*1 Pending before the Court in this motor vehicle collision case is Plaintiff Christina Ramirez's Opposed Motion to Quash Defendants’ Deposition by Written Question (“DWQ”) to Laredo Knight Security. (Dkt. No. 15.) Plaintiff argues that the information sought is overbroad, irrelevant, and burdensome, and that the Court should therefore enter a protective order. (Id. at 2 paras. 4–5; 3 sec. III.) Defendants responded to the motion, arguing that the information they seek is relevant to determine causation, mental anguish, and pain and suffering, and that Plaintiff has placed her condition in the public forum. (Dkt. No. 22 paras. 4, 6.) The Court is of the opinion that the motion should be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.

A. Facts and Procedural History

This case arises out of an alleged automobile collision that occurred in or around March 2020. (Dkt. No. 19 para. 5.) Plaintiff argues that she sustained injuries after Defendant Juan Carlos Benavides Sandoval's tractor collided into Plaintiff's vehicle while Plaintiff was stopped at a stoplight. (Id.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff was contributorily negligent by failing to take steps to avoid the accident, that Plaintiff's vehicle sustained “little, if any or no” damage from the collision, and that Plaintiff's vehicle had been involved in a prior crash. (Dkt. No. 21 at 1.) Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in state court on August 31, 2021, and Defendants removed to federal court on October 15, 2021. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.)

B. Discovery Dispute

Two relevant pleadings tell the story of the present dispute: Plaintiff's Original Petition, filed in state court, (Dkt. No. 1-5), and Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint after the case was removed by Defendants. (Dkt. No. 19.)

Initially, in Plaintiff's Original Petition, Plaintiff sought damages for suffering “disabling injuries, physical pain[,] and mental anguish.” (Dkt. No. 1-5 para. 7.2.) She claimed to have sustained “past and future reasonable and necessary medical expenses for the care and treatment of her injuries, a loss of wages and loss of earning capacity, both past and future, physical impairment, both past and future, physical pain and mental anguish, both past and future, disfigurement, loss of household services, and a diminution of enjoyment of life, both past and future....” (Id.) (emphasis added).

Then, during her deposition, Plaintiff claimed that her accident affected her at work, where she worked long hours. (Dkt. No. 22 paras. 4, 8, citing to “Plaintiff's Deposition, P47,L19 – P48,L1.”) And in discovery documents, Plaintiff's treating chiropractor Melissa O. Guerra at Laredo Family Health Center imposed “[l]ight duty restrictions” on Plaintiff, such as “[n]o prolonged standing,” until March 20, 2020, for Plaintiff's return to work. (Dkt. No. 25-2, Ex. B at 1; Dkt. No. 25 para. 7.)

Subsequently, in or around July 2022, Defendants noticed their intention to Plaintiff's counsel to take the deposition of Plaintiff's employer Laredo Knight Security by written question.[1] (Dkt. No. 15 para. 1; Dkt. No. 15-1 at 1.) Defendants, through their notice, sought to obtain the following:

(Dkt. No. 15-1 at 1.) (emphasis removed).

According to Plaintiff, the same day that Plaintiff received Defendants’ notice,[2] Plaintiff first attempted by telephone, through counsel, to persuade Defendants to drop the DWQ by offering to move for leave to amend her petition to drop her lost wages claim. (See Dkt. No. 15 para. 6; Dkt. No. 25 paras. 2–3.) After Defendants objected to withdraw the DWQ, (see Dkt. No. 25 para. 3), Plaintiff quickly moved to quash Laredo Knight Security's DWQ and for a protective order from the production of documents sought. (See Dkt. No. 15.) In her motion, Plaintiff indicated that she “advised Defendant that she no longer seeks lost wages or lost earning capacity, offering to amend her petition.” (Id. para. 6.)

The day after filing her Motion to Quash, Plaintiff filed her Unopposed Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 16.) After the Court granted Plaintiff leave, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Petition, in which she removed her claims for lost wages and lost earning capacity. (See Dkt. No. 19 para. 13). In her First Amended Petition, Plaintiff now asks for damages in an unascertained amount for injuries she allegedly sustained from the collision, including sustained past and future medical expenses, physical impairment, physical pain and mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of household services, and a diminution of enjoyment of life. (Id.)

