*1 Appellant, Charles M. Manganiello, M.D., appeals from the order entered in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the motion to compel filed by Appellee, Commonwealth Physician Network, LLC (“CPN”), and directed Appellant to respond fully to CPN's interrogatories and request for production of documents. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows:

*2 (Trial Court Opinion, filed July 20, 2021, at 1-3) (internal citations omitted).

Appellant raised objections to the following of CPN's interrogatories:

(CPN's Second Motion to Compel, Exhibit B, filed 10/30/20, at 7-10).

Appellant raised objections to the following of CPN's request for production of documents:

(CPN's Second Motion to Compel, Exhibit C, filed 10/30/20, at 7-10).

Following oral argument, the court issued an order on December 29, 2020, granting CPN's motion to compel and directing Appellant to serve full and complete responses to CPN's discovery requests. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on January 25, 2021. On February 8, 2021, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant complied on March 17, 2021.

Appellant raises the following issues of our review:

(Appellant's Brief at 4).[1]

As a prefatory matter, “[a]n appeal may be taken only from a final order unless otherwise permitted by statute or rule.” Carbis Walker, LLP v. Hill, Barth and King, LLC, 930 A.2d 573, 577 (Pa.Super. 2007) (quoting Ben v. Schwartz, 556 Pa. 475, 481, 729 A.2d 547, 550 (1999)). Collateral orders are an exception to this general rule. See Pa.R.A.P. 313.

Berkeyheiser v. A-Plus Investigations, Inc., 936 A.2d 1117, 1123-24 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[R]ule 313 must be interpreted narrowly, and the requirements for an appealable collateral order remain stringent in order to prevent undue corrosion of the final order rule. To that end, each prong of the collateral order doctrine must be clearly present before an order may be considered collateral.” Meyer-Chatfield Corp. v. Bank Fin. Servs. Grp., 143 A.3d 930, 936 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal denied, 641 Pa. 251, 167 A.3d 701 (2017) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he collateral order rule's three-pronged test must be applied independently to each distinct legal issue over which an appellate court is asked to assert jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 313.” Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Ass'n, 602 Pa. 65, 80, 977 A.2d 1121, 1130 (2009).

*6 “Generally, discovery orders are deemed interlocutory and not immediately appealable, because they do not dispose of the litigation. On the other hand, discovery orders requiring disclosure of privileged materials generally are appealable under Rule 313 where the issue of privilege is separable from the underlying issue.” Meyer-Chatfield Corp., supra.

Berkeyheiser, supra (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, Appellant claims error in the trial court's discovery order on the grounds that CPN's discovery requests were irrelevant, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and already in CPN's possession. These claims are not separable from the main cause of action, however, because an analysis of the relevance and scope of the discovery requests necessitates examination of the parameters of the underlying breach of contract action. See Berkeyheiser, supra. Additionally, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that these issues are deeply rooted in public policy beyond the litigation at hand. Id. Therefore, Appellant's objections based on relevance and the scope of the discovery requests do not meet the standard set forth in Rule 313 to qualify as immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. See Meyer-Chatfield Corp., supra (holding that objections on grounds that discovery was overbroad and burdensome are not appealable as collateral order). See also Commonwealth v. Flor, 635 Pa. 314, 325 n.8, 136 A.3d 150, 156 n.8 (2016) (stating: “Litigants may not...rely upon Rule 313 to challenge discovery orders for reasons unrelated to privilege claims, without satisfying the requirements of Rule 313 as to each issue”). Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to address Appellant's objections based on relevance and scope of discovery requests.[2]

Nevertheless, Appellant also raises assertions of physician-patient privilege, attorney-client privilege, attorney work product privilege and the right to privacy. These claims are separable from the main cause of action because this Court can address those issues without an analysis of the underlying breach of contract action. Additionally, the privileges asserted by Appellant implicate rights deeply rooted in public policy. See Berkeyheiser, supra. Further, enforcement of the order would require Appellant to disclose the disputed information and documents. Thus, there would be no effective means of review available absent our immediate review. Id. Accordingly, the order on appeal as it relates to Appellant's assertions of privilege and privacy rights is collateral to the main cause of action and immediately reviewable. See Id. See also Jones v. Faust, 852 A.2d 1201 (Pa.Super. 2004) (reviewing discovery order as collateral to main cause of action where appellant asserted order violated rights to privacy and confidentiality).

