*1 This breach-of-contract action is before the Court on several motions: (1) Defendant's Motion to File Counterclaims Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(e) [Doc. 13], (2) Defendant's Motion to Compel [Doc. 15], (3) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 16], (4) Defendant's Motion to Hold Future Discovery in Abeyance While Summary Judgment is Pending [Doc. 17], (5) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 28], and (6) Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint And/Or to Modify Scheduling Order [Doc. 30]. For the reasons provided below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to File Counterclaims Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(e), Defendant's Motion to Compel, and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint And/Or to Modify Scheduling Order, and DENIES Defendant's Motion to Hold Future Discovery in Abeyance While Summary Judgment is Pending. The Court notes that the remaining summary judgment motions will remain pending.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed unless stated otherwise. Plaintiff began selling insurance for GuideOne and its affiliates in 1989 [Doc. 16-2 at 2 ¶ 3; Doc. 26 at 1 ¶ 3]. In June of 2012, the parties signed the most recent of a series of employment contracts--known as Special Agent's Contracts (“SAC”)--defining the parties' performance and payment obligations in relation to Plaintiff's role as an insurance agent [Doc. 16-2 at 2 ¶ 4; Doc. 16-2 ¶ 4; Doc. 16-5 ¶ 5; Doc. 26 at 1 ¶ 4] . Part II of the contract (hereinafter, the “Termination Clause”) defines the parties' responsibilities upon termination of the contract. The relevant portions of the Termination Clause are located at ¶¶ 2(C), 6, and 6(E). Paragraph 2(C) states:

[Doc. 15-5 at 4]. Paragraph 6 states:

[Doc. 15-5 at 4].

*2 [Doc. 15-5 at 5].

Plaintiff resigned from GuideOne in June 2015 [Doc. 35-1 ¶ 1] . Pursuant to the payments provision in ¶ 6 of the 2012 SAC, GuideOne made six monthly installments of $5,296.00 [Doc. 16-2 ¶ 7-8; Doc. 26 at 2 ¶ 8]. However, GuideOne later learned information that made it believe Plaintiff was still in the insurance business and possibly soliciting GuideOne customers [Doc. 16-2 ¶ 9; Doc. 26 at 2 ¶ 9] . GuideOne also believed that Plaintiff had not returned “all of GuideOne's confidential policy-holder documents to the company” [Doc. 16-2 ¶ 9] . Any of these actions would be in violation of the 2012 SAC. Accordingly, GuideOne's in-house counsel, Valerie Pinkett (“Pinkett”), notified Plaintiff in December of 2015 that GuideOne would be terminating his payments pursuant to ¶ 6(E) [Doc. 16-2 ¶ 10; Doc. 26 at 2 ¶ 10; Doc. 29 at 7] . However in her letter, Pinkett referenced an unsigned, undated version of the SAC--discussed further below--as being the legal basis for GuideOne's decision to terminate payment to Plaintiff [Doc. 26 at 5; Doc. 29 at 7].

B. Procedural History

On December 7, 2018, Plaintiff Charles Barfield filed a complaint against Defendant GuideOne Mutual Insurance Company (“GuideOne”) in the State Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia [Doc. 1-1 at 4] alleging GuideOne breached the SAC by terminating Plaintiff's payments. On January 3, 2019, GuideOne removed the case to this Court [Doc. 1 at 1] . On January 7, 2019, GuideOne answered the complaint [Doc. 2]. On February 5, 2019, the parties filed their Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan, which states at Item 6(b):

[Doc. 4] . Under this deadline, amended and supplemental pleadings were due by March 7, 2019 [Doc. 33 at 4].

On March 7, 2019, GuideOne filed its unopposed Motion to File Counterclaims Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(e) [Doc. 13]. On March 28, 2019, GuideOne filed its Motion to Compel [Doc. 15] . On April 5, 2019, GuideOne moved for summary judgment [Doc. 16]. Plaintiff responded in opposition to GuideOne's Motion to Compel on April 15, 2019 [Doc. 19], to which GuideOne replied on April 17, 2019 [Doc. 20]. Plaintiff then responded in opposition to GuideOne's summary judgment motion on April 26, 2019 [Doc. 26]. On May 3, 2019, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment [Doc. 28] . On May 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed his first Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint And/Or to Modify Scheduling Order [Doc. 30]. GuideOne responded in opposition to Plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint on May 22, 2019 [Doc. 34] and to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on May 24, 2019 [Doc. 35]. Plaintiff then replied to GuideOne's response to Plaintiff's summary judgment motion on May 31, 2019 [Doc. 36].

