*1 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for a protective order or for an order quashing two third-party subpoenas seeking financial documents from two banks. Both sides also seek monetary sanctions against each other. Both sides’ requests for sanctions are DENIED. For the reasons explained below, Defendants’ motion is also DENIED.

In 2016, Plaintiff obtained an assignment of all rights, title, and interest in a $24,906,361.27[1] Judgment against Defendant Mario Alvarez, Jr., in relation to Southern District of California case, AmT CADC Venture, LLC v. Alvarez et al., 09-CV-2787-JAH(MDD). The assignment was finalized and the acknowledgement was filed as Docket No. 130 in the related case. Since then, Plaintiff has been attempting to collect on the Judgment but now alleges that Defendants are conspiring to actively and fraudulently avoid collection by fraudulently transferring and concealing assets.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges it discovered Defendants’ alleged fraud in January 2020 as part of its ongoing efforts to collect the Judgment. Although the Judgment is against Mario Alvarez, Jr., Plaintiff alleges that he has avoided collection “with the aid, assistance and active and intentional knowledge and participation of all of the named Defendants in this action. Defendants have blurred all lines of corporate, trust, and non-profit formalities to allow MARIO JR. to fraudulently transfer and conceal assets from collection by Plaintiff on the Judgment.” (Doc. No. 1 at 11.) Specifically:

(Id. at ¶¶ 54-56.) In an effort to obtain financial records to help prove up some of these allegations, Plaintiff served two document subpoenas under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 45 to two nonparty banks, JP Morgan Chase Bank and Wells Fargo Bank. The Chase subpoena sought a variety of financial records related to The Alvarez & Alvarez Irrevocable Trust Dated January 31, 2001; Balesia Towers, Inc.; and Kona Beach Bungalows, LLC. (Doc. No. 45 at 16-24.) The Wells Fargo subpoena sought a variety of financial records related to The Alvarez & Alvarez Irrevocable Trust Dated January 31, 2001; its trustee, Nicholas Alvarez; and Balesia Towers, Inc. (Id. at 27-36.) The banks have not objected to these subpoenas.

*2 “The Ninth Circuit has yet to address the question of whether a party has standing to bring a motion to quash since usually only the subpoenaed non-party may move to quash. The general rule, however, is that a party has no standing to quash a subpoena served upon a third party, except as to claims of privilege relating to the documents being sought.” Cal. Sportfishing Prot. All. v. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., 299 F.R.D. 638, 643 (E.D. Cal. 2014); see also Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 973-74 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Ordinarily a party has no standing to seek to quash a subpoena issued to someone who is not a party to the action, unless the objecting party claims some personal right or privilege with regard to the documents sought.”); Hash v. Rallos, No. 20-CV-1272-TLN-AC P, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189940, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2021) (quoting Cal. Sportfishing Prot. All.); Freed v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 18-CV-359-BAS(LL), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23763, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2019).

“Under this general rule, plaintiff lacks standing to object to the subpoenas on grounds of undue burden....” Hash, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189940, at *4; see also JW Gaming Dev., LLC v. James, No. 18-CV-2669-WHO(RMI), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106342, at *15 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2021).

The party who moves to quash a subpoena bears the “burden of persuasion.” Doe v. Jae Woo Kim, No. 21MC80101-CRB(DMR), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225305, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2021).

Although Defendants’ filing is captioned as a dual motion for a protective order or for an order to quash the subpoenas, it is substantively solely a motion to quash. Insofar as Defendants do seek a protective order, they seek protection in the form of quashing the subpoenas. Defendants contend the two bank subpoenas are “wildly overbroad, harassing, not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and violate financial privacy in that they ask not only for the entire universe of financial information pertaining to the Alvarez 2001 Trust, Kona LLC, Balesia, and Nicholas ... but they ask for information and documents as to any other person or entity with which they conductd [sic] any business.” (Doc. No. 45 at 7.)

As an initial matter, because Defendants’ standing “extends only so far as to assert [its] own interests, not those of the subpoenaed party,” In re Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. 11md2295 JAH (BGS), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137842, at *42-43 (S.D. Cal. July 22, 2021); Freed v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 18CV359-BAS(LL), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23763, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2019), the Court declines to quash the bank subpoenas based on its contention that they are “wildly overbroad, [or] harassing,” as these are objections that are personal to the banks, not Defendants. See Hash, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189940, at *4. As a result, Defendants have no standing to raise these objections on a motion to quash.

However, the financial privacy privilege they assert is cognizable. “Federal courts ordinarily recognize a constitutionally-based right of privacy that can be raised in response to discovery requests.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In resolving privacy objections to a discovery request, courts balance “the need for the information sought against the privacy right asserted.” Id. When conducting this balancing test, courts may address any privacy concerns by allowing the discovery subject to an appropriate protective order. Toranto v. Jaffurs, No. 16CV1709-JAH(NLS), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198050, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2018) (“Courts have routinely found that [financial] information can be adequately protected by the protective order.”); Textron Fin. Corp. v. Gallegos, No. 15CV1678-LAB(DHB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100407, at *12-13 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016) (finding a party's concerns about financial privacy can be addressed through an appropriate protective order).

*3 In balancing the parties’ interests, the Court finds both interests are high. First, Defendants undoubtedly maintain a very strong interest in the financial privacy of the records that Wells Fargo and Chase hold. However, Plaintiff also undoubtedly has a very strong interest in being able to obtain the evidentiary records it critically needs to be able to prove up its theory of the case and prevail on its claims. Plaintiff's interest in the records the banks hold—rather than records Defendants produce—is particularly strong given the history of the underlying Judgment that Plaintiff is now attempting to collect upon. Plaintiff alleges that Mario Alvarez Jr. has been able to fraudulently avoid paying on the Judgment for many years and that the remaining Defendants are complicit in this fraudulent avoidance. After conducting protracted judgment debtor proceedings, Plaintiff found the need to bring this secondary action against Alvarez Jr. and the rest of the Defendants. Thus, when such fraudulent behavior is alleged, the documents’ originating source—i.e., the banks—is a far more trustworthy place to obtain the documents than Defendants themselves. Thus, while both sides’ interests are high, Plaintiff's interest does outweigh Defendants’ interest—especially given that a Protective Order already is in place here.

Next, the Court addresses Defendants’ relevance and scope arguments and finds the records are highly relevant and the wide scope of the requests is proper under the circumstances of this case. Plaintiff alleges that the trust Defendants have routinely made payments to third parties on Mario Alvarez Jr.’s behalf, that these payments have benefitted Alvarez Jr. and his family, allowed them to live a lavish lifestyle between three houses, and that this was all done with the dual intent to allow Alvarez Jr. to live such a lavish lifestyle while avoiding his obligations under the Judgment. Thus, records of payments made to third parties are highly relevant.

Moreover, the broad scope of the records is appropriate given that it is not possible to know in advance which records of payments to third parties should be produced and which should not be produced. Nor can Plaintiff know the full scope of Defendants’ alleged conduct until the full records are produced an analyzed. Moreover, the Court finds it would be inadequate to task Defendants themselves with producing relevant documents given the allegations in the Complaint and the track record of the underlying Judgment and this case. The banks’ production of documents will be more efficient and complete.

In the final analysis, although both sides’ interests are strong, the Court is persuaded that the relevance and importance of the document requests outweighs Defendants’ countervailing privacy interest. The Court also finds the existing Protective Order is sufficient to safeguard Defendants’ privacy interests.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion is DENIED. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. and J.P. Morgan Chase Bank may produce the requested records subject to the Protective Order entered on November 3, 2021 (Doc. No. 46).

IT IS SO ORDERED.