Plaintiff supports her motion on the grounds that the DWQ is improper because Plaintiff “has advised Defendant that she no longer seeks lost wages or lost earning capacity, offering to amend her petition.” (Dkt. No. 15 at 3 paras. 3, 6.) In other words, Plaintiff says such records are no longer relevant to the remaining claims. At present, the Court addresses Plaintiff's Motion to Quash and for a Protective Order from the production of documents sought on that basis.

A. Standing

As a threshold issue, Defendants challenge Plaintiff's standing to quash Laredo Knight Security's DWQ, because Plaintiff is a third party. (Dkt. No. 22 para. 11.) Generally, third parties lack standing to move to quash a deposition. Bramwell v. Aspen Expl., Inc., No. 4:05-CV-384, 2008 WL 4425368, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2008). Usually, only the party or person to whom the subpoena is directed has standing. See id. But the Court rejects Defendants’ argument and finds that Plaintiff does have standing, because Plaintiff has a “personal right or privilege” or a “sufficient interest” in the information sought by the deposition—the exception to the general rule. See id. at 1–2 (acknowledging defendants’ personal right in documents concerning their financial and business records); Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgs., Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., No. 5:07CV191, 2008 WL 2944671, at *1 (E.D. Tex. July 25, 2008). Specifically,

Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgs., Inc., 2008 WL 2944671, at *1. Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing, citing Bramwell for the proposition that “[a] party may not ask for an order to protect the rights of another party or a witness if that party or witness does not claim protection for itself.” (Dkt. No. 22 para. 11.)[3] Defendants argue that “[t]herefore, a party generally does not have standing to quash a nonparty subpoena on the basis that the nonparty would be subject to an undue burden when the nonparty itself failed to so object.” (Id.)

But Defendants mischaracterize Bramwell for their argument. Bramwell clearly states an applicable exception to the general rule: that such a party would lack standing “except where the party seeking to challenge the subpoena has a personal right or privilege with respect to the subject matter requested in the subpoena.” 2008 WL 4425368, at *1 (emphasis added, internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgs., Inc., 2008 WL 2944671, at *1.

The documents Defendants seek from Laredo Knight Security are Plaintiff's own employment records—she possesses a clear personal right or privilege to them. See Bramwell, 2008 WL 4425368, at *2 (quoting 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CIVIL 2D § 2035 (“A party may not ask for an order to protect the rights of another ... if that [other] does not claim protection for himself, but a party may seek an order if it believes its own interest is jeopardized by discovery sought from a third person.”)) (internal quotations omitted, emphasis added).[4] Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has standing to challenge the DWQ.

B. Legal Standard

District courts have “broad discretion” when deciding whether to grant a motion for a protective order that limits the extent and manner of discovery. In re LeBlanc, 559 F. App'x 389, 392–93 (5th Cir. 2014). Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants the Court this discretion in order “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). Using a “somewhat demanding” balancing standard, the district court “must compare the hardship to the party against whom discovery is sought against the probative value of the information to the other party.” Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Mississippi, LLC, 838 F.3d 540, 555 (5th Cir. 2016) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The party moving for the issuance of the protective order bears the burden of showing “good cause[,]” required for issuance of the protective order. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1); In re Terra Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998); see, e.g., Anzures v. Prologis Texas I LLC, 300 F.R.D. 316, 317–18 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (denying a motion to quash where the moving party failed to show good cause and specific need for the protective order); see Tijerina v. Guerra, Civil Action No. 7:19-CV-285, 2020 WL 1663181 at *6–7 (S.D. Tex. April 1, 2020) (denying a motion to quash and for a protective order where “Plaintiff fails to make any specific argument as to the relevance or proportionality of a particular discovery request.”). The party must show good cause by “particular and specific demonstration of fact[,]” not by mere “conclusory statements.” United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978).

*4 Additionally, Rule 45 provides that the Court must quash or modify a subpoena when the subpoena “subjects a person to undue burden.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv).[5] In general, courts should modify—not quash—subpoenas when possible. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 814, 818 (5th Cir. 2004). When requesting that the Court quash a subpoena, the moving party has the burden of proof to show that “compliance with the subpoena would be unreasonable and oppressive....” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Courts consider relevance, need, breadth, time, particularity, and the burden imposed when determining if a subpoena presents an undue burden.[6] Id.

