Shijiazhuang Hongray Grp. v. World Trading 23, Inc.
Shijiazhuang Hongray Grp. v. World Trading 23, Inc.
2022 WL 17363907 (C.D. Cal. 2022)
November 15, 2022
Slaughter, Fred W., United States District Judge
Summary
The court found that the magistrate judge did not err in ordering Defendants to produce documents in their native format and to provide a privilege log for all documents withheld on the basis of attorney-client privilege. The court concluded that the magistrate judge did not clearly err by limiting discovery with regard to Interrogatory No. 2, as Plaintiff failed to adequately explain how such information was relevant to its case.
Additional Decisions
Shijiazhuang Hongray Group
v.
World Trading 23, Inc. et al
v.
World Trading 23, Inc. et al
Case No.: 5:21-cv-00972-FWS-KK
United States District Court, C.D. California
Filed November 15, 2022
Counsel
Ashley M. Koley, Jianing G. Yu, Victor De Gyarfas, Foley and Lardner LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Shijiazhuang Hongray Group.Tony Jay-Lun Cheng, Aaron M. McKown, McKown Bailey, Newport Beach, CA, for World Trading 23, Inc. et al.
Slaughter, Fred W., United States District Judge
PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW AND RECONSIDERTION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDER [43]
*1 Before the court is Plaintiff Shijiazhuang Hongray Group's (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Review and Reconsideration of the Hon. Magistrate Judge Kato's September 6, 2022, Order and Objections Thereto (“Motion” or “Mot.). (Dkt. 43-1.) Defendants World Trading 23, Inc. and World Tech Toys (collectively, “Defendants”) oppose the Motion. (Dkt. 44.) Plaintiff also filed a Reply. (Dkt. 45.) The court held oral argument on October 20, 2022, and then took this matter under submission. (Dkt. 46.) Based on the record, as applied to the applicable law, the court DENIES the Motion and AFFIRMS the magistrate judge's ruling.
I. Background
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiff initiated this action on June 9, 2021, alleging unfair competition and false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) and unfair competition in violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 25-40). Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserting the same claims on July 1, 2021. (Dkt. 13.) On October 4, 2021, the court issued a scheduling order setting the deadline for the parties to complete fact discovery on September 12, 2022. (Dkt. 24.)
On August 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel and joint stipulation pursuant to Local Rule 37-2. (Dkts. 38, 39.) On September 6, 2022, the magistrate judge issued an order (“Discovery Order”) granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's motion to compel. (Dkt. 42.) On September 20, 2022, Plaintiff submitted objections to the magistrate judge's Discovery Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (See generally Mot.)
B. The Underlying Discovery Order
In the motion to compel, Plaintiff requested that the magistrate judge compel Defendants “to resolve deficiencies in their responses and amended responses to [Plaintiff's discovery requests.” (Dkt. 39 at 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff requested that the magistrate judge compel: (1) amended responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 910, 14, 15, and 16; (2) production of a privilege log for all documents withheld on the basis of attorney-client privilege, production of documents in their native format, and responses to Requests for Production Nos. 2, 3, 5, 17, 18, 26, 27, 33, 35, 36, 42, 43, 44, 47, and 48; and (3) amended responses to Requests for Admission Nos. 15, 16, 18, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, and 81. (See generally id.)
The magistrate judge granted in part and denied in part the motion to compel. (Discovery Order at 20.) The magistrate judge granted the motion and ordered Defendants to serve supplemental responses as to: (1) Interrogatory Nos. 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 14, 15, and 16; (2) Requests for Production Nos. 2, 3, 5, 17, 18, 26, 27, 33, 35, 36, 42, 43, 44, 47, and 48, and to produce all responsive documents thereto; (3) Requests for Admission Nos. 15, 16, 18, 71, and 81. (Id. at 20.) The magistrate judge denied all other requests. (Id.)
The magistrate judge also denied Plaintiff's requests for attorney's fees, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(C). (Id.) In denying Plaintiff's request, the magistrate judge reasoned that Plaintiff did not exhaust the meet and confer process and the parties may have narrowed the discovery requests or avoided the motion to compel if Plaintiff had met and conferred with Defendant. (Id.) The magistrate judge also cited BYLT, LLC v. B.Y.L.T. Performance, LLC, 2019 WL 6330695 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2019) in support of this conclusion. (Id.)
