*1 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff Sabinsa Corporation's application for attorney's fees and costs. [Dkt. No. 227]. Sabinsa's entitlement to the recovery of fees has already been established. See Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions (“Order Granting Sanctions”), Dec. 17, 2018, [Dkt. No. 220]; Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, Aug. 2, 2019, [Dkt. No. 235]; Order Denying Appeal of Magistrate Judge Decision, Mar. 30, 2020, [Dkt. No. 257]. The only issue presented here is the reasonableness of the fees Sabinsa seeks. Defendant Prakruti Products Pvt. Ltd. (“Prakruti”) has submitted objections to Plaintiff's request. [Dkt. No. 230]. The Court has considered the parties’ submissions and held a hearing on this matter on May 7, 2021. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's request will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

The parties are well familiar with the factual background of this matter and the long and arduous path it has taken. The history of the case and the actions giving rise to this fee petition are set forth in exacting detail in the Opinions and Orders listed above. As such, the Court will provide only a brief summation of the case's history that led to this point.

Sabinsa initiated this case in 2014, filing a complaint against Prakruti for patent infringement, alleging 17 claims relating to curcuminoids—components found in turmeric rhizomes. Complaint [Dkt. No. 1]. Ultimately, Sabinsa and Prakruti reached a settlement and entered into a settlement agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, Sabinsa agreed not to sue Prakruti for any sales of the Accused Products in the litigation before the Settlement Agreement's execution date and, in exchange, Prakruti would sell only to Sabinsa any of the Accused Products until after the patent's expiration. Over a year later, Sabinsa filed a Motion seeking to reopen the case and enforce the settlement, alleging that Prakruti had breached the Settlement Agreement by selling over 5,000 kilograms of Accused Products to third parties. This led to Judge Kugler's reopening the case for the limited purposes of obtaining discovery concerning the products allegedly sold by Prakruti to third parties and determining whether those products constituted “Accused Product” under the terms of the Settlement.

The discovery was rife with disputes, which ultimately led to motions by Sabinsa for spoliation and for sanctions. [Dkt. Nos. 141, 161, and 182]. After a hearing on these matters, this Court granted Sabinsa's spoliation motion and its requests for sanctions for Prakruti's discovery misconduct, among other relief. See Order, [Dkt. No. 220]. With respect to sanctions for spoliation, this Court found that

*2 Order Granting Sanctions at 37. With respect to sanctions for Prakruti's failure to comply with the Court's orders regarding the production of discovery, this Court similarly found that

Id. at 44-45.

The Court reserved findings on the specific amounts of the monetary sanctions to be awarded and directed the parties to file submissions regarding same. Id. at 45, 46. On January 31, 2019, Sabinsa submitted Declarations from its counsel at Arent Fox LLP and Saiber LLC, including therewith billing invoices and tables reflecting Sabinsa's claimed fees and costs. [Dkt. No. 227]. With respect to Arent Fox, Sabinsa claims $ $15,150.00 for Sabinsa's Indian counsel, $965,019.20 in adjusted attorney's fees for work completed by Arent Fox from October 2017 through January 2019, and $11,148.92 in costs incurred over the same period. Decl. of James H. Hulme (“Hulme Decl.”) ¶¶ 10-12, [Dkt. No. 227]. With respect to Saiber, Sabinsa claims $98,352.00 in recoverable attorney's fees from October 2017 through January 2019, and $1,886.31 in costs incurred over the same period. Decl. of Sean R. Kelly (“Kelly Decl.”) ¶¶ 11-12, [Dkt. No. 227-6]. In sum, then, Sabinsa claims $1,078,521.20 in attorney's fees and $13,035.23 in costs.

Prakruti filed its response to Sabinsa's submissions on March 15, 2019. Prakruti objects to Sabinsa's claimed fees and costs on several grounds, including inter alia that Sabinsa has failed to establish that the attorneys’ billing rates are reasonable, a number of timekeeper entries are vague and ambiguous, some of the work included was not related to the sanctioned conduct, some entries represent inefficiencies or duplicative efforts, and fees are requested for administrative tasks. See Defendant Prakruti Products Pvt. Ltd.’s Response on the Issue of Reasonableness of Sabinsa's Fees and Costs Affidavit (“Def.’s Resp.”), [Dkt. No. 230].

