*1 This case comes to be heard on two motions. The first was filed by Defendant Protective Life Corporation (“Protective”), asking the court to reconsider in part a prior discovery order (Doc. 64 (the “Discovery Order”)) and to grant a protective order.[1] (Doc. 65 the “Motion to Reconsider”). Plaintiff Robert Beeman has filed a response in opposition. (Doc. 69). The second motion was filed jointly by the parties. It requests an extension of scheduling deadlines by 60 days from the entry of an order disposing of the Motion to Reconsider. (Doc. 70). As further explained below, the court will deny relief on Protective's Motion to Reconsider but will grant the joint motion to extend deadlines.

In this action, Plaintiff brings claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that, his former employer, Protective, discriminated against him because of race with respect to promotions and compensation. In an order entered April 29, 2019, the court required Protective to produce information and documents related to employees promoted to Vice President (“VP”), Senior Vice President (“SVP”), and Executive Vice President (“EVP”) at Protective's main campus in Birmingham for the period from August 2012 through Plaintiff's resignation in August 2016. (Doc. 45 at 9). Protective proceeded to identify 27 employees who fit those parameters and produced information that included the race of the employees in those positions, their duties, training, and qualifications. However, when Protective withheld detailed salary, pay, bonus, and total compensation information for them, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel. (Doc. 58). In opposing the motion, Protective argued principally that Plaintiff was not entitled to detailed pay data because, according to Protective, the materials already produced established that Plaintiff had not applied for the positions held and that the other employees were otherwise not valid comparators, i.e., that they were not similarly situated to Plaintiff in all relevant respects. See generally Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). For example, Protective asserted, the evidence already showed that other employees worked in different departments and had different qualifications than did Plaintiff.

The court resolved Plaintiff's motion to compel by issuing what the court is now calling the “Discovery Order.” (Doc. 64). The court acknowledged therein that Protective's evidence and arguments might well at some point be used to establish that Plaintiff cannot prove some or all his employment discrimination claims. The court ultimately found, however, that such arguments going to the merits of Plaintiff's claims were not a proper basis for limiting the scope of discovery on a motion to compel. The court further recognized that, while the detailed pay information on the other executive employees was private and sensitive financial in nature, it would be subject to a consent confidentiality and protective order previously entered at the parties’ behest. (See Docs. 21, 23). Thus, the court granted Plaintiff's motion and ordered Protective to produce the pay and compensation information for the 27 other executive employees.

*2 Protective has since moved the court to reconsider the Discovery Order in part. (Doc. 65). Protective does not contest that ruling insofar as it would compel production of pay and compensation information for the twenty employees promoted to “Vice President” positions. Protective insists, however, that it should not have to produce such information for the other seven employees, who received promotions to the level of “Senior Vice President” or “Executive Vice President.” (Id. at 2-4). Specifically, Protective argues that Plaintiff could not have received those promotions because he would have had to “skip” over the level of “Vice President.” (Id.) In support, Protective has offered an attached declaration from a Rachelle Peeler, a Vice President in Protective's Human Resources department. (Doc. 65-1). According to her, no such “skipping” happened with any of the promotions at issue, which occurred between August 2012 and August 2016, and, that, indeed, she is not aware of it happening with any similar promotions going back to at least 2006. (See id.; Doc. 65-1).

The court declines to grant relief to Protective on this issue. For starters, the court sees no reason why Protective could not have raised this argument and evidence when it filed its brief opposing Plaintiff's motion to compel. A party “cannot use a motion to reconsider to relitigate old matters, to raise new legal arguments that could have been raised earlier, or to present new evidence that could have been presented earlier.” American Income Life Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 2014 WL 4452679, *3 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 8, 2014) (citing Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005), and Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 243 F.3d 1282, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Equally to the point, however, is that Protective's argument about “skipping” levels is just a variant of its previous assertion that Plaintiff is not entitled to conduct discovery because his claims are, according to Protective, without merit. Again, it is conceivable that the testimony in Peeler's declaration may tend show that Plaintiff was not eligible for some of the promotions or support Protective's claim that he did not receive them for legitimate reasons other than race. But as made clear in the Discovery Order, the court is generally not willing to limit discovery regarding the 27 other employees and their positions insofar as they are, at least at this stage of the proceedings, relevant to Plaintiff's pled claims, which Protective not attacked by either a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., nor a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P. The court has not changed its mind on that basic principle.

Protective's motion also asks the court to impose an “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” designation for any salary, pay, and compensation information that is to be produced on the 27 employees. (Doc. 65 at 4-5). Here, Protective claims to have concerns that Plaintiff, who previously worked as its in-house counsel, will utilize such private financial information in representing other individuals in future litigation against Protective. (Id. at 1). Particularly, Protective cites a letter it received in August 2018 from an attorney then representing Plaintiff, asking whether Protective would object to Plaintiff acting as an attorney representing individuals or entities in litigation adverse to Protective. According, to Protective, Plaintiff's prior employment with the company would disqualify him from undertaking such representation. But whether that's true or not, Protective maintains, Plaintiff's expressed “desire to engage in such representation creates a unique situation in which Protective is concerned about Plaintiff having direct access to the salary, pay, and compensation information of its senior employees at the Vice President-level and above.” (Id. at 5).

The court will also deny Protective's motion on this issue. Again, its not clear why Protective could not have raised this argument previously. But even so, it seems that Protective's fear that Plaintiff could somehow make use of the pay information in representing clients against Protective, while perhaps not entirely unfounded, is largely speculative given that there is no allegation that Plaintiff represents any such actual client, in a pending court case or otherwise. Furthermore, the court does not believe that Protective has established that the protective order already entered in this case is not adequate to address Protective's concerns. To wit, that order generally prohibits disclosure of confidential information outside the confines of this litigation and provides that confidential documents are subject to being returned to opposing counsel upon the case's conclusion. (Doc. 23). And although it probably need not be said, the court would also remind both parties and counsel that the court has the means and the will to punish any violation of the protective order.

*3 Finally, the parties have filed a joint motion to extend the current scheduling deadlines established pursuant to Rule 16(b), Fed. R. Civ. P. (Doc. 70). Specifically, the parties ask for those deadlines as current set (see Doc. 57) to be extended by 60 days, after the court resolves Protective's Motion to Reconsider. The court will grant that joint motion.

Based on the foregoing, Protective's motion to reconsider in part and for a protective order (Doc. 65) is DENIED. The parties’ joint motion for a 60-day extension of Rule 16(b) deadlines (Doc. 70) is GRANTED.

DONE, this the 9th day of March, 2020.