Jennings v. Cnty. of Riverside
Jennings v. Cnty. of Riverside
2023 WL 3431917 (C.D. Cal.2023)
January 27, 2023
Spaeth, Autumn D., United States Magistrate Judge
Summary
The Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Compel in part and ordered Defendants to produce any complaints or grievances regarding denial of soft shoes or orthotics between July 2016 to December 2019. Additionally, the Court stayed both parties' summary judgment motions and ordered Defendants to produce ESI, including documents requested by Plaintiff and any documents received from Dr. Lai's subpoena. This information is important to the case as it could help Plaintiff prove the existence of a custom or policy denying orthopedic shoes.
Maurice Charles Jennings
v.
County of Riverside et al
v.
County of Riverside et al
Case No.: 5:19-01523 JFW (ADS)
United States District Court, C.D. California
Filed January 27, 2023
Counsel
Maurice Charles Jennings, Corcoran, CA, Pro Se.Michael J. Marlatt, Justin James Janzen, Thompson and Colegate LLP, Riverside, CA, for County of Riverside et al.
Spaeth, Autumn D., United States Magistrate Judge
Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S DISCOVERY MOTIONS, AND STAYING PARTIES' SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS
*1 Before the Court are several discovery-related motions filed by Plaintiff Maurice Charles Jennings (“Plaintiff”). Specifically, there are Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery (Dkt. No. 70), Plaintiff's Motion for a Subpoena Duces Tecum (Dkt. No. 71), Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Discovery (Dkt. No. 74), Plaintiff's Motions to Quash or Modify Subpoenas (Dkt. Nos. 79, 82), and Plaintiff's Motion to Submit Lodgments/Evidence (Dkt. No. 85) (collectively, “Discovery Motions”). The discovery cut-off date in this case was October 21, 2022 (Dkt. No. 53), but Plaintiff's discovery requests were timely filed. Relatedly, both Plaintiff and Defendants County of Riverside and Roslyn Richardson (“Defendants”) have also filed summary judgment motions. (Dkt. Nos. 83, 88.)
After reviewing the parties' briefing regarding the Discovery Motions, and in light of the pending summary judgment motions, the Court grants Plaintiff's discovery requests in part and denies them in part. Furthermore, the Court defers ruling on both parties' summary judgment motions, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). The parties may file supplemental briefing upon the conclusion of the granted discovery.
I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL (DKT. NO. 70)
On October 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel. (Dkt. No. 70.) Subsequent briefing by Defendants and Plaintiff clarified that there were two discovery requests at issue. (Dkt. Nos. 73, 81.) Generally, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Upon a motion to compel discovery, the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating relevance. In turn, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections with competent evidence.” United States v. McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., 2014 WL 1647385, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (internal citations omitted).
A. REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1
As part of his Motion to Compel, Plaintiff served the following Request for Production on Defendants (Dkt. No. 70, Ex. 2):
Any and all formal and informal written Complaint (including but not limited to grievances) specifically plaintiffs and “any” against “any” defendant, employee and or medical staff, alleging denial of soft shoes, orthotics, medical treatment, medication which occurred July 2016 to Dec 2019.
Defendants served the following response (Id.):
Objection: This request is overbroad, vague and ambiguous in that it seeks production of documents within a broad category without identifying with particularity the specific documents or evidence requested. Further, the documents sought are in regards to medical treatment, and thus are protected by various state and federal laws, including HIPPA, so no further response can be given.
*2 The parties dispute whether this request is relevant. Defendants argue that the request is irrelevant because it is not relevant to “whether Mr. Jennings was denied care.” (Dkt. No. 73 at 2-3.) Defendants further argue that “Plaintiffs [sic] claim here is a lack of treatment by Ms. Richardson. Prior instances, particularly those by other individuals as requested, have no relevance to whether the care she provided in this situation was appropriate.” (Id. at 3.) In response, Plaintiff argues that the request is relevant because “Plaintiffs [sic] claims allege unconstitutional policy, custom or practice as well as deliberate indifference.” (Dkt. No. 81 at 4.)
The Court agrees that Request No. 1 is relevant. As Plaintiff explains, he is not simply bringing a claim regarding lack of treatment by Ms. Richardson; he is also bringing a Monell claim against the County of Riverside for its alleged policy of not providing orthopedic shoes. See (Dkt. No. 24.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Riverside County Sheriff's Department has a policy prohibiting inmates from keeping medical orthopedic shoes, (Dkt. No. 15, First Amend. Civil Rights Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 1), unless the inmate is diabetic. (Id. ¶ 4.)
To hold a municipal defendant liable, a plaintiff must show that the municipal defendant has a “policy or custom [that] caused a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.” Ass'n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 648 F.3d 986, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2011). A policy is “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action... made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam)). A custom is “a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (citation and quotation omitted).
Liability based on an “improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir.1984)). Furthermore, at summary judgment “[c]ourts have repeatedly required Section 1983 plaintiffs to support their ‘custom’ allegations with multiple, similar past incidents.” Holloway v. Cnty. of Orange, 538 F. Supp. 3d 973, 982 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (citing Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989) (overruled on other grounds)).