Meanwhile, litigation regarding the spoliation and sanctions issues continued. On December 31, 2018, Prakruti filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order granting Sabinsa's motions. [Dkt. No. 221]. On August 2, 2019, the Court denied Prakruti's Motion. [Dkt. No. 235]. Thereafter, on August 16, 2019, Prakruti appealed this Court's orders granting Sabinsa's Motion and denying Prakruti's Motion for Reconsideration. [Dkt. No. 236]. Judge Kugler denied Prakruti's appeal on March 30, 2020. [Dkt. Nos. 256, 267]. No other appeals followed. Thus, the consideration of Plaintiff's fee award is now ripe.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

*3 Petitions for attorney's fees in this District are governed by Local Civil Rule 54.2. The party seeking fees must provide affidavits setting forth the nature of services rendered, a record of the dates and times of services rendered, a description of the services rendered on each date, a description of the professional experience of each person rendering services, and the normal billing rate for the person rendering services. Sabinsa Corp. v. Olive Lifesciences Pvt. Ltd., No. 14-cv-4739, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221107, at *26 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2017) (citing L. Civ. R. 54.2). The court must then decide upon a reasonable award of fees and costs. “The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). This approach is otherwise referred to as the lodestar and “is strongly presumed to yield a reasonable fee.” Washington v. Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1035 (3d Cir. 1996). Once the lodestar amount is determined, the court may, in its discretion, adjust the lodestar upward or downward. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 455 (3d Cir. 2009).

A party seeking attorney fees bears the ultimate burden of showing that its requested hourly rates and the hours it claims are reasonable. Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 703 (3d Cir. 2005), as amended (Nov. 10, 2005). If the petitioner makes the initial showing, “the burden shifts to the respondent to challenge the attorney's hours, hourly rate, and the reasonableness of the product of those numbers.” Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 548 F. App'x 58, 60 (3d Cir. 2013). When raising such a challenge, the opposing party must “challenge, by affidavit or brief with sufficient specificity to give fee applicants notice, the reasonableness of the requested fee.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990).

B. Reasonableness of Fee Award

In determining a reasonable hourly rate, “[t]he general rule is that a reasonable hourly rate is calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the community.” Washington, 89 F.3d 1031, 1035 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-896 n. 11 (1984)). Specifically, the “attorney's reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing rate in a legal market for an attorney of similar experience and skill.” Dee, 548 Fed. App'x at 62. Moreover, “a reasonable hourly rate should be determined by examination of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community at the time of the fee petition, not the time the legal services were performed.” L.J. ex rel. V.J. v. Audubon Bd. of Educ., 373 F. App'x 294, 296 (3d Cir. 2010). A district court “may not set attorneys’ fees based upon a generalized sense of what is customary or proper, but rather must rely upon the record.” Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1510 (3d Cir. 1996).

Although it is by no means conclusive, an attorney's customary billing rate is an appropriate place to start in determining the prevailing market rate. A.V. v. Burlington Township Board of Education, No. 06-1534, 2008 WL 4126254, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 3, 2008). Additionally, affidavits of other attorneys practicing in the same market may also be offered to establish the prevailing market rate. See Ellis v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 05-cv-726, 2010 WL 715403, at *2 (D.N.J. March 1, 2010). The burden is on the prevailing party to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate the reasonable market rate for the character and complexity of legal services rendered to make out a prima facie case. Washington, 89 F.3d at 1035; see also Ellis, 2010 WL 715403, at *2.

Once the fee applicant has carried its burden to show the reasonable market rate, the party opposing the fee “may contest that prima facie case only with appropriate record evidence.” Smith v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 107 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). “In the absence of such evidence, the plaintiff must be awarded attorney's fees at her requested rate.” Id.; see also Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 195 F. App'x 93, 98 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that “it is not enough merely to contest the claimed hourly rate; rather, [respondent] must submit evidence of a different reasonable hourly rate”) (emphasis in original).

*4 Sabinsa's counsel claims the following hourly rates for its attorneys and paralegals:

See Hulme Decl. Exs. 1 and 2; Kelly Decl. Exs. 1 and 2.

