the party who is resisting production has the burden to establish that the material either does not come within the scope of relevance or is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm resulting from production outweighs the presumption in favor of broad disclosure. Horizon Holdings, LLC v. Genmar Holdings, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 208, 211-212 (D. Kan. 2002). A party who seeks to avoid disclosure of requested materials “bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that disclosure will work a clearly defined and very serious injury ...” Empire of Carolina, Inc. v. Mackle, 108 F.R.D. 323, 326 (S.D. Fla, 1985) (citing Citicorp v. Interbank Card Association, 478 F.Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)). Courts generally do not grant protective orders without a strong showing of good cause, and the burden of establishing good cause falls on the party who seeks such an order. Howard v. Galesi, 107 F.R.D. 348, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing 8 Charles Alan Wrights & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2035 (1st ed. 1970)).

Defendants' “objections” to these discovery requests are the typical boilerplate objections known and detested by courts and commentators—and receiving parties—around the nation. A “boilerplate” objection is one that is invariably general; it includes, by definition, “[r]eady-made or all-purpose language that will fit in a variety of documents.” Boilerplate, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Thus, “[a]n objection to a discovery request is boilerplate when it merely states the legal grounds for the objection without (1) specifying how the discovery request is deficient and (2) specifying how the objecting party would be harmed if it were forced to respond to the request.” Jarvey, Matthew L., Boilerplate Discovery Objections: How They Are Used, Why They Are Wrong, and What We Can Do About Them, 61 Drake L. Rev. 913, 914 (2013).

Boilerplate objections to interrogatories and requests for production are not permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 33(b)(4) requires that objections to interrogatories be made “with specificity” and provides that “[a]ny ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.” Rule 34(b)(2)(B) requires that objections to requests for production “state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request.” Rule 34(b)(2)(C) further demands that “[a]n objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.”

When objections lack specificity, they lack effect: an objection that does not explain its grounds (and the harm that would result from responding) is forfeited. “Boilerplate or generalized objections are tantamount to no objection at all and will not be considered....” Strategic Mktg. & Research Team, Inc. v. Auto Data Solutions, Inc., 15-12695, 2017 WL 1196361, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2017) (Murphy III, J.) (quoting Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Johnson N. Am., Inc., No. 09-11783, 2011 WL 669352, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 2011) (Majzoub, M.J.)). Lawyers who purport to “preserve” an objection by including it in a boilerplate statement must be prepared to face the fact that the result of a substance-free objection is generally “the opposite of preservation[,]” i.e., forfeiture. Jarvey, Boilerplate, supra, at 925. Similarly, the common “notwithstanding-the-above” designations that frequently follow a boilerplate objection and precede a more substantive response also fail to preserve objections. Id. The idea that boilerplate in some talismanic way preserves an objection is fallacy. It has been fairly styled an “urban legend,” one that promotes the misuse of the objection process and amounts to nothing less than “a waste of effort and the resources of both the parties and the court.” Id. (quoting Guzman v. Irmadan, Inc., 249 F.R.D. 399, 401 (S.D. Fl. 2008)).

This court is not the first—nor will it be the last—to condemn the use of boilerplate objections. Indeed, perhaps the only thing more surprising than the pervasive reliance on boilerplate is the practice's continued existence in the face of strong and widespread criticism by federal courts. See, e.g., Black v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., No. 09-13616, 2014 WL 3577949, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 21, 2014) (Tarnow, J.) (“The Court strongly condemns the practice of asserting boilerplate objections to every discovery request.”); Kristensen v. Credit Payment Servs., Inc., No. 12-0528, 2014 WL 6675748, at *4 (D. Nev. Nov. 25, 2014) (describing a party's “general and additional objections” as “boilerplate objections which are designed to evade, obfuscate, and obstruct discovery”); Lowe v. Vadlamudi, No. 08-10269, 2012 WL 3731781, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2010) (Lawson, J.) (noting that a party's boilerplate objections “do not gain in substance through repetition”); Marti v. Baires, No. 08-00653, 2012 WL 2029720, at *11 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2012) (“The Court will not countenance any party's effort to obstruct discovery through objections or evasive responses which lack any good faith basis.”); Near v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 07-00006, 2008 WL 11334459, at *1 (S.D. Iowa July 16, 2008) (“[T]he use of boilerplate, unsubstantiated objections is rejected by federal courts.”). These cases, in their interpretation of the discovery rules and their denunciation of boilerplate, “are not aspirational, they are the law.” Liguria Foods, Inc. v. Griffith Labs., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 168, 191 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 13, 2017).