*1 This is an action for damages in which the plaintiff, Tennell Rhodes, alleges that he was fired by the defendant, General Digital Corporation (hereinafter “GDC”), because of unlawful discrimination based on his race and religion. It is brought pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e). Multiple discovery motions filed by Rhodes and GDC will be discussed herein.

The complaint and parties’ memoranda reveal the following facts:

In July 1997, Rhodes began working for GDC as a salesperson. Rhodes describes himself as African American and “a devout Born-Again Christian.” Due to his success as a salesperson at GDC, Rhodes was eventually promoted to vice president.

Rhodes alleges that during his employment at GDC, he noticed that both Sandra Gudrian (hereinafter “S. Gudrian”) and Brian Gudrian (hereinafter “B. Gudrian”) “would deviate from the Company's standard practice of assigning incoming sales leads ...”[1] to the detriment of African Americans and Born-Again Christians at GDC.

On November 6, 2016, Rhodes sent an email to B. and S. Gudrian “expressing the concern that the Company's planned decision to decrease the salaries of Brian Martin and Ronald Campbell, who were also both African-American and Born-Again Christian, would result in them not receiving ‘equal pay for equal work.’ ”

On August 4, 2017, B. Gudrian emailed “a significant company shareholder.” In this email, B. Gudrian told the shareholder that Rhodes had “threatened the race card.” B. Gudrian suggested that “the Company ‘consider termination and replacement of [Rhodes].” Rhodes alleges that following this email, “retaliatory targeting of Mr. Rhodes worsened and Mr. Gudrian began to re-assign more sales leads away from Mr. Rhodes....”

On September 20, 2017, Rhodes emailed B. Gudrian “reiterating concerns about being treated unfairly in lead assignments.” Rhodes further alleges that “he was being undermined and subverted wherever and whenever possible.”

On September 21, 2017, B. Gudrain replied to Rhodes’ email. In this email, he informed Rhodes that his “title of Vice President [was] removed effective immediately.” Furthermore, B. Gudrain had scheduled a meeting with Jeff Heald, S. Gudrian, and Marc Mercier “for further discussion, investigation and review.” Later in the day, Rhodes responded to B. Gudrian's email stating that he “did not ‘wish to turn this into a legal battle” and requesting a “professional conversation” with B. Gudrian. Rhodes said that if he was forced to “involuntarily attend a meeting with the Company's attorney at this attorney's office” he needed time to consult his own attorney about this matter.

On September 24, 2017, B. Gudrian sent Rhodes an email informing his that he was on probation, pending further review, and that he was suspended from GDC.

On September 25, 2017, Rhodes emailed B. Gudrian, stating that he had “been harassed, treated differently, retaliated and discriminated against particularly because of racial and religious reasons....”

*2 On September 28, 2017, Rhodes met with B. and S. Gudrian. At this meeting, he reiterated his concern that African Americans and Born-Again Christians were not being treated fairly at GDC.

On October 19, 2017, Rhodes sent B. and S. Gudrian an email reiterating his concerns about disparate treatment at GDC.

On October 23, 2017 Rhodes emailed the B. and S. Gudrian and requested that his emails raising racial and religious discrimination complaints be added to his personnel file.

Between October 16, 2017 and October 25, 2017, B. and S. Gudrian exchanged twenty emails purportedly related to Rhodes. These emails have not been disclosed during discovery.

On October 27, 2017, B. and S. Gudrian emailed Rhodes informing him that they had found no evidence to support his claims of discrimination. Later that day, Rhodes responded that he could gather evidence of such discrimination if given adequate time.

On January 22, 2018, B. Gurian emailed Rhodes a letter from the Board of Directors. This letter stated that the Board found “the probationary conditions imposed upon [Rhodes] by [B. Gudrian were] warranted.”

In January 2018, B. and S. Gudrian exchanged five emails. Members of the Board of Directors were also attached to this email. These emails have not been disclosed during discovery.

On February 8, 2018, S. Gudrian sent B. Gudrian “an approximately 13-page excerpt of a discrimination complaint Rhodes had been drafting....”[2]

On February 12, 2018, B. Gudrian emailed the Board of Directors to inquire whether they could hold a Board meeting before the annual fall meeting to discuss Rhodes’ actions and whether they violated his probation.

