*1 This cause is before this court on the Plaintiff's “Motion to Compel Complete Production of Documents and Answers to Interrogatories and Incorporated Memorandum of Law,” (Doc. 22), and Defendants' response. (Doc. 28).

I. Procedural History

The background of this case was discussed in this court's previous order regarding Defendants' emergency motion to quash and, therefore, will not be fully repeated here. (Doc. 42). In short, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants defamed it through statements regarding the Plaintiff's alleged employment of illegal aliens. (Doc. 39). Defendants purportedly told the Northwest Daily News that Plaintiff paid these aliens “under the table,” and alleged that Plaintiff contracted with “Twin City Temporaries, Inc.,” a company that allegedly imported foreign workers. (id. at ¶¶ 29-30). Defendants also allegedly posted this information on their company Facebook page and sent this information to its “Constant Contact List,”[1] media contacts, and personal contacts. (id. at ¶¶ 32-36).

On October 4, 2018, Plaintiff served Defendants with its first requests for production and first set of interrogatories. (Docs. 22-6 at 11; 22-7 at 9; 28 at 2 ¶ 4). Defendants claim that they initially produced hundreds of pages of documents in discovery. (Doc. 28 at 2 ¶ 5). On November 30, 2018, Defendants supplemented their response to Plaintiff's requests for production. (id. at 2 ¶ 7).

In the instant motion to compel, Plaintiff asks this court to compel the Defendants to produce responsive documents to several of its discovery requests and to answer more fully interrogatory number 13. Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's requests require disclosure of Defendants' trade secrets, are overbroad, burdensome, and disproportionate to the Plaintiff's need for the information. This court shall discuss each in turn.

II. Standard

The overall purpose of discovery under the Federal Rules is to require the disclosure of relevant information so that the ultimate resolution of disputed issues may be based on a full and accurate understanding of the facts and thereby produce a fair and just result. 6 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice, § 26.02 (3d ed. 2007). “Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 S. Ct. 385, 392 (1947); Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that “mechanisms for effective discovery are essential to the fairness of our system of litigation ....”).

Discovery “allows the plaintiff to develop facts to support the theory of the complaint and allows the defendant to develop facts to support its defenses.” O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501, 67 S. Ct. at 388-89); Lozan v. Md. Cas. Co., 850 F.2d 1470, 1473 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting that “the purpose of discovery is to provide a mechanism for making relevant information available to the litigants”). The discovery process also is “designed to allow the defendant to pin down the plaintiff's theories of liability and to allow the plaintiff to pin down the defendant's theories of defense, thus confining discovery and trial preparation to information that is pertinent to the theories of the case.” O2 Micro Int'l Ltd., 467 F.3d at 1365. In the words of the Supreme Court: “The various instruments of discovery now serve (1) as a device ... to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the existence or whereabout of facts, relevant to those issues.” Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501, 67 S. Ct. at 388-89. To serve these ends, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “strongly favor full discovery whenever possible.” Farnsworth v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985).

*2 Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs discovery in federal court. See Passmore v. Baylor Health Care Sys., 823 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 2016); In re Queens Univ. at Kingston, 820 F.3d 1287, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In general, a party “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. Federal courts construe relevancy “broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheim Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 2389 (1978); Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011); Moore v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 1991). Relevant information may be discoverable even if it is not admissible at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Discoverable information is not limited to admissible evidence.”). On the other hand, not all relevant evidence is discoverable. See Miscellaneous Docket Matter No. 1 v. Miscellaneous Docket Matter No. 2, 197 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that “even if relevant, discovery is not permitted where no need is shown”); See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(B)(2)(c). For example, even relevant evidence must satisfy a proportionality standard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Hernandez v. Results Staffing, Inc., 907 F.3d 354, 361 (5th Cir. 2018); Vallejo v. Amgen, Inc., 903 F.3d 733, 742 (8th Cir. 2018); In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig., 845 F.3d 231, 236 (6th Cir. 2016).

