*1 This case is before the Court upon Plaintiff Water Tree Ventures LLC's (“Water Tree”) request for reasonable attorneys' fees related to the filing of a Motion to Compel production of documents against Defendant Norman (Lee) Waid (“Waid”) (ECF Doc. 185).[1] Upon review of the parties' submissions, the Court finds Water Tree is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees of $1,467.50.

I. WATER TREE'S FEES

Water Tree seeks $8,885.00 in attorneys' fees for filing the motion to compel. To support its request, Water Tree submitted declarations from attorneys Michael T. Conway (“Conway”) and Nicholas S. Andrews (“Andrews”), as well as billing records. ECF Doc. 217. The requested fees consist of 2.3 hours of Conway's time billed at $650 per hour, 9.4 hours of attorney Alison Baker's (“Baker”) time billed at $400 per hour and 11 hours of Andrews's time billed at $330 per hour.

The starting point in determining an award of attorney's fees is the lodestar, which is “properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984); see also Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). “The first step in a lodestar analysis is to establish the reasonable number of hours for which the prevailing party's attorneys are entitled to compensation.” Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). “The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours and hourly rates.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437).

The Court may adjust the lodestar amount upward or downward based upon a number of factors, including the results obtained. See id. at 1302. The final computation ultimately involves “an exercise of judgment, because ‘[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations.’ ” Villano v. City of Boynton Beach, 254 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436).

Before attorneys submit their fee request, they “must exercise their own billing judgment to exclude any hours that are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’ ” Resolution Tr. Corp., 996 F.2d at 1149 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). A court may reduce excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, or may engage in “an across-the-board cut,” as long as the court adequately explains its reasons for doing so. Galdames v. N & D Inv. Corp., 432 F. App'x 801, 806 (11th Cir. 2011).

*2 Waid has filed a response in opposition to the amount of fees requested by Water Tree, contending that the fee is unreasonable because the parties' discovery dispute was uncomplicated. ECF Doc. 218. The Court has conducted an independent evaluation of the submitted billing records and finds that the number of hours spent and the hourly rates sought should be reduced.[2]

As set forth above, Water Tree seeks to be compensated for time spent on the motion to compel by three (3) different attorneys at two separate firms. The billing records show that multiple entries should be reduced or excluded because they appear to be redundant, duplicative or excessive. For example, it appears that Baker, Andrews and Conway all billed for analyzing the requests for production and analyzing Waid's responses and objections. ECF Doc. 217-1 and ECF Doc. 217-2. Although some of the redundancy associated with Baker and Andrews's time entries arise out of their division of labor (Baker prepared the motion and Andrews prepared the reply), because the redundancy could have been avoided had the same attorney prepared the motion and the reply, the Court does not find it appropriate to laden Waid with the additional time. See Duckworth v. Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1397 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting “unnecessary or redundant hours” should be deducted). The time entries also include work done prior to the filing of the motion to compel, which the Court does not find compensable under Rule 37. See Odom v. Navarro, No. 09-21480-CIV, 2010 WL 547652, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2010) (“Rule 37(a)(5)(A) provides for an award of the expenses incurred in filing a motion to compel, not the expenses incurred in trying to obtain discovery responses before filing a motion to compel.”). Moreover, although the motion to compel was ten (10) pages, part of the “Procedural History” section of the motion, and a significant part of the “Argument” section of the motion are similar to another motion to compel Water Tree previously filed in this case and thus it is unclear whether all of the time being sought was limited to Waid's motion to compel. Compare ECF Doc. 176 at 1-2, 6-7 with ECF Doc. 185 at 1-2, 6-7. Finally, any time sought associated with the recovery of fees is not compensable under Rule 37. See Weaver v. Stringer, Civil Action No. 1:18cv00052-N, 2019 WL 1495279, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 4, 2019) (“Since a Court must grant or find moot a motion to compel prior to awarding expenses under Rule 37(a)(5)(A), litigation over those expenses would not appear to be incurred in making the motion to compel. The Plaintiff cites no persuasive authority indicating otherwise.”).

Accordingly, after reviewing the records, the Court finds that a reasonable time expended for drafting the motion to compel is 2.0 hours of Baker's time and 0.5 hours of Conway's time. Cf. Odom, 2010 WL 547652, at *4 (concluding “that a reasonable amount of time to spend in drafting the motion to compel, which was based upon a total failure to respond to discovery, should not have exceeded one hour, even for a relatively inexperienced attorney”). Water Tree also seeks 7.9 hours of Andrews's time for filing a reply and motion for leave to file a reply. The Court finds that a reasonable time expended for the reply is 1.0 hour.[3] The reply addressed the narrow issue of whether Waid had produced all documents responsive to Water Tree's discovery requests and was filed after the Court had set Water Tree's motion to compel for a hearing (ECF Doc. 196). Although Water Tree insisted at the hearing that Waid must have more responsive documents, the Court concluded, based on the representations of Waid's counsel, that the motion to compel was moot. Thus, it is questionable whether the reply added to the effectiveness of the motion to compel. Cf. King v. Dillon Transp., Inc., No. CV411-028, 2012 WL 967047, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2012) (“The reply was largely unnecessary, since the matter was not seriously contested.”). The Court also finds that 1.0 hour is a reasonable time to prepare for the hearing and attend the hearing.[4]

*3 Water Tree seeks $650 per hour for Conway, $400 per hour for Baker and $330 per hour for Andrews.[5] Conway and Baker are attorneys at Shipman & Goodwin LLP in New York City and Washington, D.C., respectively. Conway has 27 years of experience and Baker has 11 years of experience. ECF Doc. 217-1. Andrews is an attorney at FordHarrison, LLP, in Tampa, and has 6 years of experience. ECF Doc. 217-2. While the rates sought are the rates that were charged to Water Tree, the rates are not commensurate with the prevailing market rates in Pensacola, Florida.

