*1 This matter is before us on the above-captioned Motion. We have considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to this Motion and deem this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. L.R. 7-15. As the Parties are familiar with the facts, we will repeat them only as necessary. Accordingly, we rule as follows:

I. Procedural Background

On October 29, 1987, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed a complaint against Defendants Mytel International, Inc. (“Mytel”), Gilbert Michaels (“Michaels”), Mytel's owner, and Jerry Feldman (“Feldman”), a Mytel executive. The FTC sought a permanent injunction and other relief for alleged violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. The FTC alleged that Defendants sold toner to consumers by falsely representing their affiliation with the consumers' usual suppliers and warning of impending price increases. On November 14, 1988, the Parties entered into a stipulated final order and judgment dismissing the FTC's action against Feldman and permanently enjoining Mytel and Michaels from continuing any deceptive sales practices (“the 1988 Order”). [See Dkt. 24-4.]

On April 17, 2014, the FTC filed the underlying Motion for Contempt, requesting that we find Defendants Mytel, Michaels, Feldman, and G.N.M. Financial Services, Inc. (“IDCServco”), a new entity owned by Michaels, in contempt of the 1988 Order (the “Contempt Motion”). [Dkt. 3.] The FTC's Contempt Motion seeks a judgment of “no less than $128 million, which is the amount [Defendants allegedly] received as a result of their deceptive toner sales from 2006 through 2012.” [Id. at 1.] The FTC also requests we impose coercive sanctions to ensure Defendants' future compliance with the 1988 Order. [Id. at 2.] These sanctions would require that Defendants end all sales company agreements and stop selling, delivering, and billing customers for toner. [Id.] If Defendants do not comply, the FTC asks that we order Defendants to pay $10,000 per day, roughly equivalent to Defendants' daily profits on toner sales, for each day of violation. [Id.] Finally, the FTC requests that we incarcerate the individual Defendants if they do not pay the money judgment within 30 days of a contempt finding. [Id.]

On June 16, 2014, Defendants filed a Motion to Stay the Contempt Motion and for an Evidentiary Hearing (“Stay Motion”) regarding the FTC's potential exposure to privileged documents as a result of its work with the Huntington Beach Police Department (“HBPD”), and particularly HBPD Detective Kevin Kesler (“Kesler”), during the investigation of this matter.[1] [Dkt. 24.] On June 30, 2014, we referred the case to Magistrate Judge Segal to resolve any discovery matters. [Dkt. 33.] On August 22, 2014, we referred all pending motions, save the Contempt Motion, to Judge Segal for her consideration and decision. [Dkt. 42.] On November 6, 2014, Judge Segal granted Defendants' Stay Motion and ordered an evidentiary hearing regarding “whether, and to what extent, any violations of the attorney-client privilege occurred” during the preparation of the FTC's Contempt Motion. [Dkt. 51 at 16.] On January 27, 2015, Judge Segal heard testimony from seven witnesses.[2] [Dkt. 82.] On February 4, 2015, Judge Segal ordered the FTC to serve a document subpoena on the HBPD no later than February 6, 2015 that would require the HBPD to lodge copies of all of Kesler's police reports regarding his investigation of Defendants, even those he never sent to the FTC. [Dkt. 90.[3]] The FTC served a subpoena on the HBPD as ordered, and on February 12, 2015, the HBPD produced copies of Kesler's reports. [See Dkt. 94.] Judge Segal reviewed these reports and did not find any information or attachments that would be protected by the attorney-client privilege. (Order at 14.)

*2 After reviewing these reports and the Parties' briefs, on April 16, 2015, Judge Segal issued the underlying Order (“the Order”), in which she concluded that “the FTC's Contempt Motion was not improperly influenced by exposure to Defendants' privileged communications.” (Order at 5.) She also lifted the stay on proceedings and denied Defendants' sanctions request.[4] (Id.) On April 30, 2015, Defendants filed the instant Motion, raising two objections to the Order. First, Defendants argue that Judge Segal erred by not ordering “a full privilege review” of a set of documents they call “FTC Production 1” “given that: (a) initial privilege screens identified thousands of potentially privileged documents in this set; and (b) Detective Kesler reviewed all of these documents.” (Mot. at 9.) Second, Defendants claim that “Judge Segal's conclusion that the underlying proceedings are for civil, not criminal, contempt is contrary to law.” (Id.)

