*1 On December 7, 2015, the Court held a telephonic hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Documents Requested in Discovery (“Motion to Compel”). (Docket Entry No. 52). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On September 17, 2014, Plaintiff was pulled over by Defendant Deputy Rivera (“Defendant Rivera”) for driving a vehicle with expired registration. (Def.'s Supp. Br. at 3).[1] According to Defendant Rivera's records check on the vehicle, the vehicle's registration had expired on September 9, 2013, and had been previously registered to an Ernesto Macias. (Id.) During the traffic stop, Defendant Rivera purportedly saw a loaded pistol magazine in the driver's side door of Plaintiff's vehicle. (Pl.'s Supp. Br. at 2). Defendant Rivera then ordered Plaintiff to step outside the vehicle so that he could perform a firearms investigation. (Id.; Joint Stip. at 8). Defendant Rivera also asked Plaintiff whether there were any firearms in the vehicle. (Pl.'s Supp. Br. at 2). Plaintiff responded that there was an unloaded pistol in the trunk. (Id.) Defendant Rivera then placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and into the back of his patrol vehicle while he searched Plaintiff's vehicle for firearms. (Id.) Defendant Rivera discovered an unloaded pistol wrapped in a sleeping bag in the vehicle's trunk. (Id.)

Defendant Rivera then conducted an electronic records search of the handgun and found that it was registered to Mrs. Anna Shakhgeldyan. (Def.'s Supp. Br. at 3). Plaintiff explained that Mrs. Shakhgeldyan was his ex-wife and that she had given him the handgun. (Id.) Defendant Rivera then called Mrs. Shakhgeldyan, who confirmed that the gun was registered to her and that she had given it to Plaintiff. (Pl.'s Supp. Br. at 2). When asked to where he was travelling, Plaintiff told Defendant Rivera that he was going to court. (Joint Stip. at 9). Plaintiff remained in handcuffs and within Defendant Rivera's patrol vehicle for the duration of the search, which allegedly lasted for about an hour. (Pl.'s Supp. Br. at 2).

Defendant Deputy Rivera then placed Plaintiff under arrest for violating Cal. Penal Code Section 25400(h)(1), possession of a concealed weapon. (Id. at 3). Plaintiff was permitted to call his lawyer to inform him that he was under arrest and would not be in court. (Joint Stip. at 9). Defendant Rivera drove Plaintiff to the Inmate Reception Center (“IRC”), where Plaintiff was booked into custody. (Id.) Plaintiff was held in the IRC for 34 hours, at which point he was transferred to Men's Central Jail (“MCJ”). (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that, during his time in custody, he was chained to a bench for eighteen hours. (Pl.'s Supp. Br. at 3). Plaintiff was released from MCJ on September 19, 2014, at 4:46 a.m. (Joint Stip. at 10).

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Proceedings Through December 6, 2015

*2 On May 18, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (“Compl.”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his civil rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Docket Entry No. 1). The Complaint named the County of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Deputy Rivera, and Does 1–10 as Defendants.[2] (Id. at 1).

On June 17, 2015, Defendants County of Los Angeles and Deputy Rivera filed an Answer. (Docket Entry No. 16).

On September 21, 2015, with the Court's leave, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Docket Entry No. 31). The FAC added Defendants Thomas and Avila, alleging that they, along with Defendants County of Los Angeles, Deputy Rivera, and Does 1–10, violated Plaintiff's civil rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 6–11). According to the FAC, Defendants Thomas and Avila violated Plaintiff's civil rights by approving of the illegal arrest. (Id. at 5).

On October 21, 2015, Defendants County of Los Angeles and Rivera filed an Answer to the First Amended Complaint, (Docket Entry No. 46), as did Defendant Avila, (Docket Entry No. 48). On October 23, 2015, Defendant Thomas filed an Answer to the First Amended Complaint. (Docket Entry No. 50).

On November 25, 2015, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation re Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Documents Requested in Discovery (“Joint Slip.”), setting forth the parties' respective positions on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. (Docket Entry No. 52). The Motion to Compel seeks documents responsive to twenty-five requests for production. (Id. at 16–46).

