*1 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for a Case Management Conference [DE 75], filed February 12, 2020, Plaintiff's Motion to Adjust Case Management Plan Deadlines [DE 77], filed February 14, 2020, Lance Duerfahrd's Motion to Compel [DE 79], filed February 18, 2020, and Purdue University's Motion for Protective Order Limiting Deposition Discovery [DE 87], filed March 4, 2020.

I. Background

On September 20, 2018, Plaintiff filed her Complaint, including claims for sexual assault, sexual battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant Duerfahrd, her professor at Purdue, and allegations of violation of Title IX and of negligent retention and supervision against Defendant Purdue. The claim for negligent retention and supervision was dismissed by District Court Judge Joseph Van Bokkelen on August 29, 2019.

On May 2, 2019, the Court held a preliminary pretrial conference and set discovery-related deadlines, including a deadline of February 28, 2020, for fact discovery and June 12, 2020 for expert discovery. In January 2020, new counsel appeared on behalf of Plaintiff, and her previous attorneys withdrew. Soon thereafter, on February 12 and 14, 2020, Plaintiff's new attorneys filed the instant requests for extension of the case management deadlines. On February 17, 2020, Purdue filed a response objecting to the proposed extension but requesting that the parties be required to submit a supplemental report of parties’ planning meeting to address remaining discovery. On February 18, 2020, Duerfahrd filed a response objecting to an extension of the deadline other than to allow Plaintiff to correct deficiencies in her discovery responses. On February 24, 2020, Plaintiff filed her reply acknowledging that the previous attorneys failed to comply with their responsibilities to meet Plaintiff's discovery obligations and requesting an extension of time to correct those deficiencies and take depositions. On February 18, 2020, Duerfahrd filed the instant motion to compel requesting that the Court compel Plaintiff to comply with her written discovery obligations. Plaintiff filed a response on March 2, 2020, and Duerfahrd filed a reply on March 9, 2020. On March 4, 2020, Purdue filed a motion for protective order requesting that the Court limit the number and scope of depositions to be taken by Plaintiff. She responded on March 18, 2020, and on March 20, 2020, Purdue filed a reply. On April 14, 2020, Duerfahrd filed a Stipulation Regarding Expert Discovery, granted by the Court on April 16, 2020, extending Defendants’ expert disclosure deadline to September 1, 2020, and the expert discovery deadline to September 30, 2020.

II. Analysis

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, the scope of discovery is “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.... Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevancy is “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)). A party may seek an order to compel discovery when an opposing party fails to respond to discovery requests or provides evasive or incomplete responses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). The party objecting to the discovery request bears the burden of showing why the request is improper. See McGrath v. Everest Nat'l Ins. Co., 625 F. Supp. 2d 660, 670 (N.D. Ind. 2008). The Court has broad discretion when determining matters related to discovery. Thermal Design, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Heating, Refrigerating & Air-Conditioning Eng'rs, Inc., 755 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 2014); Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100, 1110 (7th Cir. 1993).

*2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) allows the Court, for good cause, to issue an order to protect a party from discovery “from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” including “forbidding inquiry into certain matters.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(D). Rule 26(c) “essentially operates to balance the public's interest in open proceedings against an individual's private interest in avoiding annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Felling v. Knight, 211 F.R.D. 552, 554 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (quotations omitted). “The party moving for a protective order must establish that good cause exists for the Court to exercise its discretion in entering a protective order.” Nieves v. OPA, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 2d 887, 891 (N.D. Ill. 2013).

Defendant Duerfahrd moves to compel Plaintiff to respond to discovery. He argues that previous counsel for Plaintiff had not produced any responsive documents, and that the responses to interrogatories were deficient. In Plaintiff's briefing requesting an extension of the discovery deadlines, as well as in response to the motion to compel, Plaintiff admits that her previous counsel had not fully complied with discovery requirements. She now represents that she is attempting to provide the needed documents and disclosures as quickly as possible and requests an extension of time to review the discovery provided by Defendants, provide the requested discovery, and complete depositions. Defendants object to more than a brief extension for Plaintiff to provide written discovery. Purdue argues that Plaintiff had not noticed any depositions prior to filing the request for extension, and Duerfahrd argues that Plaintiff has not shown good cause for an extension. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6, “[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time ... before the original time or its extension expires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1).