On February 19, 2018, S. Gudrian sent B. Gudrian three emails. These emails have been withheld by GDC and have not been disclosed during discovery.

On February 20, 2018, Rhodes sent a “finalized discrimination complaint” to B. and S. Gudrian.

On February 21, 2018, B. Gudrian forwarded Rhodes’ complaint to the Board of Directors.

On February 22, 2018, GDC's Board of Directors approved the termination of Rhodes.

On February 23, 2018, Marc Mercier (“Mercier”) sent B. Gudrian an email entitled “Draft Rhodes Termination Letter.” Later that day, Mercier sent B. Gudrian another email entitled “Rhodes Termination Letter.” On February 26, 2018, B. Gudrian sent Mercier an email entitled “Edited Termination Letter.” GDC did not produce this email during discovery.

On February 27, 2018, B. Gudrian sent twelve emails to S. Gudrian. These emails were entitled “Edited Termination Letter.” No attorneys were attached to these emails. GDC did not produce these emails during discovery.

On February 28, 2018, B. Gudrian sent himself an email “in which he recounted what occurred in the Board Meeting that took place sometime between February 22, 2018 and February 28, 2018.” GDC redacted this email before disclosing it to Rhodes.

On March 1, 2018, GDC discharged Rhodes from employment.

On April 5, 2018, S. and B. Gudrian exchanged five emails related to Rhodes. GDC has withheld these emails during discovery.

*3 On April 8, 2018, Rhodes filed a discrimination complaint with the Connecticut Commission for Human Rights and Opportunities.

On December 14, 2018, Rhodes filed this action alleging discrimination by GDC based on his race and religion.

On March 21, 2019, GDC “served a number of interrogatories and document requests” on Rhodes. As part of the document requests, GDC requested that Rhodes sign an authorization that allowed GDC to access information, held by third parties, related to Rhodes employment after his termination from GDC. The information sought, from third parties, included “any and all information concerning [Rhodes’] employment....”

On April 3, 2019, the parties submitted a proposed scheduling order to this court.

On April 5, 2019, Rhodes served his discovery requests on GDC.

On April 22, 2019, GDC provided Rhodes with its initial disclosures.

On April 29, 2019, Rhodes responded to GDC's discovery requests by providing them with 1197 pages of documents. However, Rhodes objected to signing the authorizations as they amounted to “nothing more than a fishing expedition....”

On May 17, 2019, GDC began responding to Rhodes’ discovery requests. GDC did not produce documents at this time.

On July 10, 2019, GDC produced documents in response to Rhodes’ document requests.

On August 9, 2019, GDC provided Rhodes with 5,880 pages of documents.

On August 15, 2019, GDC sent a letter to Rhodes. In this letter, GDC expressed concern that Rhodes’ responses to interrogatories 10 and 11 were incomplete as they omitted necessary information.

On August 27, 2019, GDC and Rhodes held a conference to discuss GDC's concerns about the unsigned authorizations and the incomplete answers to interrogatories 10 and 11. GDC offered to limit the authorizations sought to “release of employment records for” International Services, Inc. (hereinafter “ISI”) and any company with which [Mr. Rhodes] was actively seeking employment during his employment with” GDC. These issues were not resolved at this meeting.

On September 19, 2019, GDC produced 341 pages of documents.

In October 2019, Rhodes provided GDC with supplemental information to try and alleviate its concerns related to the authorizations.

On November 4, 2019, GDC produced 5,770 pages of documents.

On November 6, 2019, Rhodes and GDC met and conferred to discuss discovery claims raised by the Rhodes. At this meeting, Rhodes agreed to provide GDC with authorization to access his employment records at ISI.

On November 13, 2019, GDC requested that Rhodes supplement his response to interrogatory 11. Rhodes refused and claimed that the information included in the ISI authorization provided the information requested by interrogatory 11.

On November 18, 2019, GDC produced their original privilege log. This privilege log contained 601 documents and 141 emails. Furthermore, GDC provided Rhodes with an additional 738 pages of documents.

On November 19, 2019, Rhodes reiterated his opposition to signing all of the authorizations requested by GDC, stating that he was “not willing to provide blanket authorizations that would allow Defendant to broadcast to a vast quantity of employers that Mr. Rhodes is currently engaged in a legal dispute with a former employer....”

*4 On November 20, 2019, GDC deposed Rhodes.