C. Analysis

Defendants’ request is not a mere fishing expedition. Defendants request information pertaining to Plaintiff's assertions that injuries from the vehicular accident in question caused her diminution of enjoyment of life and mental anguish, physical pain and impairment, and to incur medical expenses. (Dkt. No. 22 at 3–4; Dkt. No. 19 para. 13.) In response, Plaintiff's motion asserts that Defendant's request is irrelevant and overbroad in time and scope. (Dkt. No. 15 para. 6.)[7] Further, because in her Amended Complaint Plaintiff no longer seeks lost wages or lost earning capacity, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ request for employment and payroll records is irrelevant. (See id.; Dkt. No. 19.)

But Plaintiff provides no “particular and specific demonstration of fact” showing good cause for a protective order and then fails to show that letting the subpoena stand would cause her an undue burden. See Garrett, 571 F.2d at 1326 n.3. Three reasons show why Defendants prevail: first, Plaintiff has placed her condition in the public forum; second, Defendants’ request is relevant to the remaining claims; and third, Defendant's request is proportional. Moreover, the requested documents are needed, the request is particular, and the burden imposed is justified and minimal.

First, Plaintiff's privacy is at issue: Defendants believe Plaintiff has placed her condition in the public forum, but Plaintiff maintains that Defendants have not provided the Court with sufficient reason to waive her privacy regarding the records that could illuminate that condition. (See Dkt. No. 22 paras. 10, 12; Dkt. No. 25 paras. 6–7.) Defendants’ interest in Plaintiff's physical and mental condition outweighs Plaintiff's privacy interest. “Plaintiff has placed in issue his physical and mental health by alleging that the [automobile] crash caused him ... permanent loss of enjoyment of life [and] physical and emotional pain and suffering [among other claimed damages].... Under these circumstances, [d]efendant is entitled to more broadly explore [p]laintiff's claimed damages.” Weber v. Fairley, No. 1:18-CV-163-HSO-JCG, 2019 WL 13212654, at *2 (S.D. Miss. June 26, 2019) (authorizing release of plaintiff's employment, prescription, worker's compensation, disability, health insurance, and medical records); see also Kelly Giarratano v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated, et al., No. CV 22-88, 2022 WL 16552816, at *6 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2022) (“When a Plaintiff places her medical condition at issue, her medical records are discoverable and not protected by privilege. And when pre-existing conditions are raised in defense of a claim, broad-ranging discovery may be appropriate.”) (citations omitted). Compare Weber, 2019 WL 13212654, at *2 (see above parenthetical), with E.E.O.C. v. Renaissance III Org., No. 3-05-CV-1063-B, 2006 WL 832504, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2006) (privacy interests outweighing the defendant's interest, because the defendant only used a conclusory assertion in support, “unsupported by any facts, evidence or citations to legal authority....”) Unlike in E.E.O.C. v. Renaissance III Org., 2006 WL 832504, at *1, Defendants here cite facts, evidence, and citations to legal authority to support their assertion that the information sought is relevant to remaining claims. And similar to Weber, 2019 WL 13212654, at *2, Plaintiff has put her physical and mental condition in controversy regarding causation, as well as damages including mental anguish and pain and suffering. Therefore, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff has placed her condition in the public forum, (Dkt. No. 22 paras. 10, 12), negating her desire for privacy, passes muster.

*5 Second, most of the employment records that Defendants seek from Plaintiff's employer are relevant to her current claims, even though she no longer claims lost wages or earning capacity. Though there would likely be no controversy if Plaintiff still claimed lost wages or earning capacity, enough controversy—and therefore relevance—remains with regard to Plaintiff's remaining claims.

Federal Rule Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) governs relevance for the undue burden test. “Under that rule, information is relevant if it bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue related to the claim or defense of any party.” Leonard v. Martin, 38 F.4th 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations and citations omitted).[8] Other Texas trial courts have defined relevance broadly. See, e.g., Crossland v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. EP-18-CV-00085-DCG, 2018 WL 4905354, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2018); Merrill v. Waffle House, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 467, 470 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (regarding the relevance inquiry).

Here, the relevant records are Plaintiff's personnel files, job descriptions and assignments, performance evaluations, attendance records, correspondence, wage and salary information, medical records and medical bills, accident reports, compensation and disability claims, and insurance coverage.

These documents are relevant to inquiries regarding, first, causation; and second, damages. See Tijerina, 2020 WL 1663181, at *10 (ordering disclosure of documents that Defendant argued were “directly relevant to the disputed issues of causation, the extent of Plaintiff's injuries, and whether Plaintiff suffered or reported any related injuries in the years before the accident.”).

