*1 This cause came on for consideration without oral argument on the following motions filed herein:

I. BACKGROUND.

Plaintiffs are professional models. Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 15–24. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant operates “a strip club that engages in the business of entertaining its patrons with nude and/or semi-nude dancing and alcohol.” Id. ¶ 26. On October 22, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging that through its social media accounts and certain websites, Defendant advertises its business, events, and parties, and in many of its advertisements, Defendant used the images of one or more Plaintiffs without authorization. Id. ¶¶ 27, 149. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant engaged in false advertising and false endorsement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seq.; that Defendant violated Plaintiffs’ statutory and common law rights of publicity under Florida law; and that Defendant is liable for conversion and unjust enrichment based on the misappropriation of their images. Id. at 27–38.

On September 23, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Better Responses to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents. Doc. No. 35. The specific discovery requests at issue are Interrogatories 4, 5, 9, 14, 16, 18 and Requests 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 22, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31. Id. Plaintiffs also seek to recover the attorney's fees and costs incurred in filing the motion to compel. Id. at 20.

Defendant has filed a response to the motion to compel. Doc. No. 38. According to Defendant's response, after Plaintiffs filed the motion to compel, the parties further conferred regarding the subject discovery, and several of the issues have been resolved, as discussed more fully below. Id. at 2–3. In conjunction with its response, Defendant has also filed a Motion for Protective Order, which relates to Request 31. Doc. No. 36. Plaintiff opposes the motion for protective order. Doc. No. 39.

Both motions were referred to the undersigned for disposition, and the matters are ripe for review.

II. ANALYSIS.

A. Motion for Protective Order.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides that “[a] party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order,” upon a showing of good cause, to protect a party or person from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). If the Court finds that good cause exists, it may issue a protective order including “forbidding the disclosure or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A).

*2 “To establish good cause, the moving party must make ‘a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.’ ” Berlinger v. Wells Fargo, N.A., No. 2:11-cv-459-FtM-29CM, 2014 WL 5515783, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2014) (quoting U & I Corp. v. Adv. Med. Design, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 667, 673 (M.D. Fla. 2008)). “Conclusory predictions of ‘annoyance’ and ‘embarrassment’ cannot justify a protective order.” Id. (citations omitted). A party seeking a protective order “must show not only good cause but also—in the case of a party who objects to another party's discovery request aimed at a third party—standing to object on behalf of them.” Southard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CV 411-243, 2012 WL 1951652, at *2 n.3 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2012) (citations omitted).

Defendant moves for a protective order as it relates to Request 31. Doc. No. 36. Request 31 and Defendant's response provided:

Doc. No. 35, at 18.

Defendant makes several arguments regarding why this information is subject to protection, including that: (1) the identities of Defendant's customers, patrons, and the like are protected by the Florida constitution; (2) the information is protected under the First Amendment's associational privilege; and (3) the information constitutes a trade secret. Doc. No. 36. However, I find that, as Plaintiffs argue, these assertions are untimely and the motion for protective order is due to be denied on this basis alone. Plaintiffs served the subject discovery on Defendant on June 26, 2019. Doc. Nos. 35-1, 35-2. “A motion for protective order must be filed timely.... A motion for a protective order is generally untimely if it is made after the date the discovery material was to be produced.” Laughon ex rel. Laughon v. Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, No. 3:06-CV-692-J-25HTS, 2007 WL 1247305, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2007); see also Middle District Discovery (2015) § VII(B) (“Upon receipt of objectionable discovery, a party has a duty to seek relief immediately, i.e., without waiting until the discovery is due or almost due.”). “Communicating to opposing counsel a party's objections to production, without timely bringing the matter to the attention of the Court, is not adequate under Rule 26(c).” Cornell Pump Co. v. Thompson Pump & Mfg. Co., Inc., No. 6:17-cv-847-Orl-41TBS, 2018 WL 3827248, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2018) (quoting Andrews v. CSX Transportation, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-704-J-32HTS, 2009 WL 10670852, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2009)). Defendant has not otherwise addressed or established that good cause exists for the Court to consider the belated request. Accordingly, the Motion for Protective Order (Doc. No. 36) is DENIED.

The Court has, however, considered Defendant's objections to Request 31, and its response to the motion to compel and the motion for protective order to the extent that Defendant seeks to support those objections. See Cornell Pump Co., 2018 WL 3827248, at *3 (after denial of motion for protective order, recognizing that the objections in response to the discovery requests were outstanding and the denial of the motion for protective order did not serve to waive those objections). These objections will be considered in conjunction with Plaintiffs’ motion to compel, discussed below.

