*1 This Amended Report and Recommendation (“Amended Report”) is submitted to the Honorable Fred W. Slaughter, United States District Judge, under 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.[1] For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge strike Defendant Brent Corvalan's Answer to the Complaint and enter default judgment against the Defendant Brent Corvalan.

On August 6, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint requesting an order for two defendants, Christina E. Cavalli-Corvalan and Maria C. Corvalan, to interplead their claims to life insurance benefits under GLAIC policy No. 2,801,563 (“the 563 Policy”) and No. 2,973,635 (“the 635 Policy”). (ECF No. 1.) On September 7, 2021, Christina E. Cavalli-Corvalan filed an answer and crossclaim against Maria C. Corvalan, Susana Corvalan, Luis Felipe Corvalan, Audrey Hope Corvalan, Francisco Corvalan, and Brent Corvalan. (ECF No. 11.) On November 10, 2021, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint for interpleader against Defendants including Brent Corvalan. (ECF No. 25.)

On December 21, 2021, Brent Corvalan (“Defendant”) filed an answer to the amended complaint, claiming 100% of the 635 Policy proceeds and alleging that the beneficiary designations are invalid. (ECF No. 42.) Sergio A. Corvalan, Michael J. Chupa, Norma L. Lemus, Marisyll L. Maa (“movants”), and Union Station Homeless Services also seek proceeds from the 635 Policy. Defendant Brent Corvalan failed to serve initial disclosures pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). On January 26, 2022, movants sent a Request for Production (“RFPs”) of Documents by email seeking documents relating to Defendant Brent Corvalan's claimed right to policy proceeds. Defendant Brent Corvalan requested service by mail – which was effected as of January 27, 2022. Defendant Brent Corvalan's then-counsel requested and was granted an extension of time to respond to the RFPs by March 15, 2022. Defendant Brent Corvalan was granted an additional extension until March 29, 2022.

When repeated attempts to obtain a response (or to meet and confer) from Defendant Brent Corvalan proved unsuccessful, movants filed a motion on April 19, 2022, seeking to compel Defendant Brent Corvalan's compliance with the RFPs. (ECF No. 58.) Defendant Brent Corvalan did not oppose the motion to compel or otherwise respond to it.

On May 11, 2022, this Court granted the motion to compel and ordered Defendant Brent Corvalan to (1) serve written responses without objection to the RFPs (except for RFP 14(y)) by May 24, 2022, (2) produce all non-privileged documents within his possession, custody, or control that are responsive to the RFPs (except RFP 14(y)), and (3) pay movants $4,520 in attorneys' fees by May 31, 2022. (ECF No. 67.) After each deadline in the order passed without compliance by Defendant Brent Corvalan, movants wrote to him requesting compliance and offering to meet and confer. Defendant Brent Corvalan did not reply to any communication from the movants and did not comply with any aspect of the Court's May 11, 2022, order.

*2 On June 6, 2022, movants filed a motion for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A), (C) based on Defendant Brent Corvalan's failure to obey the May 11, 2022 discovery order. Movants' motion seeks various sanctions including the striking of Defendant Brent Corvalan's answer, entry of default judgment against him, and $7,760 in attorneys' fees. Defendant Brent Corvalan did not oppose the motion for sanctions or the amount of attorneys' fees sought by the movants and did not file any response to the motion for sanctions. Thus, it is apparent that Defendant Brent Corvalan has ceased all participation in this case.

Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits sanctions against a party who “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). Those sanctions include “directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established,” “prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims ... or from introducing designated matters in evidence,” “striking pleadings in whole or in part,” and “rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii), (vi).

In the present case, Defendant Brent Corvalan has failed entirely to respond to the RFPs and has disobeyed this Court's May 11, 2022, order. Defendant Brent Corvalan also has failed to: submit his initial disclosures, file a joint stipulation statement, and communicate with movants' counsel since March 29, 2022. This failure to obey Court orders and rules, and the complete refusal to participate in this litigation, warrant sanctions against Defendant Brent Corvalan.

The Ninth Circuit has developed “a five-part test to determine whether a case-dispositive sanction under Rule 37(b)(2) is just: (1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “The sub-parts of the fifth factor are whether the court has considered lesser sanctions, whether it tried them, and whether it warned the recalcitrant party about the possibility of case-dispositive sanctions.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Dismissal is warranted where “at least four factors support dismissal, or where at least three factors strongly support dismissal.” Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 788 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F.3d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Where a court order is violated, the first two factors support sanctions and the fourth factor cuts against a default. Therefore, it is the third and fifth factors that are decisive.”) (citing Adriana Int'l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990)). However, “[t]his ‘test’ is not mechanical. It provides the district court with a way to think about what to do, not a set of conditions precedent for sanctions or a script that the district court must follow.” Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d at 1096 (citations omitted).

