*1 Cabinets to Go, LLC (“CTG”) filed suit against Qingdao Haiyan Real Estate Group Co., LTD (“Haiyan”) and several other entities, including Scioto Valley Woodworking, Inc. (“Valleywood”) alleging that Haiyan misrepresented the country of origin of certain goods it sold to CTG.[1] Docket No. 26 (Amended Complaint). Haiyan has denied the substantive allegations and asserted affirmative defenses. Docket No. 85.

This matter is now before the Court upon Valleywood's “Motion to Quash the Subpoena to Testify at a Deposition in a Civil Action for Wei Wei Wang or for Protective Order.” Docket No. 98. Valleywood has also filed a Supporting Memorandum and other supporting documents. Docket Nos. 99, 99-1, 99-2. CTG has filed a Response in Opposition and supporting documents. Docket Nos. 101, 101-1, 101-2. Valleywood has filed a Reply. Docket No. 111. Ms. Wang and CTG have also filed a Joint Discovery Dispute Statement, to which CTG has filed a Supplement. Docket Nos. 97, 102. For the reasons set forth below, Valleywood's Motion (Docket No. 98) is DENIED.

A. Legal Standard

1. Discovery from Non-Parties by Subpoena

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party may depose “any person, including a party, without leave of court .... The deponent's attendance may be compelled by subpoena under Rule 45.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(B). Documents, electronically stored information, tangible things, or inspection of premises may also be commanded from a non-party by subpoena. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C). “On timely motion, the court for the district where compliance is required must quash or modify a subpoena that ... subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv).

2. Protective Orders

A motion for a protective order is available to “a party or any person from whom discovery is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The court may “issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” when justice requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Good cause for the issuance of a protective order is established with “specific facts showing ‘clearly defined and serious injury’ resulting from the discovery sought and cannot rely on merely conclusory statements.” Nix v. Sword, 11 F. App'x 498, 500 (6th Cir 2001) quoting Avirgan v. Hull, 118 F.R.D. 252, 254 (D.D.C. 1987).

B. Valleywood's Motion to Quash

Valleywood moves the Court for an order quashing the Subpoena to Testify at a Deposition in a Civil Action (“the Subpoena”) served by CTG upon Wei Wei Wang, Valleywood's Financial Administrative Manager.[2] Docket Nos. 98; 99, p. 3. Valleywood contends that the Subpoena should be quashed because: (1) Ms. Wang lacks relevant knowledge and (2) the information that CTG seeks can be obtained from other witnesses. Docket No. 98, p. 1-2. In the alternative, Valleywood requests that the Court enter a Protective Order limiting the scope of Ms. Wang's testimony. Id. at 1.

1. Standing

*2 As a threshold issue, CTG argues that Valleywood does not have standing to object to the Subpoena, since “[Valleywood] has been dismissed as a party to this action and has consistently disclaimed any knowledge or involvement in the facts underlying this litigation.” Docket No. 101, p. 1, n.1.

In its Reply, Valleywood asserts that it has standing to challenge the Subpoena because Ms. Wang works for Valleywood and CTG “seeks to depose [Ms. Wang] about information which she has acquired as a Valleywood employee.” Docket No. 111, p. 2. Valleywood maintains that allowing Ms. Wang to be deposed in this action would put its business information at risk:

A motion to quash brought by someone other than the target of a subpoena implicates the question of standing, which requires the Court to determine whether the movant has alleged “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant [its] invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the Court's remedial powers on [its] behalf.” Loren v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 505 F.3d 598, 607 (6th Cir. 2007), quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original); Phipps v. Wal-Mart, No. 3:12-1009, 2018 WL 11415332, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37396, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2018).

“Ordinarily, a party does not have standing to move to quash a subpoena directed to a nonparty unless the party claims a privilege or personal right in the information sought by the subpoena.” Morrow v. Cmty. Health Sys., No. 3:16-1953, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110976, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 20, 2017). “The Party seeking to quash the subpoena bears a heavy burden of proof.” Id. As previously discussed, Valleywood is no longer a party to this action. Docket No. 71. Valleywood does not claim a privilege in the information sought, and the Court finds that the fact that Ms. Wang is a Valleywood employee and CTG has “repeatedly shown interest in Valleywood's business practices and relationships” does not create a personal right in the information sought by the Subpoena. Therefore, Valleywood does not have standing to move to quash the Subpoena to Ms. Wang.

As an alternative to quashing the Subpoena, Valleywood requests that the Court enter a Protective Order “limiting the scope of any such deposition to only the issues relevant in this claim and specifically, Ms. Wang's personal knowledge of the purchase orders and products at issue, and her direct communications with CTG ....” Docket No. 99, p. 4. In contrast to a motion to quash, a motion for protective order may be brought by “a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). At this point, Valleywood is neither. Therefore, Valleywood also does not have standing to bring a motion for a protective order.

