*1 Fact discovery in this case closed on June 28, 2019, after continuing for almost two years. See Revised Scheduling Order [ECF No. 50] at 1; Pl.’s Mot. for Protective Order Against Defs.’ Subpoenas & Notices of Dep. Duces Tecum (“Pl.’s Mot.”) [ECF No. 59] at 2. During that time, the parties collectively conducted forty depositions, and defendants made at least fifty requests for document production. Pl.’s Mot. at 3; Defs.’ Opp'n to Pl.’s Mot. (“Defs.’ Opp'n”) [ECF No. 60] at 6–7. On the eve of the close of discovery, defendants Children's National Medical Center (“CNMC”) and the United States submitted fourteen proposed subpoenas seeking records and additional depositions. The return dates for many of these subpoenas fell after the close of fact discovery in this case, and of the subpoenas with return dates within the discovery period, three sought oral depositions on fewer than ten days’ notice. Pl.’s Mot. at 2–5.

Before the Court is plaintiff Monique Williams's motion for a protective order to forbid defendants from issuing these subpoenas. See id. Because of the timing of the subpoenas, the motion, and this order, if the Court permits any subpoena to be issued, it must also amend the scheduling order in this case. See Defs.’ Opp'n. Plaintiff opposes extending any deadlines. Pl.’s Reply to Defs.’ Opp'n (“Pl.’s Reply”) [ECF No. 61] at 1.

District courts have broad discretion in structuring the scope and timing of discovery. Hussain v. Nicholson, 435 F.3d 359, 363–64 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Barnes v. District of Columbia, 289 F.R.D. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2012). Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required,” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984), including to limit “the scope of ... discovery to certain matters” for good cause shown, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(D). Rule 16(b) and Local Civil Rule 16.4 also permit the Court wide latitude to adjust the discovery schedule for good cause shown. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b); Local Civil Rule 16.4; Barnes, 289 F.R.D. at 7; see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

1. Subpoenas related to decedent's cell phone

Over the course of discovery, defendants have had particular interest in retrieving data purportedly stored on the cell phone of the teenaged decedent whose death is the subject of this lawsuit. The parties did not have access to the cell phone because the phone was locked and the passcode was not available. Defendants proposed that the cell phone should be submitted to a third-party firm to be unlocked. Williams argued that the phone could not be unlocked and objected to any discovery of the cell phone. When the Court allowed discovery of the phone's contents, Williams further objected to the scope of that discovery. This cell phone was ultimately the subject of several conferences with chambers and at least four court orders. See Sept. 27, 2018, Order [ECF No. 31] at 4–8; Dec. 6, 2018, Order [ECF No. 41] at 1–4; Mar. 25, 2019, Order [ECF No. 46] at 1–9; June 25, 2019, Order [ECF No. 58] at 1–2. However, notwithstanding these efforts, the third-party firm that defendants hired to unlock the phone concluded in May 2019 that the data on the phone could not be accessed after all. Defs.’ Opp'n at 1 n.1.

*2 Several of the proposed subpoenas—to Sprint Spectrum L.P., AT&T Mobility LLC, T-Mobile USA Inc., and Apple Inc.—primarily seek to access information that defendants tried and failed to obtain through the cell phone. See Defs.’ Opp'n at 2–4. Although this Court's previous orders found that the information sought on the cell phone might lead to relevant evidence, the articulated link between the data and the claims and defenses in this case, see id. at 3, is attenuated because, for example, phone call logs appear unlikely, without additional discovery, to identify the decedent's sexual partners and determine how he became infected with syphilis and HIV. Also, any information recovered would be “provided unread to the [p]laintiff in accordance with the Court's prior order so that she could lodge any objections on the basis of relevance or privilege,” id. at 4, which would render this discovery that much more burdensome on plaintiff. For these reasons, the Court will grant the motion for a protective order as to these subpoenas. Defendants could have sought discovery from these alternative sources at any point during the two-year discovery period, but they made the strategic decision to seek the information through the cell phone itself instead of through third parties.[1] This decision ultimately led defendants down a dead end, but that bad luck does not justify further extending discovery in this case.

2. Subpoenas for oral depositions of decedent's friends and family

Defendants also seek to depose four additional family members of the decedent—Jowanda Pearson, Kenneth Williams, William Pearson, and Kiara Monae Pearson—as well as two other individuals—Harry Bass and Artenae Britt. All proposed deponents (except for Bass) “have either evaded service or refused to comply with their respective subpoenas.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff explains that three of the family members “are sick and disabled” and that the challenged depositions were “noticed ... to occur at the caregiver's address and served upon the caregiver without even so much as a phone call to the caregiver to ask whether her home was a suitable location for depositions.” Pl.’s Mot. at 5.