The majority of Plaintiff's Request for Production No. 1 is therefore relevant to his Monell claim. Grievances and complaints regarding orthotics or soft shoes would be relevant towards whether Defendant County of Riverside has a policy or custom regarding orthotics and soft shoes. Additionally, the grievance forms and complaints would allow Plaintiff to produce evidence of “multiple, similar past incidents” of a custom by the County of Riverside as required at summary judgment. However, grievances or complaints related to medical treatment or medication are not relevant to Plaintiff's claims that Defendant County of Riverside has a policy specific to orthopedic shoes.
Defendants' three remaining objections to Request for Production No. 1 are unavailing. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not properly meet and confer before filing his motion to compel. (Dkt. No. 73 at 2.) But the Court's Case Management Order does not require Plaintiff to meet and confer before filing a discovery motion. See (Dkt. No. 53 at 6.)
*3 Second, Defendants argue that the request is overly burdensome. The Court agrees that this objection has some merit. Defendants attest that Plaintiff's two requests generate a total of 3,391 complaints over the specified date range. (Dkt. No. 73 at 4.) Defendants also attest that preparing those documents, via loading them into Adobe for redactions, would take roughly 565 hours. (Id.) Given the specifics of this case, the Court agrees that would be overly burdensome. Instead, the Court strikes the terms “medication” and “medical treatment” from the request as irrelevant and overly broad.
The Court estimates that limiting the request to just “soft shoe” and “orthotics” may limit the number of complaints, in light of the fact that the other three search terms utilized by Defendants to obtain 3,391 search results (“medication,” “medical treatment,” and “indifference”) are much broader in scope. Because Defendants did not provide evidence of the burden broken down by each search term, the Court is unable to determine whether the limited scope of this request, as revised, will be overly burdensome.
Third, Defendants argue that they are prohibited by law from providing the documents to Plaintiff because of various laws including the Health Information and Privacy Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). But Defendants have already offered to redact the complaints and grievances, which will prevent any HIPAA issues from arising. See Granados v. GEO Grp., Inc., 2020 WL 6065566, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020) (“Defendants' concerns about possible HIPPA issues can be resolved by redacting any medical information.”). Accordingly, none of the objections Defendants raise are grounds to deny Plaintiff's modified Request for Production No. 1. Therefore, Defendants are ordered to produce any complaints or grievances regarding denial of soft shoes or orthotics between July 2016 to December 2019.
B. REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2
Plaintiff also moves to compel the production of documents responsive to Request for Production No. 2, which states:
Any and all formal and informal written Complaints (Including but not limited to grievances, RSD 559 form. This request includes Complaints from plaintiff and anyone housed within any of the detention centers operated in the County of Riverside, against any defendant, medical staff which alleges deliberate indifference towards medical needs. The time frame for this requests is Jan 2015 to Dec 2019, this includes all written responses, appeals, reports, investigations and/or correspondence regarding complaints.
(Dkt. No. 70, Ex. 2.) Defendants served the following response:
Objection: This request is overbroad, vague and ambiguous in that it seeks production of documents within a broad category without identifying with particularity the specific documents or evidence requested. By including documents that refer to responses or investigations, it also potentially requests those protected under various privileges, includes attorney/client and attorney work product. Further, the documents sought are in regards to medical treatment, and thus are protected by various state and federal laws, including HIPPA, so no further response can be given.
(Id.) The Court agrees with Defendants that Request for Production No. 2 seeks information that is irrelevant. General deliberate indifference grievances do not relate to Plaintiff's Monell claim regarding a policy or custom specific to orthopedic shoes. Nor does the request relate to his deliberate indifference to medical needs claim since that one is specific to his own unique circumstances. See Brook v. Carey, 352 F. App'x 184, 185–86 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of motion to compel “[a]ny and all grievances, complaints, or other documents received by the defendants ... concerning mistreatment of inmates” on the grounds it was overbroad, immaterial to plaintiff's particular circumstances, and overly burdensome to defendants). Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is denied as to Request for Production No. 2.
II. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUBPOENA DUECES TECUM (DKT. NO. 71)
*4 On October 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for subpoena duces tecum. (Dkt. No. 71.) Plaintiff requests that the Court serve subpoenas duces tecum upon Doctors Christopher C. Lai and Scott A. Allen. He seeks “production of documents, electronically stored information, and or tangible things” from Dr. Lai. Additionally, he seeks “production of documents” from Dr. Allen. Both requests relate to Plaintiff's own medical records.
Service of a subpoena is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1) which states that a subpoena may be served by “[a]ny person who is at least 18 years old and not a party,” and “[s]erving a subpoena requires delivering a copy to the named person....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1). “[T]he in forma pauperis (IFP) statute provides that officers of the court will issue and serve all process in IFP actions ... [and serve] a subpoena on behalf of an IFP party.” Williams v. Paramo, 2017 WL 5001286, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2017).