*7 In his issues combined,[3] Appellant argues that CPN's interrogatories and request for production of documents seek information that is privileged. Specifically, Appellant asserts that request for production #15 and #16 seek to discover privileged communication between Appellant and his attorney. Appellant further contends that request for production #20 requests Appellant's counsel to produce her legal research and notes in support of Appellant's claims. Additionally, Appellant claims that interrogatory #15 and #20 and request for production #2 and #4 request information about confidential communication between Appellant and his patients that is protected by the physician-patient privilege. Appellant maintains that redacting patient names and contact information does not guarantee anonymity because CPN “has access to many such patients’ unredacted prior medical records for comparison.” (Appellant's Brief at 30).

Further, Appellant asserts that the court failed to adequately consider his and his patients’ constitutionally protected privacy interests. Appellant argues that the court ordered the disclosure of confidential third-party medical records without adequately weighing competing interests and analyzing the actual need for disclosure of the requested information and documents. Appellant argues that the need to impeach a physician during civil litigation does not outweigh the privacy rights of a third-party patient. Similarly, Appellant contends that the court failed to properly consider his asserted privacy interests in avoiding disclosure of personal communication with his friends and associates, and confidential and proprietary business information. Appellant concludes the court erred by ordering Appellant to produce information that is privileged or in violation of his constitutional privacy rights and this Court should vacate the discovery order. We disagree.

This Court has explained:

Brown v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 142 A.3d 1, 8 (Pa.Super. 2016).

The Rules of Civil Procedure set forth guidelines on discoverable materials as follows:

Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1.

“Certain materials are privileged and beyond the scope of discovery.” Berkeyheiser, supra at 1126. “[T]he attorney-client privilege has deep historical roots and indeed is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications in common law.” Red Vision Systems, Inc. v. National Real Estate Information Services, L.P., 108 A.3d 54, 60 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal denied, 632 Pa. 663, 116 A.3d 605 (2015). The privilege is defined by statute as follows:

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5928.

“Despite the language of the statute, communications from an attorney to a client—not just communications by a client to an attorney—are protected under Pennsylvania law.” Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Baldwin, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 225 A.3d 817, 849 (2020). “The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to ‘foster a confidence between attorney and client that will lead to a trusting and open dialogue.’ ” Berkeyheiser, supra at 1126 (quoting Gocial v. Independence Blue Cross, 827 A.2d 1216, 1222 (Pa.Super. 2003)).

The attorney-client privilege is not absolute. See Red Vision Systems, supra at 62. “The privilege exists only to aid in the administration of justice, and when it is shown that the interests of the administration of justice can only be frustrated by the exercise of the privilege, the trial judge may require that the communication be disclosed.” Id. (quoting Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 693-94 (Pa.Super. 1976)).

Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work-product privilege “does not necessarily involve communications with a client.” Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 609 Pa. 65, 89 n.16, 15 A.3d 44, 59 n.16 (2011). Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.3 governs attorney work product as follows:

Pa.R.C.P. 4003.3.

Further, the physician-patient privilege is codified as follows:

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5929.

“Pennsylvania law distinguishes between information communicated to a physician by a patient and information acquired through examination and observation.” Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 530 Pa. 426, 434, 609 A.2d 796, 800 (1992). “The distinction originates in the rationale of the statute which was designed to create a confidential atmosphere in which a patient will feel free to disclose all possible information which may be useful in rendering appropriate treatment.” Grimminger v. Maitra, 887 A.2d 276, 279 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 588 Pa. 789, 906 A.2d 1197 (2006). Therefore, “the patient-physician privilege is limited to information which would offend the rationale of the privilege, i.e., information directly related to the patient's communication and thus tending to expose it.” Stenger, supra at 440, 609 A.2d at 803. Additionally, the privilege is intended to protect “a patient's communications if doing so would release confidential information ... which would blacken the character of the patient.” Grimminger, supra at 279-80.

*10 Additionally, the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions provide protection for an individual's right to privacy. See Stenger, supra at 434, 609 A.2d at 800. However, this right is not absolute and must be balanced against weighty competing private and state interests. Id. Our Supreme Court has recognized “an individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters...” Id. “The object of such a right is, in part, to protect an individual from revealing matters which could impugn his character and subject him to ridicule or persecution.” Id. Generally, this privacy interest is not offended by anonymous disclosures as the shield of anonymity protects an individual from disrepute. See id. at 435, 609 A.2d 801.