Defendants indicate that Plaintiff's records are relevant to causation because such records could provide evidence as to other plausible causes of Plaintiff's injury or condition that “could be negated.” (Dkt. No. 22 para. 9). Defendants elaborate by positing that if Plaintiff physically injured her body, such as through a “herniated disk or tear,” causing permanent damage but not lasting pain, then Defendants’ experts ought to know so to determine causation. (Id. para. 6.)

*6 Plaintiff claims that she has already provided Defendants “all information related to the physical injuries suffered as a result of the accident by way of Plaintiff's Disclosures (February 8, 2022),” including provider's notes and recommendations surrounding Plaintiff's return to work, including relevant recommended restrictions, so Defendants’ request is “burdensome and annoying.” (Dkt. No. 25 para. 7.)

But the medical records related to Plaintiff's injuries from the accident are not the only relevant medical records. For example, medical records, medical bills, and disability claims in Plaintiff's employment records could show whether Plaintiff suffers from a separate chronic condition that could induce physical injury, mental anguish, or pain and suffering, negating causation.[9] See Swire v. Kempf, No. 1:18-CV-1003-AWA, 2020 WL 2326198, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 11, 2020) (finding medical records relevant to the plaintiff's claims in a motor vehicle accident case, because the plaintiff claimed to have suffered various sports injuries prior to his accident). Similarly, such medical records or accident reports may illuminate the nature of the car accident Plaintiff's vehicle was allegedly previously in, also potentially negating causation. See Tijerina, 2020 WL 1663181, at *10 (“[T]he billing records from all of [the plaintiff's] medical providers predating the accident and medical records from Next Generation are also relevant to [the defendant's] defense because [the plaintiff] herself admits to suffering from a prior back injury resulting from a prior car accident....”).

If Plaintiff's already-provided information in her disclosures comports with the information in her employment records, Plaintiff need not worry. Plaintiff need only worry if her employment records information may contradict her previously-provided information in her disclosures, in which case such information would certainly be relevant to Defendants.

Defendants say that Plaintiff's records are relevant to damages because, they argue, if Plaintiff suffers from mental anguish due to circumstances unrelated to her recent auto accident such as “depression caused by family/marital problems or employment conditions,” their counsel “should be able to explore that in order to parse out the mental anguish only related to the subject incident.” (Dkt. No. 22 para. 6.) Likewise, if Plaintiff has a painful preexisting medical condition such “lupus or fibromyalgia,” Defendants claim they are “entitled to know that” when evaluating Plaintiff's pain and suffering claim. (Id.) Defendants argue that a defendant is liable “only for those injuries and impairments” caused by his negligence; not those caused by preexisting trauma. (Id. para. 7), and so they “have a right to discover the extent of Plaintiff's work conditions that may have had an impact on her physical or mental health.” (Id. para. 10.)

Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ request has no relevancy because Defendants’ request is for employment and payroll records, but Plaintiff no longer seeks lost wages or lost earning capacity. (Dkt. No. 15 para. 6; Dkt. No. 25 paras. 8, 10.)

Here, certain records may show whether Plaintiff's accident and its alleged ramifications affected her at work, which Plaintiff specifically claimed in her deposition—a claim Defendants seek to explore. (Dkt. No. 22 paras. 4, 8, citing to “Plaintiff's Deposition, P47,L19 – P48,L1.”) See also Swire v. Kempf, 2020 WL 2326198, at *2 (finding the release of employment records as relevant to the plaintiff's damage claims). For example, Plaintiff's medical records, compensation and disability claims, and insurance coverage information could help expose the extent of Plaintiff's mental anguish and pain and suffering from the present accident, helping Defendants assess damages. Merrill, 227 F.R.D. at 471 (finding that, generally, the “identities of health providers, the dates of treatment[,] and the nature of the treatment are relevant to claims for emotional distress damages.”).

*7 Plaintiff's personnel file, performance evaluations, accident reports, attendance records, and correspondence could also show whether Plaintiff was ever in involved in or sought care for any workplace incidents that could have caused her mental anguish or pain and suffering—circumstances that could mitigate the damages Plaintiff may receive in the instant case. For example, Plaintiff works for a security company and may have been negatively mentally affected by an in-person security incident, or by hearing about one second-hand. Or Plaintiff may have received bad reviews—which would be part of the performance evaluations that Defendants requested—causing her mental anguish and casting doubt on present damages claims. Plaintiff's accident reports, as well as her performance evaluations, compensation and disability claims, and medical records and bills could similarly show if Plaintiff suffered any injuries at work before or after the accident, such as a sprain from sitting or standing, a back injury, or carpal tunnel syndrome, that could cause pain and suffering. See Swire, 2020 WL 2326198, at *2; Tijerina, 2020 WL 1663181, at *10.

