*1 On December 9, 2020, the plaintiff, Michael Richey (Richey), commenced this action by service of process against the defendant, Georgette Carlow (Carlow). Thus, a long-standing dispute between neighbors ensued involving alleged drainage from Carlow's property to Richey's properly. Since this action started, there have been dozens of motions, orders, and requests entered. Most recently, the defendant's motion to strike the amended complaint was granted, leaving no operative complaint (docket entry number 166.2).

On October 11, 2022, Carlow filed this motion to dismiss the case with prejudice pursuant to Practice Book § 13-14 and the court's inherent authority to sanction parties (docket entry number 186). A memorandum in support accompanied the motion to dismiss (docket entry number 187). Richey filed an objection on December 8, 2022 (docket entry number 189). The matter was heard for oral argument on December 14, 2022.

This case involves the deep-rooted and inherent authority of the court to impose sanctions against a party during litigation. “We have long recognized that, apart from a specific rule of practice authorizing a sanction, the trial court has the inherent power to provide for the imposition of reasonable sanctions, to compel the observance of its rules.” Millbrook Owners Assn., Inc. v. Hamilton Standard, 257 Conn. 1, 9, 776 A.2d 1115 (2001). “It is well settled Connecticut policy that courts should safeguard the proper administration of justice and preserve the public confidence in the purity and efficiency of judicial proceedings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stanley Shenker & Associates, Inc. v. World Wrestling Federation Entertainment, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X05-CV-00-0180933-S (October 16, 2003, Rogers, J.) (48 Conn. Supp. 357, 372, 844 A.2d 964). “Connecticut courts, accordingly, have long recognized that they have the power to impose sanctions for litigation misconduct, including, where appropriate, the ultimate sanction of dismissal.” Id., 373.

“[A]lthough dismissal of an action is not an abuse of discretion whe[n] a party shows a deliberate, contumacious or unwarranted disregard for the court's authority ... the court should be reluctant to employ the sanction of dismissal except as a last resort.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Evans v. General Motors Corp., 277 Conn. 496, 523-24, 893 A.2d 371 (2006). “The sanction of dismissal serves not only to penalize those whose conduct warrants such a sanction but also to deter those who might be tempted to [engage in] such conduct in the absence of such deterrent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Emerick v. Glastonbury, 177 Conn. App. 701, 706, 173 A.3d 28 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 994, 175 A.3d 1245 (2018).

While the court recognizes that this is a self-represented plaintiff, he is not an inexperienced litigator. Indeed, he has been a plaintiff and a defendant in over a dozen civil actions; acting as a self-represented party most of the time. This action stretches back over two years. “Our Supreme Court has identified the following factors as relevant to determining the proportionality of a sanction: the nature and frequency of the misconduct, notice of the possibility of a sanction, the availability of lesser sanctions, and the client's participation in or knowledge of the misconduct.... Our Supreme Court also noted that these principles reflect that, in assessing proportionality, a trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including, most importantly, the nature of the conduct itself.” (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Fleischer v. Fleischer, 192 Conn. App. 540, 548-49, 217 A.3d 1028 (2019).

*2 In analyzing these factors, the court notes the plaintiff's lengthy litigation experience as a self-represented party. Moreover, after two years, the defendant is still without a complaint to respond to. This is the first of three actions involving the same or similar parties.[1] The plaintiff is on notice of the possibility of sanctions pursuant to docket entry numbers 121.2 and 135.11. In entry number 121.2, the Honorable Courtney Chaplin precluded the plaintiff from recording any further documents on the Ellington Land Records, advised him to stop using threatening language directed at defense counsel, and directed him to not file pleadings that are designed to harass, annoy, or cause undue legal expense for the defendant. Additionally, in entry number 135.11, the Honorable Carletha Parkinson precluded the plaintiff from communicating directly with the defendant and from engaging in threatening or intimidating behavior towards the defendant. Finally, the plaintiff was sanctioned in a separate action and now has a leave to file requirement related to defendant Carlow. See Richey v. Carlow, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. TTDCV-21-5015213-S (March 17, 2022, Parkinson, J.). “An order of the court must be obeyed until it has been modified or successfully challenged, and the consequences for noncompliance may be severe indeed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peterson v. Woldeyohannes, 111 Conn. App. 784, 792, 961 A.2d 475 (2008).