Here, the first two factors – public interest in expeditious resolution of litigation and the need to manage the Court's docket – favor case dispositive sanctions. Defendant Brent Corvalan has failed to provide discovery, failed to meet and confer, and failed to obey court orders despite being granted sufficient time to do so. Defendant Brent Corvalan's conduct hinders the Court's ability to move this case toward disposition and indicates that Defendant Brent Corvalan does not intend to diligently defend his claims.

*3 The third factor – prejudice to movants – also favors case dispositive sanctions. Defendant Brent Corvalan's inaction and refusal to participate in discovery prejudices movants' ability to obtain discovery necessary to prove their case. See In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1227 (“A defendant suffers prejudice if the plaintiff's actions impair the defendant's ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.”) (citations omitted). This inaction may lengthen these judicial proceedings and cause them to be more expensive. Defendant Brent Corvalan's refusal to respond to movants' discovery requests (despite a Court order requiring him to do so) and his refusal to meet and confer has plainly interfered “with the rightful decision of the case” by obstructing access to the facts and information necessary to resolve this action. See, e.g., Adriana, 913 F.2d at 1412 (a failure to produce documents as ordered is considered sufficient prejudice to justify dismissal sanctions); see also Reddy v. Gilbert Med. Transcription Serv. Inc., 2011 WL 13176583, at *6-8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2011) (imposing terminating sanctions after pro se plaintiff failed to provide discovery in a timely fashion and twice failed to appear for court-ordered deposition), aff'd, 467 F. App'x 622 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1227 (“The law also presumes prejudice from an unreasonable delay.”) Notably, Defendant Brent Corvalan has provided no excuse for his failure to provide initial disclosures or comply with Court procedures and orders. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 991-992 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding the prejudice factor strongly favors dismissal where the plaintiff provided a “paltry excuse for his default on the judge's order”).

Public policy favoring the disposition of cases on their merits (the fourth factor) ordinarily weighs against default. However, Defendant Brent Corvalan's conduct is within his control, and he is deliberately refusing to obey Court orders and procedures – by choosing not to respond or participate in this case since the filing of his answer in December 2021. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1993). In such circumstances, the policy favoring disposition on the merits does not outweigh other factors strongly favoring default. See id. at 948-949; Malone v. United States Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 133, 135 n.2. (9th Cir. 1987); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d at 1096.

The final factor – availability of lesser sanctions – further favors case dispositive sanctions. Defendant Brent Corvalan did not provide initial disclosures or responses to the RFPs, respond to the motion to compel, comply with Local Rules, or file a joint stipulation statement. Further, Defendant Brent Corvalan did not comply with this Court's May 11, 2022 order to serve written responses without objection to the RFPs (except for RFP 14(y)), to produce all non-privileged documents within his possession, custody, or control that are responsive to the RFPs (except for RFP 14(y)), and to pay $4,520 in monetary sanctions. Given this history, lesser sanctions are highly unlikely to gain compliance given Defendant Brent Corvalan's complete refusal to participate in this litigation. See Mohamed v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 2018 WL 6167926, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2018) (imposing terminating sanctions where plaintiff failed to: “(1) provide discovery responses; (2) appear at a duly noticed deposition; (2) (sic) provide Court-ordered verified written discovery responses; (3) produce Court-ordered documents; (4) appear at a Court-ordered deposition; and (5) pay Court-ordered monetary sanctions.”); Alexso, Inc. v. Shrem, 2020 WL 7481003, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2020) (finding that lesser alternative sanctions were impractical when defendant failed to pay court ordered monetary sanctions, serve responses to special interrogatories, or attend his deposition).

Dismissal and default judgment are warranted only in “extreme circumstances.” Brookhaven Typesetting Servs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 332 F. App'x 387, 389 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 589, 591 (9th Cir. 1983)). The Ninth Circuit has held that the imposition of a terminating sanction under Rule 37 is justified only where the violation is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the party. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d at 1096 (quoting Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2003)); see Dreith, 648 F.3d at 788. The requirement of willfulness, bad faith, or fault “does not require wrongful intent.” Sanchez v. Rodriguez, 298 F.R.D. 460, 463 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Instead, “[d]isobedient conduct not shown to be outside the control of the litigant is sufficient to demonstrate willfulness, bad faith, or fault.” Jorgensen, 320 F.3d at 912. Further, “[i]n evaluating the propriety of sanctions, the Court considers ‘all incidents of a party's misconduct.’ ” Blundell v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2010 WL 344320, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010) (quoting Adriana, 913 F.2d at 1411).