“The production of documents ... is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a).” Hernandez, 907 F.3d at 361. This Rule allows a party to obtain documents that are in the responding party's “possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a); see Hickman, 329 U.S. at 502, 67 S. Ct. at 389; Bennett v. Chitwood, 519 F. App'x 569, 572 (11th Cir. 2013); Tomlinson v. El Paso Corp., 245 F.R.D. 474, 476 (D. Colo. 2007). “Control with respect to the production of documents is defined ‘not only as possession, but as the legal right to obtain the documents requested upon demand.’ ” Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec USA, Inc., 102 F.3d 1224, 1229-30 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Searock v. Stripling, 736 F.2d 650, 653 (11th Cir. 1984)). The responding party must respond to the request and provide the documents requested, unless the request is objected to, in which case the reason for objection must be stated with specificity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B); see Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 1996). If the responding party withholds documents based on objections of attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine, the responding party must “expressly make the claim and describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed—and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A).

Interrogatories are governed by Rule 33. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33; Malloy v. Peters, 617 F. App'x 948, 949 (11th Cir. 2015). “That rule provides that a party may serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served.” Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501, 67 S. Ct. at 389. An interrogatory “may relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b)” and must be answered “separately and fully in writing under oath” to the extent that the receiving party has no objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 (a)-(b); see McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that Rule 33(a) requires a written answer to the question posed); Dunbar v. United States, 502 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting that interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b)).

*3 “In general, a responding party is not required to conduct extensive research in order to answer an interrogatory, but a reasonable effort to respond must be made.” Gorrell v. Sneath, 292 F.R.D. 629, 632 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). A “responding party is obligated to respond to the fullest extent possible. ...” Id., at 632. Furthermore, the party is required to respond “not only by providing the information it has, but also the information within its control or otherwise obtainable by it.” In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 196 F.R.D. 444, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). A party is required to supplement a response to an interrogatory if the information sought is later obtained or the previous response requires a correction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A).

Objections to interrogatories must be stated with specificity and not simply with “boilerplate” objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4); see Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that “the mere statement by a party that an interrogatory was ‘overly broad, burdensome, oppressive and irrelevant’ is not adequate to voice a successful objection to an interrogatory”); Mitchell v. AMTRAK, 208 F.R.D. 455, 458 n.4 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that objections must explain how an interrogatory is overbroad or unduly burdensome); Nagele v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 193 F.R.D. 94, 109 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (overruling an objection that interrogatories were “burdensome” because the objecting party failed to particularize the basis for objection). Rather, “objections should be plain enough and specific enough so that the court can understand in what way the interrogatories are alleged to be objectionable.” Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981).

III. Discussion

A. Interrogatory 13 and Requests 13 and 16

At the heart of these discovery disputes is the Defendants' Constant Contact List. Plaintiff propounded one interrogatory and two requests for production that touch on this issue:

This court has already issued an order directing the parties to meet, confer, and discuss a proposed protective order that will ensure the confidentiality of information relating to the Constant Contact List. (Doc. 42). Within ten days of the docketing of the protective order, Defendants should provide supplemental responses to Interrogatory 13, Request 13, and Request 16, in accordance with the protective order and their duty to supplement responses as provided in the Final Scheduling Order and Rule 26.

B. Unredacted Contact Information and Document Content

Plaintiff also asks this court to compel the Defendants to produce several emails in their unredacted form or to conduct an in camera review of the unredacted emails. (Docs. 22 at 19-20; 22-14; 22-15).

Defendants claim that its redaction of the emails was permissible because the redacted information was not responsive to the Plaintiff's requests. Defendants argue that they redacted identifying information or proprietary contact information for AEM customers and suppliers. (Doc. 28 at 9-10). This court will conduct an in camera review of the emails to determine if a privilege is applicable. To that end, within fourteen days of the date of docketing of this order, Defendants shall submit to this court unredacted copies of the emails in question. Additionally, within fourteen days of the date of docketing of this order, Plaintiff will provide the court—to the extent feasible—the requests for production that sought the emails, and the Defendants' objections and responses to those requests.[2]

*4 This court notes, however, that if the Defendants redacted information due to concerns that the information is proprietary contact information (particularly the contact information for AEM customers and suppliers), it may be protected from public disclosure by the protective order that will be entered by this court. If so, this information likely is discoverable. If the parties agree, they may inform the court and this court will then issue an order relieving the parties of their obligation to file the materials specified above.

C. Plaintiff's Request 6

Plaintiff also seeks “all documents concerning, relating to, or constituting communications, with the Northwest Florida Daily News from January 1, 2018 to the present, including emails, notes, text messages and phone records, in any way relating to ACT.” (Doc. 21 at 21).