II. Factual Background Regarding Potential Privilege Disclosure

In May 2013, a federal and state task force, including the United States Secret Service, HBPD, and Orange County District Attorney's (“OCDA”) Office, (collectively, “the joint task force”) began investigating Defendants' companies as a result of alleged fraudulent business practices. As part of this criminal investigation, on May 22, 2013, the HBPD executed search warrants on Defendants' businesses. (Order at 6.) The prosecutor leading the task force, OCDA Marc Labreche (“Labreche”), was aware that Mytel was involved in previous litigation, but did not warn the search team about the possibility of finding privileged documents or explain how they should handle privileged documents during their search. (Id. at 6-7.) During the search, Defendants' counsel Mark Beck (“Beck”) notified HBPD Sergeant Yasha Nikitin (“Nikitin”) that some of the seized documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege and offered to assist in identifying such documents. (Id. at 7.) Nikitin informed Labreche, who was not present during the search, and Labreche refused the offer. (Id.) Labreche then instructed the search team that if they found privileged materials, they should sequester them. (Id.) This did not occur during the search, even though investigators came across some arguably “litigation-related” documents. (Id.; Hr'g Tr. at 80:11-13.)

The following day, Beck sent Labreche a letter, requesting that the task force not review the seized documents until Beck could conduct a privilege review. (Order at 8.) Labrecehe again refused, assuring Beck that investigators were instructed “to isolate any documents which appear[ed] to be related to any law firm” and that if any documents were found, he would “request that the court appoint a special master to determine if there are any privileged communications.” (Id.; Dkt. 95-1, Linn Decl., Ex. D.) This did not occur. (Order at 8.) Labreche never attempted to determine whether or not the seized documents were privileged. (Id.)

Soon after the seizure, someone at the HBPD, likely Kesler, contacted the FTC and offered to share the seized documents. (Id.) According to Kesler, seven to eleven HBPD officers reviewed Defendants' documents before he gave them to the FTC. (Id.) The officers looked through the 140 boxes of hard copy documents seized “to see what[ was] inside.” (Hr'g Tr. at 65:16-25.) But, they only read through a “small percentage,” which Kesler estimated as less than ten percent, of these hard copy documents. (Id. at 65:16-66:3.) The officers read even fewer of the electronic documents seized. (Id. at 66:4-14.) According to Kesler, during their review of Defendants' documents, officers wrote police reports describing electronic and hard copy documents deemed relevant to the case and attached those documents to the reports. (Id. at 65:5-15.) Neither Kesler nor Nikitin recall reviewing any privileged documents. (Order at 9.)

*3 Kesler produced approximately 186,000 seized documents to the FTC in four batches:

FTC attorney Thomas Goodhue (“Goodhue”) was Kesler's FTC “primary point of contact” from September or October 2013 to May 2014, when he left the FTC for private practice. (Order at 9-10.) Goodhue told Kesler that he was mainly interested in receiving “consumer complaints, telemarketing scripts, ... [and] Attorney General complaints.” (Id. at 10.) He also told Kesler that he “did not want [Kesler] to send privileged materials,” but that “grand jury material was acceptable.” (Id.) Kesler assured Goodhue that he had not seen any privileged documents and “to the best of [his] ability” would not send privileged materials. (Id.) Kesler reviewed all of the police reports and their attachments before providing them to the FTC, but did not review all of the e-mails he produced. (Id. at 9.) In reviewing these documents, Goodhue relied on Kesler's representations and was unconcerned about receiving privileged documents. (Id. at 10.)

According to Goodhue, the extent of the FTC's substantive review[5] of each production set was as follows:

Goodhue did not find any potentially privileged documents when reviewing any of the four production sets. (Order at 10-11.)

