*1 The plaintiffs in the above-captioned two cases, De Leon v. Salinas, No. 1:10-CV-303 (“De Leon”), and Aguirre v. Koch Garza, No. 1:11-CV-81, (“Aguirre”), have filed a motion to consolidate under Federal Rule of Civil procedure 42(a) and a proposed consolidated complaint. De Leon, Dkt. No. 211; Aguirre, Dkt. No. 111; see also De Leon, Dkt. No. 215; Aguirre, Dkt. No. 113 (supplement to motion and proposed consolidated complaint filed Sept. 29, 2015). The Court has four motions before it concerning Defendant Alberto R. Garcia (“Garcia”) in De Leon, including a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) to strike two of his affirmative defenses. Dkt. Nos. 200, 201, 202,[1] 203, 206, and a motion to compel discovery responses in Aguirre filed July 31, 2015, Dkt. No. 110. The Court grants the motion to consolidate but denies Plaintiffs leave to add a proposed class-action claim against Federal Defendants.[2] The Court also grants the motion to strike two of Garcia's affirmative defenses.

I. Background

The plaintiffs in both cases generally allege that the individual defendants gave them inadequate legal advice about pending immigration matters and prepared applications to be filed on their behalf in those matters despite the fact that federal regulations did not allow them to do so. See De Leon, 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–25, 33–34, Dkt. No. 71; Aguirre, 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13–25, Dkt. No. 70. With the exception of Garcia, De Leon, 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 5, the individuals named as defendants are not licensed to practice law in Texas, though some are licensed notaries public according to Plaintiffs. See id. ¶¶ 6–12; Aguirre, 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6–11, Dkt. No. 70. Plaintiffs plead that “[t]he applications which have been signed by the defendant immigration practitioner(s) have been accepted by USDHS/USCIS, despite having the knowledge that [the alleged practitioners] are not authorized to practice by the federal regulations.” De Leon, 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 26; Aguirre, 2d Am. Compl. 1. Ten of the 12 individual defendants in De Leon are named as defendants in Aguirre. Compare De Leon, 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5–12 with Aguirre, 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6–11 (naming 11 individual defendants).

The De Leon Plaintiffs bring the following claims in their Second Amended Complaint: (1) violations of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individual defendants: (2) violations of the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., against the individual defendants; (3) violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., against Federal Defendants; and (4) declaratory relief as to Federal Defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. De Leon, 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35–100; see also De Leon, Dkt. No. 151 at 3 (describing claims asserted in proposed third amended complaint). The Plaintiffs in Aguirre assert § 1983 and RICO claims against the individual defendants as well as a common-law fraud claim against them. Aguirre, 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26–.51. They bring only a claim for declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. 2201 against Federal Defendants. See id. ¶¶ 52–54.

A. Procedural History

*2 This Court entered a memorandum and order deciding dispositive motions in De Leon on March 29, 2012, Dkt. No. 151, and an order deciding dispositive motions in Aguirre on March 15, 2012, Dkt. No. 67. In De Leon, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against Federal Defendants for lack of standing and Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Melissa Castro (“Castro”) on the merits for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). De Leon, Dkt. No. 151 at 12–17. Thus, the De Leon Plaintiffs' claims against twelve individuals, including Garcia, named as defendants remained pending after that memorandum and order. See De Leon, 2d Am. Compl. 1. In Aguirre, the Court's order entered March 15, 2012, granted Federal Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion in that case as well, leaving the claims against the 11 individual defendants pending.[3] Aguirre, Dkt. No. 67 at 7.

The respective scheduling orders set the deadline for completing discovery as January 30, 2012, in De Leon Dkt. No. 33 at 2, and March 30, 2012, in Aguirre, Dkt. No. 46 at 1. This Court's memorandum and order entered March 18, 2015, in De Leon, recites much of that case's subsequent procedural history:

De Leon, Dkt. No. 190 at 1–2. The plaintiffs in Aguirre filed a motion to recuse on April 16, 2012, Dkt. No. 93; it was referred to Chief Judge Hinojosa who disposed of it along with the motion to recuse filed in De Leon on February 20, 2015. On March 18, 2015, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion to strike, Dkt. No. 183, and their Rule 60(b) motion, Dkt. No. 173. De Leon, Dkt. No. 190 at 8–9.