Defendants objected that this request is “burdensome, overly broad, and is neither relevant to the claims Advanced Cable Ties has asserted in this case nor likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Doc. 21 at 21).

Courts frequently reject such boilerplate objections—an objection that merely recites the language of Rule 26 without meeting the specificity requirement—as insufficiently precise. See Steed v. Everhome Mortg. Co., 308 Fed. App'x. 364, 371 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Parties shall not make nonspecific, boilerplate objections.”); Josephs, 677 F.2d at 992 (holding that “the mere statement by a party that an interrogatory was ‘overly broad, burdensome, oppressive and irrelevant’ is not adequate to voice a successful objection to an interrogatory”); Liguria Foods, Inc. v. Griffith Labs., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 168, 185-88 (N.D. Iowa 2017); Covington v. Sailormen, Inc., 274 F.R.D. 692, 693 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (holding that boilerplate, shotgun-style objections could result in sanctions). Here, Defendants' objection fails to state how the requested information is irrelevant to Plaintiff's claim. Indeed, insofar as Plaintiff claims that Defendant Robert Sires contacted the Northwest Florida Daily News to arrange for publication of an allegedly defamatory article about the Plaintiff, the information seems highly relevant.

Defendants also argue that the request is overly broad and burdensome. Despite not raising these issues in its objection, Defendants argue that the request would require them to review both business and personal phone and email records for any communications regarding ACT. (Doc. 28 at 10). Plaintiff concedes that this request would cover communications between “any AEM employee” and the Northwest Florida Daily News. (Doc. 22 at 21). Defendants argue that, given the burden that responding to such a request entails, this court should deny this motion to compel, particularly because Plaintiff can obtain this information through other means. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has issued a third-party subpoena to the Northwest Florida Daily News and Plaintiff could depose reporters and seek the same information.

Although the request seeks relevant information, it likely would entail a significant burden on Defendants, given that the request seeks both business and personal emails and phone records from all AEM employees.[3] Defendants have offered to comb through telephone records if Plaintiff provides them with relevant telephone numbers. Alternatively, Plaintiff could provide Defendants with a more narrowly-tailored request that specifies that the request pertains to a limited number of AEM employees who are identified by name or position title. Similarly, the temporal scope presumably could be restricted. In any event, this court will deny Plaintiff's Request 6 without prejudice because it is overly broad and burdensome insofar as it covers both business and personal telephone and email records of all AEM employees.

D. Plaintiff's Requests 19

*5 Plaintiff asks this court to compel Defendants to produce “all documents, including communications, received in response to the publication of the media statement.” (Doc. 22 at 28). Defendants initially responded that no relevant documents existed. Defendants subsequently supplemented their responses and have found one document. (Docs. 22 at 28; 22-11 at 7; 22-12 at 6).

Rule 34(a)(1) requires only the production of relevant documents which are “in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1); see Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 204, 78 S. Ct. 1087, 1091 (1958) (noting that Rule 34's requirement that before a party may be ordered to produce documents the party must “be in ‘control’ of them”). “It is axiomatic that a request to produce relevant documents is subject to that caveat that a party must have the documents in its ‘possession, custody or control.’ ” E.E.O.C. v. Carrols Corp., 215 F.R.D. 46, 52 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)).

Control is broadly defined as “the legal right to obtain the documents requested upon demand.” Sergeeva v. Tripleton Int'l Ltd., 834 F.3d 1194, 1201 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Searock, 736 F.2d at 653); Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 142, 160 (3d Cir. 2004) (“In the Rule 34 context, control is defined as the legal right to obtain required documents on demand.”); United States v. Int'l Union of Petroleum and Indus. Workers, AFL–CIO, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Control is defined as the legal right to obtain documents upon demand.”). Thus, a party responding to a Rule 34 production request is under an affirmative duty to seek that information reasonably available to its employees, agents, or others subject to its control. Gray v. Faulkner, 148 F.R.D. 220, 223 (N.D. Ind. 1992); see A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 189 (C.D. Cal. 2006).

