*1 Plaintiff's motion to compel [87] pertains to (1) dialer records; (2) call recordings; (3) account notes; (4) emails, (5) DMI's net worth; and (6) DMI's litigation history from January 1, 2015 to the present. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

In ruling on a motion to compel, the discovery standard set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) applies. Under Rule 26(b)(1), “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense ... Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). However, discovery may be limited if the court determines “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(c)(i).

I. Dialer Records, Call Recordings, Account Notes, and Emails

The dispute regarding DMI's production of its dialer records, call recordings, account notes, and emails comes down to whether DMI has produced all records in its “possession, custody, or control” or just those documents in its “possession.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1) (“A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of Rule 26(b) ... to produce ... the following items in the responding party's possession, custody, or control ....”) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff has requested production of documents in DMI's possession, custody, or control but DMI only answers with respect to the documents in its possession. Compare Doc. [87] at 7 (“When pressed by Plaintiff as to records in its custody or control, DMI goes silent”) with Doc. [90] at 2 (DMI stating that Plaintiff's motion should be denied because it “has already either produced these documents or expressly represented that it does not possess these documents.”) (emphasis added).

The individual terms “possession, custody, and control” convey different meanings. For example, “control” includes documents not necessarily within a party's possession but “a document that the party has a legal right to obtain on demand.” Am. Soc'y For Prevention of Cruelty To Animals v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 233 F.R.D. 209, 212 (D.D.C. 2006); see also Thermal Design, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Heating, Refrigerating & Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc., 755 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 538, 542 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2004) (“On the issue of control, ‘the test is whether the party has a legal right to obtain [the document].’ ”)); Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1426 (7th Cir. 1993) (recognizing a difference between “possession” and “custody or control”).

The Court notes that DMI's counsel signed discovery responses as officers of the Court that amount to a certification, to the best of their knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry, that the disclosure of documents was complete and correct at the time it was made. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(A). However, the absence of defendant's representation in its response memorandum to this Court that it has produced all documents in its “possession, custody and control” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 does raise a gap that has not been closed by the defendants.

*2 District Courts have the authority to order a certification that production and discovery responses are complete. See, e.g., Blaga v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., No. 12 C 8049, 2015 WL 2193795 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2015) (awarding sanctions after several discovery orders, including 12 C 8049, Doc. [122] that ordered the party provide a certification of the party's search for and production of responsive documents in his possession, custody, or control); In re SPECS, No. C 10-04250 YGR DMR, 2012 WL 4120246, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2012) (sanctioning and ordering the plaintiffs serve and file certifications that the plaintiff's CEO and the plaintiff's counsel had performed a diligent and reasonable search and have produced all responsive documents in their possession, custody, or control to the defendants).

As a result, the Court orders DMI to certify whether it has searched for and produced responsive non-privileged documents in its possession, custody and control, and/or supplement its written discovery responses and production if necessary. To the extent that certain documents have been withheld as privileged, the defendants should submit a privilege log to Plaintiff. Defendant shall submit the certification, along with an additional documents and the privilege log, on or before February 28, 2019.

II. Net Worth

Plaintiff seeks discovery into DMI's net worth. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks DMI's last two years’ balance sheets, an itemization of DMI's assets and liabilities, and statements identifying DMI's operating accounts. Doc. [87] at 5. “A party's net worth is discoverable where punitive damages are at issue.” Lanigan v. Babusch, No. 11 C 3266, 2011 WL 5118301, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2011) (internal citation omitted). But to compel discovery of a party's net worth, the opposing party cannot “merely rely on broad, conclusory allegations in the complaint.” Id. (quoting Salstone v. Gen. Felt Indus., 1986 WL 13738, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 1986)).

Here, although Plaintiff's reply states that it “requires DMI's financial records not for the sole purpose of determining punitive damages,” Plaintiff has not specifically articulated the relationship between discovery of DMI's net worth and non-punitive claims, defenses, or damages. See Doc. [87] at 5. Without much explanation, Plaintiff alleges a relationship between discovery of DMI's net worth and its RESPA claim concerning a pattern or practice of noncompliance by DMI. see also Doc. [87] at 8. The Court cannot decipher a relevance between DMI's net worth and Plaintiff's RESPA ‘pattern or practice of noncompliance’ theory.