On November 26, 2019, Rhodes objected to GDC's privilege log as GDC's “assertions of privilege appeared entirely unsupported by [its] privilege log.”

On December 3, 2019, Rhodes deposed S. Gudrian. At this deposition, GDC's “counsel repeatedly asserted attorney client privilege and refused to allow S. Gudrian to testify as to a number of matters, including the nature of” emails exchanged by her and B. Gudrian and “details about the investigation Ms. Gudrian seemingly performed after the termination of Mr. Rhodes.”

On December 5, 2019, GDC wrote to Rhodes reiterating that it was waiting for supplementation of various interrogatories and requests for production.

On December 6, 2019, Rhodes deposed B. Gudrian. GDC's counsel asserted attorney-client privilege and “refused to allow Mr. Gudrian to testify as to a number of matters.”

On December 10, 2019, Rhodes served a 30(b)(6) deposition notice on GDC. This notice scheduled a 30(b)(6) deposition for December 20, 2019.

On December 11, 2019, GDC emailed Rhodes and requested that he withdraw the notice.

On December 12, 2019, Rhodes emailed GDC and refused to withdraw the 30(b)(6) deposition, but offered to reschedule it.

On December 13, 2019, Rhodes requested that the parties meet and confer regarding Rhodes’ “continued concerns that the Defendant was improperly asserting privilege to conceal highly relevant documents and prevent highly relevant testimony. Rhodes supplemented his responses to the interrogatories and requests for production mentioned in the December 5, 2019 letter. Furthermore, GDC filed a motion for a protective order from the 30(b)(6) deposition.

On December 16, 2019, GDC repeated its request for authorizations to gain access to Rhodes’ employment records. Furthermore, GDC modified its request so that it included employment records from Triple Helix, Rhodes’ current employer.

On December 17, 2019, GDC and Rhodes met and conferred. Rhodes offered to search for more emails related to his job search activity to address GDC's concerns. GDC maintained that it needed to all records related to Rhodes’ job search.

On December 19, 2019, GDC submitted a supplemental privilege log. It contained the same 601 documents as the original privilege log. The supplemental privilege log contained explanations of the privilege assertion underlying 191 of the withheld documents. Upon reviewing the supplemental privilege log, Rhodes emailed GDC noting a Disputed Documents List. In this email, Rhodes claimed “that there was not a valid basis for asserting privilege for the documents on the Disputed Document List.”

On December 20, 2019, the final day of discovery, GDC emailed Rhodes and stated, “that it would not be withdrawing privilege assertions or otherwise producing any of the documents listed in the Disputed Document List.” Following this email, Rhodes filed a motion to compel. Furthermore, Rhodes sent GDC twenty-five requests for admissions.

On January 10, 2020, this Court denied, without prejudice, Rhodes’ motion to compel non-privileged information as the Rhodes had not certified that he had met and conferred with GDC. This court also denied GDC's motion for a protective order from Rhodes’ 30(b)(6) deposition without prejudice. On January 24, 2020, GDC produced 58 heavily redacted documents from the disputed document list.

*5 On January 13, 2020, the parties met and conferred regarding the Rhodes’ request for additional documents.

On February 4, 2020, Rhodes requested unredacted documents from GDC.

On February 6, 2020, GDC and Rhodes met and conferred. GDC refused to produce further documents or unredacted versions of the 58 documents already disclosed.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides, in relevant part, as follows: “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). With respect to interrogatories, a party “must serve its answers and any objections within 30 days after being served....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2). Similarly, a request for production must be answered “in writing within 30 days after being served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A).

“A party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). In filing the motion, the party must also include a certification that the movant “has conferred with opposing counsel and discussed the discovery issues between them in detail in a good faith effort to eliminate or reduce the area of controversy and to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution.” Loc. R. Civ. P. 37(a). In addition, the motion shall include “a specific verbatim listing of each of the items of discovery sought or opposed, and immediately following each specification shall set forth the reason why the item should be allowed or disallowed.” Loc. R. Civ. P. 37(b).

Though the discovery of relevant information is generally permitted, there are “necessary” limits on the information to which the parties are entitled. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). “The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984)(“Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.”).