As a matter of logic and physics, a party cannot be in possession and control of a document that does not exist. “It is well established that in those situations in which the documents sought to be produced are not in existence, a request to produce must be denied.” In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 130 F.R.D. 641, 646 (E.D. Mich. 1989); see Shcherbakovskiy v. Da Capo Al Fine, Ltd., 490 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2007) (A “party is not obliged to produce ... documents that it does not possess or cannot obtain.”). Furthermore, a party is not obliged to create documents in response to a request for production. See Id. “As a general matter, a party cannot invoke Rule 34(a) to require another party to create or prepare a new or previously non-existent document solely for its production.” Mir v. L-3 Commc'ns Integrated Sys., L.P., 319 F.R.D. 220, 227 (N.D. Tex. 2016); Hallmark v. Cohen & Slamowitz, 302 F.R.D. 295, 299 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that a litigant was not required to create audited financial statements to comply with plaintiff's discovery request); Alexander v. F.B.I., 194 F.R.D. 305, 310 (D.D.C. 2000) (stating that “Rule 34 only requires a party to produce documents that are already in existence”).[4] Therefore, a court “cannot compel the production of documents that do not exist.” Myhre v. Seventh–Day Adventist Church Reform Movement Am. Union Int'l Missionary Soc'y, 298 F.R.D. 633, 645 (S.D. Cal. 2014); see Lopez v. Don Herring Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 567, 598 (N.D Tex. 2018); Sonnino v. Univ. Kansas Hosp. Auth., 220 F.R.D. 633, 640 (D. Kan. 2004) (observing that a court “cannot compel a party to produce documents that do not exist”).

*6 This court is permitted to rely on representations by counsel made in documents filed with this court. See Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1372 (11th Cir. 1997). “Whenever a party requests the production of documents under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a), and the recipient of the request states that it does not have any responsive documents,” courts may “trust, at least in the absence of contrary information, that the recipient is responding truthfully.” Greene v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 484 F. App'x 681, 686 (3d Cir. 2012). Thus, unless the requesting party can show that requested materials actually exist, courts may rely on the representation of the party claiming that it does not possess or control such materials. See Hubbard v. Potter, 247 F.R.D. 27, 29 (D.D.C. 2008).[5] Additionally, this court notes that the parties have a duty to supplement their response should relevant documents and information come into a party's possession or control. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion to compel with respect to Request 19 will be denied without prejudice because it failed to carry its burden to show that documents responsive to this request exist and are in the possession and control of the Defendants. In the event that Plaintiff subsequently can carry this burden, it may file a motion accordingly. Furthermore, this court reminds Defendants that they are under a continuing obligation to supplement their responses should they discover or acquire control over responsive materials.

E. Plaintiff's Request 24

Plaintiff also seeks “[a]ll documents concerning or relating to Robert Sires' ownership interest in Bay State and AEM.” In its motion to compel, Plaintiff stated that it would be “satisfied with a limited production of documents that are sufficient to show Sires' ownership interest in Bay State and AEM.” (Doc. 22 at 23 n.5). Defendants initially responded with boilerplate objections, and now argue that the Plaintiff's Request 24 is premature based on Fla. Stat. § 768.72(1). (Doc. 28 at 11).

Section 768.72(1) pertains to claims for punitive damages and provides in relevant part:

Fla. Stat. § 768.72(1) (emphasis added). Under this provision, parties are not entitled to discovery regarding financial net worth until they have offered evidence that demonstrates their entitlement to punitive damages. See Simeon, Inc. v. Cox, 671 So.2d 158, 160 (Fla. 1996) (holding that under the statute a plaintiff must show an evidentiary basis for punitive damages before the court will allow such a claim or discovery for financial worth discovery); Globe Newspaper Co. v. King, 658 So.2d 518, 519 (Fla. 1995) (holding that section 768.72 creates “a substantive legal right not to be subject to a punitive damages claim and ensuing financial worth discovery until the trial court makes a determination that there is a reasonable evidentiary basis for recovery of punitive damages”).

*7 The Eleventh Circuit has held “that the pleading rules set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3) preempt [Fla. Stat.] § 768.72's requirement that a plaintiff must obtain leave from the court before including a prayer for punitive damages.” Porter v. Ogden, Newell & Welch, 241 F.3d 1334, 1340 (11th Cir. 2001). The Eleventh Circuit has not ruled on whether federal discovery rules preempt § 768.72(1)'s limitation on discovery. Id. Regardless, it is well settled that in diversity cases federal procedural law applies. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 745, 100 S. Ct. 1978, 1982 (1980); Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814 F.2d 600, 605 (11th Cir. 1987) (“In general, only substantive state law must be applied; federal law governs matters of procedure.”); Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp. v. Brad's Mach. Prod., Inc., 666 F.2d 492, 494-95 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that federal courts generally apply federal procedural law in diversity cases).