*4 Evaluating the record of repeated non-compliance and non-participation in this present case, the Court finds that the “willfulness, bad faith, and fault” prerequisite has been shown. See Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d at 1096. There is no plausible conclusion other than that Defendant Brent Corvalan has willfully and in bad faith ceased all participation in this case and has ignored Court orders and rules. See Sanchez, 298 F.R.D. at 463-464 (finding that the plaintiff's noncompliance with a discovery order satisfied the “willfulness, bad faith, or fault” requirement where the plaintiff “received the discovery requests, the motion to compel, and the order granting the motion to compel,” yet the plaintiff did “not attempt[ ] to show that his repeated failure to comply with discovery obligations ... was outside his control”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, after careful consideration of the relevant factors, the Court concludes that the appropriate sanctions for Defendant Brent Corvalan's misconduct should be to strike his Answer and enter default judgment against him.[2]

Movants also request monetary sanctions. Rule 37(b)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: “Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Defendant Brent Corvalan has failed to provide any reason for his failure to obey the Court's order requiring him to respond to movants' discovery requests and pay sanctions, much less a substantially justified one. Further, he did not oppose movants' June 6, 2022, motion for sanctions and attorneys' fees. Although Defendant Brent Corvalan is proceeding pro se, he has been repeatedly advised of his obligation to comply with the Local Rules, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and court orders. In such circumstances, pro se status does not render an award of expenses unjust. Thus, the Court concludes that movants as the prevailing parties are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees caused by Defendant Brent Corvalan's failure to obey the Court's May 11, 2022 order.

In determining the amount of fees awardable under Rule 37, the number of hours reasonably expended are multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The reasonable hourly rate is based upon a consideration of the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting the fees. Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts “should be guided by the rate prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Id. at 1210-1211. The party seeking the award bears the burden of submitting time records justifying the hours expended. Id. at 1210. “The court reviews time records submitted by the party seeking the fee award to determine whether the hours were reasonably incurred or if ‘any of the hours were unnecessary, duplicative, or excessive,’ or inadequately documented.” Notorious B.I.G. LLC v. Yes. Snowboards, 2021 WL 6752168, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2021) (citations omitted). If the billing record contains insufficiently descriptive entries, reflects block billing, or billing in large time increments, the court may reduce the fee award. Id. at *6.

The Court finds that the $400 hourly billing rate of movants' counsel is reasonable. See, e.g., Infanzon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 335 F.R.D. 305, 314 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (finding hourly rates ranging from $380 and $575 to be reasonable); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 2015 WL 1746484, at *15-20 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015) (billing rates of $750-$930 for senior partner, $610-$750 for junior partner, and $350-$690 for associates reasonable), aff'd, 847 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2017). Movants' counsel has also filed a declaration (ECF No. 74-1) stating that he has spent 18.4 hours and his co-counsel has spent 1.0 hour preparing the present motion. After the filing of the initial Report and Recommendation, movants' counsel provided time records (ECF No. 82) that have allowed the Court to assess whether these hours are reasonable in light of the work performed. Based on that assessment, the Court concludes that the hours were reasonably incurred, and Defendant Brent Corvalan should be ordered to pay movants the full amount of attorneys' fees incurred by movants in connection with this motion ($400/hr x 19.4 hrs = $7760.00).

*5 Defendant Brent Corvalan's objections to this Amended Report and Recommendation are due no later than 21 days from the date of this Amended Report. Any reply to the objections shall be due no later than 14 days after the filing of the objections.

Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Judge accept this Amended Report and Recommendation, strike the Answer of Defendant Brent Corvalan, enter default judgment against Defendant Brent Corvalan, and order that Defendant Brent Corvalan pay the moving Defendants the sum of $7760.00, which is the amount of their attorneys' fees in connection with their successful motion for sanctions.

This Amended Report and Recommendation corrects certain case citations and formatting issues and addresses movants' recently submitted billing records in support their request for attorneys' fees.

Given the recommendation of case-terminating sanctions, alternative sanctions sought by the motion have not been discussed herein.