Instantly, the court considered each of Appellant's objections to CPN's discovery requests and determined that they were without merit. Regarding Appellant's objections based on the physician-patient privilege in his first appellate issue, the court found that the limited information requested by CPN did not encroach on the information protected by the privilege. Appellant asserts this privilege in response to CPN's request for production #2 and #4 and interrogatories #15 and #20. Request for production #2 only requests information about patient scheduling, which does not require Appellant to reveal confidential patient communication protected by the privilege. See Grimminger, supra; Stenger, supra. Similarly, interrogatory #20 requests information about Appellant's communication with two patients regarding Appellant's medical practice and any petitions and organizing efforts they undertook to support Appellant. Although this request seeks information about communication between Appellant and his patients, the communication in question is unrelated to providing medical care and thus, falls outside of the scope of the privilege. See id.

Both request for production #4 and interrogatory #15 request information about any communication from January 1, 2020 to present that Appellant had with patients he treated while employed by CPN. CPN seeks this information to gather evidence on whether Appellant solicited CPN's patients in violation of the Agreement. To limit the information sought to the desired purpose, CPN's requests specifically direct Appellant to redact names and identifying information, medical diagnosis and any other information protected from disclosure by HIPPA.[4] Therefore, the requested information on patient communication would exclude identifying information and information about medical history, diagnosis, and medical care provided to the individual. We agree with the trial court that the limited information sought does not fall within the purview of the physician-patient privilege. See Grimminger, supra; Stenger, supra. With identifying information and medical details redacted, it is unclear how the information produced could blacken the character of the patient.[5] See id. Accordingly, we see no error by the trial court in ordering Appellant to provide complete answers to the discovery requests to which Appellant asserted the physician-patient privilege.[6] See Berkeyheiser, supra. See also Brown, supra.

*11 Regarding Appellant's objections based on attorney-client privilege and work-product privilege presented in his second appellate issue, the court explained that it did not order Appellant to produce privileged information to CPN. Rather, the court noted that Appellant responded to the discovery requests with a bald assertion of privilege without following the procedure set forth in CPN's requests on how to assert privilege. Specifically, CPN's requests state that Appellant should identify the matter, describe the subject matter, specify the privilege asserted, and identify all persons who have had access to the matter. As such, the court's order merely directed Appellant to provide full responses to CPN's discovery requests and to assert the proffered privilege in the manner requested by CPN. Consequently, we see no error in the court's order directing Appellant to provide complete answers to CPN's discovery requests as it related to Appellant's objections based on attorney-client privilege and work-product privilege. See Berkeyheiser, supra. See also Brown, supra.

Further, with respect to Appellant's third appellate issue, the court determined that Appellant's objections to CPN's requests based on his privacy interests were also without merit. Specifically, Appellant raised objections based on privacy rights to CPN's interrogatories ##10-16 and ##18-20, and request for production ##1-14, 19, 24, and 25. Interrogatories ##10, 11, 14, 16, 18 and 19, and request for production ##1, 3, and 5-15, request information and records about conversations that Appellant had with peers, business consultants, insurance providers, accountants, suppliers, media outlets and CPN's former employees regarding the set up and operation of Appellant's medical practice and Appellant's employment with CPN and other entities. Request for production ##19, 24 and 25 request Appellant to produce documents that support various specific claims in Appellant's answer to CPN's complaint. Appellant's brief fails to cite to any relevant authority to demonstrate that he has a recognized privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of the information requested in the discovery requests listed above. As such, Appellant has waived this argument. See In re Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 209 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 620 Pa. 724, 69 A.3d 603 (2013) (reiterating: “This Court will not consider the merits of an argument which fails to cite relevant case or statutory authority”).

The only privacy interest properly identified by Appellant is a patient's right to avoid disclosure of confidential medical information. Of the discovery requests to which Appellant objected, interrogatory ##12, 13, and 20, and request for production ##2 and 4 request information about Appellant's patients. However, the right to privacy does not cover all patient information but is limited to confidential medical information which would impugn the character of the patient or subject the patient to ridicule if revealed. See Stenger, supra. As previously discussed, CPN only requested patient information with all identifying information and protected medical information redacted. As such, the limited, anonymous patient information requested by CPN does not implicate a protected privacy interest. See id. Therefore, we see no error in the court's decision to overrule Appellant's objections to CPN's discovery requests based on a violation of privacy rights. See Berkeyheiser, supra. See also Brown, supra. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on any of his claims on appeal and we affirm.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

While I agree that discovery is to be liberally allowed so long as it may reasonably lead to the revelation of admissible evidence, it is equally true that “no effective system of discovery can be designed which is not subject to abuse.” Explanatory Comments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, Depositions and Discovery – 1978. Abuse prevention relies primarily on self-discipline amongst the bar. See id. However, where attorneys are not disciplined, the courts must act to prevent abuse. See id.