A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction will not apply a state statute if a Rule of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “answers the question in dispute.” Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398, 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010) (plurality opinion). If a Federal Rule is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the court, “it governs ... unless it exceeds statutory authorization” under the Rules Enabling Act or “Congress's rulemaking power” under the Constitution. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398, 130 S. Ct. at 1437; Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50, 100 S. Ct. at 1985.

Here, the federal rules governing discovery—specifically, Rule 26—are sufficiently broad to control the question in dispute. Neither party argues, much less demonstrates, that Rule 26 exceeds the statutory authorization of the Rules Enabling Act or Congress's rulemaking power. Furthermore, this court is not aware of any court so holding. Accordingly, Rule 26 preempts Fla. Stat. § 768.72(1). This is consistent with the holdings of various districts courts that have addressed this issue. See Shores of Panama Resort Cmty. Ass'n Inc. v. Halberthal, No., 2015 WL 3466127, *2 (N.D. Fla. June 1, 2015); Pantages v. Cardinal Health 200, Inc., No. 5:08-cv-116, 2009 WL 1011048, at *3-4 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2009); Ward v. Estaleiro Itajii S/A, 541 F. Supp.2d 1344, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2008).[6]

Furthermore, even assuming that the Plaintiff is required to demonstrate an entitlement to punitive damages before it may seek discovery on these issues, the Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded specific facts in its complaint that—if a jury accepted them as true—are sufficient to establish the malice that is a prerequisite for punitive damages.[7] In determining whether the Plaintiff may make a claim for punitive damages, the Eleventh Circuit noted that “Florida courts do not require a fact intensive investigation into the merits.” Porter, 241 F.3d at 1340. While “merely setting forth conclusory allegation in the complaint is insufficient to entitle a claimant to recover punitive damages,” a plaintiff may establish entitlement to punitive damages by pleading specific acts committed by the defendant. Id. at 1341.

Accordingly, Defendants have not carried their burden to demonstrate a sufficient reason not to produce the material requested in Plaintiff's Request 24. This court, therefore, will order Defendants to produce materials responsive to that request.

F. Plaintiff's Requests 26 and 27

*8 Plaintiff also seeks production of documents relating to any changes in the Defendant AEM's market share from January 1, 2010, to present. (Doc. 22 at 23-24). In its motion to compel, Plaintiff only quotes verbatim Request 26,[8] which was served on AEM. Defendants, in their response, address both Requests. Because it appears that Plaintiff's failure to mention Request 27 in its motion to compel was an oversight, this court will address both Request 26 and Request 27.

Defendants initially objected to these requests by arguing that the “request is neither relevant to the claims advanced by Advance Cable Ties, Inc. has asserted in this case nor likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (id. at 23). Despite their initial objections, Defendants, in their response, stated that the Defendants updated their responses after the Plaintiff and Defendants conferred about these discovery disputes. (Doc. 28 at 12). Defendants now state that they do not have any documents responsive to these requests.

As noted above, this court cannot compel the disclosure of non-existent documents. See Shcherbakovskiy, 490 F.3d at 138 (A “party is not obliged to produce, at the risk of sanctions, documents that it does not possess or cannot obtain.”). Also, in light of the Defendants' response to the Plaintiff's requests 26 and 27, it is unclear whether the parties have already resolved this issue. Specifically, it does not appear that Plaintiff takes issue with the alleged non-existence of these documents. Therefore, this court will deny without prejudice Plaintiff's motion to compel regarding Requests 26 and 27.

G. Plaintiff's Requests 34 and 35

In Plaintiff's Request 34 to AEM and Request 35 to Sires, Plaintiff seeks “all documents concerning or relating to AEM's loss of its customer Burndy in approximately June 2016, including but not limited to all communications, between AEM and Burndy regarding the reasons or reasons [sic] for Burndy discontinuing its relationship with AEM.” (Doc. 22 at 25-26). Although Plaintiff moved to compel responses to only Request 34 served on Defendant AEM,[9] Defendants addressed both Request 34 and 35 in their response. Because it appears that Plaintiff's omission of Request 35 in its motion to compel may have been an oversight, this court will address both Requests.