On August 10, 2015, the Court ordered the remaining parties in De Leon to conduct a scheduling conference in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) and file a joint discovery/case management plan by September 30, 2015. De Leon, Dkt. No. 208 at 1. Plaintiffs and Garcia did so, but the other defendants who have not been dismissed did not participate in the conference.[4] See De Leon, Dkt. No. 216 at 1.

B. Pending Motions

On July 22, 2015, Garcia filed his Original Answer in De Leon, Dkt. No. 198. This Court ordered Garcia to confer with his attorney-in-charge, Moises R. Hernandez (“Hernandez”), because Garcia signed his answer pro se and Garcia's membership in the bar of this Court had expired. De Leon, Dkt. No. 199 at 1–2. Hernandez moves to withdraw as Garcia's attorney-in-charge. De Leon, Dkt. No. 201.

*3 On August 12, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a proposed consolidated complaint and Motion to Amend Complaints and to Consolidate Cases, De Leon, Dkt. No. 211; Aguirre, Dkt. No. 111. On September 29, 2015, they supplemented their motion to consolidate with a new proposed consolidated complaint adding a ground for injunctive relief from Federal Defendants, De Leon, Dkt. No. 215; Aguirre, Dkt. No. 113; see also Am. Consol. Compl. Suppl. Claims ¶¶ 396–412, De Leon, Dkt. No. 215-1 (asserting new claim in ground nine). Federal Defendants responded in opposition on October 7, 2015, De Leon, Dkt. No. 217; Aguirre, Dkt. No. 114, and Plaintiffs replied on October 12, 2015, De Leon, Dkt. No. 218; Aguirre, Dkt. No. 115. No other party has filed a response opposing consolidation or Plaintiffs request for leave to file an amended complaint.

The De Leon Plaintiffs have filed three motions related to Garcia. In the first, they seek to recover their costs of serving Garcia because he allegedly failed to waive service in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d), De Leon, Dkt. No. 200. They have also filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) to strike two paragraphs of Garcia's answer, De Leon, Dkt. No. 203. Finally, the De Leon Plaintiffs move for an order compelling Garcia to respond to discovery requests propounded May 1, 2015. De Leon, Dkt. No. 206 at 1. On the same day the De Leon Plaintiffs filed their motion to compel, the Plaintiffs in Aguirre filed a motion to compel the individual defendants named in that case to respond to discovery requests propounded on the same date, Aguirre, Dkt. No. 110.

II. Motion to Withdraw

“An attorney may withdraw from representation only upon leave of the court and a showing of good cause and reasonable notice to the client. ” In re Wynn, 889 F.2d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). The decision to allow an attorney to withdraw is “entrusted to the sound discretion” of this Court. Id. (quoting Streetman v. Lynaugh, 674 F. Supp. 229, 234 (E.D. Tex. 1987)). The withdrawing attorney bears the burden of proving the existence of good cause for withdrawal. See FTC v. Intellipay, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 33, 33–34 (S.D. Tex. 1993).

The Court finds that Hernandez has demonstrated that good cause exists to permit him to withdraw. According to his motion to withdraw, Hernandez retired from taking cases like this one on August 31, 2015. De Leon, Dkt. No. 201 at 2. Garcia states that he wishes to represent himself. Id. He further represents that he complied with all applicable requirements to become an attorney in good standing licensed to practice before this Court as of July 29, 2015. Id. at 1–2. As no barrier exists to Garcia's self-representation, the Court determines that good cause exists to permit him to proceed pro se.