In this action, following entry number 121.20, on June 29, 2021, the defendant served the plaintiff with a request for disclosure and production (docket entry number 140). After receiving no response, the defendant filed — and was granted — an order of compliance (docket entry number 147.10). Thereafter, another request for production was served on March 31, 2022 (docket entry number 165). After the second attempt was returned to the defendant, a third attempt was made on April 19, 2022 (docket entry number 170). The defendant filed a second motion for compliance (docket entry number 171). At a hearing on September 21, 2022, the court ordered the plaintiff to answer the discovery request. The plaintiff filed his responses to the request on October 3, 2022 (docket entry number 185). The answers to those interrogatories contain numerous responses such as “to be supplied at trial” and “come look for yourself.” The plaintiff is aware of the possibility of sanctions based on prior orders.

The availability of lesser sanctions will not change the course of the plaintiff's conduct. There have been sanctions and warnings in this case. There have been numerous orders and court hearings where the same issues about recusal of defendant's counsel and judicial bias were raised. Variations of the same complaint have been heard and dismissed in two separate actions. In this case, a motion to strike was recently granted related to the second amended complaint (docket entry number 166.2). The failure to file a complaint that comports with the practice book and established case law runs afoul of the rules of the court.[2] In the last analysis, it is the Superior Court that “can evaluate the whole ball of wax and determine whether the small incremental blows to the integrity of the trial add up to something that requires sanctioning. Death by a thousand cuts is no less severe than death by a single powerful blow.” Lafferty v. Jones, 336 Conn. 332, 379, 246 A.3d 429 (2020).

Finally, the totality of the circumstances involving this action, the other actions, and the plaintiff's failure to comply with judicial orders and court rules, necessitates the court to dismiss the action with prejudice. The court notes that “[o]vercrowded dockets have become a major problem challenging the ability of the courts of this state and elsewhere to dispense justice. It is well known that justice delayed is justice denied.” Gionfrido v. Wharf Realty, Inc., 193 Conn. 28, 32, 474 A.2d 787 (1984). “Our judicial system cannot be controlled by the litigants and cases cannot be allowed to drift aimlessly through the system....” Jaconski v. AMF, Inc., 208 Conn. 230, 233, 543 A.2d 728 (1988). Based on the foregoing, this action is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the court's inherent power to provide for sanctions.

*3 Alternatively, the plaintiff's actions run afoul of Practice Book § 13-14 (b) (5).[3] “Our Supreme Court has stated that, a court may, either under its inherent power to impose sanctions in order to compel observance of its rules and orders, or under the provisions of [Practice Book] § 13-14, impose sanctions.... The decision to enter sanctions ... and, if so, what sanction or sanctions to impose, is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alpha Beta Capital Partners, L.P. v. Pursuit Investment Management, LLC, 198 Conn. App. 671, 687, 234 A.3d 997 (2020).

The court may provide sanctions for failure to answer interrogatories and the “factors to be considered by the court include: (1) whether the noncompliance was caused by inability, rather than [willfulness], bad faith or other fault; (2) whether and to what extent noncompliance caused prejudice to the other party, including the importance of the information sought to the party's case; and (3) which sanction would, under the circumstances of the case, be an appropriate judicial response to the noncomplying party's conduct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuccio v. Garamella, 114 Conn. App. 205, 208, 969 A.2d 190 (2009).

The plaintiff's answers to the interrogatories were not caused by inability. The delay in answering coupled with the responses themselves show a willfulness in not answering or cooperating with the requirements of the litigation process. The timeline of the request for production and discovery was detailed above. The court held an in-person hearing on September 21, 2022, regarding several matters, including a motion to strike (docket entry number 166) and the second motion for compliance (docket entry number 171). At this hearing, the court ordered the plaintiff to comply with the request for disclosure and production (docket entry number 171.2). On October 3, 2022, the plaintiff filed his responses to the request for production and disclosure (docket entry number 185). Included were answers such as “to be supplied at trial” or “come look for yourself,” which show willful noncompliance with the defendant's request for production and the court's order. Some variation of “to be supplied at trial” was used as a response twenty-four times.

Noncompliance with the discovery order caused the defendant prejudice by forcing her to expend time and money to defend the action. Moreover, the defendant still does not have an operative complaint to respond to, making the information sought through the request for production all the more important to the defendant's case.

The sanction of dismissal with prejudice is the appropriate response to the plaintiff's willful noncompliance related to this case. The plaintiff has been warned and sanctioned multiple times. This action cannot be allowed to drift aimlessly through the system. Jaconski v. AMF, Inc., supra, 208 Conn. 233.

Thus, the plaintiff's action is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Practice Book § 13-14 (b) (5).

*4 For the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the court's inherent power to sanction and pursuant to Practice Book § 13-14 (b) (5).

SO ORDERED.