*1 Now pending before the court is Plaintiff's Motion (dkt. 82) seeking attorneys' fees due to certain discovery misconduct committed by Defendants and their counsel. The court will not repeat the essence of the now-adjudicated discovery disputes (see Ltr. Br. (dkt. 80) at 1-5), nor is it necessary to repeat the court's previous findings that those disputes were entirely the consequence of the unreasonable positions, frivolous objections, and baseless arguments advanced by Defendants and their counsel (see Order of August 8, 2022 (dkt. 81) at 1-8). Instead, the court will only reiterate its previous findings that Defendants and their counsel had engaged in a pattern of willful obstructionism and bad faith in advancing a series of frivolous objections and arguments designed to delay, hinder, and frustrate the course of discovery in this case – for which an award of attorneys' fees to Plaintiff was clearly warranted (see id. at 7-8). As to the determination of a reasonable sum, the court entertained a full round of briefing from the Parties (see dkts. 82, 83, 85). The matter now having been briefed, the court finds that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the matter is suitable for disposition without oral argument.

Plaintiff seeks $38,669.00 in remuneration as a result of the extra time and expense occasioned by the obstructionist tactics employed by Defendants and their counsel. See generally Pl.'s Mot. (dkt. 82); see also id. Exh. 2, Hayes Decl. (dkt. 82-2) at 12-13. As to the number of hours spend, and the hourly rates involved, Plaintiff claims the following:

Further, having reviewed the Declaration of Douglas Gold (dkt. 82-1), the court finds that Plaintiff's counsel's hourly rates are eminently reasonable and well within the range of rates charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience who practice in this court.

Defendants' response in opposition is threadbare and conclusory to the point where it warrants no serious discussion at all. See Defs.' Opp. (dkt. 83) at 2. Indeed, Defendants do little more than citing (without any discussion) to a patently inapplicable statute and irrelevant court case (which amounts to yet another round of frivolous argument by Defendants and their counsel for the reasons stated by Plaintiff – see Pl.'s Reply (dkt. 85) at 2-3). Otherwise, in substance, Defendants' opposition consists of only a single conclusory assertion to the effect that $38,699.00 is excessive – again, with no explanation at all. See Defs.' Opp. (dkt. 83) at 2.

*2 The undersigned disagrees. As mentioned previously, the court has already found (dkt. 81 at 7-8) that Defendants and/or their counsel shall be liable for Plaintiff's attorneys' fees in connection with Plaintiff's efforts to ferret through Defendants' boilerplate objections and the preparation and filing of the letter brief (dkt. 80) which brought this matter to the court's attention; and that all that remained in this regard, were determinations as to the reasonableness of Plaintiff's attorneys' hourly rates and the reasonableness of the number of hours expended, as well as the suitable target for the attorneys' fee award – to wit, Defendants or their counsel. As mentioned above, the court finds that the hourly rates charged by Plaintiff's counsel are reasonable, as are the number of hours expended in ferreting through Defendants' frivolous and boilerplate objections and bringing the matter to the court's attention. As to the suitable target for this fee award, Plaintiff submits that Defendants and their counsel should be jointly and severally liable for paying the fee award (Pl.'s Mot. (dkt. 82) at 3-4), while Defendants and their counsel chose to disregard or decline the court's invitation to express an opinion on that subject (see generally Defs.' Opp. (dkt. 83) at 2).

As to the reasonableness of the fee request, “[i]n the Ninth Circuit, courts use the two-step lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorney fee awards under fee-shifting statutes ... [and] [a]fter calculating the ‘lodestar figure’ by 'multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate, a court then considers whether ‘it is necessary to adjust the presumptively reasonable lodestar figure.’ ” Leong v. Havens, No. 18-cv-05751-JST, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179337, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2019) (citing Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996)). Having undertaken such an approach to evaluating the reasonableness of Plaintiff's fee request (as to the reasonableness of the hourly rates and the number of hours expended), the court finds (as did the court in Leong) that “the parties have identified no justification for adjusting the lodestar figure, and the court therefore does not reach the second step of the analysis.” Id. As to the propriety of jointly and severally targeting defense counsel (along with Defendants) with the fee award – the court will note that, “[i]n addition to Rule 11, federal courts have broad inherent powers to sanction parties, counsel, and firms that engage in conduct which abuses the judicial process.” DNA Sports Performance Lab, Inc. v. Major League Baseball, No. C 20-00546 WHA, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199891, at *16-17 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2020) (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017)). “And one permissible sanction is an assessment of attorney's fees — an order, like the one issued here, instructing a party that has acted in bad faith to reimburse legal fees and costs incurred by the other side.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 581 U.S. 101, 137 S. Ct. at 1186. Sanctions imposed under a district court's inherent powers require a bad faith finding, since they are intended to compensate. Lahiri v. Universal Music & Video Distribution Corp., 606 F.3d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 2010). “District courts wield significant discretion in determining appropriate sanctions.” DNA Sports Performance Lab, Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199891, at *17.

In light of the above, the court finds as follows: (1) Plaintiff's fee request for the sum of $38,699.00 is reasonable because it is premised upon a reasonable expenditure of time, multiplied by reasonable hourly rates, and that it was necessarily occasioned by the bad faith conduct, willful obstructionism, and frivolous objections and arguments advanced by Defendants and their counsel; and, (2) that Defendants and their counsel shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of that sum because Defendants and their counsel have equal shares of responsibility for the bad faith obstructionism and frivolous argumentation and objections that have operated to waste a great deal of Plaintiff's time while also abusing the judicial process and wasting the court's time.

*3 Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for the award of $38,669.00 – to be paid jointly and severally by Defendants and their counsel – is GRANTED. Defendants and/or their counsel are herewith ORDERED to tender payment of that sum to Plaintiff no later than two weeks from the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.