III. Motion to Amend and Consolidation

A. Consolidation

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), a district court has the discretion to consolidate cases that “involve a common question of law or fact.” Plaintiffs argue that consolidation will serve “the interests of judicial economy and ... avoid excessive costs and duplication of effort.” Opp. Mot. Am. Compls. & Consol. Cases 2, De Leon, Dkt. No. 211; Aguirre, Dkt. No. 111 (citations omitted). As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “Rule 42(a) should be used to expedite trial and eliminate unnecessary repetition and confusion.” Miller v. U.S. Postal Serv., 729 F.2d 1033, 1036 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing In re Air Crash Disaster, 549 F.2d 1006, 1013 (5th Cir. 1977)). The party seeking consolidation has the burden to show how consolidation will avoid unnecessary costs or delay. Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1514, 1532 (5th Cir. 1993). (affirming denial of motion to consolidate because “the purpose of consolidation is to ‘avoid unnecessary costs or delay,’ and the [parties seeking consolidation] have not shown how consolidation would serve this purpose”).

*4 The Court finds that consolidation is warranted on this record. “Consolidation may properly be denied in instances where the cases are at different stages of preparedness for trial.” Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Inc., 886 F.2d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing St. Bernard Gen. Hosp. v. Hosp. Serv. Ass'n of New Orleans, Inc., 712 F.2d 978, 990 (5th Cir. 1983)). There has been no showing here that this consideration militates against consolidation. Factors bearing on the consolidation inquiry include: “(1) same court, (2) common parties, (3) common questions of law or fact, (4) risk of prejudice or confusion versus risk of inconsistent adjudications, (5) judicial economy.” Parker v. Hyperdynamics Corp., — F. Supp. 3d —, 2015 WL 5024027, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2015) (citing Frazier, 980 F.2d at 1531). The Plaintiffs in these cases bring similar § 1983 and RICO claims against 10 of the same individual defendants. Garcia, who is a defendant in De Leon only, nonetheless participated in the preparation of a case management plan that proposes a schedule contemplating consolidation. See De Leon, Dkt. No. 216 at 2 (proposing schedule for resolving claims in ground nine of proposed consolidated complaint). These cases have in the past raised common legal questions. Compare De Leon, Dkt. No. 151 at 5–8 (analyzing motion to claims against Federal Defendants) with Aguirre, Dkt. No. 67 at 4–6 (same). Though the alleged events underlying the claims as pleaded occurred on different dates and sometimes involve different individuals, the filing of essentially parallel motions to compel on July 31, 2015, typifies the apparently duplicative cost the Court finds consolidation likely to alleviate, as do the cognate procedural histories of these cases. See Parker, 2015 WL 5024027at *2–*3 (citing Kaplan v. Gelfond, 240 F.R.D. 88, 91 (S.D. N.Y. 2007)) (finding interests favored consolidation of shareholder suits alleging “common pattern in their [factual] allegations” even though two suits alleged different starting dates of statements to potential investors). Accordingly, the Court consolidates these cases for pretrial management. See id. at *3 (quoting In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427, 438 (S.D. Tex. 2002)) (“noting that ‘consolidation for pretrial matters does not necessarily mean that the claims will all be tried together, especially where the nature of the evidence and damages issues differ substantially’ ”).

B. Leave to Amend

On September 29, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a supplement seeking leave to file a proposed complaint asserting nine grounds for relief. De Leon, Dkt. No. 215 at 2. Plaintiffs concede that grounds eight and nine are based on facts that occurred after their live pleadings were filed in De Leon and Aguirre; therefore, these grounds must be analyzed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), which governs supplementation of pleadings, rather than Rule 15(a), which governs amendments. See, e.g., Smith v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N/A, No. H-10-3730, 2011 WL 11196, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2011) (“The Supplement does not refer to actions occurring after the original complaint was filed. As a result, it appears to be in the nature of an ‘amended complaint’ under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), rather than a ‘supplemental complaint’ under Rule 15(d).”).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) mandates that “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend a pleading] when justice so requires.” Rule 15(a) “evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.” Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 872 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Martin's Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading U.S. of Am. Co., 195 F.3d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Thus, a district court's limited discretion under Rule 15(a)(2) only permits “deni[al of] leave to amend for a substantial reason, such as undue delay, repeated failures to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice, or futility.” U.S. ex rel. Spicer v. Westbrook, 751 F.3d 354, 367 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing U.S. ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 270–71 (5th Cir. 2010)).