Since Plaintiff's new counsel appeared on January 22, 2020, Duerfahrd acknowledges that they have been attempting to resolve the discovery disputes, but argues that instead of completing her discovery responses before discovery expired, Plaintiff moved for an extension of the discovery deadlines. He moves to compel Plaintiff to immediately comply with her discovery obligations. Plaintiff agrees that previous counsel failed to prosecute the case in a timely manner or to comply with discovery obligations, and represents that current counsel is attempting to remedy deficiencies in discovery and working to schedule depositions. In response to the motion to compel, Plaintiff asserts that she has provided supplemental disclosures and amended discovery responses and has committed to providing any additional information as needed. In reply, Duerfahrd agrees that Plaintiff has now responded to the requests for documents but asserts that there are still several gaps in document production. Duerfahrd includes a number of particular concerns he has with Plaintiff's production and represents that he and counsel for Plaintiff have been working in good faith to resolve the outstanding issues. He requests that the Court order Plaintiff to supplement her interrogatory responses to address the lingering concerns or grant the motion to compel. At this point the Court is unable to determine which disputes still remain to be resolved or whether Plaintiff's current responses are adequate. Plaintiff is directed to continue to supplement her discovery responses and to work with Duerfahrd to repair any deficiencies with the production as soon as possible. If there are any additional concerns about discovery that the parties are unable to work out, Duerfahrd may bring a new motion to compel laying out the specific deficiencies and giving Plaintiff an opportunity to respond. Plaintiff is cautioned of the need to continue to work diligently to complete discovery in a timely manner.

*3 As to the depositions, in its motion for protective order, Purdue moves for Plaintiff to be limited to ten depositions and limited to obtaining testimony concerning matters occurring while Plaintiff was a student at Purdue. It argues that testimony about other people's experience with Duerfahrd outside the time period of Plaintiff's enrollment at Purdue is not relevant to her hostile-environment claim, since that is limited to her own experience. Plaintiff argues that information about acts of harassment by Duerfahrd is relevant to whether Purdue had knowledge of Duerfahrd's sexual misconduct, and explains that there are a number of people she wishes to depose who have knowledge of previous accusations about Duerfahrd's conduct and attempts to make Purdue aware of allegations of sexual assault or harassment.

What Purdue knew about Duerfahrd's actions and when that information is known is entirely relevant and admissible, even if—or, perhaps, especially if—knowledge of a pattern of inappropriate sexual conduct with students was obtained well in advance of Plaintiff's arrival at Purdue without the university taking appropriate steps to alleviate the risk. On summary judgment, Plaintiff will be required to “establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether an appropriate official at [Purdue] had (1) actual knowledge of misconduct by [Duerfahrd] that created a serious risk to its students, and (2) responded with deliberate indifference to the misconduct.” Hansen v. Bd. of Trustees of Hamilton Se. Sch. Corp., 551 F.3d 599, 605–06 (7th Cir. 2008) (“if a teacher had been known to be a ‘serial harasser,’ a school district might be found to have actual knowledge of that teacher's misconduct and that students may be at great risk”). Accordingly, the Court will not enter a protective order limiting the subject of depositions to a particular time period.

As to the number of depositions, the Court notes that in the report of parties’ planning meeting, [DE 37], Plaintiff proposed that the number of depositions be governed by Rule 30, which contemplates ten depositions as a reasonable baseline, Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2), and Defendants stated that Plaintiff had identified 25 witnesses, so Defendants wished to conduct 25 depositions. At the Rule 16 preliminary pretrial conference, the Court ordered that each party was limited to 15 depositions, with a motion required to increase that number. No party has moved for additional depositions, although Plaintiff represents that she has agreed to limit the number of depositions to ten, so long as Defendants also limit their list to ten. Purdue's request to limit the number of depositions appears to be moot, or at least within their control.

Although Plaintiff's discovery participation so far in the case has not been admirable, current counsel appears to be diligently attempting to remedy past deficiencies and moved for an extension shortly after entering the case, before the fact discovery deadline expired. Given those factors, and in light of the ongoing dispute over depositions and discovery responses and the time needed to complete the discovery as ordered herein, the Court finds good cause for an extension of the fact and expert discovery deadlines in this case and resets them as reflected below. Further requests for extension, however, are disfavored given the age of the case and the potential for accruing prejudice, but if the parties need additional time, the Court encourages them to confer and attempt to reach an agreement on how much time is needed, and if agreement is impossible, to file a well-supported motion addressing the disputes.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Lance Duerfahrd's Motion to Compel [DE 79] to the extent that Plaintiff has not already supplemented her discovery responses and ORDERS Plaintiff to complete that supplementation as soon as possible; and DENIES in part and DENIES as moot in part Purdue University's Motion for Protective Order Limiting Deposition Discovery [DE 87] as described above. The Court DENIES as moot Plaintiff's Motion for a Case Management Conference [DE 75] and GRANTS, for relief different than requested, Plaintiff's Motion to Adjust Case Management Plan Deadlines [DE 77]. The Court ORDERS:

Because the motion to compel is granted and/or discovery was provided after filing, “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party ... whose conduct necessitated the motion ... to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees” unless there are circumstances that make the award unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Defendant Duerfahrd to file, on or before June 15, 2020, an itemization of his costs and fees incurred in making the motion to compel, along with argument as to why those expenses are reasonable in this situation, with Plaintiff to respond on or before June 29, 2020, and Duerfahrd to file a reply, if any, on or before July 6, 2020.

SO ORDERED this 1st day of June, 2020.