Weinreis Ethanol, LLC v. Kramer
Weinreis Ethanol, LLC v. Kramer
2022 WL 8167977 (D. Colo. 2022)
June 15, 2022
Neureiter, Norman R., United States Magistrate Judge
Summary
The court found that Plaintiffs' Requests for Production 19 and 20 were too broad and not proportional to the needs of the case. The court sustained Defendants' objections to the requests and suggested that Plaintiffs may seek to depose Mr. Free as a fact witness or request that he voluntarily provide the documents they seek.
Additional Decisions
WEINREIS ETHANOL, LLC, a North Dakota limited liability company; LAPASEOTES LAND LLC, a Nebraska limited liability company; DINKLAGE FEED YARD, INC., a Nebraska corporation; and EAST COAST AG HOLDINGS LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Plaintiffs,
v.
DAVID KRAMER; COLORADO AGRI PRODUCTS, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; and JOHN AND JANE DOES NOS. 1-25, Defendants
v.
DAVID KRAMER; COLORADO AGRI PRODUCTS, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; and JOHN AND JANE DOES NOS. 1-25, Defendants
Civil Action No. 21-cv-03120-CMA-NRN
United States District Court, D. Colorado
Signed June 15, 2022
Counsel
Nicholas Martin DeWeese, Peter G. Koclanes, Sherman & Howard LLC, Denver, CO, for Plaintiffs.Alice Conway Powers, Brian Robert DeMocker, Joseph Apisdorf, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Denver, CO, for Defendants.
Neureiter, Norman R., United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER ON DISCOVERY DISPUTE
*1 This matter is before the Court on a discovery dispute between the parties. Pursuant to the Court's practice standards, a discovery hearing was held on May 4, 2022. At the hearing, Defendants raised a dispute as to Plaintiffs’ RFP 19 and 20. The Court ordered briefing on the dispute. Plaintiffs filed their brief on May 13, 2022 (Dkt. #43) and Defendants filed their response on May 20, 2022. (Dkt. #45.)
Generally, the subject discovery requests seek production of all documents produced in two other matters that either involve Defendants or entities related to them.
RFP 19 requests: “Any and all Documents and Communications disclosed or produced by Bridgeport Ethanol, LLC, in the case of Dinsy's Gas LLC v. Bridgeport Ethanol, LLC, Case No. 2020CV30027, pending in District Court in Logan County, Colorado.” (Dkt. #45-1 at 15.)
RFP 20 requests: “Any and all Documents and Communications disclosed or produced to Defendants, or by Defendants, in the case of Edward (Ted) Free v. David Kramer and Colorado Agri Products, LLC, Civil Action No. 21-cv-03080, pending in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.” (Id.)
Analysis
Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows discovery of:
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
“When the discovery sought appears relevant, the party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevancy by demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within the scope of relevance as defined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.” Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 359 (D. Colo. 2004) (citations omitted); see also Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Caton, 136 F.R.D. 682, 685 (D. Kan. 1991) (stating that a party resisting discovery based on relevancy grounds bears the burden of explaining how “each discovery request is irrelevant, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, or burdensome”). However, when a request for discovery is overly broad on its face or when relevancy is not readily apparent, the party seeking the discovery has the burden to show the relevancy of the request. See Paradigm Alliance, Inc. v. Celeritas Tech., LLC, No. 07-1121-MLB, 2008 WL 678700, at *2 (D. Kan. March 7, 2008) (citation omitted); Williams v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Unified Gov't of Wyandotte Cnty. & Kansas City, Kan., 192 F.R.D. 698, 705 (D. Kan. 2000) (noting that when relevancy of propounded request not apparent, proponent has burden of establishing it).
*2 The Court agrees with Defendants that the relevance of the subject requests for production is not apparent on their face. RFP 19 requests documents from a lawsuit between Dinsy's Gas LLC and Bridgeport Ethanol, LLC—two parties who are not parties in the instant case. RFP 20 requests information related to a lawsuit between Edward (Ted) Free and Defendants named in this suit. Defendants, however, point out that Mr. Free's lawsuit involves none of the same claims as those at issue here. Thus, it is Plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate the relevance of the documents it seeks.
