*1 This cause comes before the Court for consideration without oral argument on the following motion:

On August 2, 2021, Linda Bauer (Plaintiff) served a Notice of Deposition on Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc. and Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc. (Defendants) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). Doc. 141-4. Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order seeking relief from the obligation to produce a witness to “testify about matters relating strictly to punitive damages before Plaintiff has established an entitlement to punitive damages.” (the Motion). Doc. 141. Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition to the Motion. Doc. 144. The Court finds that the Motion is due the denied.

I. Background

A brief description of the procedural history is warranted because it pertains to the Court's analysis. This case began in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. In 2020, Plaintiffs[1] noticed several Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses for depositions. Defendants objected but the parties subsequently advised the court that a hearing was unnecessary and that the depositions would proceed. Disputes remained, and Plaintiffs moved to compel Defendants to produce a designee to testify regarding Defendants’ financial condition and other punitive damages awarded against them. Doc. 72.

In turn, Defendants moved for a protective order arguing that such discovery constitutes an undue burden. Doc. 86. Namely, Defendants claimed that Plaintiffs had already represented that additional Rule 30(b)(6) depositions were unnecessary if documentation was provided; Plaintiffs failed to make a baseline showing of potential punitive conduct warranting discovery on the two outstanding topics; and discovery is appropriate on those topics only after liability is established which would be relevant at a bifurcated punitive damages phase. Id. Alternatively, Defendants requested to produce documentation to the Court under seal as opposed to direct production to Plaintiffs.[2] Id.

On March 18, 2021, the court in the Eastern District of Tennessee denied the request for protective order and granted Plaintiffs’ motion to compel in part. Doc. 93. The court determined that the information on Defendants’ financial condition and the punitive damage awards is relevant.[3] Id. at 8-9. The court found that the original complaint in this case made a demand for punitive damages, the parties should have discussed conducting discovery in phases, and Plaintiffs established some factual basis for punitive damages. Id. at 12, 13. As to the protective order, the court ruled that there was no need to file the documents at issue under seal because Plaintiffs’ counsel already had access to such public information; Plaintiffs’ previous offer to alternatively accept documents was not binding; and Defendants failed to establish any burden by producing the witness on the two limited topics. Id. at 15-16.

*2 On March 31, 2021, approximately two weeks after the court ruled on the discovery motions, the court dismissed the claims relating to the Tennessee Vacation Ownership Interests (VOI), determining that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the claims stemming from the Florida VOI, and transferred the case to the Middle District of Florida whereupon the instant case was opened. Doc. 95. The parties then filed the Revised Case Management Report proposing that discovery be bifurcated in phases on Defendants’ financial condition for purposes of the request for punitive damages. Doc. 129 at 5. The Case Management Scheduling Order (CMSO) does not, however, provide that discovery is to be conducted in phases. See Doc. 131.

Defendants are now before the Court seeking protection with respect to the same two topics that the Eastern District of Tennessee addressed, hoping to obtain a different result in this Court. Doc. 141.

II. Discussion

Plaintiff has noticed the 30(b)(6) deposition to address the following topics:

Doc. 141-4 at 4.

Defendants make a general request for protection from production of another Rule 30b(b)(6) witness pursuant to Rule 26(c). A protective order may be entered to protect a party or individual from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). A party moving for a protective order must show that “good cause” exists for the court to issue such an order. Id. To carry its burden of demonstrating “good cause,” the moving party must make a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statement supporting the need for a protective order. See, e.g., Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Southeast Floating Docks, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 429-30 (M.D. Fla. 2005). In addition to finding good cause, the court must also be satisfied that, on balance, the interests of the party seeking the protective order outweigh the interests of the opposing party. See McCarthy v. Barnett Bank of Polk Cty., 876 F.2d 89, 91 (11th Cir. 1989).

Here, the Motion raises similar arguments that the Tennessee court addressed during the first attempt to avoid production of a witness to testify on these topics. Specifically, Defendants seek outright protection from the deposition arguing that discovery of their financial condition and punitive damage awards is “wholly irrelevant.” Doc. 141 at 15. Defendants cite to excerpts from Plaintiff's deposition and other discovery and contend that there is no evidence that Defendants acted maliciously or intentionally towards Plaintiff which renders the “complained-of requests obsolete.” Id. at 9-15. Defendants state that a protective order is appropriate because “the fraud claims are untenable, which means there is no reasonable basis upon which to discover Defendants’ financial condition, and all of her requests related to punitive damages are therefore irrelevant.” Id. at 9. Defendants conclude that there is “no factual basis for punitive damages discovery” in this case. Id. at 12.