B. December 7, 2015, Hearing

During the December 7, 2015, telephonic hearing, the Court noted that Defendants agreed to produce documents responsive to Request Nos. 2, 6–8, 18, 19, 21–22, 24, and 25. These requests and Defendants' responses are memorialized below. Defendants have objected, and not produced any responsive documents, to the remaining requests, Request Nos. 1, 3–5, and 9–17.

Request No. 2: “Produce any and all documents/printouts/screen shots reflecting communications from or to any Mobile Data Terminal or Computer in Deputy Rivera's vehicle regarding or pertaining in any way to Plaintiff's arrest. This includes, but is not limited to emails or text messages from the patrol vehicle or to Sheriff's Communication's Center (Dispatch) or to Sheriff's jail personnel or to any Sheriff state or to any MTA station.” (Joint Stip. at 18).

Defendants' Response: Defense counsel agreed to obtain verification from Defendant County regarding whether or not there are further responsive documents.

Request No. 6: “Produce any and all dispatch records pertaining in any way to Plaintiff's arrest.” (Id. at 23).

Defendants' Response: Defense counsel stated that the CDs provided to Plaintiff's counsel were the only dispatch recordings for the time period in question.

Request No. 7: “Produce any and all recordings or videos by any Deputy or employee of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department regarding the arrest of Plaintiff.” (Id. at 24).

*3 Defendants' Response: Defense counsel stated that there are no such audio or video recordings.

Request No. 8: “Produce any and all jail videos from the time Deputy Rivera drove into the jail compound and walked [P]laintiff into the jail facility, and any video depicting [P]laintiff in any areas of the L.A. County Jail, including the following locations: booking area, search and uncuff area, clinic, custody line, inmate reception center, [M]en's Central [J]ail cell number 40 and inmate release.” (Id. at 25).

Defendants' Response: Defense counsel stated that there are no videos from the jail that are responsive to Plaintiff's request.

Request No. 18: “Produce any and all documents referencing or relating to any and all policies, procedures, and training in effect at the time of the incident related to confiscation of weapons and the arrest of persons for carrying concealed weapons in their vehicles.” (Id. at 38).

Defendants' Response: Defense counsel stated that he had produced all Los Angeles County Sherriff's Department policies regarding the confiscation of weapons from individuals.

Request No. 19: Plaintiff requests any and all documents comprising the booking jacket or jail file pertaining to Plaintiff at any jail facility to which he was taken, or at which he was incarcerated, held, or housed following his arrest and up until his release from the same.[3]

Defendants' Response: Defense counsel stated that he had complied with the request and was not aware of any medical records that were part of the booking jacket.

Request No. 20: “Produce any and all jail videos which captured the image of the Plaintiff at any time from the date of his arrest and incarceration up to and including the date of his release.” (Id. at 40).

Defendants' Response: Defense counsel noted that Request No. 20 was duplicative of Request No. 8 and stated that he would produce all non-privileged responsive documents, to the extent that they exist.

Request No. 21: “Produce any and all documents or writings which relate to any medical screening or medical clearance concerning the [P]laintiff which was conducted by, or at the request of any employee of the Defendant or its [S]heriff's Department.” (Id. at 40–41).

Defendants' Response: Defense counsel stated that he is unaware of any medical records, but that he will inquire about any medical screening that Plaintiff underwent at IRC or MCJ.

Request No. 22: “Produce any and all documents, computer print outs, or other computer generated reports or data created by mobile data software, or similar, which links the officers on the road to the dispatch centers and/or the sheriff's department, including any similar CAD reports, or computer generated detailed history reports, or similar computer generated reports which capture the radio traffic communications between deputies and dispatch and/or deputies and other deputies.” (Id. at 42).

Defendants' Response: Defense counsel stated that all responsive materials have been produced, but will verify this and produce responsive materials to the extent that they have not been turned over.

*4 Request No. 24: “Produce a true and correct copy of the LASD policy regarding deputies carrying belt recorders, or digital recorders, tape recorders, or similar.” (Id. at 44).

Defendants' Response: Defense counsel stated that the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (“LASD”) does not have a policy regarding deputies wearing any type of recording devices, audio or video.