Even the nature or conditions of Plaintiff's work could cause her mental anguish—nature and conditions that Plaintiff's job description and assignments, wage and salary information, and personnel file would illuminate. For instance, Plaintiff herself reported in her deposition that she worked long hours. (Dkt. No. 22 paras. 4, 8, citing to “Plaintiff's Deposition, P47,L19 – P48,L1”). Plaintiff's performance evaluations, correspondence, and attendance records may show the number of hours Plaintiff worked, whether Plaintiff reported any pain or suffering from long periods of sitting or standing, or whether she showed signs of mental anguish in response to the long hours, further factors that could mitigate damages.

However, Plaintiff's employment applications are not relevant, as Plaintiff's experience at her job, not in obtaining her job, is at issue. Similarly, Plaintiff's pension records are not relevant, because Plaintiff is not yet retired. And Plaintiff's records relating to employee benefits are not relevant because information showing the nature of Plaintiff's benefits is unlikely to show Plaintiff's condition prior to or after her accident. Moreover, records relating to Plaintiff's employee benefits would not necessarily show Plaintiff's use or lack thereof of her benefits. Finally, Defendants have not argued as to the importance of accessing records relating to Plaintiff's employee benefits.

Therefore, Defendants need the documents described above—except for Plaintiff's employment applications, employee benefits records, and pension records—as they help Defendants’ experts and counsel evaluate Plaintiff's claims regarding causation, as well as damages including mental anguish and pain and suffering.

Third, the relevant employment records that Defendants seek from Plaintiff's employer are tailored in scope.[10] Defendants have claimed Plaintiff's vehicle was involved in a prior accident, and Plaintiff's injuries from the present accident are the basis of her claims. See Swire, 2020 WL 2326198, at *2 (finding the release of employment records was properly tailored to the plaintiff's damage claims, despite the plaintiff arguing that the records were neither tailored “to time periods or relevant subject matter.”) Here, Defendants particularly describe the documents requested, asking for specific categories of employment records such as performance records, and the burden on Plaintiff is both justified and minimal. Plaintiff's assertion that Defendants’ request for Plaintiff's employment records is “burdensome and annoying, forcing Plaintiff to file a reply” to a response allegedly unlikely to lead to any new or admissible information, (see Dkt. No. 25 para. 7), does not pass muster.

*8 However, the Court notes that Plaintiff's employment applications are not proportional, because Plaintiff's job description and assignments and performance evaluations should cover any remaining inquiries about what Plaintiff's expected and actual duties entail. Likewise, requesting Plaintiff's pension records is overbroad because Plaintiff is not yet retired. And Plaintiff's records relating to employee benefits are not proportional, because any inquiries as to Plaintiff's potential need to utilize her benefits before and after her accident should be covered by disclosure of Plaintiff's attendance records, wage and salary information, medical records and medical bills, compensation and disability claims, personnel files, and insurance coverage information.

The Court therefore finds that the following documents are not discoverable: Plaintiff's employment applications, pension records, and records relating to employee benefits. Plaintiff's objection to the production of these documents, (see Dkt. No. 15 paras. 5–6), is sustained, and her motion is GRANTED in part, because Defendants have not shown the relevancy of these materials and the information sought is overbroad. So, the requests for these documents is unduly burdensome. Should the discovery of such documents become relevant, or should Defendants narrowly tailor their inquiry, Defendants may move the Court to reconsider after further briefing.

Excluding Plaintiff's employment applications, pension records, and records relating to employee benefits, the Court finds Defendants’ request for the remaining documents to be relevant and proportional, and Plaintiff's interest in them must yield to discovery requirements. These discoverable documents are Plaintiff's employment records, including her personnel files, job descriptions and assignments, performance evaluations, attendance records, correspondence, wage and salary information, medical records and medical bills, accident reports, compensation and disability claims, and insurance coverage information. Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated any undue burden from Laredo Knight Security's compliance with the subpoena regarding these documents, and there is no good cause for a protective order, her motion is DENIED in part.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff's Motion to Quash and for a Protective Order, (Dkt. No. 15), and ORDERS that Defendant be permitted discovery of the employment records set forth in Defendant's Notice of Intention to Take Deposition by Written Questions, as modified:

IT IS SO ORDERED.