II. Legal Standard
*2 If a party timely objects to a non-dispositive order from a magistrate judge, “[t]he district judge in the case must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (“A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter under this subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the magistrate judge's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”). “The ‘clearly erroneous’ standard applies to factual findings and discretionary decisions made in connection with non-dispositive pretrial discovery matters.” F.D.I.C. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 196 F.R.D. 375, 378 (S.D. Cal. 2000). This standard is “significantly deferential, requiring a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Green v. Baca, 219 F.R.D. 485, 489 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993)); Security Farms v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 124 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 1997). By contrast, “[t]he ‘contrary to law’ standard ... permits independent review of purely legal determinations by the magistrate judge.” Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 196 F.R.D. at 378 (citing Haines v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also Haines, 975 F.2d at 91 (“[T]he phrase ‘contrary to law’ indicates plenary review as to matters of law.”).
III. Discussion
Plaintiff requests two modifications to the Discovery Order. First, Plaintiff requests that the court “award[ ] Plaintiff apportioned reasonable expenses in connection with the Motion, pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(C) and Rule 37(a)(4)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Mot. at 1.) Second, Plaintiff requests that the court “set aside the erroneous limitations on the scope of responsive information the Court imposed on Interrogatory No. 2 as well as any effect the limitations may have had on other requests in the September 6, 2022, Order” or on the scope of future discovery. (Id. at 2.) Specifically, Plaintiff requests that court set aside the limitation on the identities of responsive individuals with regard to Interrogatory No. 2 and the definition of “At Issue Products.” (Id. at 12-13.) The court first addresses the requested fee award and then the limitations on the scope of discovery.
A. The magistrate judge did not err by declining to award Plaintiff its reasonable expenses under Federal Rule 37(a)(5)(C).
Plaintiff's motion principally argues that the magistrate judge erred by declining to award Plaintiff its reasonable expenses as a sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. (See Mot. at 5-10.) In particular, Plaintiff identifies the following two purported sources of error: (1) the magistrate judge erroneously concluded that Plaintiff could have avoided the motion to compel by meeting and conferring, citing BYLT, LLC v. B.Y.L.T Performance, LLC, 2019 WL 6330695 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2019); and (2) the magistrate judge's application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(C), rather than subsection 37(a)(5)(A),[1] is contrary to law. (Id.) The court addresses each argument in turn.
i. The magistrate judge did not err in concluding Plaintiff failed to exhaust the meet and confer process.
In the Discovery Order, the magistrate judge stated the following with regard to Plaintiff's meet and confer efforts:
Here, if Plaintiff had further engaged Defendants in an attempt to meet and confer in good faith regarding the amended responses before sending to Defendants' counsel a draft of the joint stipulation in support of this Motion to Compel, the parties may have avoided this Motion to Compel by narrowing the discovery requests. The possibility that the parties might have agreed to narrow Plaintiff's discovery requests is apparent from the fact that Defendants have agreed to supplement the majority of the requests that the Court has granted. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff is not entitled to sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees incurred by bringing this Motion to Compel. BYLT, LLC v. B.Y.L.T. Performance, LLC, 2019 WL 6330695 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2019) (denying moving party's request for sanctions related to bringing motion to compel, in part because many of responding party's response were substantially justified and moving party brought motion to compel before exhausting meet and confer).
*3 (Discovery Order at 20.)
Plaintiff argues the magistrate judge clearly erred in concluding that Plaintiff could have engaged in further meet and confer efforts before filing the motion to compel because Plaintiff previously met and conferred with Defendants regarding Defendants' deficient discovery responses. (Mot. at 6-7.) In particular, Plaintiff asserts that when it received Defendants' original discovery responses, it sent Defendants “a detailed meet and confer letter on March 18, 2022” and attended “a lengthy meet and confer on March 31, 2022.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff argues that initiating a second meet and confer, after Defendant provided supplemental discovery responses in April 2022, would have been futile because Defendants' amended responses merely reiterated their previously deficient responses. (Id.)
In opposition, Defendant argues the magistrate judge correctly concluded that Plaintiff did not comply with Local Rule 37-1, stating “[a]fter receipt of [Defendant's] amended responses, Plaintiff made no effort to meet and confer on the amended/supplemental responses and proceeded straight to the service of a joint statement and the filing of the Motion, contrary to the language and spirit of Local Rule [37-1].” (Opp. at 1.)
The court concludes the magistrate judge did not clearly err in finding that Plaintiff could have undertaken additional meet and confer efforts. The court notes that Local Rule 37-1 mandates that:
Before filing any motion relating to discovery under F. Rs. Civ. P. 26-37, counsel for the parties must confer in a good-faith effort to eliminate the necessity for hearing the motion or to eliminate as many of the disputes as possible. It is the responsibility of counsel for the moving party to arrange for this conference.
L. R. 37-1. Local Rule 37-2 further provides that counsel may file a motion only if they “are unable to settle the differences” after meet and conferring. L. R. 37-2.