Plaintiff seeks to compel the production of these documents because Plaintiff believes that Defendants lied about Burndy's reason for severing its relationship with Plaintiff. Plaintiff stated that these materials are important to demonstrate actual malice and for impeachment purposes at trial. Although Defendants initially objected to the relevancy of the request, Defendants amended their responses and stated that no responsive documents exist. (Doc. 28 at 13).

As with Request 26 and Request 27, it is unclear if this issue has been resolved by the parties. Specifically, it does not appear that Plaintiff takes issue with Defendants' claim that no such documents exist. In its motion to compel, Plaintiff took issue only with Defendants' initial objection based on irrelevance. The motion to compel did not address whether the updated responses were sufficient. Further, Plaintiff did raise an argument about documents that Defendants alleged do not exist, but Plaintiff only raised that concern with respect to Request 19. (Doc. 22 at 28). This court, therefore, will deny without prejudice Plaintiff's motion to compel responses to Requests 34 and 35.

H. Plaintiff's Requests 38 through 42

*9 Plaintiff's Requests 38 through 42 seek information regarding Defendant AEM's use of temporary staffing agencies or employee leasing companies. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks “all documents concerning or relating to AEM's use of temporary staffing agencies from January 1, 2012, to present.” (Doc. 22 at 26). Defendant objected that this “request is neither relevant nor likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (id.).

Local Rule 26.2(B) of the Northern District of Florida provides that motions to compel “shall (1) quote the discovery request verbatim, (2) quote each objection specifically directed to the discovery request; and (3) set out the reasons why the discovery should be compelled.” Although Plaintiff seeks to compel documents responsive to Requests Number 38 through 42, Plaintiff only quoted Request 38 and the Defendants' objection. Thus, this court will limit its analysis to Request 38. Requests Number 39 through 42 will be denied without prejudice for failure to comply with Local Rule 26.2(B).

Plaintiff argues that Request 38 is necessary to obtain evidence that demonstrates that Defendant made statements about Plaintiff with malice. Even if Plaintiff's claims are not centered around Defendants' use of temporary staffing agencies, the information sought may be relevant to Plaintiff's claim of defamation. Specifically, it may be relevant to whether the Defendants acted with malice when they allegedly published defamatory remarks about the Plaintiff.

Additionally, Defendants objected to this request only through use of a boilerplate objection. To sufficiently object to a request for production, a party must “state the specific ground for objecting to the request, including the reasons” and “must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of the objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. Defendants' objection and response to the motion to compel does not inform this court whether responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of the objection. Furthermore, Defendants' boilerplate language is anachronistic insofar as it employs the language of Federal Rule 26(b) prior to the 2015 amendments. Lopez v. Don herring Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 567, 573 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (“The 2015 amendments to Rule 26 deleted from the definition of relevance information that appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence because [t]he phrase has been used by some, incorrectly, to define the scope of discovery and has continued to create problems given its ability to swallow any other limitation on the scope of discovery.”) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Rule 26 provides that the request must be relevant and proportional. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. As such, this boilerplate language reveals little about whether responsive documents exist and whether Defendants have a proper objection to this request. This court will grant Plaintiff's motion to compel documents responsive to Request 38 regarding Defendant AEM. Defendants' objection is overruled.

I. Plaintiff's Request for Attorney's Fees

Finally, Plaintiff seeks attorney's fee pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 22 at 29). That Rule provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A).

In the present case, only a portion of Plaintiff's motion to compel was granted. It also is not readily apparent that Plaintiff made a reasonable effort to reach an agreement on all issues before moving to compel. Furthermore, some of Plaintiff's requests were overly broad by a wide margin, thereby making any compromise unlikely. Concomitantly, some of the Defendants' objections were legitimate, meritorious, and substantially justified. See Devaney v. Cont'l Am. Ins. Co., 989 F.2d 1154, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[A]n individual's discovery conduct should be found ‘substantially justified’ under Rule 37 if it is a response to a ‘genuine dispute, or if reasonable people could differ as to the appropriateness of the contest action.’ ”). In light of these facts, an award of attorney's fee is not warranted.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to compel (Doc. 22) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, without prejudice, as follows:

SO ORDERED this 7th day of February 2019.