II. Discussion

Because Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint And/Or to Modify Scheduling Order may affect the summary judgment motions, the Court begins with the motion to amend. The Court then addresses the parties' remaining motions in the order they were brought.

A. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint And/Or to Modify Scheduling Order

*3 Plaintiff based his original complaint on a SAC executed “[o]n or about April 19[ ], 2013” [Doc. 1-1 ¶ 7], However, the contract on which the complaint was based “did not correspond to any contracts that GuideOne had in its records” [Doc. 16-1 at 2] . During discovery, GuideOne came to believe that the April 19, 2013 contract Plaintiff referenced in his complaint was actually one executed on April 29, 2013 between Plaintiff and another party--Career General Agency, Inc. (“CGA”) [Doc. 161 at 11] . However, discovery ultimately revealed that the contract on which Plaintiff relied was actually an unsigned and undated SAC [Doc. 16-2 ¶ 11; Doc. 26 at 3 ¶ 11].

GuideOne conducted an investigation and believes that the unsigned SAC on which Plaintiff based his complaint was executed in 2011 [Doc. 16-1 at 10-11] . The 2011 version contains the same Termination Clause as the 2012 version, however it is located in a different part of the contract [Doc. 16-5 at 11-12]. While the Termination Clause is located in Part II of the 2012 SAC, it is located in Part III of the 2011 SAC. [Doc. 16-5 at 11-12; Doc. 16-5 at 17-18]. The language Plaintiff relied on in his complaint, however, remains unchanged across the versions [compare Doc. 15-5 at 4-5 (2012 SAC) with Doc. 28-3 at 7-8 (2011 SAC) ] . To the extent the 2011 unsigned SAC was legally operative, the 2012 SAC expressly states that it “supersede[s] all prior contracts between” GuideOne and Plaintiff [Doc. 15-5 at 5] .

In light of the confusion surrounding the SAC and the version on which Plaintiff bases his complaint, Plaintiff now seeks to amend his complaint [Doc. 30-1]. Plaintiff is not trying to allege new or different claims [Doc. 30-1 at 5], but seeks leave to clarify that he is basing his complaint on the 2012 SAC [see Doc. 30-2 at 4 ¶ 14] . GuideOne argues that this Court should deny Plaintiff's motion for two reasons: (1) Plaintiff's proposed amendments are untimely; and (2) Plaintiff's amendments are futile.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a party may amend its complaint once as a matter of right within twenty-one days after service of a response by answer or motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Otherwise, the party may amend its complaint “only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.” Id. Leave to amend a party's pleading shall be “freely give[n] ... when justice so requires.” Id.

A district court has discretion to make this determination but in light of rule 15(a)'s policy of “liberally permitting amendments to facilitate determination of claims on the merits,” the court should grant leave to amend “unless a substantial reason exists to deny [it].” Shipner v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 401, 407 (11th Cir. 1989). When determining whether to grant leave to amend, the Court can consider factors such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment [.] ” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Doe v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 891 F. Supp. 607, 611-12 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (Freeman, J.). GuideOne argues that the Court should not grant leave to amend because it is untimely and the proposed amendments are futile. The Court addresses these arguments in turn.

GuideOne first argues that Plaintiff's motion to amend is untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b). Under Rule 16(b), district courts are required to “issue a scheduling order” that “limit[s] the time to ... amend the pleadings [.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). On February 5, 2019, the parties filed their Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan, which states at Item 6(b):

[Doc. 4]. Any amendment to the pleadings was therefore due by March 7, 2019 [Doc. 33 at 4] . Where, as here, the motion to amend is past the deadline in the court's scheduling order, “the moving party must show ‘good cause’ for the untimely motion before the court can consider whether the amendment should be allowed under Rule 15 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Apex Bank v. Ameris Bank, Inc., CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:16-CV-4019-MHC, 2018 WL 6167945, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 6, 2018) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The “good cause standard” precludes modification of the scheduling order “unless the schedule cannot be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc. , 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When a claimant is “not diligent, the [good cause] inquiry should end[.]” Bibb Cty. School Dist. v. Dallemand, CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:16-CV-549(MTT), 2019 WL 1519299, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 8, 2019) (citation omitted). “What constitutes good cause sufficient to justify the modification of a scheduling order necessarily varies with the circumstances of each case.” Crutchfield Props., LLLP v. Ashgan Prods., LLC, CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 4:17-CV-0076-HLM, 2018 WL 6177957, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2018) (citation omitted).