Request No. 25: “Produce any and all policies and training materials used by the LAPD [sic] related to LASD's procedures for deputies to receive approval prior to the booking of a prisoner in jail.” (Id. at 45).

Defendant's Response: Defense counsel stated that he was unable to locate a specific LASD policy that is responsive to Request No. 25.

Request No. 1: “Produce any and all arrest reports of similar arrests for Penal Code section 25400(a)(1) for weapons located in a vehicle for five years preceding 9/17/2015.” (Joint Stip. at 16).

Request No. 3: “Produce any and all records of any and all phone calls made by or to Deputy Rivera to/from any phone used by him pertaining in any way to Plaintiff's arrest.” (Id. at 19).

Request No. 4: “Produce any and all records of any phone calls made by or to Sgt. Avila to/from any phone used by him pertaining in any way to Plaintiff's arrest.” (Id. at 20).

Request No. 5: “Produce any and all records of any phone calls made by or to Sgt. Thomas to/from any phone used by him pertaining in any way to Plaintiff's arrest.” (Id. at 21).

Request No. 9: “Produce any and all documents referencing or relating to claims or complaints of perjury, allegations of dishonesty, untruthfulness and submissions of false/untruthful reports, unlawful search and seizure of property, false arrest and excessive force by Deputy Rivera for all dates of his employment with THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.” (Id. at 26).

Request No. 10: “Produce any and all documents referencing or relating to disciplinary warnings or other disciplinary measures administered to Deputy Rivera for the past 10 years of his employment with THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.” (Id. at 30).

Request No. 11: “Produce any and all documents referencing or relating to any criminal action initiated against Deputy Rivera for all dates of his employment with the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, whether or not such action resulted in a conviction.” (Id. at 31).

Request No. 12: “Produce any and all documents referencing or relating to disciplinary warnings or other disciplinary measures administered to Sergeant Avila for all dates of his employment with THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.” (Id. at 32).

Request No. 13: “Produce any and all documents referencing or relating to disciplinary warnings or other disciplinary measures administered to Sergeant Thomas for all dates of his employment with the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.” (Id. at 33).

Request No. 14: “Produce any and all documents referencing or relating to any criminal action initiated against Sergeant Avila for all dates of his employment with THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, whether or not such action resulted in a conviction.” (Id. at 34).

Request No. 15: “Produce any and all documents referencing or relating to any criminal action initiated against Sergeant Thomas for all dates of his employment with the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, whether or not such action resulted in a conviction.” (Id. at 35).

*5 Request No. 16: “Produce any and all documents referencing or relating to allegations of dishonesty, untruthfulness and submissions of false/untruthful reports by Sergeant Avila for all dates of his employment with the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.” (Id. at 36).

Request No. 17: “Produce any and all documents referencing or relating to allegations of dishonesty, untruthfulness and submissions of false/untruthful reports by Sergeant Thomas for all dates of his employment with the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.” (Id. at 37).

C. Supplemental Briefing

On December 8, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Brief re: Excessive Force in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel (“Pl.'s Supp. Br.”). (Docket Entry No. 54). In his brief, Plaintiff argued that the arrest was illegal, thereby making any use of force, including simple handcuffing, unlawful. (Id. at 3–6).

On December 9, 2015, Defendants filed a Brief re: Excessive Force in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel (“Def.'s Supp. Br.”). (Docket Entry No. 55). In their brief, Defendants argued that this is not an excessive force case. (Id. at 2). In support of this contention, Defendants pointed out that the arrest was objectively reasonable based on the facts of the case. (Id. at 4-6). As a result, Defendants claimed that the use of force was justified and, based on the minimal amount of force used, was not excessive. (Id.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The current version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) reads:

Based on the language of 26(b)(1), it appears that even relevant information is subject to the proportional needs of the case before it is within the scope of discovery. While some courts have held that relevance is defined more broadly for the purposes of discovery than for trial, such findings were ostensibly based on a now deleted phrase in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) stating that evidence need only be “reasonably calculated to lead to evidence that is admissible at trial” in order to be discoverable. See Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 295–96 (CD. Cal. 1992) (citations omitted). The advisory committee notes to the most recent amendment make clear that the now non-existent phrase was consistently misread as defining the scope of discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), advisory committee's note.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Request No. 1

Request No. 1 seeks “any and all arrest reports of similar arrests for Penal Code section 25400(a)(1) for weapons located in a vehicle for five years preceding 9/17/2015.” (Joint Stip. at 16). Defendants argue that the information sought in Request No. 1 is irrelevant and cannot be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible information. (Joint Stip. at 16). Plaintiff attempts to counter this assertion by arguing that the request seeks information relevant to Plaintiff's Monell claim. (Id. at 17). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the arrest records provide evidence supporting a County practice of illegal searches, seizures, and excessive force. (Id.)