In support of these rates, Sabinsa provides profile information concerning its attorneys. Mr. Hulme, a Senior Partner, graduated law school in 1979 and has been practicing at Arent Fox since 1980. Hulme Decl. ¶ 15a. Taniel Anderson has been practicing law since 2009 and was elevated to Partner in January 2019. Id. at ¶15b. Jake Christensen has been practicing law since 2016. Other Arent Fox attorneys who have participated in this matter are Janine A. Carlan, a Partner at the firm who graduated law school in 1998; Shelby A. Cummings, an Associate whose tenure is unspecified; and Rebecca W. Foreman, an Associate who graduated law school in 2014. Hulme Decl. Ex. 4.[1]

With respect to Sabinsa's Saiber counsel, Mr. Kelly states that he has been practicing law since 1979. Kelly Decl. ¶ 15a. Mr. Kelly was principally assisted by Katherine A. Escanlar, who is Counsel at the firm and who has been in practice since 2004. Id. at ¶ 15b. In addition to Mr. Kelly and Ms. Escanlar, Sabinsa was represented by Jakob Halpern, a Member of the firm who graduated law school in 2004; Gery Albin, Counsel at the firm who graduated law school in 2006, and Monvan Hu, an Associate who graduated law school in 2013. Kelly Decl. Ex. 4.

Outside of counsel's own Declarations, wherein Messrs. Hulme and Kelly state that the rates billed are “fair and reasonable” for attorneys of the respective levels at law firms of Arent Fox's and Saiber's “size, location, and reputation,” Hulme Decl. ¶ 15; Kelly Decl. ¶ 15, Sabinsa has not submitted affidavits or other evidence demonstrating that its billed rates are consistent with the prevailing market rates in the community, namely, New Jersey. Instead, counsel relies on two recent decisions in this District wherein the court found counsels’ rates to be reasonable in patent cases brought by Sabinsa. See Sabinsa Corp. v. Olive Lifesciences Pvt. Ltd., No. 16-cv-3321-FLW-TJB, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93365, at *23-25 (D.N.J. June 1, 2018) (finding that Arent Fox charged “reasonable hourly rates for patent litigation, ranging from $385.00 for a third-year associate to $850 for a senior partner” and that Saiber “charged reasonably hourly rates ranging from $300 for counsel to $450 for the senior partner on the matter”); Sabinsa Corp. v. Olive Lifesciences Pvt. Ltd., No. 14-cv-4739-JBS-KMW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221107, at *25-28 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2017) (finding that Arent Fox “charged reasonable hourly rates for patent litigation ranging from $440.00 for a seventh-year associate to $815.00 for the senior partner on the matter” and that Saiber “charged reasonable hourly rates ranging from $200 for a third-year associate to $575 for the senior partner on the matter”).

Prakruti objects to Sabinsa's claimed attorney billing rates,[2] arguing that Sabinsa has not provided the Court with sufficient evidence that its rates are reasonable. Def.’s Br. at 9. Prakruti further argues that the only “record evidence” of market rates in New Jersey are from the rates charged and submitted by Saiber, given that Arent Fox is a Washington, D.C., based firm and its rates are irrelevant to this market. Id. Prakruti's point is not taken lightly. It is true that Sabinsa has not presented the kind of evidence, by way of affidavits from counsel within the market or otherwise, typically presented in support of a fee application. See Ellis, 2010 WL 715403, at *2. It is also the case, however, that Prakruti has not submitted contrary evidence regarding the prevailing market rate, as it must do as well. It is not enough to merely argue that Saiber's rate should be used as the prevailing market rate without providing evidence of same. See Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc., 195 F. App'x at 98. As such, if Sabinsa has met its burden, it “must be awarded attorney's fees at [its] requested rate.” Smith, 107 F.3d at 225.

*5 Though less than ideal, the cases cited to and relied upon by Sabinsa do offer some support for its claimed rates. Courts in this District have looked to recent opinions from the court to assist in determining prevailing market rates. See Chaaban v. Criscito, No. 08-cv-1567, 2013 WL 1737689, at *11 (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2013) (concluding that in the absence of evidentiary support for the reasonableness of rates, “the Court must turn to recent cases within this district to determine the prevailing market rate”), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 1730733 (D.N.J. Apr. 22, 2013). In Chaaban, plaintiffs did not submit affidavits from other litigators who have practiced in New Jersey to support the reasonableness of plaintiffs’ counsels’ hourly rates as compared with other litigators possessing similar skills and experience. Id. at *10. Additionally, the defendant offered no evidence in support of different hourly rates. Id. at *10 n.16. The court therefore examined recent cases and, comparing plaintiffs’ counsels’ experience and rates to those approved by courts in this district, found plaintiffs’ counsels’ rates to be reasonable. Id. at *11.