With respect to RFP 19, Plaintiffs argue that this request seeks “highly relevant” documents because in this case and the Dinsy's Gas, LLC matter, the plaintiffs “allege misconduct by Mr. Kramer and CAP relating to their involvement with and operation of Bridgeport.” (Dkt. #43 at 5.) Further, both cases assert violations of the Bridgeport Operating Agreement and seek access to Bridgeport's books and records. Plaintiffs also point to the fact that the plaintiffs in the Dinsy's Gas, LLC matter waited through nearly a year and a half of litigation, including through trial, for Bridgeport to turn over the requested financials.
Apparently, through RFP 19, Plaintiffs seek the financial books and records of Bridgeport. (Id. at 43.) However, the actual language of RFP 19 is much broader—it seeks any and all documents and communications produced by Bridgeport in the Dinsy's Gas matter. The Court declines to compel Defendants to respond to this request for production. First, Plaintiffs cast far too wide a net by seeking any and all documents produced in a separate action. Such a broad request is likely to result in the production of irrelevant documents and is not proportional to the needs of this case. Second, as Defendants argue, Bridgeport is not a party in the instant case. Though Defendants in this matter have significant relationships with Bridgeport, it appears to be a separate and distinct entity. There is no evidence before the Court that would justify piercing the corporate veil or otherwise treating Bridgeport as one and the same as Defendants, so the Court will decline to compel Defendants to produce Bridgeport's documents. Discovery is more properly sought from Bridgeport itself. Indeed, Plaintiffs have already submitted a third-party subpoena to Bridgeport, rendering this request duplicative. (Dkt. #45-2.)[1]
With respect to RFP 20, Plaintiffs argue that the documents disclosed to Defendants by Mr. Free and vice versa are “highly relevant” because Mr. Free “was the former General Manager of Bridgeport and was employed by CAP to help run operations, reporting directly to Mr. Kramer.” (Dkt. #43 at 7.) According to Plaintiffs, “Defendants’ conduct relating to Mr. Free forms a significant portion of the allegations contained in [their] complaint in this case.” (Id.)
Again, Plaintiffs cast too wide a net. The Court takes judicial notice that Mr. Free's complaint asserts seven claims for relief, including for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and slander. The Court struggles to see how documents pertaining to these claims would be relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims for an accounting and breach of the operating agreement. Such a broad request is clearly not proportional to the needs of this case. Further, as Defendants note, some of the documents exchanged might implicate Mr. Free's privacy interests, such as Mr. Free's employment records and evidence of his emotional distress or other damages.
*3 Plaintiffs are not without remedy; they may seek to depose Mr. Free as a fact witness in this matter. Plaintiffs might also request that Mr. Free voluntarily provide the documents they seek or subpoena him if he chooses not to cooperate with their requests.
The Court notes that “[a] party seeking discovery ordinarily must ‘do their own work and request the information they seek directly’ and ‘must make proper requests describing the information in which they are interested.’ ” Wollam v. Wright Med. Grp., Inc., No. 10-CV-03104-DME-BNB, 2011 WL 1899774, at *2 (D. Colo. May 18, 2011) (quoting Midwest Gas Serv. Inc. v. Indiana Gas Co., Inc., 2000 WL 760700 *1 (S.D. Ind. March 7, 2000)). The subject RFPs may, in fact, seek some relevant information. But the overreaching requests seeking all documents from two cases that are, at best, only tangentially related to the present one, are disproportionate to the needs of this case and just as likely (if not more likely) to elicit irrelevant information. Moreover, the Court sees no reason that Plaintiffs cannot obtain the information they seek directly from Defendants using more narrowly tailored discovery requests.
Conclusion
For all of the above reasons, the Court SUSTAINS Defendants’ objections to Plaintiffs’ RFP 19 and RFP 20.
Footnotes
The Court notes that the portion of the subpoena cited by Defendants is narrower than RFP 19 in that it requests all documents produced by Bridgeport in response to one of the state court's specific orders, rather than all documents produced in that matter. The Court makes no findings as to the propriety of the subpoena request.