In this instance, Local Rule 37-1 indicates that it was Plaintiff's responsibility to initiate the meet and confer conference. See L. R. 37-1. The court notes that at oral argument Plaintiff conceded that it did not attempt to meet and confer regarding Defendants' amended discovery responses before filing the motion to compel. (See Dkt. 46.) Other than the Local Rules, Plaintiff has not cited sufficient legal authority indicating that its prior meet and confer efforts in March 2022 regarding Defendants' original discovery responses were sufficient to meet the requirements of Local Rule 37-1 as to Defendants' amended discovery responses. (See generally Mot; Dkt. 46.) Additionally, Defendants indicated they were willing to supplement their discovery responses after the motion was filed. (Discovery Order at 20.) See also L. R. 37-1 (“[T]he parties must confer in a good-faith effort to eliminate the necessity for hearing the motion or to eliminate as many of the disputes as possible.”) Given this record, the court finds the magistrate judge plausibly and reasonably found that Plaintiff could have narrowed its discovery requests by engaging in further meet and confer efforts. Accordingly, the court concludes the magistrate judge did not clearly err in making these findings. See Wolpin v. Phillip Morris Inc., 189 F.R.D. 418, 422 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“To conclude that a magistrate judge's decision is clearly erroneous, the District Court must arrive at a ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ”) (quoting Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 130 F.R.D. 507 (D.D.C. 1990)).
*4 Nor did the magistrate judge clearly err by citing BYLT, LLC v. B.Y.L.T Performance, LLC, 2019 WL 6330695 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2019) as supporting authority. In fact, the court finds this authority factually analogous to the circumstances surrounding the motion to compel. In BYLT, LLC, as with this case, the plaintiff met and conferred with the defendant regarding certain disputed responses. 2019 WL 6330695, at *1. The defendant agreed to supplement those responses and subsequently produced additional documents and responses several weeks later. Id. Approximately one month after the defendant provided the amended responses, and without any interim discussion, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel. Id. The court found that “many of the issues raised in the Joint Stipulation could have been resolved had Plaintiff been willing to continue engage [in] the meet and confer process.” Id. at *2. The court ultimately denied Plaintiff's request for sanctions, in part, because “Plaintiff filed the motion before exhausting the meet and confer process.” Id. Given the factual similarities between BYLT, LLC and the instant case, the court finds the magistrate judge did not clearly err in citing this authority when denying Plaintiff's request for sanctions.
ii. The magistrate judge applied the correct Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff argues that the court incorrectly analyzed Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(C) rather than Rule 37(a)(5)(A). (Mot. at 9-10.) In the Opposition, Defendants argue the magistrate judge applied the correct subsection of Rule 37 because Plaintiff's motion was granted in part and denied in part. (Opp. at 4-5.)
If a motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(C) authorizes the court, in its discretion, to “issue any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c)” and “apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion” after giving the parties an opportunity to be heard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C). By contrast, subsection 37(a)(5)(A) provides:
If a motion is granted—or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed—the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees. But the court must not order this payment if:
(i) The movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action;
(ii) The opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or
(iii) Other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A).
Thus, “[t]he primary difference between Rule 37(a)(5)(A) and Rule 37(a)(5)(C) is that an award is discretionary under Rule 37(a)(5)(C).” Barlow v. Herman, 2015 WL 846568, at *3 (D. Nev. Feb. 26, 2015). “Ultimately, the analysis underlying a decision under either subsection is the same and the arguments pertaining to exceptions under Rule 37(a)(5)(A) are equally applicable.” Id.
In this instance, the court finds that the magistrate judge's application of Rule 37(a)(5)(C) instead of subsection 37(a)(5)(A) was not contrary to law. Subsection 37(a)(5)(A)'s mandatory fee award applies only “[i]f a motion is granted—or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Here, it is undisputed that the magistrate judge did not grant Plaintiff's motion to compel in its entirety and that Defendants only provided some of the requested discovery after the motion was filed. (See Mot. at 9-10 (“In this case, the Court granted in substantial part Plaintiff's Motion. Defendants agreed to provide some of the requested discovery only after the motion was filed.”).) Instead, because the motion was granted in part and denied in part, subsection 37(a)(5)(C) applies and any potential award was discretionary. See Barlow, 2015 WL 846568, at *3. The magistrate judge was also entitled to consider “arguments pertaining to exceptions under Rule 37(a)(5)(A)” in declining to award reasonable expenses. Id.
*5 Accordingly, because the magistrate judge did not clearly err as to the factual findings and applied the correct subsection of Federal Rule 37, the court finds that the magistrate judge did not clearly err in declining to award Plaintiff its attorneys' fees under Rule 37(a)(5)(C). See F.D.I.C., 196 F.R.D. at 378 (“The ‘clearly erroneous’ standard applies to factual findings and discretionary decisions made in connection with non-dispositive pretrial discovery matters.”).
