*1 Edward Richardson sues pro se the Chair of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Federal Reserve), his former employer, alleging constitutional torts, common-law torts, and statutory violations during Mr. Richardson's employment. As relevant here, Mr. Richardson has moved to compel the production of unredacted copies of documents from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), a non-party respondent from whom Mr. Richardson subpoenaed information about three former colleagues’ pre-employment background checks. For the reasons explained herein, the Motion to Compel will be denied.

On March 10, 2017, Mr. Richardson moved to subpoena third parties, including OPM, to produce employment records regarding a former colleague, Shandra J. Love, as well as background investigation records on Ms. Love and two other former colleagues, Rocco Christoff and Darren Harris (collectively, the Former Colleagues). Mr. Richardson claims that unfavorable events in the Former Colleagues’ employment histories, including background check results, are relevant as comparators to his own case. On March 30, 2017, the Court granted Mr. Richardson's motion; subpoenas for OPM and another third party were subsequently issued. OPM moved to quash the subpoena; the Court denied the motion to quash as to OPM, and OPM was required to produce the materials.

Subsequently, as requested by the Court, OPM filed a joint status report on behalf of both parties, informing the Court that OPM had provided certain third-party information to Mr. Richardson, but that Mr. Richardson opposed redactions in the material. The specific redactions disputed by Mr. Richardson are (1) “a redaction of information showing the results of an inquiry to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (‘FBI’) about these third parties” (FBI Name Check Results), and (2) “the information from credit reports that would identify the subjects of the credit reports” (Credit Report Information). Joint Status Report by OPM [Dkt. 123] at 1. Mr. Richardson separately filed a status report noting his opposition to the redactions.

After Mr. Richardson moved to compel production of the redacted portions of these materials, OPM moved to provide the materials to the Court for review in camera; the Court granted the motion, received the materials, and has reviewed them. The FBI Name Check Results comprise six pages of reports from which a total of ten brief result fields have been redacted. The Credit Report Information comprises 53 pages of credit check results from which names, identifying information, and account numbers have been redacted. The Court has reviewed these materials to assess the probative value, if any, of the redacted portions.[1]

*2 Any party in this case is permitted to designate discovery materials as “Confidential Information” pursuant to a Protective Order issued by the Court on October 6, 2016. Protective Order [Dkt. 56]. Any such confidential information would be filed under seal, and would be subject to various protections outlined in the Protective Order. See id. at ¶ 5.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limit the scope of discovery to relevant materials that are “proportional to the needs of the case”:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “[A]bsent an express congressional intent to the contrary, the standards set forth in the [Federal Rules] must be followed with respect to discovery requests in District Court.... [T]he test of discoverability is the relevance standard of Rule 26(b)(1)....” Laxalt v. McClatchy, 809 F.2d 885, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

Notwithstanding the presumption in favor of discovery, district courts have “ample discretion to fashion appropriate protective orders upon a showing of ‘good cause.’ ” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)). In Laxalt, which concerned a discovery dispute over Privacy Act protection of FBI information, the D.C. Circuit noted that the district court should

Id. at 889-90. The district court should “undertake some substantive balancing of interests” to determine whether disclosure should be limited to protect persons from harm that could be caused by a production. Id. at 890.

Mr. Richardson argues that he is entitled to review the FBI Name Check Results and Credit Report Information without redactions because these materials are relevant to the Former Colleagues’ backgrounds in ways that could illustrate, by comparison, alleged discrimination against Mr. Richardson. In part, Mr. Richardson intends to show that his termination by the Federal Reserve was discriminatory because, while his termination was premised in part on unfavorable background investigation results, other employees also had unfavorable background investigation results but were not terminated. Mr. Richardson argues that the redacted information is directly relevant to the Former Colleagues’ suitability for employment pursuant to OPM regulations. See 5 C.F.R. § 731.101 et seq. (setting forth criteria based on which OPM may take adverse employment actions). Mr. Richardson argues that, because the Federal Reserve “bases it[s] hiring and retention (‘suitability’) decisions on the financial backgrounds of prospective and current personnel,” he should have access to the unredacted materials so he can compare the Former Colleagues’ financial information to his own. Mot. to Compel at 3.