“Where ... [the discovery] is relevant, the burden is upon the party seeking non-disclosure or a protective order to show good cause.” Dove v. Atl. Capital Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992) (quotations omitted). “A party establishes ‘good cause’ by showing a ‘clearly defined, specific and serious’ injury will occur in the absence of a protective order.” DaCosta v. City of Danbury, 198 F.R.D. 37, 38 (D. Conn. 2014) (quoting In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001 454 F. Supp. 2d 220, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). Good cause requires particularized facts in support of the harm rather than mere conclusory allegations of harm. DaCosta, 198 F.R.D. at 38.

I. MOTIONS TO COMPEL

(a) Defendant's motion to compel

GDC has filed a motion to compel Rhodes to supplement his response to interrogatory 10 and 11. GDC further moves to compel Rhodes to fully respond to Requests for Production 16 and 17. GDC argues that the information requested in these interrogatories and requests for production is relevant because the discovery seeks information concerning Rhodes’ job search efforts and employment after his termination from GDC. Specifically, GDC argues that the information sought is relevant to mitigation of damages, Rhodes’ credibility as a witness and may help develop an after-acquired evidence defense based on Rhodes’ misrepresentations about potential employment elsewhere, while employed at GDC.

*6 Rhodes argues that the authorizations sought by GDC, which would allow GDC to access third party employment records about Rhodes, is unduly burdensome on its face. Specifically, Rhodes argues that the requests for employment records are nothing more than a “fishing expedition” meant to harass and embarrass him by broadcasting him as an “untrustworthy troublemaker” to potential employers. They further argue that the evidence GDC seeks to support its after acquired evidence defense will not uncover conduct sufficiently severe to support the defense.

Parties are entitled to discover relevant information so long as discovery of the information will not unduly burden the party from whom the information is sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). Here, GDC alleges that the information sought is relevant to multiple parts of its defense. Thus, so long as the discovery of this information is not unduly burdensome on Rhodes, GDC is entitled to discovery of this information. The information GDC seeks is related to Rhodes’ past job search activities. Rhodes’ application to these positions were either denied or he rejected job offers proffered by these entities. Rhodes is not currently being considered for employment at any of these entities. Even if the authorizations sent to these organizations would make Rhodes appear like an “untrustworthy troublemaker,” it would not have any impact on his ability to obtain jobs at these enterprises as he is not being actively considered for employment. Therefore, these discovery requests are not unduly burdensome and GDC's motion to compel is GRANTED.

(b) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel

Rhodes has moved to compel GDC to disclose 58 emails. GDC states that these emails are protected by the attorney client privilege and the work product doctrines. Rhodes argues that these documents are not protected by the attorney client privilege because 56 of the disputed emails were not sent to an attorney. The two emails that were sent to the attorney were drafts of Rhodes’ termination letter. GDC argues that the drafts of the termination letter are protected by the work product doctrine.

i. Attorney Client Privilege

The attorney client privilege “is designed ‘to encourage attorneys and their clients to communicate fully and frankly ...’ ” HSH Nordbank AG New York Branch v. Swerdlow, 259 F.R.D. 64, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). As such, the attorney client privilege applies to communications between clients and their attorneys when the communications are for obtaining legal advice. Bernstein v. Mafcote, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 109, 113 (D. Conn. 2014); see also United States v. Constr. Prods. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996). Generally, information shared with third parties lose the protection of the attorney client privilege. U.S. v. United Technologies Corp., 979 F. Supp. 108, 111 (D. Conn. 1997). However, in corporations, legal advice may be shared throughout the organization without losing the protection of the attorney client privilege. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 518 (D. Conn. 1976). The attorney client privilege is construed narrowly as it can render relevant information undiscoverable. Bernstein v. Mafcote, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 109, 113 (D. Conn. 2014). The burden is on the party asserting the attorney client privilege to demonstrate its applicability. Id.

The emails withheld by GDC all appear to discuss how the company will communicate with its attorneys, communicate information given to them by their attorneys, or discuss advice given to it by an attorney. As the emails in question are for the purpose of discussing legal representation throughout the company, they are protected by the attorney client privilege. SCM Corp., 70 F.R.D. at 518.

ii. Work Product Doctrine

*7 The work product doctrine protects documents prepared in anticipation of litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see also Lagace v. New England Cent. Railroad, 2007 WL 2889465, at 1 (D. Conn. 2007). A document is prepared in anticipation of litigation when it reveals the attorney's legal analysis and strategy. QBE Ins. Corp. v. Interstate Fire and Safety Equipment Co., Inc., 2011 WL 692982, at 1 (D. Conn. 2011); see also United States v. Aldman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998). To be prepared in anticipation of litigation, an action does not need to be currently filed or imminent. U.S. v. Aldman, 135 F.3d 1194, 1198-1199 (2d Cir. 1998). As such the burden is on the party seeking to protection of the work product doctrine to demonstrate that this doctrine applies. Breon v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New England, 232 F.R.D. 49, 54 (D. Conn. 2005).