The Court denies Plaintiff's requests for both subpoenas. The request to subpoena Dr. Lai is moot. Defendants simultaneously subpoenaed Dr. Lai for Plaintiff's medical records, as evinced by Plaintiff's motion to quash that particular subpoena. See (Dkt. No. 79.) Pursuant to the parties' filings, the Court understands that this dispute was resolved between the parties themselves. See (Dkt. No. 89.) Furthermore, the Court presumes that the documents Defendants subpoenaed from Dr. Lai are the same documents Plaintiff sought in his own subpoena given that Plaintiff consented to Defendants' discovery of them. (Id.) If it has not yet occurred, Defendants are ordered to provide Plaintiff with a copy of any records received in response to Dr Lai's subpoena.
The Court denies the request to subpoena Dr. Allen as irrelevant. Plaintiff does not explain who Dr. Allen is, his relation to Plaintiff, or when Dr. Allen treated plaintiff. It is unclear how Dr. Allen's medical records would relate to the medical issues in the instant case.
III. PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS TO QUASH SUBPOENA (DKT. NOS. 79, 82)
In November 2022, Plaintiff filed two motions to quash subpoenas that Defendants sought to serve on Dr. Lai and Calipatria State Prison. (Dkt. Nos. 79, 82.) The Court understands that this issue has been resolved between the parties themselves, as Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Opposition to the Motion to Quash states that Plaintiff has consented to a modified version of Defendants' subpoena. (Dkt. No. 89 at 2.) Accordingly, the Court denies these motions as moot.
IV. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SUBMIT LODGMENTS (DKT. NO. 85)
On December 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting the Court “lodge and consider” evidence Defendants produced so that it could support Plaintiff's previously filed motion for summary judgment. In light of the Court's order staying both parties' summary judgment motions pursuant to Rule 56(d), the Court denies this request as moot. Plaintiff may incorporate these documents, if necessary, in his supplemental summary judgment briefing.
V. PARTIES' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NOS. 83, 88)
Presently, both parties have pending motions for summary judgment before the Court. See (Dkt. Nos. 83, 88.) Relatedly, Plaintiff timely filed a motion to stay discovery on October 19, 2022. (Dkt. No. 74.) To resolve the issue of the timely filed Discovery Motions in light of the parties filing summary judgment motions, the Court notes that other courts in this district have relied on Rule 56(d) under similar circumstances.
*5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) allows a court to deny or defer consideration of a motion for summary judgment where the nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition. To obtain such relief, the party requesting such relief must establish: (1) specific reasons why the alleged evidence was not discovered or obtained earlier in the proceedings (“good cause”); (2) specific facts it hopes to elicit from additional discovery; (3) that the facts sought actually exist; and (4) that these sought-after facts would overcome the opposing party's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Hollyway Cleaners & Laundry Co., Inc. v. Cent. Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Family Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008)).
While Plaintiff did not file a request under Rule 56(d), the Court now construes his motion to stay the discovery deadline as a motion pursuant to Rule 56(d) given that (1) the Discovery Motions were pending when the discovery deadline passed and (2) Plaintiff identified the issue. See (Dkt. No. 85 at 1) (“Plaintiff filed [motion for summary judgment] to adhere to Court deadlines despite Plaintiff having pending discovery motions.”)
The Court finds that Rule 56(d) applies and stays both summary judgment motions. First, Plaintiff has given specific reasons why the alleged evidence was not discovered earlier in the proceedings. He timely filed his discovery requests seeking relevant documents before the filing of summary judgment motions in this case. Second, Plaintiff's motion to compel set forth specific facts he hopes to elicit from the discovery, chiefly grievance forms and complaints evincing a policy or custom by Defendant County of Riverside to deny orthopedic shoes to inmates. Third, these facts exist, as Defendants have attested that over 3,300 complaints were found using Plaintiff's proposed search terms for his requests. (Dkt. No. 73 at 4.) Fourth, the evidence could help Plaintiff overcome Defendants' summary judgment motion to the extent it would evince “multiple, similar past incidents” such that a triable issue of fact exists over whether a custom or policy denying orthopedic shoes exists. See Holloway, 538 F. Supp. 3d at 982. Accordingly, both motions for summary judgment are stayed pending Defendants' production of documents pursuant to Plaintiff's Request for Production No. 1. The parties may file supplemental summary judgment briefing once the production is complete.
Plaintiff's Discovery Motions are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Specifically, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is granted as to Request for Production No. 1, with the Court's modifications. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Request for Production No. 2, his Motion for a Subpoena Duces Tecum, his Motions to Quash, and his Motion to Submit Lodgments/Evidence are denied. Defendants are ordered to produce responsive documents, along with any documents received from Dr. Lai's subpoena, by no later than February 10, 2023.
Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Discovery is construed as a Motion to Defer or Deny Summary Judgment until the discovery is resolved. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to stay both parties' summary judgment motions. The parties must file supplemental briefs in support of their respective motions for summary judgment no later than February 24, 2023. Reply briefs must be filed no later than March 10, 2023.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Initials of Clerk kh