A. FBI Name Check Results

*3 Mr. Richardson argues that the FBI Name Check Results should be provided so he can ascertain whether the Federal Reserve had any information about “an investigative inquiry against” any of the Former Colleagues at the time those employees were hired. Id. at 4; see also Reply at 2 (“[T]he Board violated its own Suitability Policy by retaining the [Former Colleagues] when it had express knowledge that such derogatory matters existed.”). OPM contends that it should not be compelled to produce unredacted FBI Name Check Results, citing “the law enforcement interests of the FBI.” Opp'n at 2. OPM relies on the sworn declaration testimony of David Eisenreich, the FBI's Section Chief of the National Name Check Program Section, who explains that the FBI's policy precludes disclosure of name check results to any individual, largely because doing so could “potentially compromis[e] investigations, confidential sources, or investigative techniques.” Id. at 2-3 (citing Declaration of David F. Eisenreich [Dkt. 124-1] at ¶ 5). OPM argues that production of such information should not be compelled “in the face of the FBI's legitimate concerns for [its] protection,” and that disclosure “could reveal sensitive law enforcement information and could compromise ongoing investigations.” Opp'n at 3-4.

The declaration of Mr. Eisenreich provides important context regarding the FBI Name Check Results: as a matter of agency policy, the FBI does not disclose name check results to individuals, largely because doing so could have a serious deleterious effect on investigations and other sensitive operations. The redacted information, FBI contends, is so sensitive that even providing it to the person who is its subject could compromise important agency functions. These are undoubtedly serious concerns; in addition, persons who have committed no crime might be named in FBI records and their privacy rights must be protected. See, e.g., Nat'l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004) (providing that, in the context of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, a person requesting records must articulate a “significant” public interest sufficient to outweigh an individual's privacy interest); SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (recognizing the “substantial” privacy interests of third parties in records requests related to law-enforcement investigations). Having reviewed the material in unredacted form, the Court finds that the redacted portions of the FBI Name Check Results are not sufficiently probative to be considered “proportional to the needs of the case,” given the arguments against providing the information to any person and the potential invasion of privacy rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Laxalt, 809 F.2d at 890 (advising that the district court should “undertake some substantive balancing of interests” to determine whether disclosure should be limited). The Court will deny Mr. Richardson's Motion to Compel as to the FBI Name Check Results.

B. Credit Report Information

OPM argues that the Credit Report Information should not be provided to Mr. Richardson in unredacted form because such a disclosure “would not be in compliance with” the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (the Act). Opp'n at 6-7. The Act provides that “any consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report” under certain circumstances, including “[i]n response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue such an order.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(1). OPM correctly asserts that, under the present circumstances, it cannot produce identifying consumer reporting information without a court order and it opposes granting such an order to Mr. Richardson.

The Court also agrees with OPM that the privacy interests of the individuals whose identifying information is at issue should be considered. See Laxalt, 809 F.2d at 889-90 (“[The district court] should also consider, in its discretion, the wisdom of notifying the affected parties.”). Arguing that disclosure of personally identifying Credit Report Information would not be foreseeable to the affected third parties, OPM notes that its online form that obtains authorization to collect credit reports for federal-employment applicants does not warn that such reports could be released if requested by a third party in litigation. See Opp'n at 5-6 (citing Standard Form 86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions, Fair Credit Reporting Disclosure and Authorization Form (Online Form) [Dkt. 127-1] at 136); see also Opp'n at 6 n.2 (asking the Court to take judicial notice of the Online Form, which the Court does).

*4 The Court has reviewed the redacted Credit Report Information in light of the allegations of Mr. Richardson's complaint and his arguments here. It balances the privacy interests of the persons who are the subjects of the credit reports and Mr. Richardson's interest in this litigation. It finds that the Credit Report Information provides extensive details that can be readily compared to Mr. Richardson's own credit report as of that time; the redactions are of account numbers (not challenged) and the identity of the person on whom credit is reported. For Mr. Richardson's purposes, what matters is whether, or the extent to which, the Credit Report Information provides negative information about any of the alleged comparators that is analogous to Mr. Richardson's credit report. With full information about three former colleagues for that comparison, the specific person about whom each credit report contains information is not critical to satisfy Mr. Richardson's interest.

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Richardson's Motion to Compel will be denied. A memorializing Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

The relevant pleadings and orders are all on the docket: Pl.’s Mot. to Subpoena Third-Parties (Mot. to Subpoena) [Dkt. 103]; Order on Mot. to Subpoena [Dkt. 105]; OPM Mot. to Quash [Dkt. 109]; 6/14/2017 Order on Mot. to Quash [Dkt. 118]; 6/28/17 Minute Order; Joint Status Report by OPM [Dkt. 123]; Pl.’s Status Report [Dkt. 124]; Pl.’s Mot. to Compel (Mot. to Compel) [Dkt. 125]; OPM Opp'n to Pl.’s Mot. to Compel (Opp'n) [Dkt. 127]; OPM Unopposed Mot. for Leave to Submit Materials Ex Parte, In Camera, and Mem. in Support Thereof [Dkt. 128]; Pl.’s Reply Brief in Support of Mot. to Compel (Reply) [Dkt. 130]; Notice of Ex Parte, In Camera Submission [Dkt. 133].