No party has filed a response in opposition to Plaintiffs' request to amend to plead their first seven grounds for relief, and the deadline to do so has passed. See S.D. Tex. Civ. R. 7.4 (“Failure to respond will be taken as a representation of no opposition.”). The plaintiffs filed three complaints in De Leon and Aguirre. De Leon, Dkt. Nos. 1, 9, 71; Aguirre, Dkt. Nos. 1, 5, 70; see also Aguirre, Dkt. No. 67 at 7 (directing plaintiffs to file second amended complaint entered as Dkt. No. 70). Nevertheless, only Defendant Melissa Castro's claims were dismissed at the pleadings stage in De Leon. See Dkt. No. 151 at 17. Plaintiffs may seek leave to amend their claims against Defendant Melissa Castro, despite this court's order of dismissal. See Louisiana v. Litton Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298, 1302–03 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[U]nless a district court order states expressly or by clear indication reflects the court's intention to dismiss an entire action, the order dismisses only the complaint and a plaintiff may seek leave of court to amend.” (citing Whitaker v. City of Hous., 963 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir. 1992))). Given Castro's deemed nonopposition and that of all defendants, there is no substantial ground to deny Plaintiffs leave to amend to plead grounds one through seven on this record.

*5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). The Supreme Court has held that “persons participating in ... new events [for which a pleading is supplemented] may be added [as parties] if necessary.” Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, 227 (1964).

As the Fifth Circuit has observed, “[w]hile the text of Rule 15(a) provides that leave should be freely granted, the text of Rule 15(d) does not similarly provide.” Burns v. Exxon Corp., 158 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 1998). The dismissal of some claims is not by itself necessarily a ground for supplementation under Rule 15(d). See id. (affirming denial of Rule 15(d) motion because “nothing has changed except for the granting of [defendant]'s motions for partial summary judgment”); Schoemann v. Murrell, Civ. A. No. 09-0802, 2009 WL 3711257, at *1–*2 (E.D. La. Nov. 4, 2009) (denying Rule 15(d) motion because “[n]othing ... changed except the grant of Matthew's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction”). In contrast to a new transaction, event, or occurrence justifying supplementation, Rule 15(d) cannot be used to assert “a new and different cause of action from that presented in the original complaint.” Griffin, 377 U.S. at 226; see also, e.g., Garcia v. Hackman, Civ. A. No. C-10-311, 2011 WL 2457918, at *19 (S.D. Tex. June 16, 2011) (quoting Griffin for the proposition that “[l]eave to supplement should not be granted where a plaintiff attempts to present ‘new and different cause[s] of action’ ” (second alteration in original)); see also Chemetron Corp. v. Bus. Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1193–94 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds by 460 U.S. 1007 (1983) (holding Rule 15(d) motion should have been denied where evidence was used “to create another cause of action” at trial and defendant did not receive fair notice of new legal theory). The Court weighs several factors when considering whether to allow supplementation under Rule 15(d): “(1) undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on part of the movant; (2) undue prejudice to the opposing party; and (3) futility.” Mangwiro v. Napolitano, 939 F. Supp. 2d 639, 648 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (citing Chemetron, 682 F.2d at 1194).

The proposed amended complaint pleads two claims Plaintiffs describe as supplemental on behalf of Plaintiff Alvaro Ramirez (“Ramirez”). See De Leon, Am. Consol. Compl. Suppl. Claims ¶¶ 368–412, Dkt. No. 215-1. The Court considers each in turn.