To determine whether Plaintiff satisfies the good cause standard, the Court summarizes the timeline of events surrounding Plaintiff's notice of the 2012 SAC as follows. Plaintiff retired from GuideOne in June 2015 [Doc. 35-1 1 1], after which Plaintiff was required to turn over GuideOne's property--including the information establishing the parties' legal relationship. Upon learning Plaintiff was allegedly violating the parties' SAC, Pinkett notified Plaintiff in December of 2015 that GuideOne would be terminating his payments [Doc. 16-2 ¶ 10; Doc. 26 at 2 ¶ 10] . In her letter, Pinkett referenced the unsigned, undated version of the SAC as being the legal basis for GuideOne's decision to terminate payment to Plaintiff [Doc. 26 at 5; Doc. 29 at 7]. Plaintiff, relying on the contract referenced by Pinkett, filed his lawsuit on December 7, 2018 [Doc. 1] . Of note, Plaintiff alleged that “[o]n or about April 19th, 2013, the parties entered into their most recent contract defining the parties' performance and payment obligations in relation to the plaintiff's services as an insurance agent in the State of Georgia” [Doc. 1-1 ¶ 7 ] . On January 7, 2019 GuideOne answered Plaintiff's complaint, “[a]dmitt[ing] that Plaintiff entered into a contract with CGA in April 2013” [Doc. 2 ¶ 7 ] (emphasis added) but it did not deny the remainder of the contention. In fact, the answer contained no reference to the 2012 SAC.

On February 20, 2019, GuideOne sent its initial disclosure documents to Plaintiff, including Plaintiff's entire agent's file. Although the file contained the 2012 SAC that Plaintiff seeks to include in his amended complaint, there exists a dispute between the parties as to how many other pages of documents were contained in the file.[1] On March 6, 2019--the day before the deadline to amend the pleadings--GuideOne, through its counsel, sent Plaintiff a letter to alert him to the confusion surrounding the contracts [Doc. 16-7]. The letter addressed GuideOne's confusion regarding the April 19, 2013 contract and alerted Plaintiff to the fact that it believed the source of the contract was in fact an unsigned contract from 2011 [Doc. 16-7 at 3]. However, the letter made no mention of the 2012 contract. Rather, GuideOne asserted that “[n]o matter which contract one considers, [Plaintiff's] claims in his Complaint are insupportable” [Doc. 16-7 at 3]. On March 7, 2019, GuideOne filed its Motion to File Counterclaims Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(e) [Doc. 13]. In its memorandum in support of the motion, GuideOne stated that “[t]he contract that is relevant to GuideOne's counterclaims is the most recent ‘[SAC],’ executed June 18, 2012” [Doc. 13-1 at 2]. Although GuideOne attached the 2012 contract as an exhibit to the motion [Doc. 13-3 at 2], it referenced only that its claims were based on the 2012 contract, not that Plaintiff's claims should have been.

*5 In response to GuideOne's letter and motion to file counterclaims, Plaintiff--through his counsel--wrote to GuideOne on March 7, 2019 to “see if [GuideOne] [would be] agreeable to a consent order that [would] grant[ ] [GuideOne] leave to file [its] counterclaim and grant[ ] [Plaintiff] leave to amend and withdraw the allegations at issue in [GuideOne's] abusive litigation letter” [Doc. 33 at 6]. GuideOne responded on March 8, 2019 saying it was “confused by [the] email” because it did not “see that dropping parts of Plaintiff's case [would] cure[ ] the deficiencies that the letter identified” [Doc. 33 at 7]. On March 28, 2019, GuideOne filed a Motion to Compel, indicating that “[t]he contract relevant to this matter was executed on June 18, 2012” [Doc. 15-1 at 2]. GuideOne again attached the 2012 contract as an exhibit to the memorandum [Doc. 15-5 at 2].

On April 5, 2019, GuideOne filed its motion for summary judgment [Doc. 16]. In its motion, GuideOne identified the 2012 SAC as the legally operative contract, having “supersede[d] all earlier contracts” between the parties [Doc. 15-5 at 5] . GuideOne additionally noted that “[p]erhaps Plaintiff could have drafted a complaint based on the 2012 SAC. However, for reasons known only to him, he did not” [Doc. 16-1 at 14]. Roughly one month later, Plaintiff moved the Court to do exactly that: base his claim on the 2012 contract.