Without expressly citing to the Florida law on claims for punitive damages, it appears from the cases discussed in the Motion[4] and Defendants’ use of the “reasonable basis” language, that Defendants rely on Florida Statutes section 768.72(2)(1), which provides the following:

Based on that statute, it seems Defendants at least partially contend that protection from the deposition is warranted because Plaintiff has not made a requisite showing that she may proceed with discovery.

However, the courts that have addressed section 768.72 in federal diversity actions have found that parties are not required to proffer evidence to proceed with financial discovery, as Defendants’ first argument insinuates. The Eleventh Circuit has established that a plaintiff who pleads punitive damages in a diversity case need not show evidence in the record to provide a basis for its demand. Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 1999). As such, “[w]hen pleading punitive damages, a plaintiff must merely comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3), which requires a ‘concise statement identifying the remedies the parties against whom relief is sought.’ ” Gallina v. Horne Bros. Constr., Inc. v. Commerce and Industry Insur., 2008 WL 3895918, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 2008) (citing Cohen, 184 F.3d at 1297). Plaintiff's Complaint satisfies the minimal pleading requirements and any reliance on an evidentiary burden found in section 768.72 is misplaced. Defendants have not demonstrated that it is appropriate for the Court to make a merits-based ruling on the validity of the claim for punitive damages at this juncture. See Riley v. Roberts Bros. Coach Leasing Co., Inc., 2010 WL 11626737, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2010) (finding that the defendants’ responses to the financial worth discovery is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and not section 768.72); Pantages v. Cardinal Health 200, Inc., 2009 WL 1011048, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2009) (deciding that under Cohen a plaintiff does not have to plead and prove a basis for punitive damages.).[5]

The Court recognizes that Defendants’ argument for protection from the deposition does not end with the discussion of Florida law. Defendants contend that they have already proffered Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses and additional testimony is unnecessary and serves as harassment and requiring punitive damages testimony at this stage would be unduly burdensome. Defendants again argue that if financial discovery is appropriate then providing a Rule 30(b)(6) witness is “least efficient” and the information can be derived from documentation. Doc. 141 at 16-17.

*4 The Court rejects this argument because the court in the Eastern District of Tennessee has ruled on this request for relief and the Court sees no reason to change course. Defendants may be correct that the originating court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Florida claims which means the March 18, 2021 order is void, but the Court finds the Tennessee court's analysis on the same issue persuasive and production of the witness on these two topics is appropriate. Other than the punitive damages argument, Defendants provide no other explanation as to why production of the witness would be “unduly burdensome” under Rule 26, and any statement that can be construed as such is inadequate for the reasons stated in the Easter District of Tennessee court's order. See Doc. 93.

Since the Court has ruled that discovery related to the two topics noticed for deposition is appropriate, Defendants request that the Court bifurcate the discovery process. This request is due to be denied. As the parties acknowledge, they expressed to the Court their interest in bifurcating discovery on the issue of Defendants’ financial condition as it relates to punitive damages in the Revised Case Management Report. The Court did not adopt that proposal and set one deadline for discovery in the CMSO. There is nothing currently before the Court that would justify altering that decision especially considering that the request is presented to the Court in a motion for protective order.

Further, the Court mentions that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim for defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Relevance, for purposes of discovery does not hinge on admissibility at trial and is construed broadly to include any matter that reasonably could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). Financial net worth discovery is relevant to a claim for punitive damages even if the scope of such discovery is within the discretion of the court. Alexander v. Allen, et. al, 2014 WL 3887490, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug, 7, 2014) (citing Chudasma v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1368 n.37 (11th Cir. 1997)).

As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed with the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition on the two noticed topics. See Fiddler's Creek, LLC v. Naples Lending Group LC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93850, at *7-9 (M.D. Fla. July 19, 2016) (rejecting the defendant's request to postpone financial net worth discovery until after ruling on the dispositive motions noting that when punitive damages are sought the plaintiff is entitled to seek discovery under Rule 26); Gottwald v. Producers Group I, LLC, 20113 WL 1776154, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2013) (finding that it was not premature to allow financial discovery before there was a basis for recovery of punitive damages when Rule 26 permits discovery relevant to any claim or defense, and financial net worth is relevant to a claim of punitive damages.).

III. Conclusion

It is ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 141) is DENIED. Defendants are directed to produce the Rule 30(b)6) witness as requested in the Notice of Deposition (Doc. 141-4) on or before September 24, 2021.

DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on September ___, 2021.