Here, recent opinions in this District approving the hourly rates for patent litigation performed by the same firms—and, in relevant part, the same attorneys—at issue herein for the same client during a proximate time-period is informative. Though the time-periods do not fully overlap, the approved rates in those cases are in line with the yearly progression of billing rates discussed in the Sabinsa's submissions. See Hulme Decl. ¶ 15a n.3; Kelly Decl. ¶ 15a n.2. The Court therefore finds that Sabinsa has provided support for its claimed billing rates. On the other hand, Prakruti has not supplied evidence of its own to establish a contrary reasonable market rate. The Court will therefore award Sabinsa's requested rate, which the Court concludes is reasonable given the nature of the work performed, the complexities of the matter, the burdens caused by Prakruti's misconduct, and the experience, qualifications, and reputations of counsel.[3] The Court will therefore apply these rates to the lodestar analysis.

In calculating the hours reasonably expended, the court should review the time expended, determine its reasonableness, and exclude any hours that are “excessive, redundant or unnecessary.” Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Public Int. Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1188 (3d Cir. 1995). While the court cannot adjust the fee award based upon factors not raised by the opposing party, the burden remains on the party seeking the fee to justify it and courts have an affirmative function in the fee fixing process. L.J. v. Audubon Board of Education, 2009 WL 995458, at *13.

Here, according to the records provided, Sabinsa's attorneys at Arent Fox have expended over 1,996 hours and its local counsel at Saiber have expended over 253 hours on the issues relevant to Plaintiff's fee petition. The Court notes, based upon the Court's line-by-line review of counsels’ billing records, that Plaintiffs appear to have taken care, for the most part, to exclude from time entries work that did not fall into the Court's enumerated categories for which fees will be awarded. Defendants, however, have lodged both broad and specific objections to the reasonableness of many, if not most, of Sabinsa's claimed hours expended on numerous grounds. See Def.’s Br. Exs. A and B, Dkt. Nos. 230-2 and 230-3. The Court addresses the various categories of objections below.

*6 Prakruti argues that many time entries of Plaintiff's counsel are vague. As such, Prakruti argues, it is not possible to determine whether such entries fall into a permissible category or if the amount of time spent on the given task was reasonable. Def.’s Br. at 4-5. A party's fee application must “be specific enough to allow the district court to determine if the hours claimed are unreasonable for the work performed.” Washington, 89 F.3d at 1037. However, “it is not necessary to know the exact number of minutes spent nor the precise activity to which each hour was devoted nor the specific attainments of each attorney.” Id. at 1038. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's counsels’ time entries and does agree that, given that Plaintiff may recover fees only for specific work done on this matter, there are some entries for which it is not possible to determine if the claimed time was reasonable or if the work fell into categories the Court described. For example, a number of Mr. Hulme's time entries include vague descriptions such as “Work on Prakruti matter” with no description of what that work entailed. See e.g., Hulme Decl. Ex. 1, Nov. 18, 2017 entry, [Dkt. No. 227-1]. The Court will therefore exclude these entries from the lodestar. See Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183 (“The court ... can deduct hours when the fee petition inadequately documents the hours claimed.”). The Court itemizes the entries found to be too vague in the table below.

Defendant raises 185 objections to hours Plaintiff's attorneys or paralegals allegedly expended on administrative tasks. It is true that clerical work should not be billed at the rate of an experienced attorney. See L.J. v. Audubon Board of Educ., 2009 WL 995458, at *13 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Fed. Express Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 700, 724 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (citing Halderman by Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 49 F.3d 939, 942 (3d Cir. 1995))). The majority of Prakruti's objections, however, address time entries for work completed by paralegals. As the Supreme Court has observed, much of the work delegated to paralegals “lies in a gray area of tasks that might appropriately be performed either by an attorney or a paralegal.” Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989). That said, “[o]f course, purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them.” Id.