The Court finds that Plaintiff had good cause for filing his motion to amend the complaint after the date set forth in the Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan. Contrary to GuideOne's assertions, the facts do not indicate that Plaintiff knew about the confusion surrounding the contract the day he filed his complaint. First, Plaintiff no longer had his employment documents in his possession. Second, GuideOne admits that its own in-house counsel referenced the unsigned 2011 contract—which Plaintiff relied on and used to file his complaint—in the letter terminating Plaintiff's payments. Moreover, GuideOne had the 2012 SAC in its possession at the time it filed its answer, but did not deny Plaintiff's assertion that “[o]n or about April 19th, 2013, the parties entered into their most recent contract defining the parties' performance and payment obligations” [Doc. 1-1 ¶ 7].

GuideOne next asserts Plaintiff was put on inquiry notice that he filed suit on the wrong contract after receiving GuideOne's initial disclosures. The Court is unclear how many pages of documents were located in the file. However, because GuideOne's in-house counsel referenced the unsigned 2011 SAC in her letter, and because the operative language in that contract and the 2012 contract are identical, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not need to seek leave to amend his complaint upon receiving the file.

Next, GuideOne contends that Plaintiff should have been aware of the confusion after the March 6, 2019 letter or the March 7, 2019 Motion to File Counterclaims. The Court disagrees. The letter does clearly address GuideOne's confusion as to “what contract (s) [Plaintiff] bases his case on” [Doc. 16-7 at 3]. However, the letter does not reference or contain any information regarding the 2012 SAC. Instead, the letter, as well as GuideOne's reply to Plaintiff's response to the letter, seem to indicate that no matter which contract Plaintiff relied on, he would be unsuccessful. With several versions of a largely similar contract being mentioned in the parties' legal filings and correspondences, the Court's confusion as to the legally operative contract--and seemingly GuideOne's own inhouse counsel's confusion--renders Plaintiff's confusion reasonable.

It was not until GuideOne's March 28, 2019 Motion to Compel and its April 5, 2019 motion for summary judgment that Plaintiff was put on notice that he “could have drafted a complaint based on the 2012 [SAC]” and in fact should have [Doc. 16-1 at 14]. Plaintiff then filed his motion for leave to amend his complaint on May 6, 2019, roughly one month later. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has shown good cause and diligence. See Coleman v. Danforth, CV 316-095, 2017 WL 5490918, at *9 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 15, 2017) (finding good cause and diligence where plaintiff received relevant discovery on July 28, 2017 and filed his first motion for leave to add defendants one month later).

*6 However, finding good cause under Rule 16(b) does not end the inquiry of whether the motion to amend was timely under Rule 15 (a) . The question of whether a motion to amend is timely under Rule 15(a) is not whether there was a delay, but whether the delay amounted to an undue delay. See Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[M]ere passage of time need not result in refusal of leave to amend; on the contrary, it is only undue delay that forecloses amendment.”); Atlanta Indep. School Sys. v. S.F. ex rel. M.F., 740 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (Story, J.) (“While Plaintiffs have certainly delayed filing an amended complaint, the question is whether this amounts to undue delay.”). Discovery is not yet complete in this action,[2] and this is Plaintiff's first motion to amend his complaint. Moreover, Plaintiff's amended complaint only clarifies which contract on which he bases his complaint. Because the verbiage of the Termination Clause is identical in each version of the SAC, any work GuideOne has conducted thus far analyzing the contract language would not be lost, and GuideOne would therefore not be prejudiced. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint was brought diligently and with good cause under Rule 16(b) and that any delay was not undue under Rule 15 (a) .

GuideOne next argues that the Court should deny Plaintiff's motion to amend because amendment would be futile. The claim is futile--GuideOne argues--because the “claim's defeat on summary judgment is inevitable.” Nelson v. Doe, 159 F.R.D. 583, 585 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (Freeman, J.). Accordingly, the Court addresses the merits of GuideOne's motion for summary judgment [Doc. 16].

GuideOne first argues in its motion for summary judgment that Plaintiff's claims are legally frivolous because the complaint “makes no reference at all to the 2012 [SAC]” [Doc. 16-1 at 16]. Because Plaintiff's amended complaint would mend this error, the Court finds that GuideOne's motion for summary judgment would be unsuccessful on this ground.

