*1 Before the Court is Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Written Discovery against Defendants JLG Industries, Inc. and Oshkosh Corporation (Dkt. No. 43),[1] wherein Plaintiff asks the Court to overrule Defendants' objections and compel complete answers to the propounded interrogatories and requests for production. The motion was followed by a court-ordered supplement (Dkt. No. 49), filed by Plaintiff to address a number of deficiencies in his motion. (See Dkt. No. 46). Defendants JLG Industries, Inc. and Oshkosh Corporation have filed responses. (Dkt. Nos. 51 & 52).

Because it appeared that Plaintiff filed the motion to compel without first adequately conferring on its disposition, as both the federal and the local rules require, the Court issued a spate of orders directing Plaintiff to confer in good faith to resolve Defendants' objections without further court intervention. (See Dkt. Nos. 46, 50, & 57). These orders spurred the parties to conference and culminated in a Joint Advisory Regarding Motion to Compel Written Discovery (Dkt. No. 60), in which the parties identified the discovery requests that remain in dispute:

Interrogatories to Defendant Oshkosh Nos 2, 3, 11, and 20;

Requests for Production to Oshkosh Nos. 18, 21, 23, 27, 29, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, and 66 (second);

Interrogatories to Defendant JLG Industries, Inc. Nos. 2, 3, 15, 16, and 20;

Requests for Production to Defendant JLG Industries, Inc. Nos. 3, 18, 21, 23, 27, 29, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, and 66 (second).

All other discovery requests addressed in Plaintiffs' motion have been resolved by agreement of the parties.

This is a personal-injury case arising from a workplace accident that occurred on February 1, 2018 in Laredo, Texas at a warehouse allegedly owned by Defendant Oshkosh Corporation and managed by Jorge Estrada. (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 3). Plaintiff claims that he suffered his on-the-job injuries when a JLG scissor lift operated by Jorge Estrada crushed his legs and fractured both his ankles. (Id.).

Plaintiff's complaint raises two claims: a general negligence claim against all Defendants, and a negligent-undertaking claim against Jorge Estrada. (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 3–4).[2] Plaintiff alleges that the scissor lift was in the exclusive custody and control of Jorge Estrada (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 3); notably, however, he alleges neither a pattern nor a history of accidents involving scissor lifts.

*2 It is well-established in the Fifth Circuit that “a district court has broad discretion in all discovery matters, and such discretion will not be disturbed ordinarily unless there are unusual circumstances showing a clear abuse.” Beattie v. Madison County Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d 595, 606 (5th Cir.2001) (cleaned up). In federal court, the scope of discovery is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b). Rule 26(b)(1) permits parties to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). At the discovery stage, the “threshold for relevance...is lower than at the trial stage.” Rangel v. Gonzalez Mascorro, 274 F.R.D. 585, 590 (S.D. Tex. 2011). Relevancy is thus to be “construed liberally to reach ‘any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.’ In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 623 F. Supp. 2d 798, 838 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).

Under Federal Rule of Procedure 33, a party may serve on any other party interrogatories that relate “to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1), (2). Objections to interrogatories “must be stated with specificity,” and “[a]ny ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). Similarly, Rule 34 permits parties to request the production of “any designated documents,” “electronically stored information,” or “tangible things” that fall within the scope of Rule 26(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). A response to a Rule 34 request must, “[f]or each item or category,” ”either state that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B). “An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(C). By signing a discovery request, “an attorney or party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry” the requested discovery, the response, or the objection is “neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii). And if a court finds that the requested discovery lies outside the scope of Rule 26(b)(1), the court “must limit the frequency or extent of discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). Nevertheless, “Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery.” Kleppinger v. Texas Dep't of Transportation, No. CV L-10-124, 2012 WL 12893652, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Crawford–El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 599 1998)).

*3 If a party fails to answer interrogatories under Rule 33 or to produce materials requested under Rule 34, the party seeking the discovery may move to compel their production. Crosswhite v. Lexington Ins. Co., 321 F. App'x 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)). Generally, the party resisting discovery bears the burden of showing “specifically how each request is not relevant or how each request is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive.” Kleppinger v. Texas Dep't of Transportation, No. CV L-10-124, 2012 WL 12893652, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2012). However, if the discovery request “is overly broad on its face” or the “relevancy is not readily apparent, the party seeking discovery has the burden to show the relevancy of the request.” Id. (citing Tara Woods Ltd. P'ship v. Fannie Mae, 265 F.R.D. 561, 567 (D. Colo. 2010)).