In April 2014, Defendants informed the FTC of their concerns that the HBPD production might contain privileged documents. (Id. at 11.) The FTC then conducted a preliminary privilege screening of January 2014 Production A,[6] using attorney names Goodhue identified from public sources, and identified 443 potentially privileged documents. (Id.) After this discovery, the FTC stopped reviewing all of the HBPD-produced documents,[7] and segregated these potentially privileged emails. (Id. at 12.) The FTC submitted the potentially privileged emails to Defendants for privilege review. (Id.) The FTC then filed its Contempt Motion on April 17, 2014, which relies, in large part, on evidence collected by the HBPD and a declaration from Kesler. [See Dkt. 3.]

*4 Defendants then confirmed that 358 of these documents were, in fact, privileged[8] and requested copies of all of the documents the FTC had received from the HBPD so Defendants could conduct a complete privilege review. (Order at 13.) On May 5 and 6, 2014, the FTC produced its database of HBPD-produced documents to Defendants. (Id.) The FTC did so in two batches, which the Parties deem “FTC Production 1” and “FTC Production 2.” FTC Production 1 consists of approximately 22,882 documents, which the Parties agree primarily include HBPD police reports and their attachments. (See Mot at 7; Opp'n at 4; Dkt 95-9, Sebastian Decl. at ¶ 4 (“Sebastian Decl. II”).) FTC Production 2 consists of approximately 162,743 documents, which the Parties agree are the January 2014 Production A emails. (See Mot at 7-8; Opp'n at 4; Sebastian Decl. II at ¶ 4.)

Defendants conducted their own privilege review of all of the HBPD documents that the FTC produced, and found approximately 524 documents that hit on “narrow”[9] privilege terms and approximately 21,395 documents that hit on “broad”[10] privilege terms.[11] (Sebastian Decl. II at ¶¶ 6-8.) While conducting this review, Defendants discovered many potentially privileged government investigation documents. (Order at 13.) Defendants informed the FTC of the presence of such materials, and the FTC requested Defendants to cease their privilege review. (Id. at 14.)

II. Legal Standard

For any non-dispositive pretrial matter, the ruling of a magistrate judge may be modified or set aside only if “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The clearly erroneous standard applies to the magistrate judge's factual findings while the contrary to law standard applies to the magistrate judge's legal conclusions, which we review de novo. Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. 2007). In reviewing factual findings for clear error, a district judge may not simply substitute his or her judgment for that of the magistrate judge. See Grimes v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991). Rather, the magistrate judge's ruling is clearly erroneous only when the district court is left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” See Burdick v. Comm'r Internal Rev. Serv., 979 F.2d 1369, 1370 (9th Cir. 1992).

III. Analysis

A. Whether Judge Segal Erred in Concluding these Proceedings are for Civil, Not Criminal Contempt

Defendants argue that Judge Segal's conclusion that the underlying proceedings are not for criminal contempt is contrary to law because the $128 million and indefinite incarceration that the FTC seeks “are punitive and criminal in substance.” (Mot. at 4.) Thus, Defendants argue, they are entitled to certain Constitutional protections available in criminal contempt proceedings. We disagree.

Contempt proceedings can either be criminal or civil. Criminal contempt “penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded the protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings.” Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Civil contempt sanctions can be “imposed in an ordinary civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 827. To discern whether contempt is civil or criminal, we must look at the “character and purpose” of the sanctions. Id. Civil sanctions are “remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant[,]” while criminal sanctions are “punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court.” Id. at 827-28 (internal quotation marks omitted). “District courts have broad equitable power to order appropriate relief in civil contempt proceedings.” SEC v. Hickey, 322 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2003).

*5 As a preliminary matter, Defendants are correct that we cannot solely rely on the FTC's labeling of the relief sought in its Contempt Motion. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828 (“[T]he stated purposes of a contempt sanction alone cannot be determinative.”). Instead, we must “examin[e ] the character of the relief itself.” See id. As for the $128 million the FTC seeks, a fine is “civil and remedial if it either coerce[s] the defendant into compliance with the court's order, [or] ... compensate[s] the complainant for losses sustained.” Id. at 829 (internal quotation marks omitted). The $128 million falls into the latter category of civil sanctions, as the FTC does not ask us to punish Defendants for violating the 1988 Order, but instead seeks disgorgement of the money Defendants purportedly made as a result of their violative toner sales. [See Dkt. 3 at 21 (“Defendants should be held in civil contempt and ordered to redress consumers for the millions of dollars of harm they have caused.”); id at 22 (“[A]n appropriate remedy for civil contempt is the measure of consumer loss.”); id. at 23 (seeking recovery of “the money [consumers] paid as a result of defendants' contumacious actions”).]