GuideOne next argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because ¶ 6(E) of the 2012 SAC is enforceable, and as such, GuideOne was entitled to terminate payment to Plaintiff upon learning Plaintiff was allegedly in violation of the contract. Even if ¶ 6(E) is enforceable, there is insufficient evidence in the record for the Court to ascertain whether Plaintiff engaged in activities in violation of the contract. GuideOne contends Plaintiff was “diverting GuideOne business immediately after his ‘retirement,’ and conducting those activities from his own office” [Doc. 33 at 21], however there has been little to no discovery on that issue.[3] Although GuideOne has provided a sworn affidavit of Plaintiff's wrongdoing, GuideOne's primary purpose in filing its Motion to Compel was because it felt Plaintiff's discovery responses were inadequate.[4] The Court therefore finds that it would be premature to award GuideOne summary judgment until more discovery is taken on this issue. Because more discovery is necessary, the amendment would not be futile. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint And/Or to Modify Scheduling Order [Doc. 30]. The Clerk is DIRECTED to file the amended complaint [Doc. 31] as of the date of the filing of this Order.

B. Defendant's Unopposed Motion to File Counterclaims Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(e)

*7 At the start of discovery, GuideOne “used its subpoena power to learn more about Plaintiff's [alleged] violations of the [2012 SAC]” [Doc. 15-1 at 4] . One of the subpoenas was sent to Plaintiff's former business partner, Mr. Nelson (“Nelson”) [Doc. 15-1 at 4]. In light of information produced by Nelson-- allegedly confirming GuideOne's belief that Plaintiff violated the 2012 SAC--Defendant now seeks to add counterclaims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 (e) .

Generally “a counterclaim is asserted early in litigation, usually in the answer.” Trauner v. Interstate Indem. Co., 1:04- cv-2167-WSD, 2005 WL 8154739, at *2 (N.D. Ga. July 22, 2005). However, Rule 13(e) allows the late assertion of a counterclaim by amendment to the pleadings where “a counterclaim [has] matured or was acquired by the party after serving an earlier pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(e). “Whether to allow a party to file an omitted counterclaim is within the Court's discretion.” Trauner, 2005 WL 8154739, at *2. However, the Court should grant an amendment “provided the amendment will not impose undue prejudice on the opposing party or is futile” and “where the moving party is not guilty of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, [or] repeated failure to cure deficiencies.” Id.

Here, GuideOne seeks to amend its pleadings to add four counterclaims against Plaintiff: (1) “Misappropriation of Trade Secrets”; (2) “Breach of Contract (Trade Secrets)”; (3) “Breach of Contract (Non-Solicitation)”; and (4) “Breach of Contract (Contingency Payments)” [Doc. 13-2]. Noting the motion is unopposed, the Court finds that none of these claims would be futile or unduly prejudicial to Plaintiff. There is also nothing in the record to suggest GuideOne is guilty of bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure any previous deficiencies. Although the motion is delayed, it is not unduly delayed. Under the parties' Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan [Doc. 4], GuideOne had until March 7, 2019--the day it filed this motion--to file any amendments to the pleadings. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to File Counterclaims Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(e). The Clerk is DIRECTED to file the amended pleadings attached to Defendant's Motion to File Counterclaims Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(e) [Doc. 13-2] as of the date of the filing of this Order.

C. Defendant's Motion to Compel

Defendant additionally moves the Court to compel discovery responses from Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 37(a) and for $750 in fees[5] under Rule 37(a) (5). GuideOne contends Plaintiff has failed to respond to certain requests and interrogatories.[6] For instance, GuideOne requested “any and all documents which relate to any of the allegations Plaintiff made in this case” [Doc. 15-1 at 6]. Plaintiff provided a response and noted that “[a]11 responsive documents known to the Plaintiff and currently in its possession [were] produced with [that] response[ ]” [Doc. 15-1 at 6] . However, Nelson provided GuideOne with a number of e-mails suggesting he and Plaintiff had been working together in violation of the 2012 SAC. Plaintiff--who was on these e-mails --did not provide these e-mails in his response to GuideOne's discovery request despite their relevance to the request.

*8 In response to this and other examples of Plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery requests,[7] Plaintiff argues that ¶ 6(E) is an unenforceable restrictive covenant under Georgia law. Because it is unenforceable--Plaintiff argues--discovery related to his alleged violation of the Termination Clause is unnecessary. Plaintiff has asserted this argument in his summary judgment motion. If Plaintiff believes that discovery on this issue is not required, he should have filed a motion to stay discovery while his summary judgment motion is pending, not ignore GuideOne's discovery requests altogether. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Compel pursuant to Rule 37 (a) and DIRECTS Defendant to show cause in writing, within ten (10) days of entry of this Order, why Defendant's request for $750 in fees should not be granted. Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED to produce the requested discovery within twenty (20) days of this Order.