“[C]ourts ... have deferred discovery of the defendant's financial information until it appears that the defendant will be liable for punitive damages.” Lanigan, 2011 WL 5118301, at *4 (quoting 6 Moore's Federal Practice § 26–41[8][c], at 26–176 (3d ed. 2011) (ellipses in Lanigan); see also Makowski v. SmithAmundsen LLC, 2010 WL 3172476, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2010) (postponing discovery of certain revenue information until after summary judgment decided). Since it appears that Plaintiff seeks this information for its punitive damages claim, Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery of DMI's net worth is denied without prejudice. The issue of DMI's net worth is postponed until it appears that DMI will be liable for punitive damages.

III. Identification of DMI's Litigation History

Plaintiff moves to compel a response to its interrogatory, and argues that the identification of cases wherein DMI was found liable since January 1, 2015 for violations of RESPA, TCPA, ICFA, and FCRA are relevant because they go towards the question of RESPA's “pattern or practice” and the determination of punitive damages. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)(B); see Doc. [87] at 6 (“Plaintiff then further narrowed the request again-asking only to identify the cases and advising that Plaintiff will pull the cases himself.”). DMI's position is that it need not produce this information because it is “publicly available information that is equally accessible to Plaintiff” and that it would burden DMI to provide this information. Doc. [90] at 3.

*3 DMI analogizes its situation to Bey v. Pollard, No. 13-cv-952-JPS, 2014 WL 4113127, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 20, 2014) and Sabratek Liquidating, LLC v. KPMG LLP, No. 01-cv-9582, 2002 WL 31520993, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2002). In Bey, the plaintiff requested “the name and docket numbers of any lawsuits alleging excessive use of force filed against certain defendants, and for a summary of the cases.” Bey, 2014 WL 4113127, at *3. “In response, defendants produced docket sheets from PACER and [Wisconsin Circuit Court Access, also known as] CCAP[,]” and objected to summarizing the cases. Id. Bey held that “[i]t is plainly not the defendants’ obligation to provide a summary of publicly-available documents from prior litigation to the plaintiff” and “that this information regarding prior litigation ‘can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive’ because plaintiff can seek out the cases in his institution's library.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)). This Court agrees with Bey’s holding, but also notes that, unlike the instant dispute, Bey did not question whether the defendants were required to provide the name and docket numbers of any lawsuits because the party resisting discovery provided a responsive list of cases and docket numbers. See id.

Sabratek is more instructive. In Sabratek, the plaintiffs sought documents concerning other lawsuits in which the defendant was a party in claims for professional malpractice. Id. at *4. Sabratek reasoned that such documents were relevant because they could contain admissions that could be used against KPMG or other information that could be helpful for impeachment purposes. The district court denied Sabratek's request, reasoning that “[w]hile we agree that the information sought may contain information useful for gaining admissions and impeaching testimony, we do not believe this justifies such a potentially enormous amount of production on the part of KPMG. Moreover, most, if not all, of the information sought is publicly available.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii) (internal citation and quotations omitted)).

The Court agrees that DMI's liability history may be relevant to prove a pattern or practice of DMI's conduct with respect to claims, defenses, and damage theories involved in this case. But the Court does not find that this justifies compelling DMI to compile a list of their public litigation history – a list that DMI states it does not readily maintain (Doc. [90] at 5). As in Sabratek, Plaintiff and his counsel can search for this public information themselves. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii) (allowing court to limit discovery if “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”). For example, Plaintiff and his counsel can search for cases involving DMI on Lexis, Westlaw, Bloomberg, PACER, law libraries, and applicable regulatory bodies. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel DMI to provide information regarding its litigation history is denied.

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff's motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part. The Court also notes that Plaintiff has moved for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), but as a result of the ruling above, the Court finds that sanctions are not warranted in this instance.

SO ORDERED.