*6 The Court cannot conclude that all arrest records for Cal. Penal Code § 25400(a)(1) are relevant to Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff is not suing Defendant Rivera for simply arresting him. Rather he is suing Defendant Rivera for illegally arresting him. Likewise, Plaintiff's Monell claim is ostensibly based on an unofficial policy or custom of illegal searches and seizures by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Indeed, arrests effectuated by law enforcement that did not violate the Fourth Amendment are, at a minimum, unhelpful to Plaintiff. Therefore, “any and all arrest reports” for the violation of a specific penal code is too broad a request, and the request should be limited to “any and all records of illegal arrests for Penal Code Section 25400(a)(1) for weapons located in a vehicle for five years preceding 9/17/14,” as those are the only documents that would be relevant to Plaintiff's claim.

Having narrowed Plaintiff's request considerably, the Court must now consider whether records of illegal arrests for Cal. Penal Code § 25400(a)(1) are proportional to the needs of the case, taking into account the factors listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation weighs in favor of Plaintiff. Subversion of the protections afforded citizens by the Constitution is always an important issue and should never be taken lightly.

While Plaintiff does not have access to all of the Los Angeles County Sherriff's Department's arrest records, Plaintiff is capable of searching for lawsuits brought against the Department alleging illegal searches and seizures. As a result, the parties' relative access to information does not weigh in favor of compelled discovery.

The amount in controversy in this case does not weigh heavily on the Court's decision. While the parties may consider the amount in controversy to be significant, that amount is a good faith valuation by Plaintiff as to what his damages are, and is based on intangible factors. As a result, the damages cannot, at this point, be determined with any certainty.

Here, the parties' resources weigh in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff is correct in his contention that Defendants cannot hide behind an inadequate filing system in order to prevent discovery. See Thomas v. Cate, 715 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1033 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). However, the fact remains that Plaintiff's request remains very broad and would require a considerable amount of time and manpower to comply with the request, even if Defendants maintained the records in an electronic filing system. Additionally, whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit strongly supports Defendants' claim. Here, the only arrest records that would be helpful to Plaintiff are those that indicate an illegal arrest based on Cal. Penal Code § 25400(a)(1). Indeed, such records would only assist Plaintiff if they were either facially invalid or accompanied by the subsequent history of the arrest to show whether it was, in fact, deemed illegitimate. As a result, any search for arrest records that would aid Plaintiff's claims would require at least a reading of each record to determine whether or not the arresting officer validly arrested an individual.[4] The burden placed on Defendants in such an instance outweighs the likely benefits of the requested information.

Because the factors listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) weigh in favor of Defendants, Plaintiff is not entitled to discovery of all records of arrests for violations of Cal. Penal Code § 25400(a)(1).

B. Request Nos. 3–5

*7 Request Nos. 3–5 seek “any and all records of any and all phone calls made by or to [Defendants] to/from any phone used by him pertaining in any way to Plaintiff's arrest.” (Joint Stip. at 19–20). Plaintiff's agreed at the telephonic hearing to narrow the request so as to seek the records from only the time period in which Plaintiff was in custody. Defendants objected to this request on the basis that it was overbroad, unduly burdensome, and irrelevant. At the telephonic hearing, Defense counsel suggested that the request be narrowed in terms of the phones that were used by Defendants during the time Plaintiff was in custody, so as to prevent a wider search for the requested materials.

The Court finds Defendants' argument unpersuasive. The phone records are relevant for the purpose of showing whether Defendants discussed the nature of Plaintiff's arrest. Plaintiff has narrowed the timeframe of these requests to only the time period during which Plaintiff was in custody. Presuming that the records are not extraordinarily voluminous, they are within the scope of discovery and should be produced.