*12 At the outset, I emphasize that I do not conclude that Commonwealth is attempting to abuse the system, nor that the majority is condoning such conduct. Rather, I write to highlight that abuse prevention is impossible where courts do not exercise at least a modicum of control over the system. As a baseline, then, courts must scrupulously ensure that all discovery requests comply with Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.1(b): that all discovery requests must be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. While this hurdle is quite low, it is not non-existent. After reviewing the record here, I conclude that Commonwealth is unable to clear the Rule 4003.1(b) hurdle, and I therefore dissent.

Here, Manganiello challenges the trial court's orders granting Appellee's discovery requests, despite, upon my review, Appellee's failure to establish a compelling need for the discovery documents requested, which purportedly include privileged materials and private information relating to Manganiello's patients and unrelated business decisions. Manganiello argues that the discovery requests in issue are impermissibly vague, overly broad because they address factual matters which are not relevant at this stage of the litigation, and are therefore not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at this time. Most importantly, in my opinion, until there is a disposition by the trial court that Manganiello breached the contracts with Commonwealth, as alleged by Commonwealth in its Second Amended Complaint, the discovery requests are premature and are designed to invade Manganiello's personal business dealings and handling of his patients. Simply stated, Commonwealth's requests seek information not discoverable until Commonwealth establishes that Manganiello breached the contracts; until that time, this personal and business information is protected by Manganiello's privacy rights. “Our Supreme Court has recognized that the privacy interests protected by the federal Constitution receive the same protections from Pennsylvania's Constitution.” Jones v. Faust, 852 A.2d 1201, 1203 (Pa. Super.2004).

Berkeyheiser v. A-Plus Investigations, Inc., 936 A.2d 1117, 1125–26 (Pa. Super. 2007).

This interlocutory appeal arises from Commonwealth's Second Amended Complaint, which alleged that Dr. Manganiello breached several contracts with Commonwealth. The first contract is an asset purchase agreement, which includes a non-compete clause. The second contract is an employment contract which contains a confidentiality agreement. The asset purchase agreement directly referenced the employment agreement.

Commonwealth alleged that Dr. Manganiello breached the employment agreement by, among several other allegations, using a non-licensed person to authorize his prescriptions to patients. As a result, Commonwealth notified Dr. Manganiello on January 14, 2020, that it was suspending his employment pending an investigation. Shortly thereafter, Commonwealth concluded that Dr. Manganiello was not cooperating with its investigation and notified Dr. Manganiello that it would terminate his employment after the appropriate notice period.

Commonwealth subsequently initiated this action, seeking to enjoin Dr. Manganiello's continued practice of medicine within the area covered by the asset purchase agreement's non-compete clause. Commonwealth also sought liquidated damages for the breach of each agreement.

*13 Dr. Manganiello has conceded that he continued to practice medicine after Commonwealth's notice. He contends that since it was Commonwealth who first breached the contracts, he was no longer bound by the non-compete agreement.

So, right from the start, the universe of relevant evidence in this matter is constricted. The only legal issue in dispute which is relevant at this stage of the litigation is whether there was a breach of the contract by either party. As such, the only material factual issues in dispute are Commonwealth's allegations that Dr. Manganiello materially breached the employment contract before Commonwealth suspended his employment.

The universe of relevant evidence is further restricted by Commonwealth's election of liquidated damages:

Carlos R. Leffler, Inc. v. Hutter, 696 A.2d 157, 162 (Pa. Super. 1997). Combined with Commonwealth's election to seek an injunction pursuant to the non-compete clause, the amount of monetary damages should Commonwealth prevail is not in material dispute.[1]

With this knowledge in mind, I turn to Commonwealth's proposed discovery requests.

In Request for Production 1, Commonwealth requested “all employee time and payroll records of [Dr. Manganiello's current office] reflecting time that you or any individual working to support your medical practice ... have worked or payments made to any employee working to support your medical practice from January 1, 2020, to the present.” Based on the pleadings of both parties, there is no indication that Dr. Manganiello operated out of his current office until well after January 14, 2020. Therefore, this information cannot lead to admissible evidence on the issue of whether Commonwealth had cause to suspend Dr. Manganiello on January 14, 2020. This request is not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.