B. Motion to Compel.

*3 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery is permitted to obtain “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The party requesting discovery has the burden of demonstrating the relevance of the discovery requests. See Stern v. O'Quinn, 253 F.R.D. 663, 670 (S.D. Fla. 2008). When the discovery requests seek relevant information, the responding party has the burden of showing that the discovery is improper, unreasonable, or burdensome. Wagner v. Viacost.com, No. 06-81113-CIV, 2007 WL 1879914, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2007). General objections to discovery requests as a whole are not proper. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B). Additionally, “objections not made in responses to discovery requests are normally waived.” Abruscato v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., No. 3:13-cv-962-J-39JBT, 2014 WL 12617735, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 7, 2014) (citation omitted).

According to Defendant's response to the motion to compel, the parties have resolved Plaintiffs’ contentions regarding each of discovery requests at issue, except for Interrogatories 4 and 9, and Request 31. As to the interrogatories, Defendant states as follows:

Doc. No. 38, at 2. Regarding the requests for production, Defendant states:

Id. at 2–3; see also Doc. No. 38-1.

Accordingly, it appears that the only issues to be resolved as it relates to the motion to compel are Interrogatories 4 and 9, Request 31, and Plaintiffs’ request for attorney's fees. Consequently, these are the only issues that I will address.

Interrogatory 4 and Defendant's answer provided:

Doc. No. 35, at 5–6.

Plaintiffs contend that the information sought is relevant to demonstrating that Defendant is a “habitual infringer,” and argues that Defendant's objection that the information is equally available to both parties is improper. Id. at 6. Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that the club at issue is under different management than at the time the events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred; thus, according to Defendant, current management has little to no knowledge regarding similar lawsuits and the information would be more easily obtained by Plaintiff by performing a public records search. Doc. No. 38, at 3–4.

*4 Defendant's objections are overruled. As Plaintiffs argue, an objection that the information requested is equally available to the requesting party is generally improper under the federal rules. See Belfor USA Grp., Inc. v. Bray & Gillespie, LLC, No. 6:05-cv-1624-Orl-18UAM, 2007 WL 9723122, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2007); see also U.S. Nutraceuticals LLC v. Cyanotech Corp., No. 5:12-cv-366-Oc-10PRL, 2014 WL 1918040, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 13, 2014) (“It is not usually a ground for objection that information sought in discovery is equally available to the requesting party or is a matter of public record.”). Moreover, Defendant did not assert an objection in response to Interrogatory 9 regarding the new management of Defendant's business. “[O]bjections not made in responses to discovery requests are normally waived.” Abruscato, 2014 WL 12617735, at *1 (citation omitted). Finally, Defendant fails to address in the response to the motion to compel its objections based on relevancy and proportionality. “Objections asserted that are not addressed in a response to a motion to compel are deemed to have been abandoned.” Zamperla, Inc. v. I.E. Park SrL, No. 6:13-cv-1807-Orl-37KRS, 2014 WL 12614505, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2014) (citing Jackson v. Geometrica, Inc., No. 3:04-cv-640-J-20HTS, 2006 WL 213860, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2006)). Therefore, I find that Defendant has abandoned its objections based on relevancy and proportionality.

Accordingly, the motion to compel as it relates to Interrogatory 4 is GRANTED.

Interrogatory 9 and Defendant's answer provided:

Doc. No. 35, at 7–8.

Plaintiffs argue that the first portion of Defendant's response is an inadequate boilerplate objection. Id. at 8. As to the objection regarding “a legal opinion and/or conclusion,” Plaintiffs contend that Interrogatory 9 does not seek a legal conclusion, but instead seeks an answer regarding Defendant's understanding of its right to publish Plaintiffs’ images in its advertising. Id.

Defendant responds that the “interrogatory is so broad and not limited in time and scope that this Defendant is unable to fashion a response,” without elaboration. Doc. No. 38, at 4. Defendant further states that because the current management was not in charge when the events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred, current management has no knowledge of any rights that might have been present. Id. Finally, Defendant points out that it has filed a third-party complaint against the person who is the alleged creator and distributor of the subject marketing materials, and argues that Plaintiffs should seek to obtain the information from her. Id.