C. Request Nos. 9 and 10

Request No. 9 seeks “any and all documents referencing or relating to claims or complaints of perjury, allegations of dishonesty, untruthfulness and submissions of false/untruthful reports, unlawful search and seizure of property, false arrest and excessive force by Deputy Rivera for all dates of his employment with THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.” (Joint Stip. at 26). Furthermore, Request No. 10 seeks “any and all documents referencing or relating to disciplinary warnings or other disciplinary measures administered to Deputy Rivera for the past 10 years of his employment with THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.” (Id. at 30).

Ordinarily, complaints and claims of excessive force in an officer's personnel file are relevant to show “excessive force, aggressive conduct, unnecessary violence or unnecessary force” on the part of a defendant officer. See Fisher v. Houser, 2010 WL 4917066, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2010). However, while “the relevance and discovery of officers' disciplinary records, including unfounded complaints and allegations of misconduct, are widely recognized,” Johnson v. Sandy, 2014 WL 4631642, at *12 (E.D. Cal. 2014), a plaintiff is not entitled to “unfettered access to the personnel records” of a defendant officer, Bernat v. City of California City, 2010 WL at 4008361, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Instead, “countervailing ... privacy considerations can be adequately addressed by narrowly tailoring the compelled production.” Johnson, 2014 WL 4631642, at * 12; see also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)) (alteration in original) (“[D]istrict courts should not neglect their power to restrict discovery where ‘justice requires [protection for] a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense ....’ ”). “Though federal courts recognize a general right to privacy, the resolution of a privacy objection requires a balancing of the need for the particular information against the privacy rights asserted.” Bernat, 2010 WL 4008361, at *6 (citing Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 621 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).

Here, Plaintiff was not shot, struck with a baton, beaten, tackled, tasered, or pepper sprayed at the scene of the traffic stop and initial arrest. Rather, Plaintiff was pulled over, handcuffed, and confined to the back of Defendant Rivera's patrol car on a hot day.[5] As a result, the only question regarding Deputy Rivera's actions is whether the minimal amount of force used was justified by a valid arrest. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (finding that claims involving the “seizure of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its reasonableness standard”). Simple handcuffing is not, by itself, excessive force. See DeLuca v. County of Los Angeles, 2015 WL 4451420, at *7 (CD. Cal. 2015) (noting the absence of cases “hold[ing] that the mere fact of handcuffing alone, notwithstanding an unlawful seizure, is sufficient to state a claim for excessive force”). Even including the placement of Plaintiff into Defendant Rivera's patrol vehicle, complaints of excessive force tending to show “excessive force, aggressive conduct, unnecessary violence or unnecessary force” are, at most, minimally probative about whether Defendant Rivera's actions were justified by a valid arrest.[6] See Fisher, 2010 WL 4917066, at *2.

*8 Based on the countervailing privacy concerns at play in this case, Plaintiff's requests for Defendant Rivera's disciplinary history should be narrowly tailored. As discussed above, prior instances of excessive force unrelated to false arrest are not probative as to whether Defendant Rivera illegally arrested Plaintiff using a minimal amount of force. Additionally, such requests implicate important privacy concerns, requiring that Plaintiff's discovery requests be tailored. As a result, Plaintiff is limited to discovery of documents related only to complaints of perjury, dishonesty, or untruthfulness, the submissions of false or untruthful reports, and false or unlawful arrests.

D. Request No. 11

Request No. 11 seeks “any and all documents referencing or relating to any criminal action initiated against Deputy Rivera for all dates of his employment with the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, whether or not such action resulted in a conviction.” (Joint Stip. at 31). For the reasons noted above, the only criminal actions against Defendant Rivera that are discoverable are any actions based on crimes of dishonesty.