Other courts have concluded that similar relief requests by the FTC were civil in nature. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. EDebitPay, LLC, 695 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that “district courts have broad discretion to use consumer loss to calculate sanctions for civil contempt”); F.T.C. v. Kuykendall, 371 F.3d 745, 753 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n award of consumer redress commensurate with the total payments consumers made to defendants ... is clearly a request for compensatory [civil] sanctions.”); F.T.C. v. Leshin, 618 F.3d 1221, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he contempt sanctions are civil in nature because the sanctions were imposed to compensate consumers for the losses they sustained.”). Defendants argue that the relief sought is not compensatory in nature because the FTC's Contempt Motion seeks “no less than $128 million” and does not offer sufficient proof to demonstrate that such relief is proper.[12] (Mot. at 16-17 (emphasis altered).) This makes little sense. We are not bound by the FTC's suggested sanctions amount or its proposed calculation method. If the FTC is unable to prove that the appropriate compensatory relief here is at least $128 million, then we simply will not grant it. The FTC's purported inability to succeed on the merits does not transform its Contempt Motion into a criminal proceeding.

The FTC also requests that Defendants be incarcerated[13] if they do not pay the $128 million within 30 days, because this is the “only means of ensuring the Defendants pay the ordered amount.” [Dkt. 3 at 2-3.] The FTC's request is a “paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction” as it “involves confining [ ] contemnor[s] indefinitely until [they] compl[y] with an affirmative command,” which, in this case, would be to reimburse their wronged customers. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828-29 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (further stating that “imprisonment is punitive and criminal if it is imposed retrospectively for a completed act of disobedience ... such that the contemnor cannot avoid or abbreviate the confinement through later compliance”).

*6 Defendants do not dispute the coercive nature of this requested relief, but instead argue that such a “drastic” sanction would be punitive here because “Defendants do not have anywhere close to $128 million.”[14] (Mot. at 25.) Defendants' argument is flawed. As reflected in its proposed order, the FTC is not requesting that Defendants be incarcerated if they are unable to comply with any sanctions order. [See Dkt. 3-15 at ¶ 35 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (stating that, to secure their release, “Defendants will need to show categorically and in detail why they are unable to comply and that they have made in good faith all reasonable efforts to comply”).] The FTC only seeks to prevent Defendants from refusing to comply in bad faith. Defendants argue that Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011) stands for the proposition that we cannot “defer the ability to pay question until after [we have] decided the merits” of the FTC's Contempt Motion. (See Reply at 11.) But, this case does not stand for Defendants' asserted proposition. It merely emphasizes the importance of “assur[ing] a fundamentally fair determination of the critical incarceration-related question, whether the [contemnor] is able to comply with the [ ] order.” It does not hold that the ability to pay question must be decided before any merits decision.[15] Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2513. Accordingly, Judge Segal's conclusion that this proceeding is for civil contempt was not erroneous.[16]

B. Whether Judge Segal Erred in Ruling Against Defendants Without First Ordering a Full Review of FTC Production 1

As this is a civil proceeding, Defendants bore the burden of demonstrating that the FTC violated the attorney-client privilege. See United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 609 (9th Cir. 2009). Judge Segal found that Defendants failed to show that: (1) the FTC reviewed privileged documents or (2) Defendants were prejudiced in any way by the FTC's purported exposure. Defendants argue that it was erroneous for Judge Segal to make these findings without first approving Defendants' post-evidentiary hearing request to conduct “an appropriate privilege review of FTC Production 1.” (Mot. at 10.)

