*1 Before the Court is Plaintiffs Dish Network L.L.C. and Sling TV L.L.C.’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs’ ”) Motion for Sanction Striking Defendant James Dustin Meadows’ (“Meadows’ ”) Answer and Entering Default (“Motion to Strike”). (DN 23). Meadows has not responded, and the time to do so has elapsed. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B), the District Judge referred this matter to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation on the pending motion. (DN 27).

On October 28, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against Meadows and Kevin Hibdon (“Hibdon”), both individually and collectively doing business as “Louisville Media Box.” (DN 1). Plaintiffs seek damages for violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201. (Id., at PageID # 1). Plaintiffs allege Hibdon and Meadows illegally rebroadcasted and resold Plaintiffs’ content through their own streaming devices. (Id., at PageID # 4–11). Both Meadows and Hibdon filed answers to the complaint. (DN 6; DN 7).

While Hibdon has complied with the demands of discovery, Meadows has not. Following the Rule 26(f) conference, Plaintiffs served Meadows with its first set of discovery requests. (DN 23, at PageID # 80). Despite the Court granting him an extension, Meadows did not timely respond to the first set of discovery requests. (Id.). Specifically, Meadows failed to timely respond to Requests for Production; failed to adequately verify his Interrogatory responses; and did not produce any responsive documents. (Id.).

Twice in February 2022, Plaintiffs met with Meadows and his counsel to discuss these discovery deficiencies. (Id.). Meadows, however, never corrected these shortcomings. (Id.). He continued to withhold all responsive documents and never verified his Interrogatory responses. (Id.). Since then, Plaintiffs have sent additional discovery requests. (Id.). Meadows has yet to respond or even acknowledge these requests. (Id., at PageID # 80–81). Due to Meadows’ “inability to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” his counsel moved to withdraw. (DN 17, at PageID # 68).

On April 11, 2022, this Court held a joint teleconference call with the parties to discuss the above issues. (DN 19). Despite being made aware of the call, Meadows elected to not attend. (Id., at PageID # 75). The Court then granted Meadows’ counsel's motion to withdraw and issued an order directing Meadows to cure the deficiencies in his behavior during discovery within thirty days. (Id.). His former counsel then mailed Meadows an update and informed him of the pending discovery requests. (DN 23, at PageID # 81). Meadows never addressed these issues. (Id.).

Meadows remained absent from the discovery process. (Id.). On May 13, 2022, Plaintiffs moved the Court to strike his answer to the complaint (DN 6) and enter default as to Meadows (DN 23). The Court scheduled a show cause hearing and warned Meadows that his failing to appear would subject him to default judgment proceedings. (DN 28).

*2 Meadows appeared at the October 28, 2022 show cause hearing and stated his life and family “ha[d] been threatened,” and he was told to “not speak[ ] in the case.” (DN 30, at PageID # 118–19). He had not reported these threats to law enforcement. (Id., at PageID # 119). The Court warned Meadows of the possibility of default judgment, and he stated he was “willing to try to comply” with the demands of discovery. (Id., at PageID # 125). The Court gave Meadows thirty days to correct his deficiencies and directed the parties to update the Court through a joint status report at the end of that period. (DN 29).

On November 30, 2022, the parties’ Joint Status Report indicated “Meadows ha[d] failed to comply in any regard.” (DN 32, at PageID # 138). He has neither corrected his previous flawed discovery responses nor produced additional documents. (Id.). In an email to Plaintiffs’ counsel on November 30, 2022, Meadows stated “I'm sorry I couldnt [sic] help dish more with me and my family being threatened with death I would rather lose this case than have my wife or my 5 children murdered I pray for mercy from the judge.” (DN 32-3, at PageID # 148).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) empowers a court to issue various sanctions against a party for failing to cooperate with the discovery process, including striking pleadings in whole or in part. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(iii). Courts should consider entry of default, like a dismissal, as a “sanction of last resort that may be imposed only if the court concludes that a party's failure to cooperate in discovery is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault.” Bank One of Cleveland, N.A. v. Abbe, 916 F.2d 1067, 1073 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Regional Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Inland Reclamation Co., 842 F.2d 150, 154 (6th. Cir. 1988)). Courts in the Sixth Circuit use the Regional Refuse test to determine the appropriateness of imposing sanctions under Rule 37. Regional Refuse Systems, Inc., 842 F.2d, at 154–55; see Harmon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 110 F.3d 364, 366–67 (6th Cir. 1997). This four-part test guides the court to consider whether: (1) “a party's failure to cooperate in discovery is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault;” (2) “the adversary was prejudiced by the dismissed [or defaulting] party's failure to cooperate in discovery,” (3) “the dismissed [or defaulting] party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal [or default];” and (4) “whether less drastic sanctions were imposed or considered before dismissal [or default] was ordered.” Bank One of Cleveland, N.A., 916 F.2d at 1073 (quoting Regional Refuse Systems, Inc., 842 F.2d, at 153–55).