As discussed below, the Court finds that some of Plaintiff's requests are patently overly broad and seek information not relevant to Plaintiff's claims or Defendants' defenses. And while the parties have agreed to narrow the scope of some of Plaintiff's requests, many still remain for the Court to decide. But given the hours-long conferences that the parties held—or should have held—and the battery of orders directing the parties to confer on the motion in good faith, the Court will not spend its time rewriting the remaining requests to narrow them further to the Court's satisfaction. The Court has already invested considerable time directing the parties to confer and to attempt to reach agreement as to the scope of the discovery requests. (See Dkt. Nos. 46, 50, & 57). It is not the Court's responsibility to modify patently overbroad discovery requests. See Kleppinger, 2012 WL 12893652, at *11; see also Dombach v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CIV. A. 98-1652, 1998 WL 695998, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 1998) (holding that it is not the court's responsibility to redraft overbroad discovery requests).

In the Joint Advisory Regarding Motion to Compel Written Discovery (Dkt. No. 60), the parties represent that certain of the discovery requests and corresponding objections have been resolved by agreement between the parties. Plaintiff agrees to withdraw a number of his requests; Defendants agree to supplement their responses to other requests; and Plaintiff has agreed to modify other of his requests. (Id. at 1). The Court APPROVES and ACCEPTS the parties' agreement regarding the resolution of the discovery matters as set forth in the parties' Joint Advisory Regarding Motion to Compel Written Discovery (Dkt. No. 60).

Interrogatory No. 2 as to both Defendants

This interrogatory, seeking the identification of “every person who is expected to be called to testify at trial, including [Defendants'] experts,” is duplicative of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3)(A)(i). As such, Interrogatory No. 2 is DENIED, without abrogation of Defendants' obligation to disclose information pursuant to Rule 26(a).

Interrogatory No. 3 as to both Defendants

This interrogatory seeks identification of all discoverable consulting experts. Defendants do not assert an objection in response to this request but instead state that this information is unknown at this time. Accordingly, there is nothing to compel, and Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED as to this request.

Interrogatory No. 11, Subpart (iii), as to Oshkosh

Plaintiff agreed to modify this interrogatory into three separate subparts, and the parties are in agreement as to subparts (i) and (ii). Subpart (iii) is a request for the identification of all employees who have knowledge of relevant facts. This broad request is duplicative of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(i), which requires a party to identify “each individual likely to have discoverable information.” Although Plaintiff has withdrawn the interrogatory as originally worded, the Court finds that a request for identification of all employees who worked on the premises on the date of the accident is overly broad and seeks information which is neither relevant nor proportional to the needs of this case. In addition to subparts (i) and (ii) of this interrogatory, a request for identification of all persons who have knowledge of Plaintiff's accident would perhaps be more appropriate in scope; however, Defendants have an ongoing obligation to disclose this information pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i). Plaintiff's motion to compel is therefore DENIED as to this interrogatory.

Interrogatory No. 15 as to JLG Industries

*4 Plaintiff asks Defendant to describe the precautions it takes to prevent “accidents of this type from happening.” After conferring, Plaintiff limited the interrogatory to “videos, documents, and training materials regarding prevention of injuries while moving scissor lifts at the Laredo warehouse at the time of the accident.” Defendant offers boilerplate objections denying the relevance, materiality, specificity, and reasonableness of Plaintiff's inquiry, along with an objection that “Jorge Estrada, the supervisor subject of Plaintiff's complaint, was an Oshkosh employee, not a JLG employee.”

As narrowed, Plaintiff's interrogatory relates to matters within the scope of Rule 26(b). Defendant's objections are either non-specific and conclusory or irrelevant. That Mr. Estrada is not Defendant JLG's employee may affect the nature of Defendant's answer, but it has no bearing on whether the matter to which the interrogatory relates is discoverable. Defendant does not meet its burden of showing that those matters are otherwise undiscoverable, and its objections are overruled. Plaintiff's motion to compel is GRANTED as to this interrogatory.

Interrogatory No. 16 as to JLG Industries

Plaintiff asks Defendant to describe “what [Defendant] did immediately after the accident.” Defendant objects on the basis that the inquiry is “overly broad, vague and ambiguous,” and that even after the conference, Plaintiff would not narrow this interrogatory to the “jobsite”; because JLG is national company with facilities in several other states, Plaintiffs interrogatory “would require an answer for all its employees at any location.”

Plaintiff's request is patently overbroad. It does not narrow the scope of the answer by time, place, or activity. The request is not tailored to ask what Defendant did in regards to something arguably relevant, such as reporting the accident, providing treatment to Plaintiff, investigating the accident, or even what Defendant did after the accident, but pertaining to the accident. Plaintiff's motion to compel is therefore DENIED as to this interrogatory.