Defendants claim that “unrebutted evidence amply supports the inference that FTC Production 1 includes privileged documents and that at the very least Detective Kesler reviewed those documents.” (Mot. at 10.) Thus, Defendants argue, Judge Segal could not have concluded that Kesler did not come across privileged documents without first reviewing this production set. Defendants are correct that, based on his testimony, Kesler reviewed the entirety of FTC Production 1, which consisted of HBPD police reports and their attachments, before producing it to the FTC. (See H'rg Tr. at 64:18-24 (“Q: In providing documents to the FTC, did you review all documents before you gave them to them? [Kesler's] A: Yes. Q: You understand the estimate volume of documents that were provided to the FTC is in excess of 185,000 pages? [Kesler's] A: Let me rephrase this. I reviewed all of the police reports.”); id. at 65:8-10 (Kesler testifying “all those police reports and all the documents attached to all the police reports have been reviewed”).) Defendants are also correct that, unlike the emails in FTC Production 2, the documents in FTC Production 1 are all likely relevant, because, according to Kesler, they were hand-selected by HBPD officers to help prove their case against Defendants. (See id. at 58:25-59:3 (Kesler testifying that “[t]o the best of my ability, anything that I found that I felt had merit in the case ... I wrote a police report and attached those documents to the police report”); id. at 65:10-13 (Kesler testifying that “[a] lot of the electronic files that we went through, we printed out all the things that were relevant—that we found relevant with the case, wrote police reports on that and attached it”); id. at 87:7-13 (“THE COURT: I have a question for you. Does the Huntington Beach Police Department maintain records as to what they've reviewed? ... [KESLER]: Different detectives will maintain different, I'll call it, notes.... [W]hat we really try to do is, if we review something and it has any pertinence to the case, then we write a police report, and we write a lot of police reports to document. We try to document via police report.”); id. at 63:17-22 (“Q: At some point when you provided the documents to the FTC, how did you select them? [Kesler's] A: They were police reports that I thought were relevant to [the HBPD's] case.”).)

*7 Even if FTC Production 1 contains relevant documents that Kesler reviewed, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that this production set includes any privileged documents. Defendants' argument hinges on the assumption that a “hit” on their privilege search terms necessarily means that a document was actually privileged. But, as the FTC points out, just because a document includes an attorney or a law firm's name (or the words “priv.,” “inhouse,” or “common interest”[17]) does not mean that document contains privileged information. See United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The fact that a person is a lawyer does not make all communications with that person privileged.”). Defendants argue that this assumption is reasonable because their “privilege screens have already proven effective at identifying privileged documents” in FTC Production 2. (Mot. at 11.) Defendants also claim that “[w]hat differences exist between the contents of FTC Production 1 and FTC Production 2 are not likely to impact the results.” (Mot. at 11 n.5.) We disagree. The attorney-client privilege is meant to protect communications relating to legal advice. See Martin, 278 F.3d at 999 (stating the elements of the attorney-client privilege are: “(1) When legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his or her capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are, at the client's instance, permanently protected (7) from disclosure by the client or by the legal adviser (8) unless the protection be waived”). FTC Production 2 primarily consists of electronically stored internal company emails. (See Goodhue Decl. at ¶ 11.) Thus, it makes sense that 358 out of 443, or 81 percent, of the documents in that set that included attorney names were, in fact, privileged. In contrast, FTC Production 1 consists of police reports and their attachments, including financial records, consumer complaints, and call scripts. (See id. at ¶¶ 3, 7, 11, 14.) Therefore, we cannot, as Defendants suggest, merely apply the same percentage to FTC Production 1, and conclude that 184 documents, or 81 percent of the 227 “narrow” hits, are actually privileged. (See Mot. at 11.) Moreover, the number of search term hits these FTC Production 1 contained can be alternatively explained. Both HBPD officers who testified at the hearing admitted that they came across non-privileged, hard copy, “litigation-related” documents that included Defendants' counsel's names. (See, e.g., H'rg Tr. at 58:23-59:3 (Kesler testifying that he “encountered documents from IDC's counsel” and clarifying that these were “some court documents with counsel's name on them”); id. at 80:11-81:19 (Kesler describing the “prior legal filings” and “complaint[ letters] from law firms to IDC Servco” that he found among the hard copy documents seized); id. at 199:14-23 (Nikitin testifying that he came across “documentation from law firms,” but that none of it was “communications between IDC Servco's counsel and Mr. Michaels or another employee of IDC Servco”).)