B. The magistrate judge did not erroneously limit the scope of discovery.
Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge erroneously imposed several limits with regard to Interrogatory No. 2, including limiting: (1) the relevant time frame; (2) the identities of responsive individuals; and (3) the definition of “At Issue Products.” (Mot. at 10-13.) Defendant argues that the magistrate judge imposed appropriate limits within the scope of her discretion and Plaintiff's arguments lack legal or factual foundation. (Opp. at 7-8).
The relevant interrogatory, Interrogatory No. 2, states: “Identify all persons and individuals who were or are, responsible for or participating in, the manufacture, import, distribution, marketing and/or sale of the At Issue Products.” (Discovery Order at 6.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that the scope of discovery encompasses:
[A]ny nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2) (“An interrogatory may relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b).”). Rule 26(b)(2)(C) further mandates that the court “limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that ... the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
The court finds Plaintiff does not sufficiently demonstrate any clear error on the part of the magistrate judge and that the prescribed limits adhere to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C)'s mandate.[2] First, as to the alleged limited time frame, the magistrate judge noted that “parties referenced in a packing slip for goods dated before the time frame alleged in the FAC are not responsive.” (Discovery Order at 6.) Here, as in the motion to compel, Plaintiff argues only that the FAC did not specify a time period as to Defendants' conduct. (Mot. at 10-11.) In responding to Plaintiff's argument, the magistrate judge stated, “[w]hile Plaintiff argues the term “At Issue Products” is not limited in time, to the extent Plaintiff seeks information concerning products that are not referred to in the operative complaint, the interrogatory is disproportionate to the needs of the case.” (Id. at 6-7.) Thus, the court finds that the restriction at issue pertained to products not relevant to the case or alleged in the FAC rather than any particular time frame. Plaintiff also did not sufficiently demonstrate that information regarding other products, e.g., those not referred to in the operative complaint, was “relevant to any party's claim ... and proportional to the needs of the case.” Accordingly, the court concludes this restriction was not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. See Contemp. Servs. Corp. v. Landmark Event Staffing, 2013 WL 12142953, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013) (affirming discovery limitations because the magistrate judge's order “provides a rational basis for limiting the scope of discovery” and “[defendant] failed to show that the Order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law”).
*6 Similarly, the magistrate judge stated that “goods that Defendants maintain they have no ownership interest in do not fall within the definition of ‘At Issue Products’ and persons connected with those goods are not responsive to the instant interrogatory” and “a party who only entered into a contract with Defendants, but where no sale of goods was completed is not responsive.” (Discovery Order at 7.) Plaintiff argues that this limitation “prevents Plaintiff from seeking the identities of importers, manufacturers, and anyone who participated in marketing or distribution” and “[s]uch identities could relate to the gloves' authenticity (source of origin), and thus, the falsity of Defendants' statements concerning the gloves.” (Mot. at 12.) However, the court concludes Plaintiff fails to adequately explain how such information is relevant to its case in light of the burden such discovery would impose or why these limitations were clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court concludes the magistrate judge did not clearly err by limiting discovery with regard to Interrogatory No. 2.
IV. Disposition
For the reasons stated above, the court DENIES the Motion and AFFIRMS the magistrate judge's ruling.
The Clerk shall serve this minute order on the parties.
Footnotes
Plaintiff states that the magistrate judge “failed to consider Rule 37(a)(4)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” in its motion. (See Mot. at 9-10). Because Rule 37 does not contain a subsection (a)(4)(A), section 37(a)(4) does not concern expenses, and Plaintiff quotes subsection (a)(5)(A), the court construes this argument as referring to Rule 37(a)(5)(A). (See id. at 9.)
The court notes that courts sometimes apply the more deferential abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a magistrate judge's decision regarding discovery disputes. See, e.g., Rutherford v. Palo Verde Health Care Dist., 2014 WL 12632905, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2014) (“At this juncture, the Court must review the magistrate's order with an eye toward the broad standard of relevance in the discovery context.”) (quoting Geophysical Sys. Corp. v. Raytheon Co., 117 F.R.D. 646, 647 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“When reviewing discovery disputes, however, the Magistrate is afforded broad discretion, which will be overruled only if abused.”); AMEC Env't & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Integral Consulting, Inc., 2014 WL 6601960, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2014) (“Though a magistrate judge's determination of relevance is a legal conclusion, district courts have tended not to disturb such conclusions absent abuse of discretion.”). Here, because the court finds that the magistrate judge's rulings were proper under the more stringent “clearly erroneous” standard, “[t]he court need not decide which standard is appropriate”. See Stanwood v. Mary Kay, Inc., 2013 WL 12132033, at *1 n.1 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2013).