Ground eight stems from Garcia's alleged discovery responses in this litigation. See id. ¶¶ 373–374. Plaintiffs assert that Garcia committed perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621 and ask the Court to issue a U-Visa Nonimmigrant Status Certification stating that Ramirez “has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful in the investigation or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity of which he ... is a victim.” 8 C.F.R. 214.14(a)(12) (2016); see also id. § 214.14(a)(2), (3)(ii) (defining certifying agency to include “a Federal ... judge” and certifying official to include “[a] Federal, State, or local judge”). The Fifth Circuit has acknowledged the possibility that events during discovery warrant supplementation under Rule 15(d), but not all discovery conduct qualifies as a changed circumstance under that rule. See Mohwish v. Muhammad, No. 00-60279, 2001 WL 85900, at *1 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam, unpublished table decision) (holding district court did not abuse discretion when it denied motion to supplement with retaliation claim premised on filing of discovery motion where original pleading asserted claims of retaliation for filing grievance). No party challenges Plaintiffs' implicit assertion that the alleged factual basis for the claim pleaded in ground eight came to light as late as July 22, 2015, approximately two months before Plaintiffs moved to supplement. Am. Consol. Compl. Suppl. Claims ¶ 371. Further, the claim as pleaded concerns alleged statements made in a discovery response and a pleading in this litigation. See id. ¶¶ 373–374. For these reasons and because no party has filed a response opposing the addition of ground eight, the Court finds that no substantial reason has been shown to deny leave to add this ground. See Garcia, 2011 WL 2457918, at *19 (“[If] no other ‘substantial reason’ mandates denying leave, the motion should be granted.” (citing Chemetron, 682 F.2d at 1194)).

*6 Ground nine concerns advice Ramirez allegedly received from a U.S. Department of Homeland Security employee during a March 2015 visit to a facility located in Harlingen, Texas. Am. Consol. Compl. Suppl. Claims ¶¶ 397–398. According to the proposed supplemental complaint, the employee told Ramirez that he could download and file a Form I-130 and that “he does not need an attorney.” Id. ¶ 398. Plaintiffs further allege that DHS employees “in the Rio Grande Valley repeatedly advise aliens [sic] they do not require attorneys, make affirmative derogatory statements about individual attorneys that are not true, and interfere with the attorney client relationship in numerous ways, all to the detriment of the aliens.” Id. ¶ 407. Plaintiffs apparently intend to seek certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on ground nine. See Jt. Discovery Case Mgmt. Plan 3, De Leon, Dkt. No. 216 (proposing deadline by which motion to certify will be filed). As relief, Plaintiffs propose to seek an order enjoining DHS employees, with specified exceptions, “from advising/misadvising U.S. citizen [sic], or Lawful Permanent Resident petitioners, or their alien spouses [sic] what benefit to apply for under the INA, unless the employee is an accredited representative, or an attorney who has reviewed all the facts of the individuals [sic] immigration history prior to providing advice and if a person relies on that advise relief in the form of estoppel shall be available ....” Am. Consol. Compl. Suppl. Claims 40–41. Plaintiffs also propose to seek “[i]njunctive relief prohibiting employees of any branch of the USDHS from providing derogatory information about an alien's attorney unless that attorney is under indictment, or a civil complaint has been filed by a government body against that attorney ....” Id. at 41.

Federal Defendants argue in their response filed October 7, 2015, that Plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief on grounds eight and nine as alleged in their proposed complaint, making granting leave to supplement an exercise in futility. See, e.g., Haggard v. Bank of Ozarks Inc., 668 F.3d 196, 202 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming denial of Rule 15(d) motion to supplement on futility grounds). The Court has stricken that response for failure to comply with Rule 5, however, and the Court therefore neither expresses nor implies any views on the merits of the claims sought to be pleaded as grounds eight and nine.