Thus, the “hits” within FTC Production 1 are not as significant as Defendants claim them to be, and we cannot say that it was contrary to law for Judge Segal to conclude that Defendants failed to meet their burden without reviewing FTC Production 1. First, as Judge Segal noted, “[d]espite having the opportunity at the Evidentiary Hearing to question the relevant participants in the search of Defendants' premises and the review of Defendants' documents, Defendants have not identified one person who actually reviewed any privileged document.” (Order at 25.) Second, both Kesler and Goodhue, the government officials most actively involved in preparing the FTC's Contempt Motion, testified that they did not review any privileged documents. (See H'rg Tr. at 85:6-7 (“Again, to the best of my knowledge, I've not reviewed any privileged documents.”); id. at 127:16-17 (“The documents that we reviewed did not—were not privileged. I didn't understand them to be privileged. I didn't understand anyone else to have reviewed privileged documents.”). Judge Segal found their testimony to be credible, especially since her review of Kesler's police reports, a subset of FTC Production 1,[18] yielded no privileged documents and thus “strongly support[ed] Kesler's contention that he did not review privileged documents.” (Order at 26.)

Defendants also argue that Judge Segal erred by concluding, without reviewing FTC Production 1, that Defendants were not prejudiced by any potential privilege violations. We disagree. Judge Segal had several good reasons for reaching this conclusion. First, Defendants have provided no evidence, beyond pure speculation,[19] that the Contempt Motion includes or was in any way influenced by privileged materials. Second, Judge Segal found that “[c]onfidential attorney information was certainly not required to provide a roadmap to the types of materials the FTC filed in support of its Contempt Motion,” including consumer complaints and telemarketing scripts. (Order at 27.) Defendants counter that “[e]ven assuming the relevance of the FTC's supporting materials is obvious, that does not mean the review of privileged materials did not lead to their discovery or help Detective Kesler and the FTC understand their meaning or strategic significance.” (Mot. at 12.) We disagree. This type of consumer fraud action is not out of the ordinary. The FTC knew exactly the type of information it needed to support its Contempt Motion—it did not need to rely on privileged materials to make such a determination. See F.T.C. v. AMG Servs., Inc., 2014 WL 317781, at *16 (D. Nev. Jan. 28, 2014) (noting that consumer complaints are the “core information” the FTC “uses to initiate investigations and prosecute cases”); see also H'rg Tr. at 105:23-106:4 (“Q: How did you decide what documents you wanted to receive from Detective Kesler in this fall, 2013, time frame? [Goodhue's] A: So I discussed with him some documents that would be a general interest in investigation of this sort. The things I was really interested in was [sic] consumer complaints, telemarketing scrips, [sic] any sorts of materials like Attorney General complaints.”). Moreover, it is unclear how privileged documents would have helped Kesler or the FTC discover the existence of consumer complaints. According to the testimony of the HBPD officers, consumer complaints and other incriminatory materials were easily identifiable and found. (See, e.g., H'rg Tr. at 80:14-81:4 (Kesler describing how the search team found such documents in file cabinets and desk drawers in Feldman's office).) Without more, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that Judge Segal's decision was erroneous.

IV. Conclusion

*8 For the foregoing reasons, on this record, we OVERRULE Defendants' Objections.

But, at the same time, we recognize that Defendants were stymied in their ability to affirmatively prove FTC Production 1 contains privileged documents because the FTC requested that they stop their privilege review due to the presence of potentially privileged or confidential law enforcement documents. The FTC has been opaque as to whether or not it still objects to Defendants reviewing these documents themselves. We are also unaware of the joint task force's view as to whether or not FTC Production 1 contains any documents that might be protected by the law enforcement investigatory privilege.

Thus, we hereby ORDER the FTC to meet and confer with Defendants and representative of the joint task force, within 14 days hereof, and file a joint status report that clearly states: (1) the FTC's position regarding Defendants' suggestion that they conduct their own privilege review of FTC Production 1 (see Mot. at 13) and (2) any different position from any member of the joint task force. If there is any law enforcement privilege claim, we will issue an order directing further briefing as to whether or not this privilege was effectively waived by reason of production from the task force to the FTC without, as the FTC states, any joint prosecution agreement in place. [See Dkt. 100 at 31-32 n.86.]

IT IS SO ORDERED.