2. The Merits of Valleywood's Objections

*3 Even if Valleywood did have standing to move to quash the Subpoena or for a Protective Order, the Motion would be denied on its merits.

a) Relevant Knowledge

Valleywood argues that “[t]his litigation is about disputes between CTG and Haiyan,” about which Ms. Wang has no relevant knowledge because “[a]s a Valleywood employee, Ms. Wang has no personal knowledge of any contracts and/or agreements between CTG and Haiyan.” Docket No. 99, p. 3 (emphasis in original); Docket No. 99-2, p. 2. Specifically, Valleywood asserts that “Ms. Wang has no direct, personal knowledge regarding the importation of products by CTG or payment of tariffs in this litigation, therefore can provide no substantive testimony with respect to the same.” Id.; Docket No. 99-2, p. 1-2.

Even assuming that this is an accurate representation of Ms. Wang's knowledge, it is not clear that “the import of products by CTG or payment of tariffs in this litigation” are the only relevant topics about which Ms. Wang could be questioned. Haiyan has identified Ms. Wang in its Rule 26 Initial Disclosures, stating “Ms. Wang may possess information regarding the facts and circumstances relating to the alleged transactions at issue and other allegations contained in the Complaint.” Docket No. 101-1, p. 4-5. Although Valleywood argues that Ms. Wang's knowledge relates only to Valleywood, now dismissed from the litigation, Valleywood concedes that “Ms. Wang was present for isolated communications between CTG and Haiyan,” and has a “peripheral understanding of Haiyan's manufacturing process.” Docket No. 111, p. 2. Additionally, in identifying Ms. Wang, Haiyan did not indicate that her knowledge was limited to Valleywood. Docket No. 101-1, p. 4-5. Further, CTG maintains that it is seeking to depose Ms. Wang in part because “she sent numerous emails and participated in several phone calls related directly to the purchase orders at issue in this case.” Docket No. 101, p. 3; Docket No. 101-2, p. 3. It is not clear that Ms. Wang has “no personal knowledge of the events ... underlying the case” such that prohibiting her deposition would be appropriate. Graves v. Bowles, 419 F. App'x 640, 645-46 (6th Cir. 2011). The fact that her knowledge may not be exhaustive does not mean that her deposition would impose an undue burden, and is not a permissible reason to quash the Subpoena. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)-(B). Neither does it meet the standard for a Protective Order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); Nix, 11 F. App'x 498, 500.

b) Availability of Evidence from Other Witnesses

Valleywood contends that “Ms. Wang cannot provide any testimony about Haiyan that could not also be provided more fully by Haiyan's Senior International Business Manager, Sabrina Lee, or Haiyan's former account executive, Amanda Li,” described by Valleywood as “Haiyan employees with substantial knowledge about its relationship with CTG and the facts at issue in this litigation.” Docket No. 99. Valleywood argues that any testimony that Ms. Wang could give (if any) “would be duplicative of testimony to be elicted from Haiyan's own employees.” Id.

CTG responds that “Amanda Li is a former Haiyan employee who currently resides in China and is believed to be a Chinese citizen” and that Haiyan has not agreed to produce Sabrina Lee for deposition. Docket No. 101, p. 4. Therefore, CTG argues that even if Ms. Wang's testimony would be duplicative of or less informed than that of Ms. Li or Ms. Lee, those individuals may not be available to be deposed. Id. In contrast, Ms. Wang is alleged to be living and working in Ohio. Id.

*4 At this point, Valleywood has not demonstrated that Ms. Wang's testimony would be duplicative of that of Ms. Li or Ms. Lee.[3] Even if it could make such a showing, it would not necessarily follow that Ms. Wang's deposition would impose an undue burden such that the Subpoena should be quashed or a Protective Order issued. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)-(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); Nix, 11 F. App'x 498, 500. Further, CTG has indeed moved to compel the deposition of Ms. Lee, but Haiyan has opposed the motion. Docket Nos. 106, 117.[4] The prospects of deposing Ms. Li, purportedly a Chinese citizen living in China, are also limited. Thus, CTG's concerns as to the availability of these other, allegedly superior witnesses seems warranted.

For the foregoing reasons, Valleywood's Motion (Docket No. 98) is DENIED. Ms. Wang must present for a deposition at a date and time to be determined (the noticed date having now passed). The Court encourages CTG and Ms. Wang to work together in scheduling the deposition.

IT IS SO ORDERED.