Interrogatory No. 20 as to both Defendants

Defendants are asked to “[d]escribe any accidents that occurred on the premises for the five-year period before the date of plaintiff's accident.” The scope of the information sought would include all accidents that may have occurred at the premises during the referenced time period—slip-and-fall accidents, a stapled finger in the office, two cars bumping in the parking lot—and thus the request, which asks for information neither relevant nor proportional to the needs of this case, is patently overly broad. Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED as to this interrogatory.

Request No. 3 as to JLG Industries

Plaintiff seeks “copies of Juan Castillo's signed receipt for any materials, brochures, books, policies, standards, safety matters, or other written material” provided by Defendant JLG. JLG objects that it has no materials to supplement. Accordingly, there is nothing to compel, and Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED as to this request. Defendant JLG does have a continuing duty to supplement this response if they identify additional responsive documents.

Request No. 18 as to both Defendants

This request is for “[c]opies of all witness statements obtained from any person about any information relevant to any issue in this lawsuit, including, but not limited to, the issue [sic] of liability or damages.” Defendants raise various objections relating to privilege and work product. Defendants state that they have already produced one witness statement, that of Oscar Dominguez (see Dkt. No. 52 at 5), and that any statements taken after service of suit and in anticipation of litigation are privileged. However, the privilege log produced by Defendant Oshkosh to Plaintiff pertaining to Request No. 18 does not identify any witness statements being withheld pursuant to a claim of privilege. (Dkt. No. 49-3). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(A) provides:

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(5)(A). Accordingly, to the extent Defendant is in possession of any witness statements described in this request, Plaintiff's motion to compel is GRANTED, and Defendant is ordered to produce any requested witness statements not identified in Defendant's Privilege Log (Dkt. No. 49-3).

Request No. 21 as to both Defendants

This request seeks “Copies of emails between any of your (sic) and any of the Defendants concerning Juan Castillo for the seven (7) days prior to the incident, the day of the accident, through today” [sic]. Defendant asserts various objections, including that production would require the disclosure of privileged correspondence. Not all the correspondence that Defendants resist would be privileged, however. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel is GRANTED as to all emails or electronic correspondence concerning Juan Castillo for the seven days prior to the incident, the day of the accident, and through February 27, 2018, the date Defendant was served with suit.

Request No. 23 as to both Defendants

This request, as modified by Plaintiff, is for all complaints or petitions involving personal injury claims in Texas filed against Defendants within the last five years. It is not limited to accidents involving scissor lifts or even, perhaps, motorized vehicles used in Defendant's warehouse. As such, it is overly broad and seeks information which is neither relevant nor proportional to the needs of this case. Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED as to this request.

Request No. 27 as to both Defendants

This request is similar to Request No. 18, above, in that it requests “tapes and transcripts of conversations, interviews, statements, etc.” for potential witnesses. Defendants raise various objections in response; state that they have already produced one witness statement, that of Oscar Dominguez (see Dkt. No. 52 at 5); and assert that any statements taken after service of suit and in anticipation of litigation are privileged. However, the privilege log produced by Defendant Oshkosh to Plaintiff pertaining to Request No. 27 does not identify any witness statements or recordings being withheld pursuant to a claim of privilege. (Dkt. No. 49-3). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(A) provides:

*6 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(5)(A). Accordingly, to the extent Defendants are in possession of any witness statements described in this request, Plaintiff's motion to compel is GRANTED, and Defendants are ordered to produce any requested witness statements not identified in Defendants' Privilege Logs (Dkt. No. 49-3).

Request No. 29 as to both Defendants

This request seeks “all documents showing the legal and our [sic] business relationship between [the Defendants] in this lawsuit.” Defendants object that this request is irrelevant and overly broad, and that it would “require production of countless documents between Oshkosh and JLG since 2006, when Oshkosh acquired JLG, and the Court finds this objection to have merit. Though this request arguably includes material within the scope of Rule 26(b), it is patently over-broad as drafted. Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED as to this request.

Request No. 34 as to JLG Industries

Plaintiff requests “copies of all sign-in logs for safety meetings the day of the incident, and seven days before and seven days after.” After conferring with Defendants, Plaintiff limited this request to the Laredo warehouse location only. Defendant JLG objects on the basis that the information sought is privileged, and that “Jorge Estrada, the supervisor subject of Plaintiff's complaint, was an Oshkosh employee, not a JLG employee.”

This request, as narrowed, relates to matter within the scope of Rule 26(b). Furthermore, Defendant's privilege log identifies no material to be withheld as privileged, (Dkt. No. 49-2), and as with Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 15, Defendant fails to show how the fact that Defendant JLG did not employ Mr. Estrada places this matter outside the scope of discovery. Plaintiff's motion to compel is therefore GRANTED as to this request.

