*1 Pending before this Court are Defendant Judson Phillips’ Rule 60(b) Motion Regarding Court's Order of January 4, 2022, and Defendant Capital Compliance Group's Rule 60(b) Motion Regarding Court's Order of January 4, 2022, both filed January 18, 2022. Both motions ask this Court to reconsider its January 4, 2022 Order which granted sanctions against defendants by striking their defenses. The Court notes that the Order being challenged in this case is not a final judgment; accordingly, the motions are more properly construed as motions for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Washington v. Deline, No. CIV.A. ELH-15-0853, 2015 WL 5521786, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 16, 2015) (“to avoid elevating form over substance, a motion to reconsider may be construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), or a motion for relief from judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).”) (citing MLC Auto., LLC v. Town of S. Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 278–280 (4th Cir. 2008)).

First, this Court recalls the words of retired Magistrate Judge James E. Seibert, who often stated that there is a special place in hell for lawyers who file motions to reconsider. A reconsideration motion may be granted: (1) where there has been an “intervening change in controlling law;” (2) to address new evidence that was not available at trial; or (3) “to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Pettis v. Nottaway Co. School Bd., 592 Fed.Appx. 158, 161 (4th Cir. 2014); Talley v. United States, 2014 WL 4417848, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 8, 2014) (Chambers, J.); Alig v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 2017 WL 5127235 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 21, 2017) (Bailey, J.).

Here, defendants raise several arguments supporting reconsideration–the motions and memorandum for Judson Phillips and Capital Compliance raise the same arguments. They argue, first, that the sanction of striking defenses does not match the purported discovery violations. They contend that each of them “has an absolute defense that he was not the person or entity who made the purported telephone calls to Plaintiff. Plaintiff admits as much in her deposition.” [Doc. 204 at 5]; see also [Doc. 206 at 5]. They further contend that any omissions of legal actions were inadvertent, and that the sanctions therefore are too severe. Second, they argue that plaintiff was not prejudiced by the omissions because she was able to find the lawsuits in question. [Id.].

Defendants are not arguing that there has been an intervening change in controlling law or that there is new evidence not previously considered; accordingly, they seek reconsideration under the third ground - clear error of law. A clear error finding requires a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). As noted by Judge Allyson Duncan, writing for the Court in TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot, 572 F.3d 186, 194 (4th Cir. 2009), “[i]n order to justify reconsideration due to clear error, the error cannot be just maybe or probably wrong; it must ... strike [the Court] as wrong with the force of a five-week old, unrefrigerated dead fish.”

*2 The manifest injustice standard also “presents parties with a high hurdle.” In re Yankah, 514 B.R. 159, 166 (E.D. Va. 2014) (quoting Westerfield v. United States, 366 Fed. Appx. 614, 620 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 2010)). It requires that a “fundamental flaw” exists in a court's decision. See id.

Consistent with those high standards, it is “improper to file a motion for reconsideration simply to ask the Court to rethink what the Court had already thought through — rightly or wrongly.” Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh, PA, 999 F.Supp.2d 906, 918 (S.D. W. Va. 2014) (Goodwin, J.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). That is, “mere disagreement with a court's application of the law is insufficient to support a motion for reconsideration.” Matter of Vulcan Constr. Materials, LLC, 433 F.Supp.3d 816, 820 (E.D. Va. 2019) (Doumar, J.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When a reconsideration motion does little more than request that the court “reconsider a legal issue” or “ ‘change its mind,’ relief is not authorized.” Prichard v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., 3 Fed. Appx. 52, 53 (4th Cir. Feb. 7, 2001) (quoting United States v. Williams, 674 F.2d 310, 312 (4th Cir. 1982)).

Applying the foregoing standard, the Court declines to reconsider its previous Order. This Court previously found that “defendants have engaged in a pattern of concealing discoverable material.” [Doc. 202 at 9]. Defendants contend that those discovery abuses are unrelated to their defenses that they were not the persons or entities who made the calls to plaintiff. But the discovery in question sought to establish “whether defendant corporations are fraudulently conveying assets among themselves.” [Id. at 11]. Plaintiff's theory has consistently been that defendants acted through agents in making the calls in question, and the discovery sought to establish her theory that “Judson Phillips and other individual Defendants named herein are behind this vast web of inextricably intertwined corporate entities and scheme to place illegal telemarketing calls.” [Doc. 63 at 8]. Accordingly, the defense that they are not, individually, the persons or entities who made the calls, is directly related to discovery, which sought to establish their responsibility for the calls through their agents or alter egos.

As to the assertion that plaintiff was not prejudiced because she ultimately obtained the information sought through other methods, the Court is unpersuaded. The fact that plaintiff was ultimately able to obtain the information does not excuse defendants engaging in what this Court has already found to be “a pattern of concealing discoverable material.” [Doc. 202 at 9].

Accordingly, the Motions [Docs. 203 & 205] are hereby DENIED.

It is so ORDERED.