E. Request Nos. 12–15

Request Nos. 12 and 13 seek “any and all documents referencing or relating to disciplinary warnings or other disciplinary measures administered” to Defendants Avila and Thomas, respectively, for the duration of their employment with the County of Los Angeles. (Joint Stip. at 32–34). Additionally, Request Nos. 14–15 ask for “any and all documents referencing or relating to any criminal action initiated” against Defendants Avila and Thomas, respectively, for all dates of their employment with Los Angeles County. (Id. at 34–36). At the hearing on December 7, 2015, the parties stated that Defendant Avila signed the arrest report, indicating that he believed it to be facially valid. Defendant Thomas apparently signed off on Plaintiff's booking information when he was booked at the IRC. Therefore, it appears that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Avila and Thomas are based on their complicity in Plaintiff's arrest.

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Thomas and Avila physically participated in his arrest or in chaining him to a bench for eighteen hours. Further, neither Defendant is alleged to have covered up any wrongdoing by Defendant Rivera.[7] Instead, Plaintiff simply alleges that Defendants approved of Plaintiff's arrest by Defendant Rivera through inaction following their review of Plaintiff's arrest report. Based on the factors within Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), the disciplinary histories of Defendants Thomas and Avila, if they are relevant, are not discoverable in their entireties. Furthermore, Plaintiff may not bring Defendants Thomas and Avila into the case based on their minimal involvement simply to conduct discovery for his Monell claim. See Valenzuela v. City of Calexico, 2015 WL 2184304, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (internal quotations omitted) (“A litigant may not file suit in order to use discovery as the sole means of finding out whether [he has] a case.”). Even assuming the entire disciplinary records of Defendants Thomas and Avila are relevant, the limited probative value of such information to this case requires the restriction of discovery. Consequently, the only portions of Defendants Thomas' and Avila's disciplinary records that are discoverable are those pertaining directly to approvals of false or unlawful arrests. Additionally, for the same reasons that Plaintiff's discovery of Defendant Rivera's criminal history should be limited, Defendants Thomas' and Avila's criminal histories are only discoverable as to actions involving crimes of dishonesty.

F. Request Nos. 16 and 17

*9 Request No 16. Seeks “any and all documents referencing or relating to allegations of dishonesty, untruthfulness and submissions of false/untruthful reports by Sergeant Avila for all dates of his employment with the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.” (Joint Stip. at 36). Request No. 17 seeks the same regarding Sergeant Thomas. (Id. at 37). Because Defendants Thomas and Avila will likely be witnesses at trial, their credibility is at issue. Therefore, the documents sought in Request Nos. 16 and 17 are discoverable.

G. Privilege Assertions

In defense against Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, Defendants assert four privileges: (1) the self-critical analysis privilege; (2) the official information privilege; (3) the government communication privilege; (4) the self-deliberative analysis privilege. The self-critical analysis privilege does not apply in civil rights cases against law enforcement agencies. See Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 612 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Likewise, the deliberative process privilege is also inapplicable to civil rights cases against police departments. Id. The Court is unaware of any caselaw endorsing the government communications privilege. The official information privilege may be asserted in a suit against a law enforcement agency. Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 660 (N.D. Cal. 1987). However, the official information privilege requires that the party asserting the privilege submit “a declaration or affidavit from a responsible official with personal knowledge of the matters to be attested to in the affidavit.” Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613 (citations omitted). This declaration or affidavit is required to include:

Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 670.

Here, Defendants have not submitted any affidavit or declaration including any of the information required to successfully assert the “official information” privilege. As a result, the privilege does not protect any information from disclosure.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is GRANTED with respect to:

Request Nos. 3–5 as limited to the time period in which Plaintiff was in custody, beginning with the traffic stop by Defendant Rivera, and ending with his release from Men's Central Jail.

Request Nos. 9 and 10 insofar as they relate to complaints of complaints of perjury, dishonesty, or untruthfulness, the submissions of false or untruthful reports, and false or unlawful arrests.

Request No. 11 insofar as it relates to crimes of dishonesty.

Request Nos. 12 and 13 insofar as they relate to complaints involving the approvals of false or unlawful arrests.

Request Nos. 14 and 15 insofar as they relate to crimes of dishonesty.

Request Nos. 16 and 17 in their entirety.

Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is DENIED as to all other requests, or portions of those requests, in dispute.

Defendants are further ORDERED to comply with their obligations relating to those requests not in dispute, as memorialized above. Both parties are also reminded of their continuing discovery obligations, per Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1).