Request No. 35 as to both Defendants

This request seeks the personnel file for “Juan Estrada” and each employee who was working the day of the accident. While Plaintiff could have chosen to narrow the scope of this request to specific types or categories of documents within the personnel file of Mr. Estrada that would arguably be relevant to Plaintiff's claims against Mr. Estrada, it appears he chose not to do so. As written, the request for the entire personnel file of Mr. Estrada is overly broad, seeks information which is not relevant to this lawsuit, and is confidential by law. See e.g., Ramey v. Salazar, No. EP16CV00293FMATB, 2018 WL 703431, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2018). The portion of the request seeking the personnel files of all employees working the day of the accident is even more tenuous. The Court finds that this request is patently overly broad, seeks information which is irrelevant to the claims and defenses asserted in this case, and is not proportionate to the needs of this case. Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED as to this request.

Request No. 36 as to both Defendants

This request seeks the production of a copy of each of the employee records showing who was working the day of the incident. For the same reasons discussed above for Request No. 35, the Court finds that this request is overly broad, seeks information which is irrelevant to the claims and defenses asserted in this case, and is not proportionate to the needs of this case. Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED as to this request.

Request No. 37 as to JLG Industries

*7 Plaintiff seeks copies of any policies, procedures, video training materials, and manuals covering safety, fleet safety, safety programs, safety standards, and employee handbooks provided to Juan Castillo prior to the date of the incident. JLG objects that it has no materials to supplement. Accordingly, there is nothing to compel, and Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED as to this request. Defendant JLG does have a continuing duty to supplement this response if they identify additional responsive documents.

Request No. 38 as to both Defendants

This request seeks production of “a copy of the index of the policies and procedure manual, internal operating procedures, or other compilation of corporate policies and procedures specifically [sic] include the positions of safety director, safety committee, risk manager, and risk management committee, effective on the date of the subject incident” (emphasis added), limited to the Laredo warehouse. This request, as worded or as modified, does not request production of job descriptions for the safety director, safety committee, risk manager, or risk management committee. Plaintiff's counsel could have easily worded it as such. It requests “an index” or “other compilation” of corporate policies and procedures. The Court finds that an index or compilation of policies and procedures which reference the positions of a safety director, safety committee, risk manager, or risk management committee, in effect on the date of the accident, is relevant and proportional to this workplace accident claim.

Defendant JLG objects, once again, on the basis that it did not employ Mr. Estrada; and, once again, Defendant fails to show how the fact that Mr. Estrada is not employed by Defendant renders Plaintiff's request undiscoverable. Plaintiff's motion to compel is therefore GRANTED as to this request to the extent clarified above.

Request No. 39 as to both Defendants

This request is for a copy of Defendant's safety handbook or documentation and compilation of policies and procedures in the area of loss control and safety, limited to the safety handbook for the Laredo location, in effect on the date of the accident. The Court finds that this request is relevant and proportional to this workplace accident claim. Plaintiff's motion to compel is GRANTED as to this request.

Request No. 41 as to both Defendants

This request, as modified by Plaintiff, is for all accident reports for injuries in Texas for the five years prior to the incident. It is patently overly broad and seeks information which is neither relevant nor proportional to the needs of this case. Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED as to this request.

Request No. 66 (second) as to both Defendants

This request is for copies of all federal safety investigative reports, limited to injuries in Texas, for five years prior to the accident and one year after the accident. As with Requests Nos. 23 and 41, and for the same reasons, the Court finds that this request is overly broad and seeks information which is neither relevant nor proportional to the needs of this case. Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED as to this request.

It is ORDERED that Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Written Discovery against Defendants JLG Industries, Inc. and Oshkosh Corporation (Dkt. No. 43) and Plaintiff's First Supplement (Dkt. No. 49), as modified by agreement between the parties and as stated above, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

To the extent that Plaintiff's motion to compel is granted as reflected herein, Defendant is ORDERED to supplement its discovery responses within ten days after the entry of this order.

*8 IT IS SO ORDERED.

SIGNED on July 15, 2019.

Plaintiff's motion to compel does not involve Jorge Estrada, who was dismissed from the suit by the District Judge for improper joinder and terminated as a Defendant on March 6, 2019. (See Dkt. No. 30). Accordingly, the term “Defendants” as used herein refers to Defendants JLG Industries, Inc. and Oshkosh Corporation only.

In his original petition, Plaintiff alleged that Estrada was in exclusive control of the scissor lift at the time of the accident. (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 3). This petition persists as Plaintiff's live pleading, though the District Judge, in ruling on Plaintiff's motion to remand, held that neither claim against Estrada would survive a 12(b)(6) challenge, and Estrada was later terminated as a Defendant for having been improperly joined to defeat diversity. (See Dkt. Nos. 13 at 7–9 & Dkt. No. 30).