Nonetheless, the Court determines Plaintiffs should be denied leave to supplement to add ground nine under Rule 15(d). While the alleged advice given by nonattorneys to persons involved in the immigration system has in a general sense been the subject of this litigation from the outset, Plaintiffs propose to introduce through ground nine class-action issues and seek injunctive relief aimed solely at Federal Defendants' conduct without regard to private actors. See Am. Consol. Compl. Suppl. Claims ¶¶ 396–412,, 40–41. Addressing the claim pleaded in ground nine will therefore delay resolution of Plaintiffs' claims against the individual defendants, and some of those claims have been pending for nearly seven years. See Haralson v. Campuzano, 356 F. App'x 692, 699 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam, unpublished) (citing Burns, 153 F.3d at 343) (affirming denial of Rule 15(d) motion based on finding that “granting leave to supplement would delay the disposition of the claims against Appellees, thereby causing them prejudice”); Garcia, 2011 WL 2457918, at *20 (denying Rule 15(d) motion in part because “the incorporation of new parties would postpone litigation when it has already reached an advanced stage”). The prejudice to Ramirez and Plaintiffs does not provide a counterweight, given Plaintiffs' admission that the claim asserted in proposed ground nine could be brought in a separate suit, De Leon, Dkt. No. 215 at 3. See Chemetron, 646 F.2d at 1194 (finding prejudice of claim that might be lost did not outweigh prejudice from supplementation approximately eight years later); Gardner v. City of Hous., Civ. A. No. H-12-1612, 2013 WL 4042022, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) (holding that granting leave to supplement would prejudice defendants who had filed motions to dismiss and noting that plaintiff remained free to file separate action based on new events). Moreover, the proposed claim pleaded in ground nine does not stem from discovery in this litigation, rather it concerns the alleged giving of advice by federal employees—a claim distinct from the alleged giving of advice by private persons on which the litigation in De Leon and Aguirre have been based. See Mohwish, 2001 WL 85900, at *1 (holding retaliation claim arising from discovery conduct was distinct cause of action under Rule 15(d) even though plaintiff alleged First Amendment retaliation claims in original pleading); Minix v. Stoker, 289 F. App'x 15, 18 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam, unpublished) (affirming denial of Rule 15(d) motion where plaintiff argued that all events took place in same prison unit and rejecting argument that claims had to be considered together to afford him complete relief); Mangwiro v. Napolitano, 939 F. Supp. 2d 639, 642, 647–48 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (holding supplemental claim stemming from denial of third I-130 application for adjustment of status was new cause of action in suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06, challenging denial of first two I-130 applications).

*7 To sum up, the Court grants Plaintiffs' leave to amend all the grounds of their complaint as pleaded in their proposed supplemental complaint filed September 29, 2015, De Leon, Dkt. No. 215, except ground nine.

IV. Insufficient Certificates of Service

At least two papers presently before the Court omit one or more self-represented defendants from the certificate of service. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require “a written motion, except one that may be heard ex parte,” to be “served on every party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1)(D). Default has not been entered against any party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2) (excepting parties in default from service requirement). Further, Rule 5 requires “[a]ny paper after the complaint that is required to be served–together with a certificate of service–must be filed within a reasonable time after service.” Id. R. 5(d)(1). This Court possesses the discretion to strike a paper that lacks a proper certificate of service. See, e.g., Gene F. ex rel Victor F. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 793 F.2d 633, 635–36 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming district court's decision to strike motion because it lacked a certificate of service).

This Court struck a motion filed by the De Leon Plaintiffs on April 13, 2015. De Leon, Dkt. No. 193. In the order striking, the Court explained that the docket sheet shows that some of the defendants in this civil action are “represented by counsel who received a copy of the motion via the Court's electronic case filing system. According to the docket sheet, the remaining defendants represent themselves and, with one exception, did not receive electronic notice.” Id. at 1. As this Court's order striking implies, a self-represented party must be served in accordance with Rule 5 like any other party. See, e.g., Daniels v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 574 F. App'x 337, 338 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam, unpublished) (considering whether mailing motion to dismiss to pro se plaintiffs affected proper service under Rule 5).