The court concludes that the emails regarding Rhodes’ termination letter are protected by the work product doctrine. The emails purportedly contain edits to the termination letter and were emailed to counsel.

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion to compel the disclosure of withheld emails listed in the defendant's privilege log is DENIED.[3]

II. Motions for Protective Orders

(a) Protective Order re: 30(b)(6) Deposition

GDC argues that this court should issue a protective order to prevent a 30(b)(6) deposition of a corporate representative of GDC. GDC argues this request is untimely because it was issued on December 10, 2019 and the close of discovery was December 20, 2019, giving them only ten days to prepare a corporate representative for the deposition. GDC also argues that the 30(b)(6) notice is overbroad and unduly burdensome. Specifically, GDC argues that the notice is unduly burdensome because likely corporate representatives have already been deposed and the time required to prepare these individuals for a 30(b)(6) deposition would interfere with GDC's operations. GDC states that the notice is overbroad because it contains a wide range of topics that would require the representative to review years of documents.

Rhodes argues that this deposition is warranted because ten days is a reasonable amount of time to prepare for a deposition, he will be prejudiced if the deposition is not taken, and the notice is not overbroad. Specifically, Rhodes claims that this deposition is necessary because B. and S. Gudrian could not answer a variety of questions because of lack of memory.

“In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). When the corporation receives this notice, it must appoint a representative to speak for the corporation on the items contained in the deposition notice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). The corporation has the duty to prepare the representative to adequately respond to the questions related to the topics contained in the deposition notice. Id.

Generally, parties must have adequate time to prepare for depositions before the close of discovery. Nunn v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 WL 6775820, at 1 (D. Conn. 2014). However, courts have broad discretion to reopen discovery and allow untimely depositions if presented with good cause to do so. Id.

*8 In light of the lack of relevant information uncovered at the Gudrains’ depositions and the fact that the notice was filed several days prior to the close of discovery, Rhodes’ request for a 30(b)(6) deposition is granted. In light of the fact that the notice was filed late in the discovery period, the topics of this deposition are limited to the topics raised at the depositions S. and B. Gudrians’ depositions that could not be fully answered due to lack of memory. Therefore, GDC's motion for a protective order is DENIED.

(b) Protective Order re: Request for Admissions

GDC has further moved for a protective order so that they are not required to respond to Rhodes’ requests for admissions. These requests were served upon the defendant at 2:34 PM, on December 20, 2019, the last day of discovery. GDC states that they did not have 30 days to respond to the requests for admissions before the close of discovery and service of the requests for responses was untimely. Therefore, GDC argues it should not be required to respond.

Rhodes argues that the notices were not untimely because they were served as soon as the need for additional depositions became apparent. Specifically, Rhodes argues that the need for the requests for admissions only became apparent when the Gudrians failed to answer questions and verify documents at their depositions.

Under rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties may request admissions from their opponent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36. Under rule 36, the party from whom admissions are sought has 30 days to either admit, deny, or explain why they cannot truthfully answer the question posed to them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36.

Requests for admissions are discovery devices and, thus, must generally be served within the limits of the discovery schedule. Joseph L. v. Connecticut Dept. of Children and Families, 225 F.R.D. 400, 401 (D. Conn. 2005). However, the court may allow untimely requests for admissions given good cause to do so. Nunn v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 WL 6775820, 1 (D. Conn. 2014).

In light of the limited information garnered at the depositions of B. and S. Gudrian, the motion for a protective order is DENIED. GDC shall file its response to Rhodes’ request for admissions in accordance with rule 36.

For the foregoing reasons the defendant's motion to compel (no. 44) is granted, the plaintiff's motion to compel (document no. 62) is denied, and the defendant's motions for protective orders (document nos. 64 and 67) are denied.

It is so ordered this 11th day of August 2020, at Hartford, Connecticut.