D. The Parties' Summary Judgment Motions

Both parties moved for summary judgment [Doc. 16; Doc. 28] . Because the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint And/Or to Modify Scheduling Order, the Court does not address the summary judgment motions here. Rather, the Court DIRECTS the parties to file any needed amendments to their summary judgment motions based on the amended complaint within ten (10) days of the close of discovery. Until then, the parties' summary judgment motions will remain pending.

E. Defendant's Unopposed Motion to Hold Future Discovery in Abeyance While Summary Judgment is Pending

Lastly, GuideOne moves the Court to stay discovery until its summary judgment motion is decided. However, the Court has already determined that more discovery is allowable on the issue of Plaintiff's alleged violation of the 2012 SAC in order for the Court to rule on GuideOne's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Hold Future Discovery in Abeyance While Summary Judgment is Pending.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons provided above, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to File Counterclaims Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(e) [Doc. 13], Defendant's Motion to Compel [Doc. 15], and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint And/Or to Modify Scheduling Order [Doc. 30], and DENIES Defendant's Motion to Hold Future Discovery in Abeyance While Summary Judgment is Pending [Doc. 17]. The Clerk is DIRECTED to file the amended complaint [Doc. 31] and the amended pleadings attached to Defendant's Motion to File Counterclaims Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(e) [Doc. 13-2] as of the date of the filing of this Order.

The Court DIRECTS Plaintiff to show cause in writing, within ten (10) days of entry of this order, why Defendant's request for $750 in fees should not be granted. The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to produce the requested discovery within twenty (20) days of this Order. The Court further ORDERS that discovery is re-opened for a period of two months for the sole purpose of allowing the parties the opportunity to take discovery on matters relating to whether Plaintiff breached the 2012 SAC. The Court DIRECTS the parties to file any needed amendments to their summary judgment motions based on the amended complaint within ten (10) days of the close of discovery. Until then, the parties' summary judgment motions will remain pending.

*9 SO ORDERED, this 25 day of October, 2019.

GuideOne contends it sent only 322 pages of documents in its initial disclosures [Doc. 33 at 4 n.2] whereas Plaintiff contends he received 2,000 pages of documents [Doc. 30-1 at 3].

GuideOne filed a motion to stay discovery while its summary judgment motion was pending [Doc. 17]. Plaintiff has also urged the Court to consider the legal merits of his claim that ¶ 6(E) of the Termination Clause is an unenforceable noncompete agreement before conducting discovery on whether Plaintiff breached the alleged non-compete clause [Doc. 19 at 3] .

GuideOne's motion to stay discovery was premised on GuideOne's belief that it was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of Plaintiff basing his claim on the wrong contract. Moreover, in Plaintiff's response to GuideOne's motion to compel discovery, Plaintiff admitted that he attempted to “limit the necessity and scope of discovery” on the issue of whether Plaintiff violated the contract because Plaintiff's claim is premised on ¶ 6E being invalid and unenforceable [Doc. 19 at 5] . “If ¶ 6E of the SAC is invalid and unenforceable, the termination of payment by [GuideOne] was impermissible, and the plaintiff's activities allegedly constituting violations of that provision would be irrelevant” [Doc. 19 at 5-6].

See, e. g. , Doc. 15-1 at 10 (“Plaintiff ... presumably has financial records concerning his take from the partnership, as well as other responsive documents which he has not produced.”).

$750 represents Defendant's costs to write and file the Motion to Compel [Doc. 15-1 at 1].

GuideOne's motion highlights concerns with Plaintiff's response to: Request No. 2, Request No. 3, Request No. 6, Request No. 7, Request No. 11, Request No. 12, Request No. 13, Request No. 14, Request No. 15, Request No. 16, Request No. 19, Interrogatory No. 1, Interrogatory No. 9, Interrogatory No. 10, Interrogatory No. 11, and Interrogatory No. 13 [Doc. 15-1].

Plaintiff filed his response to GuideOne's motion on April 15, 2019. In its reply, GuideOne argued that Plaintiff's response was untimely. Under Local Rule 7.1(B), Plaintiff's response was due fourteen days after GuideOne filed its Motion to Compel. Because GuideOne filed its motion on March 28, 2019, Plaintiff's response was due April 11, 2019. However, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Extend the Time for Filing Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Compel and For Leave to Amend Exhibit A [Doc. 21] on April 25, 2019 [Doc. 25]. Accordingly, Plaintiff's response was not untimely.