On July 27, 2015, the De Leon Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking an award of fees based on Garcia's alleged failure to waive service of process. De Leon, Dkt. No. 200. The certificate of service accompanying this motion reads in its entirety: “I hereby certify that this motion and exhibits were served on all counsel of record by CM/ECF filing.” Id. at 2. The certificate of service does not recite that the De Leon Plaintiffs made any efforts to serve the defendants who represent themselves. Id. at 2.

The De Leon Plaintiffs corrected the same omission in the certificate of service accompanying their later-filed motion to compel. See De Leon, Dkt. No. 206 at 2 (reciting that motion served by first-class mail on pro se defendants). Indeed, on October 13, 2015, the De Leon Plaintiffs filed a corrected certificate of service for a reply filed the previous day, De Leon, Dkt. No. 219 at 2, yet they have not corrected the certificate of service accompanying the motion under consideration, De Leon, Dkt. No. 200. The Court therefore strikes this motion, even though Garcia received electronic notice via the Court's CM/ECF system, because the Court cannot dispense with Rule 5's requirement of service on “every party” not in default for failing to appear, especially where there is no evidence that any efforts were made to serve the pro se parties with this motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1)(D); see also Borroto v. Wilson, No. 96-10527, 1998 WL 110042, at *2 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam, unpublished table decision) (“The language of Rule 5 is mandatory.”); cf. Scott v. Carpanzano, 556 F. App'x 288, 292 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam, unpublished) (explaining on review of entry of default judgment that although Rule 5 may not have been complied with, “the measure of due process is whether there was ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections’ ” (quoting United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010))); Jackson v. La. Tech. Univ., Civ. A. No. 11-0524, 2011 WL 5866010, at *6 (E.D. La. Nov. 22, 2011) (denying motion to strike for lack of certificate of service based in part on finding that nonmovant suffered no prejudice based on subsequent filings).

*8 The certificate of service accompanying Federal Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Supplement to Opposed Motion to Amend and Consolidate Complaints also omits mention of the self-represented parties. See De Leon, Dkt. No. 217 at 8; Aguirre, Dkt. No. 114 at 8. The Court strikes this response as well and does not consider the arguments it raises. See Gene F. ex rel Victor F., 793 F.2d at 635–36.

V. Motions to Compel

On July 31, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed a separate motion to compel in each case. Both motions ask the Court to compel one or more of the individual defendants to respond to discovery requests propounded May 1, 2015. De Leon, Dkt. No. 206; Aguirre, Dkt. No. 110.

Turning first to the motion to compel in De Leon, this Court stayed discovery in that case on June 14, 2011. Dkt. No. 70 at 2. No order has lifted that stay, and the Court accordingly denies the motion to compel in De Leon.

As for Aguirre, the discovery deadline set in the scheduling order had passed when the case was stayed on April 18, 2012, Aguirre, Dkt. No. 46 at 1 (setting Mar. 30, 2012, as discovery deadline). Although the stay pending resolution of the motion to recuse was lifted on February 20, 2015, the Court has not modified the scheduling order in Aguirre. Rather, it ordered the parties in De Leon to conduct a supplemental discovery conference in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) on August 8, 2015, De Leon, Dkt. No. 208. The pending motion to amend and to consolidate was filed four days later on August 12, 2015. De Leon, Dkt. No. 211; Aguirre, Dkt. No. 111.

The discovery deadline set in a scheduling order typically represents the date by which discovery must be completed rather than a deadline to initiate a last round of discovery requests, and so discovery requests that cannot be responded to before that deadline must ordinarily be deemed untimely. Dixon v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 13-179-JWD-RLB, 2014 WL 6474355, at *3 (M.D. La. Nov. 19, 2014); Dixon v. Albemarle Corp., No. H-04-0170, 2005 WL 6737048, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 20005); Borninski v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 2d 918, 919 (N.D. Tex. 1998); see also Hall v. Louisiana, Civ. A. No. 12-657-BAJ-RLB, 2014 WL 2560715, at *1 (M.D. La. June 6, 2014) (granting protective order where request for production propounded fewer than thirty days before discovery deadline because denying motion “would effectively condone a party's ability to, at its whim, modify the discovery timeframes to its opponent's detriment by propounding discovery at the eleventh hour”). The Aguirre Plaintiffs do not address this issue in their motions to compel, and it must therefore be denied. See, e.g., Dixon, 2014 WL 6474355, at *3.