“A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation. The applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence that the requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299 (citations omitted). As an initial matter, the Court notes the declarations from Conway and Andrews describe their experience and that of Baker but do not establish the requested rates are in line with prevailing market rates in Pensacola, Florida. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299 (“Satisfactory evidence at a minimum is more than the affidavit of the attorney performing the work.”) (citation omitted). The declarations do not identify cases in which attorneys with similar experience and under similar circumstances were awarded such rates; nor has Water Tree presented opinion evidence from an independent attorney to support the requested rates. See id. (“Evidence of rates may be adduced through direct evidence of charges by lawyers under similar circumstances or by opinion evidence.”); cf. N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 54.1(E)(2) (stating that, for motions for attorney's fees, a party must file “[a] declaration of an independent attorney addressing the reasonableness of the claimed time and rates”).

Based upon the Court's own experience and familiarity with rates in this market, the undersigned finds that a rate of $475 should be assigned to Conway; $340 should be assigned to Baker; and a rate of $275 should be assigned to Andrews. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (the court is “an expert on the question [of attorney's fees] and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value”) (quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940)).

II. WAID'S OPPOSITION

Waid claims a fee award would be unjust because he “has had very little income since June 2018 and was without sufficient funds to adequately defend this case when it was filed against him”; due to his “financial circumstances” he requested a friend “to represent him ‘on account’ and [as of May 17, 2019], this ‘account’ is in excess of $20,000”; a “payment of any significance” is unlikely to be satisfied and “would be the equivalent of a dismissal with prejudice.”[6] Id. at 5. Based on the foregoing, Waid argues any fee award should not exceed $500. Id. at 6-7.

Under Rule 37, a court “must not order payment” of reasonable fees in making a motion to compel if “other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(iii). While the Court is not unsympathetic to Waid's financial circumstances, Waid is a party to this action and is obligated to comply with his discovery obligations. Indeed, had Waid responded to the discovery requests when they were issued, he would have saved himself, his counsel, Water Tree's counsel and this Court significant time and expense. Additionally, regardless of whether counsel is currently being compensated by Waid, counsel also has an obligation to represent his client, including responding to discovery. The plain fact is that Water Tree had to expend funds and incur expenses to compel Waid to produce documents to which it was entitled. Expenses which could have been avoided had Waid simply responded. Moreover, Waid proffered no justification for his failure to respond to written discovery prior to the motion being filed.

III. CONCLUSION

*4 The Court finds that a reasonable lodestar for Conway is $475 at .5 hours, for a fee award of $237.50; a lodestar for Baker is 2.0 hours a rate of $340 per hour, for a fee award of $680; and a lodestar for Andrews is 2.0 hours at a rate of $275 per hour, for a fee award of $550.00. The Court, therefore, awards Water Tree $1,467.50. See ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Courts are not authorized to be generous with the money of others, and it is as much the duty of courts to see that excessive fees and expenses are not awarded as it is to see that an adequate amount is awarded.”).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

Plaintiff is awarded $1,467.50 in expenses for bringing its Motion to Compel Production of Documents from Norman (Lee) Waid (ECF Doc. 185), which Defendant Waid shall pay to Plaintiff by remitting same to Plaintiff's counsel within sixty (60) days from the date of this order.

DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of July, 2019.

The Court held a hearing on Water Tree's motion to compel on April 22, 2019, during which Waid's counsel acknowledged that Waid had not responded to Water Tree's October 10, 2018, requests for production until after Water Tree filed its motion to compel. Thus, the Court determined that Water Tree was entitled to attorneys' fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). ECF Doc. 216. Waid did not object to the Court's determination of entitlement.

The Court's order should not be interpreted to mean that the time spent by Baker, Conway and Andrews was not necessary or valuable to their overall representation of Water Tree in this matter. The Court's order is limited solely to a determination of what is reasonable and recoverable under Rule 37 for the subject motion to compel.

The Court has also excluded time entries related to the motion for adjournment.

Water Tree seeks 2.6 hours of Andrews's time for preparing for and attending the hearing.

$330 is the rate Andrews charges on this matter, but his normal rate is $340/hour. ECF Doc. 217-2.

Defendant Waid's failure to pay a fee award would not result in a dismissal with prejudice. The case Waid cites to support this argument, Davis v. Robinson, Case No. 4:13cv504-MW-CAS, ECF Doc. 73 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2015), is not similar to this case because the party facing sanctions in Davis was an incarcerated pro se plaintiff.