The Court has considered the entries that Prakruti objects to as administrative in nature. Most of the contested entries are for work appropriately performed by a paralegal and “lie in [the] gray area of tasks” that are legal in nature and are typically performed by paralegals. The Court does agree, however, that certain tasks – for example, downloading documents to local drives, circulating letters, assembling binders, and shipping samples – are more clerical in nature and should not be billed at an attorney or paralegal rate.[4] Accordingly, the Court will exclude from the lodestar the following time entries:

Prakruti objects to certain billing entries as being duplicative or representing inefficient work. Prakruti takes issue, for example, with Sabinsa's employment of three attorneys to prepare briefs and to participate in meet and confer conferences. Def.’s Br. at 7. A reduction for duplication of work is only appropriate if the attorneys are unreasonably doing the same work. Rode, 892 F.2d at 1187. Moreover, “[i]n a complex case, or one as fractious as this, it is reasonable to have more than one attorney present at meetings ... in order to effectively litigate the case.” Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 598, 604 (D.N.J. 1998). The Court has reviewed Prakruti's objections and Sabinsa's submissions and notes that Prakruti has lodged objections on duplicative grounds (as well as other objections as discussed below) with a brush so broad as to remove any element of specificity to its challenges. For example, in the twenty-eight pages of tables objecting to the fees claimed for Sabinsa's attorneys at Saiber, Prakruti includes “duplicative” in every single objection listed. See Dkt. No. 230-3. Such generalized objections cannot support a reduction in fees. See United States v. Eleven Vehicles, Their Equip. & Accessories, 200 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2000) (“a court may not reduce counsel fees ... as ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary’ in the absence of a sufficiently specific objection to the amount of fees requested”).

*7 In short, Prakruti has not shown that Sabinsa's multiple attorneys were “unreasonably doing the same work.”[5] Rode, 892 F.2d at 1187. Given the complexities and international nature of this patent litigation and having reviewed the submissions, the Court does not find that Sabinsa's claimed hours include time that is excessive based on duplication of effort.

Prakruti also raises numerous objections to time entries that Prakruti claims fall outside of the awarded sanctions, i.e., that certain time entries represent work Sabinsa's counsel would have done without Prakruti's misconduct or work that was related in whole or in part to irrelevant issues. Def.’s Br. at 5-6. As with its duplication objections, Prakruti has turned what otherwise would be specific objections into broad and blanket ones by including these assertions in the vast majority of its objections. See Dkt. Nos. 230-2, 230-3. It has done so with generalized and conclusory statements that lack support or specificity with respect to the challenged entries. Instead, Prakruti lodges numerous objections—the bases for which are in many cases unsubstantiated or indecipherable—as if hoping that something will stick. This scattershot approach is, in essence, no different than the kinds of generalized and vague objections that have been held insufficient to challenge the reasonableness of hours expended. See Atl. Plastic & Hand Surgery, PA v. Anthem Blue Cross Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 17-cv-4600, 2019 WL 4635482, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2019) (finding that “[respondent] presents nothing more than vague and unspecified assertions that are insufficient to challenge [petitioner's] total billable hours”); Chaaban, 2013 WL 1737689, at *14 (finding that “where, as here, defendant raises only generalized conclusory objections to the time spent by the [petitioning] firm, the Court may not award less in fees than requested by the petitioner”) (citing Eleven Vehicles, 200 F.3d at 211); Bell v. United Princeton Properties, Inc., 884 F.2d 713, 720 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that objections must “rais[e] arguments with specificity and clarity”).

In short, forwarding the same objections with little-to-no differentiation or specificity from entry to entry does not convert generalized, conclusory objections into sufficiently specific ones. Instead, these objections are often lodged for no clear reason. An example illustrates the point. Prakruti objects to a January 26, 2018, entry of Mr. Hulme, the description for which states only, “work on discovery matters,” because the description is vague and ambiguous.[6] [Dkt. No. 230-2 at 24]. At the same time, Prakruti objects to the entry because, inter alia, it “relates to work Sabinsa would have done even if Prakruti had not destroyed or withheld evidence,” “relates to work Sabinsa would have done even if Prakruti had produced Prakruti Foods discovery,” and is “duplicative of proximate entries, tasks performed by other attorneys.” Id. It is curious how, if the entry is vague and ambiguous such that it “preclude[s] an ability to determine if the work performed falls within a permissible category,” Def.’s Br. at 4, it is simultaneously clear and definitive enough for Prakruti to assert that it is work Sabinsa would have performed regardless of Prakruti's misconduct or that it is duplicative of work performed by other attorneys. These are not, then, specific objections, despite their being presented as if they are. They are generalized, conclusory objections which cannot be maintained.[7]