The Court will allow some but not all depositions to proceed. Plaintiff has sought the bulk of the fact depositions that have occurred to date. See Defs.’ Opp'n at 5–7. Allowing some proposed depositions to proceed balances the parties’ “relative access to relevant information” about the personal and social details of the decedent during his last months of life. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). However, some limitation is appropriate to prevent collection of “unreasonably cumulative” evidence and to reduce the burden to plaintiff's family members and their caretaker. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Accordingly, the Court will permit defendants to conduct depositions of Bass and Britt, as well as two of the four other family members. Defendants may select which two of the four family members’ depositions they wish to pursue.

3. Subpoena for elementary-school records

Defendants seek to subpoena elementary school records of the deceased high-school student from Miner Elementary School in order to “clear up a discrepancy in the oral testimony” about whether or not the decedent repeated second grade. Defs.’ Opp'n at 2. The decedent's elementary-school record is not at issue in this case, and the Court does not believe that good cause exists to extend discovery to seek this information. Hence, the plaintiff's motion is granted as to the subpoena for school records.[2]

4. Subpoena for plaintiff's time-and-attendance records

Defendants seek to subpoena plaintiff's employer, DC Home Health Care, for time and attendance records because plaintiff could not “recall exactly which ER visits she attended or when she arrived at some of those she was sure she did attend.” Id. This information, defendants explain, bears on the negligence claims in this case, and the information's relevance only became apparent after plaintiff's deposition. Id. Plaintiff moves for a protective order primarily on the grounds that defendants have long known where plaintiff was employed, any need for such records was “entirely foreseeable,” and that no good cause exists to extend discovery to subpoena this information. Pl.’s Reply at 3; Pl.’s Mot. at 7–8.

*3 The Court will permit defendants to issue a subpoena for this information. Knowing plaintiff's place of employment is not the same as knowing that plaintiff's time and attendance records would be relevant to the negligence claims asserted in this case. Time and attendance records may indeed be probative of key disputes in this case, and defendants have sufficiently accounted for their delay in seeking them. Hence, plaintiff's motion is denied as to these records.

5. Subpoenas for depositions from AmeriHealth and DC Fire & EMS

Finally, defendants seek oral depositions from two sources for supplemental information related to the healthcare that the decedent received before his death. One proposed subpoena seeks a brief deposition from AmeriHealth, a Medicare managed care organization, about records received pursuant to a previous subpoena seeking the decedent's insurance claims records between 2012 and 2014. Defs.’ Opp'n at 3. Defendants previously subpoenaed this information but only received records from 2014. Id. Defendants now want to either confirm that AmeriHealth did not insure the decedent in 2012 and 2013 or else receive the missing records. Id. Defendants note that plaintiff's counsel “has a medical authorization and can talk freely with Ameri[H]ealth” but that defendants lack access to the same information. Id. Plaintiff primarily objects on the grounds that the AmeriHealth subpoena seeks “unreasonably cumulative and duplicative” evidence. Pl.’s Mot. at 6.

The second proposed subpoena in this category seeks a deposition related to decedent's health care—specifically, EMS transports of the decedent before his death—from the District of Columbia's Fire and EMS Department (“DC Fire & EMS”). Defendants argue that the deposition is necessary to assure that they have a complete record of all of the decedent's EMS transports in light of the lack of records from AmeriHealth. Defs.’ Opp'n at 3. Plaintiff notes that defendants have already conducted a “lengthy deposition” of a DC Fire & EMS ambulance driver over a year ago and that there is no justification for requesting this new deposition so late in the discovery process. Pl.’s Mot. at 7.

The Court will allow these subpoenas to issue, notwithstanding its concern about defendants’ delay in seeking these subpoenas. Both depositions are likely to provide evidence relevant to decedent's health condition in the period leading up to his death and the healthcare he received over that period, which in turn is likely to be probative in relation to the claims and defenses in this medical negligence case. The AmeriHealth subpoena does not seek cumulative evidence because it explicitly seeks to fill a gap in the evidentiary record rather than corroborate or supplement some existing evidence, and allowing the subpoena to issue serves to balance the parties’ “relative access to relevant information” about decedent's health records. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The DC Fire & EMS subpoena similarly appears likely to fill gaps in the evidence produced to date. Hence, plaintiff's motion as to the AmeriHealth and DC Fire & EMS subpoenas is denied.

Because the Court denies plaintiff's motion in part and will permit certain of the contested subpoenas to issue, the Court also grants defendants’ request to extend the discovery deadline in this case.

Accordingly, having considered plaintiff's motion for a protective order, defendants’ opposition, plaintiff's reply, and the entire record in this case, it is hereby

*4 ORDERED that [59] plaintiff's motion for a protective order is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for a protective order is GRANTED as to defendants’ proposed subpoenas to Sprint Spectrum L.P., AT&T Mobility LLC, T-Mobile USA Inc., Apple Inc., Miner Elementary School, and two of the four proposed family-member deponents; it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's motion is DENIED as to defendants’ proposed subpoenas to DC Home Health Care, AmeriHealth, DC Fire & EMS, Mr. Bass, Ms. Britt, and two of the four proposed family-member deponents; it is further

ORDERED that defendants’ motion extend deadlines is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that the following schedule shall govern further proceedings:

SO ORDERED.