In Request for Production 2, Commonwealth requested “a copy of any appointment diary, chronology, log, calendar, appointment book, or schedule reflecting medical care that you provided or were scheduled to provide which was kept by you or any individual on your behalf from January 1, 2020 to the present.” Given the only material dispute of fact concerns whether Dr. Manganiello breached the contracts prior to January 14, 2020, this request is overbroad. While there is some remote possibility that patient appointments after January 14, 2020, could lead to admissible evidence, that is not the standard set forth in the Rules. The standard is whether the request appears reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Without more justification from Commonwealth, I conclude the request for information about patients beyond January 14, 2020, does not appear to be reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.

*14 In Request for Production 3, Commonwealth sought “all documents concerning, evidencing or reflecting any communication between you (or any individual on your behalf) and any current or former CPN employee, including without limitation Cheri Rash, from January 1, 2020, to the present.” The trial court concluded that this request was relevant to the question of whether Dr. Manganiello solicited Commonwealth's clients in contravention of the non-compete clause. As I have already noted, this is not a subject of material dispute. Without a different rationale from Commonwealth, I cannot conclude that this request is reasonably likely to lead to admissible evidence on the sole factual dispute of whether Dr. Manganiello breached the employment agreement prior to January 14, 2020.

In Request for Production 4, Commonwealth requested “all documents concerning, evidencing, or reflecting any communication from January 1, 2020, to the present between you (or any individual on your behalf) and any individual whom you treated while employed by CPN.” Once again, only communications to patients from January 1 to January 14 could reasonably be expected to lead to admissible evidence. Without more justification from Commonwealth, the request for documents generated after January 14, 2020 does not appear to be reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.

In Request for Production 5, Commonwealth requested “all documents concerning, evidencing, or reflecting any communication between you (or any individual on your behalf) and any media outlet, including without limitation any print or digital publication, from January 1, 2020 to the present.” Similar to Request 3, the trial court ruled that this request was relevant to Commonwealth's claims that Dr. Manganiello was soliciting clients for his separate practice after January 14, 2020. However, as noted previously, this is not in dispute. I fail to see how this request could be reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence on the issue of whether Dr. Manganiello breached the employment contract before January 14, 2020.

In Request for Production 6, Commonwealth sought “all documents reflecting the status of your employment with [Commonwealth] that you or any person on your behalf received from any agent, employee or representative of [Commonwealth] from January 1, 2020 to the present.” At the outset, I once again fail to see how this request is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence on the issue of whether Dr. Manganiello breached the employment agreement prior to January 14, 2020. Above and beyond this issue, however, is that even if it were reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, it is improper. See Eigen v. Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., 874 A.2d 1179, 1189 n.14 (Pa. Super. 2005) (noting that discovery does not require “a party to supply, at its own expense, information already under the control or readily available to the opposing party”). This request seeks documents generated by Commonwealth agents and sent to Dr. Manganiello. These documents are at least as available to Commonwealth as they are to Dr. Manganiello, and to request them from Dr. Manganiello through discovery is an abuse of the process.

Request for Production 7 is the reciprocal of Request 6: it seeks all documents Dr. Manganiello or his agents sent to Commonwealth regarding his employment with Commonwealth from January 1, 2020, to the present. For all of the reasons just discussed regarding Request 6, I would conclude this request cannot lead to admissible evidence and is further an abuse of the discovery process seeking documents equally in the possession of Commonwealth.

Request for Production 8 sought “all documents concerning ... any communication between you (or any individual on your behalf) and any insurance agent, broker, or provider regarding insurance coverage for your medical practice[.]” The trial court overruled Dr. Manganiello's objection to this request, concluding the request was relevant to establishing whether Dr. Manganiello established a practice in contravention of the non-compete provision. As noted previously, that issue is not in dispute. And, in the absence of another reason for its relevance, I cannot conclude the request is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.

*15 In Request for Production 9, Commonwealth requested “all documents concerning ... any communication between you [or any agent] and any accountant regarding your medical practice from January 1, 2020, to the present.” Once again, the trial court overruled Dr. Manganiello's objection to this request by concluding that it was relevant to the issue of whether Dr. Manganiello sought to establish a medical practice in contravention of the non-compete clause. As before, I conclude this was error, as there is no dispute that Dr. Manganiello in fact established such a practice – the only factual issue is whether he was entitled to do so due to his allegation that Commonwealth was already in breach of the contract.