VI. Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) authorizes a court to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense ... [, inter alia,] on motion made by a party.” In De Leon, Plaintiffs invoke Rule 12(f) to ask the Court to strike two affirmative defenses pleaded in Garcia's answer:[5]

De Leon, Dkt. No. 198 at 5.

In their motion to strike, Plaintiffs contend that Garcia's answer does not “include any factual allegations for the Plaintiff [sic] to know how he [sic] was negligent, or what he [sic] failed to do to mitigate damages.” De Leon, Dkt. No. 203 at 2. They ask the Court to apply the pleading standards enunciated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) to Garcia's affirmative defenses. Id. The Court reads Plaintiffs' motion to strike as arguing that Garcia's answer must plead more factual material; the Court does not understand Plaintiffs to be arguing that either defense is legally insufficient because it is unavailable as a matter of law, for example. See Hernandez v. Balakian, No. CV-F-06-1383 OWW/DLB, 2007 WL 1649911, at *5–*8 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2007) (analogizing to antitrust law to deny motion to strike failure-to-mitigate defense to RICO Claims and describing this area of the law as unsettled); Marin v. Evans, No. CV-06-3090-RHW, 2007 WL 655456, at *2–*3 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2007) (same); cf. Khoder v. AMF, Inc., 539 F.2d 1078, 1080 (5th Cir. 1976).

*9 Plaintiffs' argument that the Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard applies to Garcia's answer raises an open legal question. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) authorizes a court to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter ... on its own; or on motion made by a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (numbering omitted). Before Twombly and Iqbal, the Fifth Circuit construed Rule 12(f) as requiring a defendant to “plead an affirmative defense with enough specificity or factual particularity to give the plaintiff ‘fair notice’ of the defense that is being advanced.” Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that “[a]n affirmative defense is subject to the same pleading requirements as is the complaint” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e))). Depending on the circumstances, “merely pleading the name of the affirmative defense ... may be sufficient” under this standard. Id. (citing Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Napoli, 166 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1948)) (other citation omitted). For example, pleading the affirmative defense of contributory negligence sufficed, without more, to satisfy this standard in a negligence suit arising out of a car accident. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 166 F.2d at 26. In contrast, under the standard enunciated in Twombly and Iqbal, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). An intra-Circuit split has developed over whether the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standard applies to affirmative defenses. United States ex rel. Parikh v. Citizens Med. Ctr., 302 F.R.D. 416, 418 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (Costa, J.) (collecting cases); Rodriguez v. Physician Lab. Servs., LLC, No. 7:13-CV-622, 2014 WL 847126, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2014).

The Court need not weigh in on this issue on this record. While Plaintiffs' motion to strike cites Iqbal, Twombly, and Woodfield, they neither recognize the existence of this split nor discuss the reasoning underpinning the cases on both sides of it. De Leon, Dkt. No. 203 at 2. Garcia did not file a response to the instant motion, and his deadline to do so under Local Rule 7.3 of this Court has passed. Thus, under Local Rule 7.4, he has represented his nonopposition and, in effect, withdrawn the two defenses Plaintiffs move to strike. Striking these defenses will not dispose of this case in its entirety or even all of the defenses Garcia pleads. See Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating that Fifth Circuit has held that district courts have power to enact local rules requiring a response to a motion, but the Fifth Circuit has “not ‘approved the automatic grant, upon failure to comply with such rules, of motions that are dispositive of the litigation’ ” (quoting John v. Louisiana, 757 F.2d 698, 709 (5th Cir. 1985))).

Accordingly, the Court grants the instant motion to strike without expressing any view on how, if at all, Twombly or Iqbal affected the standard applicable for pleading an affirmative defense.

VII. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:

SIGNED this 12th day of February, 2016.