The Court will analyze each of the four factors in turn. The Court first considers the intentionality behind Meadows’ conduct. Meadows’ absence is not the product of a misunderstanding or a lack of awareness of the suit. Meadows hired an attorney, filed an answer to the complaint, responded to the initial set of discovery, and attended teleconferences and the show-cause hearing. Meadows is aware of the suit and has elected to not engage in it, despite potential consequences. His absence from this suit results from his knowing intention to not participate.

Turning to the prejudice Meadows’ inactivity has caused Plaintiffs, not only have Plaintiffs been unable to obtain the requested information from Meadows, but Plaintiffs have also acted numerous times to encourage Meadows’ participation. Since December 2021, Plaintiffs have (1) extended Meadows’ deadline to respond to the first set of discovery, (2) sent Meadows a meet-and-confer letter regarding deficiencies in his discovery responses, (3) engaged with Meadows twice over the phone regarding discovery issues, (4) filed the instant motion, and (5) appeared at the show cause hearing. (DN 23, at PageID # 80–81). Undoubtedly, Meadows’ behavior has prejudiced Plaintiffs by forcing them to expend significant time and money to secure Meadows’ compliance.

*3 Next, the Court considers whether Meadows had adequate notice of the potential ramifications of his absence. When a party “has not been given notice that dismissal is contemplated, ‘a district court should impose a penalty short of dismissal unless the derelict party has engaged in bad faith or contumacious conduct.’ ” Harmon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 110 F.3d 364, 367 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Harris v. Callwood, 844 F.2d 1254, 1256 (6th Cir. 1988)). After the Court's order directing Meadows to comply with discovery (DN 19) went unaddressed, the Court issued a show cause Order (DN 28). The Order stated “[i]f Defendant Meadows fails to appear ... he [would] be subject to default-judgment proceedings.” (Id.). Meadows appeared at the hearing and the Court again warned him about a potential default judgment should he not engage in discovery. (DN 30, at PageID # 120). According to Plaintiffs, Meadows acknowledged the possibility after the hearing by telling them to “go get [their] default.” (DN 32, PageID # 138). The Court gave Meadows adequate warning of the potential for default.

Lastly, the Court must consider if less drastic sanctions would be adequate. “In the absence of contumacious conduct, an alternate sanction that would protect the integrity of pretrial procedures should be utilized rather than dismissal with prejudice.” Harmon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 110 F.3d 364, 367–68 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Freeland v. Amigo, 103 F.3d 1271, 1280 (6th Cir. 1997)). Meadows has persistently failed to comply with the demands of discovery and ignored the Court's multiple orders to engage in this suit. Meadows was absent from the demands of pretrial procedures for eight months before the show cause hearing, and he continues to be absent now. No lesser sanction is suitable.

The Court must also address what little information Meadows has shared about his absence in this process. Both at the show cause hearing and in emails sent to Plaintiffs, he has tried to justify his inaction through vague references to death threats against him and his family. (DN 30, at PageID # 118–19). At the hearing, Meadows stated he had not reported the threatening calls because “[a]ll the phone numbers were blocked.” (Id., at 119). If Meadows and his family have truly been threatened, he should immediately report this behavior and all accompanying details or suspicions to law enforcement.

While the Court doesn't take lightly Meadows’ allegations of threatening behavior toward his family, his unsupported allegations of these threats do not change the Court's analysis. Time and again, the Court has given Meadows chances to change course and engage in this suit. The Court repeatedly alerted him to the potential of default judgment, but he continued to shirk the demands of discovery. The undersigned therefore recommends the District Judge strike Meadows’ Answer and enter default as to Meadows.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanction Striking Defendant James Dustin Meadows’ Answer and Entering Default (DN 23) be GRANTED.

Therefore, under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Sections 636(b)(1)(B) and (C) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge files these findings and recommendations with the Court and a copy shall forthwith be electronically transmitted or mailed to all parties. Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such findings and recommendations as provided by the Court. If a party has objections, such objections must be timely filed or further appeal is waived. Thomas v. Arn, 728 F.2d 813 (6th Cir.), aff'd U.S. 140 (1984).