While Defendant's lack of knowledge or the responsibility of a third party might have been proper answers to Interrogatory 9, Defendant's answer to Interrogatory 9 states neither. Moreover, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Defendant's boilerplate objection—“this interrogatory, as framed, is overly broad, vague, ambiguous, not limited in time and scope, and neither relevant to the claims nor proportionate to the needs of the case”—is boilerplate and due to be overruled. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (“The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity.”); Asphalt Paving Sys., Inc. v. General Combustion Corp., No. 6:15-cv-49-Orl-41TBS, 2016 WL 3167712, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2016) (“The Court does not consider frivolous, conclusory, general, or boilerplate objections.”). Finally, Defendant's response does not address its objection that the interrogatory calls for a legal conclusion. Accordingly, I find that Defendant has abandoned this objection. See Zamperla, Inc., 2014 WL 12614505, at *2 (citing Jackson, 2006 WL 213860, at *1).

*5 For these reasons, the motion to compel as it relates to Interrogatory 9 is GRANTED.

Request 31 and Defendant's response provided:

Doc. No. 35, at 18.

Defendant does not address in the response to the motion to compel or in the motion for protective order its “overly broad, vague, ambiguous, unduly burdensome,” proportionality, or relevancy objections. See Doc. Nos. 36, 38. Accordingly, those objections have been abandoned. See Zamperla, Inc., 2014 WL 12614505, at *2 (citing Jackson, 2006 WL 213860, at *1). As to Defendant's remaining objections, they are likewise due to be overruled.

First, Defendant asserts that the identities of its customers, patrons, attendees, and social media followers are protected under the Florida constitution. Doc. No. 36, at 3–4. However, Defendant does not have standing to assert a claim under the Florida constitution on behalf of its customers, patrons, attendees, or social media followers. See Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Shelley, 827 So.2d 936, 941 (Fla. 2002) (“[E]ven where a constitutional right to privacy is implicated, that right is a personal one, inuring solely to individuals.”); see also Adelman v. Boy Scouts of Am., 276 F.R.D. 681, 694 (S.D. Fla. 2011). Thus, the privacy objection is overruled.

Second, Defendant has not established that a list of the email addresses of its customers, patrons, attendees and/or social media followers is subject to trade secret protection. Defendant's motion for protective order in this regard is wholly conclusory, and Defendant has not demonstrated “that the information is valuable or competitively sensitive, what it does to maintain the confidentiality of the information, and that the information has not been made available to others without restriction.” See, e.g., Superior Consulting Servs., Inc., No. 6:16-cv-2001-Orl-31GJK, 2017 WL 2895919, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2017). Moreover, Defendant provides no evidence in support of its motion for protective order or in support of the response to the motion to compel, in the form of affidavits, declarations, or otherwise. Accordingly, Defendant has not established that the information qualifies as a trade secret. See id. Finally, I note that Defendant states that the parties will enter into a confidentiality agreement, and Defendant has not demonstrated that such agreement would not provide sufficient protection over the allegedly confidential information. Therefore, Defendant's objections to Request 31 are overruled, and the motion to compel as it relates to Request 31 is GRANTED.[1]

*6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A) provides that when, as here, a motion to compel is granted, “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party ... whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees.” While the rule permits the Court to decline to award sanctions under certain circumstances, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i)–(iii), Defendant has not presented any information or argument suggesting that those circumstances apply here. See Doc. Nos. 36, 38.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, on or before November 6, 2019, counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendants shall meet and confer in good faith to determine an amount of reasonable fees and expenses that should be awarded to Plaintiffs for the filing of the present motion. The parties shall file a joint notice of the amount agreed upon on or before November 6, 2019. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement by that time, counsel for Plaintiffs shall file a motion, supported by appropriate documentation, for their reasonable fees and expenses incurred in filing the present motion. That motion, if necessary, shall be filed by November 13, 2019.

III. CONCLUSION.

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED as follows:

DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on October 23, 2019.

In the motion for protective order, Defendant asserts that the First Amendment associational privilege applies. Defendant did not raise this objection in its response to Request 31. As discussed above, Defendant's motion for protective order is untimely and this argument will not be considered by the Court. I note, however, that even if the motion for protective order were timely, Defendant has not established that the associational privilege applies. In the motion, Defendant claims that it will be “severely harmed by a loss of goodwill, loss of revenue and a myriad of an untold number of lawsuits for their violation of the members’ confidentiality.” Doc. No. 36, at 6. However, argument by defense counsel in the motion for protective order is not evidence, nor is it sufficient to establish that the First Amendment associational privilege applies. See, e.g., Edmondson v. Velvet Lifestyles, LLC, No. 15-24442-CIV, 2016 WL 7048363 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2016) (rejecting claim that associational rights would be violated by disclosure of email distribution list of swingers’ clubs in part because the movant presented only attorney argument and no evidence).