Request for Production 10 fails for similar reasons. Request 10 sought “all documents concerning ... any communication between you [or any agent] and any business consultant regarding your medical practice from January 1, 2020, to the present.” The trial court found that this request was relevant to the issue of whether Dr. Manganiello opened a new medical practice and solicited clients in violation of the non-compete provision. As set forth before, this is in fact not relevant to any factual dispute in this matter, and the trial court's reasoning constitutes error.

Requests 11 and 12 sought all documents pertaining to office or medical supplies and equipment from January 1, 2020, through January 14, 2020. I conclude that these requests are generally relevant, as they are limited in time to a period before January 14, 2020. However, they are still overbroad, in that any documents relating to business and medical supplies that were left in Commonwealth's possession when Dr. Manganiello was suspended are not relevant to whether Dr. Manganiello was breaching the employment contract during that time. The proper scope of this request is for documents from January 1 to 14, 2020, pertaining to office or medical supplies later used in Dr. Manganiello's separate practice.

Request for Production 13 is similarly generally relevant but overbroad. It sought “all documents concerning ... any communication between you [or your agent] and any agent or employee of Geisinger Health System regarding your medical practice from January 1, 2020, to the present.” For the period of January 1 to 14, 2020, this request is relevant and reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Beyond January 14, 2020, however, these documents become only remotely likely to lead to relevant, admissible evidence. Without more justification, I would conclude that this request is properly limited to January 1 to 14, 2020.

Request for Production 14 requested “all documents concerning ... any efforts by you [or your agent] to incorporate any business between January 1, 2020 and the present.” For all the reasons I have already set out above, this request is only relevant to the period of January 1 to 14, 2020. For the period after January 14, 2020, this request is not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.

Request 19 sought “all documents ... that you believe support your belief that [Commonwealth] “further materially breached the Agreement on January 14, 2020[.]” Dr. Manganiello identified two such documents, one of which has already been produced to Commonwealth. The remaining document is the January 14, 2020 letter from Commonwealth to Dr. Manganiello informing Dr. Manganiello that he was suspended. Dr. Manganiello was not required to produce this document as it was equally available to Commonwealth. See Eigen, 874 A.2d at 1189 n.14.

In Request 24, Commonwealth sought “all documents ... that you believe support your denial “that [you were obligated, or refused to participate in [Commonwealth's] purported ‘compliance investigation,’ ” as alleged in Paragraph 55 of your Answer to Motion for Preliminary Injunction.” Dr. Manganiello identified 11 total documents, which he alleged are already in the possession of Commonwealth. Ten of these documents are letters from Dr. Manganiello's then counsel addressed to Commonwealth. The remaining document is the “suspension letter” of January 14, 2020. All are likely in the possession of Commonwealth. If Commonwealth asserts that it does not have any record of these documents, then it may request that Dr. Manganiello produce in discovery. Absent that assertion of record, these documents are equally available to Commonwealth under Eigen.

*16 Request 25 sought “all documents ... that you believe support your belief that [Commonwealth's] “protectable business interests are outweighed by [your] interest in earning a living in [your] chosen profession and the general interest of the public,” as alleged in Paragraph 61 of your Answer to Motion for Preliminary Injunction.” Dr. Manganiello objected to this request by asserting it violated his attorney client privilege and the work product doctrine. To the extent that he did answer this request, he asserted that “responsive Pennsylvania caselaw is equally accessible to [Commonwealth] as it is to [Dr. Manganiello].” I agree with the trial court here, as Dr. Manganiello's answer is non-responsive.

Clearly, Commonwealth is seeking any additional documents which might provide factual support for Dr. Manganiello's claim. In his appellate brief, Dr. Manganiello asserts that he “already provided the factual basis supporting his legal conclusion as well as documents[.]” If this is true, Dr. Manganiello can offer this statement as his answer, and be subjected to any remedies reasonably constructed by the trial court if the court finds this answer to be untruthful or incomplete.

In Interrogatories 15 and 20, Commonwealth wanted information about any attempts at soliciting Commonwealth patients for Dr. Manganiello's separate practice. As set forth in detail above, I believe this interrogatory must be restricted to communications occurring before January 14, 2020. There is no factual dispute that Dr. Manganiello subsequently solicited his former patients for his separate practice.

For all these reasons, I dissent from the majority's memorandum affirming the trial court's blanket refusal to entertain Dr. Manganiello's objections to Commonwealth's discovery requests.