support an inference that part or all of the distress was attributable to the other events.”); Lewis v. District of Columbia, 793 F.2d 361, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (affirming admission of plaintiff's past use of drugs as probative of whether some of suffering and nightmares he experienced following police shooting may have been proximately caused by drug withdrawal and not the shooting); Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming admission of evidence that plaintiff in excessive force case had subsequent encounters with the police and difficulties in school as evidence was relevant to cause of damages which plaintiff attributed to injuries to his “head, body and psyche” allegedly incurred as result of arrest). To the extent the Court has declined to quash the Subpoena, it has determined that the information sought is relevant and proportional to the needs of the case considering the factors in Rule 26(b)(1). Third, the Court has considered whether it is appropriate to quash the remaining disputed portions of the Subpoena based on privacy. Questions of privilege that arise in the course of the adjudication of federal rights are governed by the principles of federal common law. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (citing Federal Rules of Evidence 501). Where, as in this case, a federal question claim and pendent state law claims are present, federal law on privilege, not state law (e.g., the provisions of the California Penal Code/other California law upon which Plaintiff relies) applies. Agster v. Maricopa County, 422 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 958 (2005). Federal courts ordinarily recognize a constitutionally-based right of privacy that can be raised in response to discovery requests. Farber, 234 F.R.D. at 191. Courts balance the need for the information sought against the privacy right asserted. Id. Here, Plaintiff relies exclusively upon state law to support his privacy objection, does not address the governing federal law and ignores the existence of the Protective Order that has been entered in this action. After conducting the balancing required by the aforementioned authorities, the Court concludes that to the extent it has declined to quash the Subpoena, Plaintiff's privacy rights are outweighed by Defendant's need for the information and that Plaintiff's privacy interests can be adequately protected by the Protective Order entered in this action. Farber, 234 F.R.D. at 191 (privacy concerns can be addressed by carefully drafted protective order). IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Quash is granted in part and denied in part. It is granted, and the Subpoena is quashed except to the extent the Subpoena calls for the production of the following items as to which the Motion to Quash is denied: (1) Richard Castillo's medical records; (2) abstracts of judgment for Richard Castillo; (3) those arrest reports, including all related supplemental reports for Richard Castillo that involve the use of physical force/violence/threats by Castillo or against Castillo or the use/possession of illegal drugs by Castillo; (4) records sufficient to reflect in custody use of illegal drugs by Richard Castillo; (5) reports by Richard Castillo of mistreatment by government officials if they exist; (6) those portions of Probation Officer reports for Richard Castillo that reflect arrests/charges that involve the use of physical force/violence/threats by Castillo or against Castillo or the use/possession of illegal drugs, the disposition of any such arrests/charges, and any gang membership/affiliation of Castillo; and (7) to the extent the abstracts of judgment/unquashed portions of the Probation Officer reports do not already do so, documents sufficient to reflect sentence(s) received by, time served by, and time credited/removed for Richard Castillo. Documents produced pursuant to the Subpoena shall be deemed “Confidential” and shall be treated in accordance with the protections afforded to “Confidential” information in the Protective Order entered in this action. *6 IT IS SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] On July 6, 2021, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Quash (alternatively, “MTQ”) with two declarations of Wesley G. Ouchi (respectively “First Ouchi Decl.” and “Second Ouchi Decl.”) and exhibits (“Ouchi Ex.”). On July 13, 2021, Defendant Hernandez filed his Opposition (alternatively “Opp.”) with a declaration of Denise L. Rocawich (“Rocawich Decl.”) and exhibits (“Rocawich Ex.”). On July 19, 2021, Plaintiff Hernandez filed a Reply with another declaration of Wesley G. Ouchi (“Third Ouchi Decl.”) and exhibits (“Third Ouchi Ex.”). On August 31, 2021 – following a meet and confer directed by the Court – the parties jointly made a further submission (“Status Report”) which was accompanied by a Declaration of Richard A. Lucero (Lucero Decl.) with an exhibit (“Lucero Ex.”), and another Declaration of Wesley G. Ouchi (“Fourth Ouchi Decl.”). (Docket No. 50). [2] On May 27, 2021, Plaintiff wrote to the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office with a demand of $7,557,435.17 to resolve the case, asserting that Officer Hernandez's assault had, among other things “caused a 24-point drop in IQ, and significantly impaired his social skills, ability to control his emotions, cognitive thought process, and ‘street smarts[,]’ ” and had resulted in Plaintiff's “permanent[ ] lo[ss] [of] the ability to navigate the ‘street,’ take care of himself, engage in meaningful relationships and fully enjoy any aspect of his life.” (Rocawich Ex. A). Declarations from Plaintiff's family members describe changes such family members have assertedly observed in Plaintiff's personality, mood, interests, behavior and attitude since the incident at issue – including that Plaintiff is easily irritated and upset, is more impulsive, is depressed and crying, has poor concentration, displays poor hygiene, has poor manners and social skills, is more disorganized, is fatigued and has problems sleeping, is overeating, has lost interest in his favorite activity, is less social, is uninterested in dating, and is constantly worried about the police. (Rocawich Ex. A). [3] Plaintiff indicates that the FID Report (which Defendant also possesses) reflects that Plaintiff's criminal record consists of four misdemeanor convictions (three for possession of drug paraphernalia and one for possession of a controlled substance) and that it does not reflect that he has a conviction for possession of a controlled substance for sale (Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11378) or any felony. (Fourth Ouchi Decl. ¶ 4). Plaintiff argues that his misdemeanor convictions are not admissible, that the facts underlying his convictions/arrests are not admissible and accordingly that evidence of the foregoing is irrelevant. As noted above, however, admissibility is not determinative of relevance. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (information need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable). [4] In the Status Report, Defendant also argues that the information – to the extent it encompasses Plaintiff's potential gang affiliation – is relevant to the credibility/potential bias of a witness for Plaintiff who apparently was in a gang.