*8 In any event, as the Court has noted above, Sabinsa has taken steps to mark down hours in entries that do include work that was not related to the permissible categories or conduct at issue. In the absence of sufficiently specific objections to the reasonableness of the remaining hours billed, the Court may not and will not reduce those hours further.

Finally, the Court addresses a category of time entries that Sabinsa's counsel has coded as “CC” in their submissions. These entries are identified by Sabinsa as representing work falling into the categories “Conferences with the Court regarding Prakruti's discovery misconduct” and “Conferences with the Court regarding Prakruti Foods discovery misconduct.” See Hulme Decl., Exs. 1 and 2; Kelly Decl., Exs. 1 and 2. These categories and codes are listed in summary tables included in the Exhibits 2 to both the Hulme and Kelly Declarations. See id. The codes also appear appended to the margins of counsels’ billing statements next to the claimed time entries. See Hulme Decl., Ex. 1; Kelly Decl., Ex. 1. Upon reviewing Sabinsa's submissions, the Court finds that significant portions of these entries fall outside of the scope of this Court's Order Granting Sanctions.

According to Mr. Hulme's Declaration, “[t]he summary table (Ex. 2) ... breaks down the recoverable fees and costs into the Court-enumerated categories of recoverable fees.” Hulme Decl. ¶ 13.[8] The summary tables in Exhibits 2 list the number of hours billed and fees charged for each of the coded categories designated by Sabinsa.[9] The tables further break out, for each month, which time entries on given dates fall into which coded categories, detailing the hours expended and fees charged for each. One can therefore easily identify time entries Sabinsa claims for each category and can also compare, code by code, the entries in the Exhibit 2 summary tables with the time entries billed in Exhibit 1.

The Court has completed such a comparison with respect to the “CC” category which, as noted above, purports to represent billing for conferences with the Court. The Court also has extensively reviewed the docket and confirmed that it conducted conferences with the parties on the following dates: July 17, 2017; October 5, 2017; November 6, 2017; December 5, 2017; February 22, 2018; April 17, 2018; and September 26, 2018.[10] The Court's review of the billing records, however, found that numerous claimed time entries are coded as “CC” on dates on which no conference was held. For example, on December 1, 2017, Mr. Anderson billed one hour for “Discussion with J. Hulme re: Dec. 5th hearing.” Hulme Decl., Ex. 1, Invoice dated Jan. 18, 2018. On December 6, 2017, Mr. Hulme billed 2.8 hours to “Prepare and send report to client on hearing; work on post-hearing issues and matters.” Id. Though these entries are coded as “CC,” no conference was held on these dates. Consequently, any such entries billed and coded exclusively as “CC” on dates other than those conference dates listed above will be excluded.[11] This reduction is consistent and aligned with this Court's Order granting Sabinsa's Motions for sanctions, wherein the Court stated that Sabinsa could recover fees for “the conferences with the Court concerning the discovery misconduct.” See Order Granting Sanctions at 37; 44-45 (emphasis added).

*9 To be clear, the Court is not finding that the work billed in these instances was not performed. However, it is Sabinsa's burden to show that the fees it seeks to recover are within the bounds set forth in this Court's Order. Entries billed exclusively for court conferences on dates when no conference occurred are outside of those bounds and Sabinsa cannot be compensated for them. As such, the entries will be reduced as follows:

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's petition for attorney's fees will be granted in part and denied in part. Based on the foregoing, the Court makes the following reductions from the lodestar:

Accordingly,

IT IS this 21st day of May, 2021, hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff Sabinsa Corporation's request for attorney's fees is GRANTED in the amount of $991,624.70; and it is further

ORDERED that Sabinsa's request for costs is GRANTED in the amount of $13,035.23.